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INTRODUCTION
J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.
This edition of the U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy reflects to some extent
recent changes in the structure of the core curriculum at the War College. The college broke its traditional core
course, “War, National Policy and Strategy,” into two courses: “Theory of War and Strategy” and “National
Security Policy and Strategy.” The result for this book is the expansion of the block on strategic theory and the
introduction of a block on specific strategic issues. Because little time has passed since the publication of the
most recent version of this book, this edition is largely an expansion of its predecessor rather than a major rewriting. The authors, all current or former members o f the faculty, represent each of the four primary teaching
departments of the college. Several chapters are new, and others have undergone significant rewrites or updates,
but about two-thirds of the book remains unchanged. The appendix on the USAWC strategy formulation
guidelines reflects the alterations in that fundamental document made for the 2006 academic year. Although
the Department of National Security and Strategy uses several of the chapters in this volume as readings for its
core courses and at least one other department uses chapters in its core instruction, this is not a textbook. It
does reflect, however, both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America’s future
senior leaders. As we continue to refine and update the Guide, we intend to increase course-oriented essays,
and several of the new chapters were written specifically to support our instruction. The book also is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategy or the policymaking process.
The Guide is organized in broad groups of chapters addressing general subject areas. We begin with a look
at some specific issues about the general security environment—largely international. The section on strategic
thought and formulation includes chapters on broad issues of strategy formulation, as well as some basic
strategic theory. The third section is about the elements of national power. A section on the national security
policymaking process in the United States precedes the final section that deals with selected strategic issues.
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PART I
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER 1
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Alan G. Stolberg
For strategic leaders of the 21st century primarily concerned with the issues of foreign policy and
national security, the international system with which they will be dealing is likely to reflect only
partially the traditional international system. While the nation-state, first codified by the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, remains the dominant political body in international politics, its ability to influence
events and people is being challenged by an assortment of nonstate actors, failed or failing states, and
ungoverned regions. This is occurring in combination with the transnational threats posed by terror,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), crime, drugs, pandemics, and environmental
degradation, as well as by elements of the system that also have potentially positive impacts such as
globalization and the information revolution.
The international system refers to the structure of relationships that exist at the international level.
These include the roles and interaction of both state and nonstate actors, along with international
organizations (IO), multinational corporations (MNC), and nongovernment organizations (NGO).1
States make foreign and national security policy against this external environment. Opportunities for
both conflict and cooperation arise within this framework. The international community has tried for
years to maintain order and prevent conflict using international institutions like the United Nations
(UN) and international legal regimes like the Geneva Conventions.2
The international system frames the forces and trends in the global environment; it also frames
the workspace of national security policy and strategy makers. As they work through the formulation
process, with an understanding for the interests and objectives of any actors in a given situation, those
involved in the business of policy and strategy making must be able to account for the associated
state and nonstate actors present in the international system. In addition, it has become particularly
important that they be able to assess the competing values associated with the global actors, both state
and nonstate, especially in relation to the Global War on Terror. Also, given the criticality of being
able to call upon other nation states and international or multinational organizations for support, the
strategist or policymaker must know which alliances and coalitions are stakeholders in the issue in
question. Another related element of the international system is the economic condition, as influenced
by both the positive and negative components of globalization that helps determine the amount of
power actors can wield in the system. It is also important to be able to identify the international legal
tenets and regimes that bear on the situation. Finally, the 21st century policy and strategy maker must
be able to understand the threats to order in the international system represented by both conventional
and transnational entities. If the policymaker or strategist can accurately assess all these factors, he might
be able to determine friends and enemies, threats and opportunities, and capabilities and constraints
inherent in the contemporary world.
Threats, challenges, and opportunities can come in many shapes and sizes. A traditional threat
might take the shape of a nation-state in possession of WMD and a hostile attitude. This is also true for
a nonstate actor, potentially going down to the individual level, if he is willing to fly an airplane into a
building. Less direct but also significant in the 21st century world are the threats that can be made to the
successful execution of a nation-state’s policies, if other nation-states are unwilling to provide support
in a given situation. This lack of support can manifest itself in an opposing vote in an international
organization like the United Nations (UN), a multinational organization like the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), or an international regime such as the International Atomic Energy Agency


(IAEA). It can equally be demonstrated by the refusal of a state to grant transit or over flight rights to
the forces of another state.
The international system also affords the strategy or policymaker numerous opportunities for
advantage. If a nation-state can come to the assistance of another nation-state or region in time of need
like a natural disaster or failing economy, the opportunity exists to demonstrate concern and ultimately
gain some level of influence with the entity in need. The same may be true when cooperating with
other states as they transition toward democratic forms of government or market economies, or when
accepting an international regime like an arms control treaty. In all cases, these are opportunities to
gain acceptance and influence through and with other actors in the international system.
Who Are the Actors?
Nations and states are not the same. Nations represent groupings of a people that claim certain
common bonds, such as descent, language, history, or culture. Collectively, such an aggregation would
constitute a national entity.3 States, also known as nation-states, have a legal character and possess
certain rights and duties under the tenets of international law. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, considered the classic legal definition for states, indicates that states possess
the following characteristics: permanent population, defined territory, and a government capable of
maintaining effective control over its territory and conducting international relations with other states.4
In addition, the government must possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the state, and
other states in the international system must recognize the sovereignty of that government.5
The concept of sovereignty came into existence with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty
Years War in Europe, when, for the first time, the authority of state governments became officially
recognized as greater than the authority of organized religion in formal state affairs. In contemporary
international law, sovereign states are treated as equals, every recognized state can participate in the
international system on the same plane. This sovereign equality possesses the following elements:
1. States are legally equal.
2. Every state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty.
3. Every state is obligated to respect the fact of the legal entity of other states.
4. The territorial integrity and political independence of a state are inviolable.
5. Each state has the right to freely choose and develop its own political, social, economic, and
cultural systems.
6. Each state is obligated to carry out its international obligations fully and conscientiously and to
live in peace with other states.6
Since the 17th century, the nation-state has been the dominant entity in the international system,
in part because of the power the concept of sovereignty gave the recognized states—both in terms of
absolute domestic control and independence on the international level.
But nation-states have never been alone in the international system. A variety of nonstate actors
always have challenged their influence. The term nonstate actor typically refers to any participant in
the international system that is not a government. It is an entity or group that may have an impact
on the internationally related decisions or policies of one or more states. Examples of nonstate actors
would be IOs, NGOs, MNCs, the international media, armed elements attempting to free their territory
from external rule, or terrorist groups. An individual may also be a nonstate actor.7
An IO is a formal institutional structure that transcends national boundaries. States create them by
multilateral agreement or treaty. IOs normally function as an association of states that wields statelike power through governmental-like organs. The founding treaty defines the limits of the IO’s legal


competence. This is the primary difference between a state and an IO. The IO only possesses the powers
granted to it in its originating document by the states that created it, and cannot legally act beyond
those powers. A state possesses the rights and duties recognized by international law, subject to the
provisions of that law, and can involve itself in almost any activity of its choosing. IOs are completely
dependent on member states for support and resources, both political and practical (like money and
personnel). The result is that every IO is dependent on a sufficient number of member states believing
that it is in their national interest to support the IO and its activities. Without member state support,
the IO will not be able to function. Examples of IOs include the UN, NATO, and the European Union
(EU). 8
Different from IOs that are state based, NGOs are voluntary organizations of private individuals,
both paid and unpaid, who are committed to a wide range of issues not on the behalf of any specific
state government. Owing to increased interconnectedness partly associated with improvements in
communications technology and transportation, specialized NGO organizations, agencies, and groups
have risen around the globe, and have an unprecedented level of influence in the modern international
system. NGOs typically fall in one of two categories: those that have a universal noncommercial
(nonprofit), and nonpartisan focus; and those that are primarily motivated by self-interest. The former
are likely to involve humanitarian aid organizations, human rights groups, environmentalists, or
new social movements. Representative organizations of this first type are Amnesty International,
Greenpeace, the Red Cross, and Save the Children.9
The second NGO grouping, those that are directed by self-interest, is usually best represented by
MNCs. Sometimes called transnational corporations, MNCs are global actors that execute commercial
activities for profit in more than one country. Estimates are that the largest 500 MNCs control more
than two-thirds of world trade. While not a new concept, given that predecessors like the Hudson Bay
Company and the British East India Company were operational over 300 years ago, contemporary
MNCs such as General Motors or IBM have been able to take advantage of advances in technology and
communication to become truly global in nature, with only a corporate headquarters in a single given
country. Production no longer has to be located at the headquarters. With their enormous wealth,
the impact of MNCs on the global economy is immense. Much of this influence comes in the arena
of international commerce. In addition to being credited as a modernizing force in the international
system through the establishment of hospitals, schools, and other valuable infrastructure in the Third
World, MNCs are also charged with exploiting underdeveloped states in their conduct of free trade.10
To combat violations of the world order, the international community has created a number of
regimes to ensure that widely accepted principles, procedures, norms, and rules are in place to govern
particular issues in the international system. The intent is to create opportunity for states to use these
regimes as fora to cooperate to achieve beneficial outcomes. Membership in these special purpose
organizations generally is open to all relevant state actors. The success or failure of regimes is based on
the level of coordination and cooperation of policies among the member states.11
International regimes can take the form of legal conventions, international agreements, treaties, or
international institutions. Special issue areas that they occupy include economics, the environment,
human rights, policing, and arms control. Contemporary regimes like the World Trade Organization
(WTO), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Bank, International Monetary Fund
(IMF), Kyoto Protocol on the Environment, Geneva Conventions, International Criminal Court (ICC),
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II
are all intended to specify general standards of behavior and identify the rights and obligations of
signatory states.12
The checks and balances created for the international system by the primary state actors and regimes
have still been unable to assure global stability and good governance. This has been particularly manifest
in the increase in the number of failed states and ungoverned spaces as well as the appearance of rogue
states in the later part of the 20th century.


The problem of failed states has emerged since the end of the Cold War. It indicates that a breakdown
of law, order, and basic services, such as education and health for the population, has occurred. This
situation arises when a state is no longer able to maintain itself as a workable political and economic
entity. A failed state is ungovernable and has lost its legitimacy from the perspective of the international
community. In some cases, power lies in the hands of criminals, warlords, armed gangs, or religious
fanatics. Other failed states have been enmeshed in civil war for many years. In essence, the government
of the state has ceased to function (if it exists) inside the territorial borders of the original sovereign
state. The end of the Cold War catalyzed the state failure process because the rival powers no longer
provided economic and military assistance to former client regimes in the underdeveloped world. The
governments of the failed states in countries like Haiti, Somalia, Liberia, Cambodia, and Rwanda were
unable to survive without that assistance.13
While not necessarily a component of a failed state, ungoverned spaces feature rugged, remote,
maritime, or littoral areas not governed effectively by a sovereign state. The state that theoretically
should control the territory either lacks the willingness or ability to exercise authority over part or all of
a country. Ungoverned spaces are areas where nonstate actors that threaten domestic or international
order can exploit the lack of legal norms and processes. Examples include northern parts of sub-Saharan
Africa and the Northwest Territories in Pakistan.14
An additional failure to maintain complete order in the international system is associated with the
development of the rogue state. A rogue state is a state that frequently violates international standards
of acceptable behavior. This is a sovereign entity that is openly aggressive, highly repressive, and
intolerant with little or no regard for the norms of the international system. As such, it is a threat to
international peace. The rogue state may attempt to exert influence over other states by several means.
It might threaten to or actually develop, test, and field WMD or ballistic missile systems. It might traffic
in drugs, break international treaties, or sponsor terrorism. It is likely to be aggressive toward other
states. Current example rogue states are North Korea and Iran.15
Transnational threats are threats to the international system that cross state borders. Such threats
emerged or increased dramatically in the latter part of the last century. While the term transnational
relates to any activity that cross state boundaries, transnational threats is a technical term that usually
refers to activities with minimal or no governmental control. Three types of movement can be associated
with transnational behavior: movement of physical objects, to include human beings; movement of
information and ideas; and movement of money and credit.16
The combination of the cross border movement with illicit or dangerous activities has resulted in the
identification of an emerging set of threats to human security, the ability of states to govern themselves,
and ultimately the stability of the international system at large. These transnational threats fall into two
broad categories:
1. Direct threats from human beings (terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal alien
smuggling, and smuggling of WMD), and
2. Threats from impersonal forces (disease and international pandemics, population growth and
migration, resource shortages, global environmental degradation and climate change).17
Transnational threats have been expanding since the end of the Cold War for a number of reasons.
These include the premise that many emerging democracies are the vestiges of former authoritarian
states where there has been a long tradition of coercion, violence, and corruption. Such states relied more
on roles and relations than on rules and regulations. Thus, many governments have been constrained
by political norms that place factional loyalties above commitment to public policies. Also, as was
the case with failing states and ungoverned spaces, diminished assistance from the developed world
helped reduce the ability of governments to police their borders.18



Clearly, transnational threats, along with other traditional state-to-state threats, have created a
number of significant challenges for the maintenance of stability in the international system. These
threats and the problems associated with failed and rogue states, ungoverned spaces, and potential
competition and conflict among the state and nonstate actors also present some opportunities. Some
states and nonstate actors can advance their individual causes in support of their national, organizational,
or group interests by exploiting instability in the system. This interaction among the actors represents
the international system at work.
How Does the International System Function?
As players on the international stage, both state and nonstate actors either work alone or attempt
to work with other elements of the system. Such relationships might be with other states or nonstate
actors on a bilateral basis; formal groupings of states, IOs, NGOs, or other nonstate actors; or informal,
even unacknowledged cooperation with other system members. States can opt to form or join
existing alliances or coalitions. An alliance is a formal security agreement between two or more states.
Typically, states enter into alliances to protect themselves against a common threat. By consolidating
resources and acting in unison, members of an alliance believe they can improve their overall position
in the international system and their security relative to states that are not members of their alliance.
Additional benefits to alliance membership might include the ability to offset the cost of defense.
Unless an alliance partner is an actual liability, membership in an alliance allows states to supplement
their military capability with those of their alliance partners. The alliance is thus, at least theoretically,
less expensive than a unilateral approach to security. Also, economically related alliances can provide
expanded economic benefits through increased trade, assistance, and loans between allies.19 Alliance
examples include NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Coalitions are normally less formal than alliances. Normally, they represent a broad grouping of
often very diverse states temporarily united for a specific purpose, typically military action.20 States
often agree to participate in a coalition strictly as a matter of convenience. Coalitions are likely to
be temporary, while alliances frequently can endure for lengthy periods. Examples would be the
American-led coalitions during the first Persian Gulf War (Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM) and
the second conflict (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM).
Two ways states might use alliances or coalitions are to balance or to bandwagon. Both refer to
decisions, conscious or subconscious, about relations with other system members. A state is balancing
when it joins a weaker alliance or coalition to counter the influence or power of a stronger state or
group of states. “Balancing happens when weaker states decide that the dominance and influence
of a stronger state is unacceptable and that the cost of allowing the stronger state to continue their
policies unchecked is greater than the cost of action against the stronger state.”21 Balancing can be either
external or internal in origin. In the external case, weaker states form a coalition against a stronger state,
shifting the balance of power in their favor. A weaker state can also balance internally by deciding to
undertake a military build up to increase its power with respect to the stronger state. Balancing in the
international system also can be either a hard or soft action. It would be hard when it is intended to
increase or threaten the use of military power of one state relative to another. A soft usage would be
when a weaker state or states want to balance a stronger opponent but believe use of military power is
infeasible. In that situation, states employ nonmilitary elements of power to help neutralize the stronger
states.22
Bandwagoning is different from balancing because it will always refer to the act of a weaker state
or states joining a stronger state, alliance, or coalition. Bandwagoning occurs when weaker states
determine that the cost of opposing a stronger state exceeds the benefits to be gained from supporting
it. The stronger power may offer incentives like territorial gain or trade agreements to entice the weaker
actor to join with it.23


Actors on the global stage, both state and nonstate, decide to participate in alliances and coalitions
and to conduct policies in support of balancing and bandwagoning based on their assessment of
their relative power in the international system. This reflects one of the pervasive concepts about the
system—that it represents or responds to a balance of power. It is important to distinguish between
balance of power as a policy (a deliberate attempt to prevent predominance on the part of another actor
in the international system) and balance of power as a description of how the international system
works (where the interaction between actors tends to limit or restrict any attempt at hegemony and
results in a general status of stability). The most widely accepted usage of the balance of power term is
related to the later concept: the process that prevents or opposes the emergence of a single dominant
actor. Theoretically, the international system works to prevent any actor from dictating to any other
actor—that is, the balance of power concept actually works to maintain the system of independent and
sovereign states.24 In effect, balance of power describes the distribution of power in the international
system in both equal and unequal portions. Given an assumption that unbalanced power is dangerous
for the maintenance of stability, actors attempt to conduct policy that produces equilibrium of power
in the system. This helps form the rationale for actors to bandwagon or balance as they form alliances
or coalitions against potentially dominant competitors.25
Belief that equilibrium protects the sovereignty of the states, perceived inequality of power, and the
threat of violence combine to give both dominant and subordinate actors a shared (if unequal) interest
in maintaining order in the international system. Balance of power becomes a type of compromise
among actors that find stability preferable to anarchy, although it results in a system that favors the
strong and wealthy over the weak and poor. More powerful actors, like the great power states, play
leading roles in a balance of power international system because they have superior military force and
the ability to wield key technology.26
Ultimately, the balance of power concept fulfills three functions in the international system:
1. It prevents the system from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire.
2. Localized balances of power serve to protect actors from absorption by a dominant regional
actor.
3. Most important, the balance of power has helped create the conditions in which other elements or
characteristics of the international system can develop (i.e., diplomacy, stability, anarchy, war).27
Above all, this third function ensures the importance of the balance of power concept to the international
system for the foreseeable future.
For those actors in the international system less comfortable with operating in alliances and
coalitions, collective security provides an alternative. In formal terms, collective security is a framework
or institution designed to prevent or neutralize aggression by a state against any member state. All state
members are jointly responsible for the physical security of every other member. Membership in such
an institution permits states to renounce the unilateral use of force because the institution guarantees to
come to the assistance of the aggrieved state and sanction the aggressor. The overall intent of collective
security is the maintenance of peace among members of the framework or institution (i.e., the UN,
League of Nations), not between the system and external elements, as in the case of an alliance.28
The search for security is the most significant concern in some manner, shape, or form for the
vast majority of actors in the international system. Security implies the absence of threats to one’s
interests. In absolute terms, complete security would mean freedom from all threats. Historically, the
term security equated to the military dimension of security. Thus, security meant security from war or
violent conflict. But the 20th century witnessed an expansion of the concept to include other security
issues such as those relating to the economy or environment. Economic security is the need to ensure
that a hostile actor cannot control the supply of goods and services, or the prices for those goods and



services.29 Examples are access to water, oil, or natural gas. Environmental security implies protection
from environmental dangers caused by natural or human processes due to ignorance, accident,
mismanagement, or design and originating within or across national borders.30 Example issues are air
and water quality, global warming, famine, or health pandemics.
How an actor in the international system chooses to interpret the concept of security helps determine
participation in alliances or coalitions, involvement in collective security frameworks or institutions,
and balancing or bandwagoning behaviors. In all cases, these actors consider their ability to wield all
the elements of power they have available, whether or not to use force, and—most significantly—what
interests their ultimate policies will support.
Power in the international system is the ability of an actor or actors to influence the behavior of
other actors—usually to influence them to take action in accordance with the interests of the powerwielding state. Power does not have to be used to be effective. It is enough that the other actors
acknowledge it, either implicitly or explicitly, since the potential exercise of acknowledged power
can be as intimidating as its actual use. Historically, some international actors have sought power
for power’s sake; however, states normally use power to achieve or defend goals that could include
prestige, territory, or security.31
There are two general components of power: hard and soft. Hard power refers to the influence that
comes from direct military and economic means. This is in contrast to soft power, which refers to power
that originates with the more indirect means of diplomacy, culture, and history. Hard power describes
an actor’s ability to induce another actor to perform or stop performing an action. This can be done
using military power through threats or force. It can also be achieved using economic power—relying
on assistance, bribes, or economic sanctions. Soft power is a term used to describe the ability of an actor
to indirectly influence the behavior of other actors through cultural or ideological means.32
In contrast with the primary tools of hard power—the ability to threaten with sticks or pay with
carrots—soft power attracts others or co-opts them so that they want what you want. If a state can attract
another state to want what it wants, it can conserve its carrots and sticks. The sources of soft power are
culture (when it is attractive to others), values (when there is no hypocrisy in their application), and
foreign polices (when they are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others). Soft power uses an attraction to
shared values and the perceived justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.33
It is much more difficult to systematically or consciously develop, manage, control, or apply than hard
power.
Whether it is hard or soft, an actor’s power is measured in terms of the elements of power that it
actually possesses. Such measurement is always done in relation to another actor or actors and in the
context of the specific situation in which the power might be wielded. Are the available elements of
power appropriate given the potential foe or the nature of the conflict?34 American security professionals
traditionally have categorized the elements of power in terms of the acronym DIME for the diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic elements. This concept has been expanded in the National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism to MIDLIFE: military, information, diplomacy, law enforcement,
intelligence, finance, and economic.35
Regardless of which specific elements of power are available for potential use, the most important
consideration for an actor’s ability to transform potential power into operational power is political will.
Effectiveness of the actor’s government and depth of domestic support (or leadership effectiveness
and stakeholder support for nonstate actors) are crucial for developing and sustaining political
will.36 Without either of those components, the likelihood for the successful use of power is reduced
significantly.
One of the most visible uses of power is in the application of force. There are a number of reasons
given for its employment. In 1966, the classic analyst of the use of force and influence, Thomas



Schelling, described the use, or threat of use, of force as a kind of “vicious diplomacy.” He described
four different ways in which force might be used: deterrence, compellence, coercion, and brute force.
Deterrence seeks to prevent another actor from doing something that it might otherwise have done.
This is implemented over an indefinite period of time by convincing the deteree that he cannot achieve
the aim he seeks successfully, sometimes by demonstrating sufficient force to prevent achievement and
sometimes by promising a punishing response should the target engage in the action. An actor chooses
to use compellence when it desires to make an enemy do something by a specific time deadline. It
might have the positive effect of persuading an adversary to cease unacceptable behavior, or it might
cause him to retreat from seized positions or surrender assets illicitly taken. Compellence usually is
used after deterrence has failed, although that condition is not a prerequisite. It can carry the promise
of inflicting an escalating level of damage to a foe until it meets demands. It might also provide some
type of reward for meeting the demands. For both deterrence and compellence to be successful, both
the threatened penalty and promised reward (if applicable) must be credible.37
Coercion is the intent to inflict pain if an opponent does not do what you want. It is normally most
successful when held in reserve as a credible threat. Signaling the credibility and intensity of the threat
are keys to success. Different from compellence, coercion only offers a threat for noncompliance without
a reward for compliance. Brute force is directly taking what the actor wants. It is not dependent on
signaling intent to the opponent and succeeds when used based simply on the success of the application
of force. Brute force is ultimately not about asking, but taking whatever the actor wants through the
direct use of force.38
Virtually any action taken by an actor in the international system, whether it be peaceful or forceful,
likely will be done for the purpose of supporting the interests of the executing actor. The national
interest is intended to identify what is most important to the actor. Until the 17th century, the national
interest usually was viewed as secondary to that of religion or morality. To engage in war, rulers
typically needed to justify their action in these contexts. This changed with the coming of the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648. For a state, the national interest is likely to be multifaceted and can be oriented on
political, economic, military, or cultural objectives. The most significant interest is state survival and
security. The term “vital” frequently is applied to this interest, with the “implication being that the
stake is so fundamental to the well-being of the state that it cannot be compromised” and may require
the use of military force to sustain it. Other types of interests considered to be important are the pursuit
of wealth and economic growth, the promotion of ideological principles, and the establishment of a
favorable world order. In addition, many states believe the preservation of the national culture in the
state to be of great significance.39 Ultimately, it is the state’s assessment of the importance of its national
interests that will determine much or all of what it will do or not do within the international system.
Why Does the International System Behave the Way It Does?
Given a belief that the international system is composed of a structure and associated interacting units,
political scientists in the late 1950s developed the concept known as levels of analysis to help analyze all
the dynamics of interaction in the system. They believed examining problems in international relations
from different perspectives on the actors would help determine why different units and structures in
the international system behave as they do. They developed the term “levels” for the perspective units
and structures. Levels represent locations where both outcomes and sources of explanation can be
identified. The five most frequently used levels of analysis are:
1. International systems—largest grouping of interacting or interdependent units with no system
above them; encompasses the entire planet.
2. International subsystems—groups or units within the international system that can be distinguished
from the entire system by the nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence
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on each other. (Examples: Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Organization of
African Unity [OAU], and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC].)
3. Units—actors consisting of various subgroups, organizations, communities, and many individuals,
all with standing at higher levels. (Examples: states, nations, and MNC.)
4. Subunits—organized groups of individuals within units that are able or try to affect the behavior
of the unit as a whole. (Examples: bureaucracies and lobbies.)
5. Individuals. 40
Making use of the levels of analysis, international relations theory attempts to provide a conceptual
model with which to analyze the international system. Each theory relies on different sets of assumptions
and often a different level of analysis. The respective theories act as lenses, allowing the wearer to
only view the key events relevant to a particular theory. An adherent of one theory may disregard
completely an event that another could view as crucial, and vice versa.41
International relations (IR) theories can be divided into theories that focus primarily on a statelevel analysis and those that orient on an overall systemic approach. Many, often conflicting, ways of
thinking exist in international relations theory. The two most prevalent schools of thought are Realism
and Liberalism; though increasingly, Idealism, also known as Constructivism, is becoming a competing
concept.42
Realism has been a major, if not the dominant, theory of international relations since the end of
World War II. From the realist perspective, struggle, conflict, and competition are inevitable in the
international system. Mankind is not benevolent and kind, but self-centered and competitive. Realism
assumes that the international system is anarchic because there is no authority above states capable
of regulating their interactions; states must arrive at relations with other states on their own rather
than by obeying the dictates of some higher entity. States, and not international institutions, NGOs, or
MNCs, are the primary actors in the international system. For states to thrive and survive, they must
orient on security as their most fundamental national interest. Without security, no other goals are
possible. States must struggle for power in that system; this produces the constant competition and
conflict.43 Military force is the ultimate arbiter in the struggle for power. Each state is a rational actor
that always acts in accordance with its own self-interest. The primary goal is always ensuring its own
security. Strong leaders are key to success in this environment and will be required to exhibit realistic
vice morally idealistic based positions.
Realism asserts that states are inherently aggressive, and territorial expansion is only constrained by
opposing state(s). This aggressive orientation, however, leads to a security dilemma because increasing
one’s own security produces greater instability as opponents build up their forces to balance. Thus,
with realism, security is a zero-sum game where states make only relative gains.44
A variation of realism is called neorealism. Rather than the realist view of the influence of human
nature, neorealists believe that the structure of the international system controls and impacts all actors.
In effect, it is the system itself that is in charge. States, with their orientation on survival, have a primary,
if not sole, focus on war and peace. For a neorealist, state interests shape behavior. In neorealism, the
success of regimes is totally dependent on the support of strong powers.45
The international system constrains states. The system comprises both the states and the structure
within which they exist and interact. From a neorealist point of view, cooperation is more likely than
a pure realist claims because states are more interested in relative than absolute gains. States are often
willing to bargain to give something up.46
Several principal notions, especially since Immanuel Kant drafted “Perpetual Peace” in 1795, have
characterized liberalism as another fundamental theoretical basis for international relations:
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Peace can best be secured through the spread of democratic institutions on a worldwide basis. Governments, not
people cause wars . . . Free Markets and human nature’s perfectibility would encourage interdependence and
demonstrate conclusively that war does not pay . . . Disputes would be settled by established judicial procedures
. . . Security would be a collective, communal responsibility rather than an individual one.47

Liberalism, which in this context differs from liberalism as used in the liberal-conservative political
paradigm, maintains that interaction between states goes beyond the political to the economic
components of the international system—to include commercial firms, organizations, and individuals.
Thus, instead of the realist anarchic international system, liberals see plenty of opportunities for
cooperation and broader notions of power like cultural capital. Liberals also assume that states can
make absolute gains through cooperation and interdependence—thus peace and stability are possible
in the system.48
One primary hope of liberals for stability is the democratic peace concept. The main propositions
of this concept are: peace through the expansion of democratic institutions; populations of states focus
naturally on their economic and social welfare as opposed to imperialistic militarism; the subordination
of states to an international legal system; and commitment to collective security enhances stability.
Perhaps the most important element of the democratic peace concept is the belief that liberal democratic
states are likely to remain at peace with one another. The international judicial system, combined with
the perceived economic and social success of liberal states, normally dictates avoidance of external
conflict, especially with another liberal democratic state.49
As with classic realism, liberalism has a related alternative called neoliberalism. This postulates
that the system is not in charge of everything; states make their own decisions. States are not only
interested in survival, but also in cooperation. International institutions can promote cooperation;
there are options beyond war and peace. Rules, principles, ideas, social norms, and conventions must
be considered. With neoliberalism, there is a much greater degree of cooperation in the international
system than neorealism is willing to acknowledge. To a great degree, this is as a result of the success of
international regimes.50
Regimes as a framework of rules, expectations, and prescriptions between actors can change state
behavior, particularly in the arena of cooperation.51 Regimes often develop their own interests and
become actors in the system.52 Regimes come about for many reasons. They can benefit all actors in the
system and do not require a hegemonic state for support. The more times states cooperate in a regime, the
more opportunity exists to change the behavior of a particular state. In effect, regimes can change state
behavior. There is a shared interest that ultimately can benefit both parties. Institutional incentives can
motivate states to cooperate peacefully even in situations when force might be considered. A regime’s
intervention in state behavior can lead to cooperation. The result is that the existence of regimes makes
cooperation more likely—which, in turn, could help drive change.53
Idealism, also known as constructivism, rejects standard realist and liberal views of the international
system, arguing that states derive interests from ideas and norms. Idealists believe that the effects of
anarchy in the system are not all defining, but “anarchy is what states make of it.”54 For an idealist,
the state’s identity shapes its interests. To understand change, an idealist must assess a states’ identity.
States are social beings, and much of their identity is a social construct. If a state identifies itself as a
hegemonic global policeman, it will shape its interests accordingly. States that self-identify as peaceloving economic powers emphasize different interests. Who a state is—primarily in the form of
culture—will shape that state’s identity. States understand other states through their actions. Key for
an idealist, one state’s reaction will affect the way another state behaves.55
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Summary.
In the end, there is no single answer for why any actor in the 21st century international system
behaves the way that it does. There is also no single description for all the actors in the system, as well as
no predictable method that any of them will use to interact. In effect, even considering the complexities
of the 20th century, the 21st century international system is highly likely to be more complex than ever.
Clearly the nationstate will continue to be the primary actor, but it will have increasing competition from
the nonstate actors that have emerged in the later part of the last century. Advances in communication
and transportation, along with the information revolution’s contribution to globalization have provided
both emerging states and nonstate actors a degree of international influence never previously imagined.
From the perspective of a 21st century strategic leader, these emerging state and nonstate actors and
emerging transnational threats will create numerous challenges and opportunities. These challenges
and opportunities will force leaders to address issues like determining the exact threat, assessing the
intensity of national interests at stake, deciding whether to employ hard or soft power, and opting
to work with alliances or coalitions or to go it alone. Ultimately, understanding these issues, and
many others dependent on the situation, will be critical for the success of any actor in the 21st century
international system.
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CHAPTER 2
MULTILATERALISM AND UNILATERALISM
James A. Helis
Our best hope for safety in such times, as in difficult times past, is in American strength and will—the strength and
will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce
them.1
Charles Krauthammer
The paradox of American power at the end of this millennium is that it is too great to be challenged by any other
state, yet not great enough to solve problems such as global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. America needs the
help and respect of other nations.2
Sebastian Mallaby

At the beginning of the 21st century, the United States enjoys an historically unprecedented
accumulation of national power. The American economy is the largest in the world and, even in a
slowdown, far outstrips that of any other nation.3 The prowess of America’s armed forces has been
demonstrated again and again, from Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. In 2002, the United States accounted
for 43 percent of the world’s military spending, more than the total of the next 14 together.4 Projected
increases in American military spending will likely lead to the United States spending more on defense
than the rest of the world combined, and the training and technological superiority of America’s armed
forces provide a quantum advantage that no nation is likely to even approach in the near to medium
term. The combination of overwhelming economic and military power gives the United States enormous
political influence throughout the world. There are few, if any, global issues that can be addressed or
resolved without U.S. support and cooperation.
One central debate in United States foreign policy has been the degree to which the United States
should be involved in the affairs of the world. World War II and the Cold War seemed to settle the question
of isolationism or engagement in favor of the latter. After the Cold War, the issue of isolationism rose
again, but only briefly. The real post-Cold War debate was, and remains, over the degree to which the
United States should pursue its foreign policy alone or in partnership with other states. The debate has
been framed in terms of multilateralism versus unilateralism and is heavily influenced by competing
views on what the United States should do with its position of preeminent international power and
influence. In one sense, “the differences [between the two views] are a matter of degree, and there
are few pure unilateralists or multilateralists.”5 However, there are clear differences between the two
schools of thought on when and to what extent the United States should work with others. We should
keep in mind that unilateralism and multilateralism are not strategies. Strategy is about matching ends,
means, and ways. Unilateralism and multilateralism are competing ways to approach problems. This
monograph will examine the advantages and disadvantages offered by each approach. The goal is to
identify those conditions under which it is better to work with others through coalitions and alliances
and when it is might be best go it alone.
Unilateralism.
People who advocate unilaterlaism tend to believe that the post-Cold War world is unpredictable
and dangerous. They believe America must use its power to protect, and in many cases propogate,
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its interests and values. America no longer need constrain itself in the assertion and expansion of its
influence out of fear of provoking a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War standoff with its threat of nuclear war created an opportunity for the United States to apply its overwhelming
military, economic, and political power to build an international order that will perpetuate America’s
preeminent position in the world.
Unilateralists contend that an assertive approach to foreign policy is justified on both pragmatic
and ideological grounds. Charles Krauthammer concisely summarizes the unilateralist philosophy:
“The essence of unilateralism is that we do not allow others, no matter how well-meaning, to deter us
from pursuing the fundamental security interests of the United States and the free world.”6 In other
words, as a practical matter, the United States should not compromise when pursuing national security
interests. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and America’s subsequent pursuit of a global
war on terrorism strengthened the belief that the United States was vulnerable to threats and needed
to act aggressively to defeat those threats, irrespective of how the strategy played on the global stage.
Ideologically, unilateralists argue that American values and ideals essentially are universal. Policies
and actions intended to advance them are in the interest of not only the United States, but people
throughout the world. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that “the United States must defend
liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere . . . America
must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity.”7 The non-negotiability of interests
and values calls for their uncompromising pursuit, preferably with the support of others, but alone if
necessary. The United States, with its overwhelming aggregation of national power, can be a decisive
player anywhere in the world on virtually any issue it desires. “It is hard for the world to ignore or
work around the United States regardless of the issue—trade, finance, security, proliferation, or the
environment.”8 The United States should not squander its position and capabilities by compromising
and diluting its objectives in order to attract allies and partners. If the cause is right and just, the United
States should pursue it without compromise. Others states can either accept America’s arguments and
follow her lead or be left behind as the United States does what it should and must to advance its
interests and values.
One of the main advantages of unilateral approaches to problems is that they provide maximum
freedom of action. While allies and partners can bring extra capabilities to the table, they often bring
constraints on how their tools can be used. Those who contribute to an enterprise normally expect to
have a say in how it will operate. A common problem in United Nations (UN) military operations in the
1990s was the “phone home syndrome,” under which commanders of forces assigned to UN operations
had to seek approval from authorities in their home capital before accepting orders from the coalition
commander. Unilateralists also point to the limitations that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) allies placed on air operations during the Kosovo campaign as an example of how multilateral
approaches can be inefficient and reduce the effectiveness of American capabilities by restricting how
they will be used. Because foreign militaries cannot approximate American capabilities, their military
contributions are seldom worth the inevitable constraints they add.
Multilateralism.
Multilateralists acknowledge that there are circumstances in which the United States should not
rule out acting unilaterally, particularly when “vital survival interests” are at stake.9 On the other
hand, multilateralists argue that most important issues facing the United States in the 21st century are
not amenable to unilateral solutions. Transnational issues requiring multilateral approaches include
terrorism; the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; illegal drugs; and organized
crime. Globalization has made management of international trade and finance even more important,
as economic crises are susceptible to contagion that can have global impact, as was seen in the Asian
16

financial crisis of 1997. And environmental and health problems, to include the spread of infectious
diseases, can only be dealt with on a global basis.10
The reality is that American power, while overwhelmingly superior to that of any other state or
present coalition of states, is not unlimited. Allies and coalition partners allow the consolidation and
pooling of capabilities. A group of nations almost always can bring more tools of power to bear against
a problem than one state can alone. While NATO allies did place constraints on air operations over
Yugoslavia, they provided the majority of the peacekeeping forces deployed to Kosovo following
the air campaign. The price of their participation in post-conflict operations was a say over how the
war was fought. While air planners may have chafed under the politically imposed limitations on
their freedom of action, those limits were seen as an acceptable price to pay for cooperation in the
peacekeeping effort. The United States certainly had the capacity to conduct the air campaign itself (in
fact, the overwhelming majority of missions were flown by American aircraft). However, it was not in
the interests of the United States to be the sole or main provider of ground troops for what was bound
to be a protracted peacekeeping mission that would follow the air campaign. Going it alone may offer
short term efficiency, but sometimes long-term interests call for multilateral approaches and making
concessions in order to have committed partners. And measuring allies’ worth only in terms of their
military capabilities ignores the importance of their political and diplomatic contributions.
Multilateralists agree that the United States should seek to protect and extend its status as the
soul superpower. However, they believe that exercising power unilaterally could actually be
counterproductive. Historically, dominant powers have faced efforts by other states to counterbalance
their accumulation of power. “Balance of power theory makes a clear prediction: weaker states will
resist and balance against the predominant state.”11 For the United States to maintain its position in the
international system, it should endeavor to secure the cooperation of other states in addressing global
problems. Such a cooperative approach might negate or lessen any perceived need to counterbalance
U.S. power. Multilateralists reflect a liberal institutionalist point of view in arguing that it is easier to
gain the support and cooperation of others by working within a system of norms, rules, and institutions
that assure others of America’s intention to act in good faith as a partner, not a hegemon. While
unilateralists contend that the United States should use its power to impose an international order
favorable to maintaining America’s long-term supremacy, multilateralists counter that eventually that
approach will generate resistance and backlash. A system developed through cooperation is more likely
to stand the test of time. Given America’s predominance of power, it would take a remarkable effort
and investment of resources for any state or group of states to challenge America’s position. If America
behaves as a cooperative member of the international community and does not create the impression
that it threatens international stability, there is no reason for other states to seek to balance against
American power. No one doubts American capabilities. What America does with its capabilities will
determine how others will react and if America’s position will be accepted or challenged.
Alone or with Others?
The rhetoric in the dispute between multilateralist and unilateralist approaches obscures that there
are few foreign policy decisions that are purely one or the other. Advocates for both positions agree
that it is better to have allies in support of a cause than to go it alone. They disagree over what the
United States should be willing to give up to recruit partners. Unilateralists favor staking out one’s
position and moving forward with whomever is willing to go along. Multilateralists favor rallying other
nations to our cause and are more willing to accept trade-offs in building coalitions. Unilateralists and
multilateralists agree that there is little room for compromise on such fundamental issues as survival
interests. Time constraints also may limit the ability of the United States to drum up allies. Threats that
are immediate and pose a serious threat to survival or vital interests may force America’s hand.
17

Finally, both unilateralists and multilateralists agree that the United States should seek to build
an international order that will favor the expansion of American values and help preserve America’s
dominant position in the world. The United States has a unique opportunity to establish international
rules and standards that protect American interests. They differ on how the United States should
attempt to build that order. Unilateralists tend to favor more assertive, even coercive approaches. They
fall more into the realist school of international relations theory and argue that ultimately power is
what matters, and reliance on agreements or treaties in lieu of real power is dangerous. On the other
hand, multilateralists favor moving ahead in a framework of international institutions and treaties
that will bind all states, America included, to rules and commitments. They feel that restrictions on
the United States will assuage concerns “about a global order dominated by American power—power
unprecedented, unrestrained, and unpredictable.”12 And even within the constraints of a rules-based
system, America will continue to enjoy a preponderance of power.
The Case of Iraq.
The U.S.-Iraq War of 2003 was a showcase for the different approaches to foreign policy. The
American position was clear: Iraq would comply with UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to
divest itself of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and medium-range missiles, or the United
States, with whomever was willing to assist, would enforce the resolutions by force. Advocates for
unilateral American action argued that the UN had been ineffective in enforcing its own resolutions.
Iraq posed an imminent threat to the United States, and the United States could no longer tolerate the
international community’s unwillingness to force Iraq to comply and disarm. While the United States
welcomed other states that were willing to support the forcible disarmament of Iraq, the positions
of other states, including key allies and the UN Security Council, would not influence the course
of American foreign policy. The United States saw a need to act and was going to do so. And by
acting alone, the United States actually could enhance stability in the Middle East and the globe. An
America willing to use its power without the support of the international community would have
greater credibility in dealing with other threats. No longer could potential adversaries hope the UN or
America’s allies could dissuade it from major military action. When the United States said it would act,
that would be a credible threat. Knowing the consequences of defying America would deter states from
doing so in the future, which could only contribute to stability and to American security.
Multilateralists approached the issue differently. While acknowledging Iraq’s failure to comply
with UN resolutions and the likelihood that Iraq was in possession of significant quantities of banned
weapons, they questioned whether it was in America’s best interest to take military action without
broad support within the international community. While it would be faster and militarily more
expedient for the United States to forge ahead with a unilateralist Iraq policy, the costs of such a policy
likely would be prohibitive in the long run. By acting largely alone and without broad international
support, the United States risked weakening the international norm against unilateral use of military
power to resolve political disputes. A war with Iraq had potentially global consequences, both political
and economic. By undertaking such a war and assuming these risks for the international community
without its approval, the United States would reinforce fears of unconstrained American power and
increase the potential for a future backlash. Finally, the United States risked finding itself burdened
with a lengthy and expensive occupation of post-war Iraq. There would be no guarantee of significant
international support for post-conflict efforts following a war the United States started and waged
largely on its own. Leaving the United States saddled with post-war Iraq would serve as something of
a balancing tool. An America committed to a major military presence in Iraq would not find it as easy
to exercise military operations in other parts of the world without support from allies. Also, a lengthy
and costly overseas commitment could undermine domestic support for future actions.
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In summer 2003, it was too early to assess how the Iraq war will affect America’s position in the
world or how the world will react to American power. However, the unilateralist and multilateralist
camps used the lead up to the war to make their cases for acting more or less unilaterally or within
broader international coalitions. While the war and early phases of the occupation of Iraq have not
settled the debate, both have established some measures by which to determine if, in this case, a
generally unilateral approach to foreign policy and war helped or hurt America’s long-term standing
in the world. The end of the war may have opened the door for progress in the Israel-Palestine conflict,
but there has been relatively little international support for post-war occupation, which may leave a
substantial portion of America’s ground forces committed to Iraq for some time to come.
Conclusion: Recent Trends in U.S. Foreign Policy.
There is a growing view that American foreign policy has tended to be more assertively unilateral in
recent years. America’s refusal to join the international ban on antipersonnel land mines, its rejections of
the Kyoto treaty on global warming, an inspection and verification protocol for the Biological Weapons
Convention, and its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court and the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty are offered as evidence of a policy of avoiding international commitments that might constrain
America’s freedom of action. Critics argue that the United States pursues its own international agenda
without regard for the interests, views, or concerns of the rest of the world. The response is that the
United States is acting, as all states should and must, in its own self-interests.
In spite of its overwhelming power, in the spring of 2003 the United States found itself embarking on
a war with Iraq. While Saddam Hussein undoubtedly was one of the world’s great villains, the United
States found itself diplomatically at odds with important traditional allies, politically outmaneuvered
and stymied at the UN, and opposed by public majorities in virtually every nation in the world.
How did the United States, with all its advantages, become so politically isolated? One answer lies
in the perception that the United States is using its national power more unilaterally than in the past.
International opposition did not prevent the United States from going to war. However, the absence of
allies has caused the United States to bear the overwhelming burden of post-conflict operations in Iraq.
In contrast, in Bosnia and Kosovo NATO allies and other partners provided the bulk of peacekeeping
troops following U.S.-led campaigns.
The perceptions and reality of the extent to which the United States pursues unilateralist policies
undoubtedly will affect America’s strategic choices in the future. There are clear trade-offs between
sacrificing freedom of action and lowering costs and adding the capabilities of other nations. Considering
these trade-offs should be part of the strategic decisionmaking process for the United States as it wages
a global war on terrorism and confronts a range of critical global interests and issues. The United States
cannot limit its options by clinging to notions about whether it should act unilaterally or multilaterally.
There are times and circumstances for both approaches. The art is to recognize them and select the
proper tool.
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CHAPTER 3
ETHICAL ISSUES IN WAR: AN OVERVIEW
Martin L. Cook
Violent conflict among human beings is, unfortunately, one of the great constants in our history as a
species. As far back as we can see, the human species has engaged in war and other forms of organized
violence. But it is equally true that, as far back as human culture and thought have left written records,
humans have thought about morality and ethics. Although cultures vary widely in how they interpret
death and killing from a moral and religious perspective, every human culture has recognized that
taking human life is a morally grave matter; every human culture has felt the need to justify taking of
life in moral and religious terms.
In the modern world, a large body of ethical and legal thought attempts to limit, to constrain, and
to establish criteria that sanction the use of violence in the name of the state and society. Through the
mechanisms of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Charter of the United Nations (UN), military
manuals such as the U.S. Army’s “Law of Land Warfare” and similar documents, modern governments
and militaries attempt to distinguish “just war” and just conduct in war from other types of killing of
human beings. Morally conscientious military personnel need to understand and frame their actions
in moral terms so as to maintain moral integrity in the midst of the actions and stress of combat.
They do so in order to explain to themselves and others how the killing of human beings they do is
distinguishable from the criminal act of murder.
Attempts to conduct warfare within moral limits have met with uneven success. Many cultures
and militaries fail to recognize these restraints, or do so in name only. The realities of combat, even
for the best trained and disciplined military forces, place severe strains on respect for those limits and
sometimes cause military leaders to grow impatient with them in the midst of their need to “get the job
done.” In the history of the U.S. Army, events like My Lai in Vietnam show that even forces officially
committed to just conduct in war are still capable of atrocities in combat—and are slow to discipline
such violations.
Despite these limitations, the idea of just war is one to which the well-led and disciplined military
forces of the world remain committed. That the constraints of just war are routinely overridden is
no more a proof of their falsity and irrelevance than are similar points about morality: we know the
standard, and we also know human beings fall short of that standard with depressing regularity. Moral
failure, rather than proving the falsity of morality, points instead to the source of our disappointment
in such failures: our abiding knowledge of the morally right.
Because of the importance of just war thinking, the general history, key provisions, and moral
underpinnings of just war are things which every military person, and especially every senior leader,
must understand and be able to communicate to subordinates and the public. It is important that senior
leaders understand just war more deeply and see that the positive laws of war emerge from a long
moral tradition which rests on fundamental moral principles. This chapter will provide that history,
background, and moral context of ethics and war.
Background of Just War Theory.
Most cultures of antiquity attempted to place some restraints on war. All recognized that there are
some causes of war which are justifiable and others that are not. All recognized that some persons are
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legitimate objects of attack in war and others are not. All recognized that there were times, seasons, and
religious festivals during which warfare would be morally wrong or religiously inappropriate.
The roots of modern international law come from one specific strand of thought emerging out
of antiquity: the Christian Roman Empire that took shape after the conversion to Christianity of the
Emperor Constantine in the year 312 AD. Although there were important ideas of restraint in war in
pre-Christian Greek and Roman thought and indeed in cultures all over the world, it is the blend of
Christian and Greco-Roman thought that set the context of the development of full-blown just war
thinking over a period of centuries.
Christianity before this time had been suspicious of entanglement in the affairs of the Empire. For
the first several centuries of the movement, Christians interpreted the teaching of Jesus in the Sermon
on the Mount and other places quite literally, and saw themselves as committed to pacifism (the refusal
to use force or violence in all circumstances). Although many appreciated the relative peace, prosperity,
and ease of travel the Empire’s military force made possible, Christians felt prayer on behalf of the
Emperor was the limit of their direct support for it.
Much changed with Constantine. For many, war fought on behalf of a “Christian Empire” was a very
different thing than war on behalf of a pagan one. Further, during the century following Constantine’s
conversion, the Empire began to experience wave after wave of invasion from the north, culminating
in the fall of the city of Rome itself in 410 AD—a mere 100 years after Constantine.
It was in that context that Christian thinkers, most notably St. Augustine, a doctor of the church
and bishop of Hippo in North Africa, first worked out the foundations of Christian just war thought.
History, Augustine argued, is morally ambiguous. Human beings hope for pure justice and absolute
righteousness. Augustine firmly believed that the faithful will experience such purity only at the end
of time when God’s kingdom comes. But until that happens, we will experience only justice of a sort,
righteousness of a sort.
What passes for justice will require force and coercion, since there will always be people who strive
to take more than their share, to harm and steal from others. In that world, the peacemakers who are
blessed are those who use force appropriately and mournfully to keep as much order and peace as
possible under these conditions. The military officer is that peacemaker when he or she accepts this
sad necessity. Out of genuine care and concern with the weak and helpless, the soldier shoulders the
burden of fighting to maintain an order and system of justice which, while far short of the deepest
hopes of human beings, keeps the world from sliding into complete anarchy and chaos. It is a sad
necessity imposed on the soldier by an aggressor. It inevitably is tinged with guilt and mournfulness.
The conscientious soldier longs for a world where conflict is unnecessary, but sees that the order of
well-ordered states must be defended lest chaos rule.
For Augustine and the tradition that develops after him, just war is an attempt to balance two
competing moral principles. It attempts to maintain the Christian concern with nonviolence and to
honor the principle that taking human life is a grave moral evil. But it attempts to balance that concern
with the recognition that, the world being what it is, important moral principles and that protection of
innocent human life requires the willingness to use force and violence.
As it wends its way through history, the tradition of just war thought grows and becomes more precise
and more elaborate. In that development, it faces new challenges and makes new accommodations.
The Spanish in the New World, for example, were challenged to rethink the tradition as they
encountered and warred against indigenous populations. Are such wars, too, governed by moral
principles? Are all things permitted against such people? Or, it was seriously debated, are they even
people, as opposed to some new kind of animal? Through that discussion came an expansion of the
scope of just war principles to populations that did not share common cultures.
After the Protestant Reformation, as wars raged throughout Europe in the attempt to restore religious
unity to “Christendom,” some thinkers (most notably Hugo Grotius) argued that just war must be
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severed from a distinctively Christian religious foundation. Human reason, instead, must provide a
system for the restraint of war that will be valid despite religious difference, valid etsi deus non daretur,
even if God did not exist! In other words, for Grotius and others, human reason is a commonality
all people share, regardless of religious, ethnic, and cultural differences. That rationality, rather than
revealed religion or religious authority, could suffice to ground moral thinking about war.
As a result of that “secularization” of just war thinking in Europe, the foundation was laid for the
universal international law of the present international system. As a result, the foundation was laid for
that system in natural law (moral rules believed to be known by reason alone, apart from particular
religious ideas and institutions) and in the jus Gentium, the “law of peoples,” those customary practices
which are widely shared across cultures. In current international law, these accepted practices are
called “customary international law” and set the standard of practices of “civilized nations.”
Since virtually all modern states have committed themselves by treaty and by membership in the UN
to the principles of international law, in one sense there is no question of their universal applicability
around the globe. But the fact that the tradition has roots in the West and in the Christian tradition does
raise important multicultural questions about it.
How does one deal with the important fact that Muslims have their own ways of framing moral
issues of war and conflict and even of the national state itself which track imperfectly at best with
the just war framework? How does one factor into one’s thinking the idea of “Asian values” which
differ in their interpretation of the rights of individuals and the meaning of the society and state from
this supposedly universal framework? What weight should the fact that much of the world, while
nominally nation-states on the model established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe, in
reality are described better as “tribes with flags”? How does one deal with the fact that, in much of the
world, membership in a particular ethnic group within an internationally recognized border is more an
indicator of one’s identity than the name of the country on one’s passport?
All of these questions are subjects of intense scholarly debate and practical importance. All have
very real-world applications when we think about the roots of conflict around the modern world and
attempt to think about those conflicts in the ways many of the participants do. But for our purposes, we
will need to set them aside in favor of making sure we understand the just war criteria as they frame
United States military policy and the existing framework of international law.
This limitation of focus is justified not only by the limitations of time, but also by legal reality.
Whatever one might want to say about the important cross-cultural issues posed above, it remains
true that the United States and its allies around the world are committed by treaty, policy, and moral
commitment to conduct military operations within the framework of the existing just war criteria. That
fact alone makes it important that strategic leaders possess a good working knowledge of those criteria
and some facility in using them to reason about war.
Ideally, however, strategic leaders also will have some grasp of the ongoing debate about cultural
diversity and the understanding of war in fundamentally differing cultural contexts as well.
The Purposes of the Just War Framework.
The framework of principles, commonly called “Just War Criteria,” provide an organized schema
for determining whether a particular conflict is justified morally. As one might imagine, any such
framework inevitably will fall short of providing moral certainty. When applied to the real world in
all its complexity, inevitably persons of intelligence and good will, can, and do disagree whether those
criteria are met in a given case.
Furthermore, some governments and leaders lie. No matter how heinous their deeds, they will
strive to cast their actions in just war terms to provide at least the appearance of justification for what
they do. If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, it is testimony to the moral weight of the
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just war principles that even the most extreme lies follow the shape of just war principles. Just war
language provides the shape of the lie even the greatest war criminals must tell. Rare indeed is the
aggressor or tyrant willing to declare forthrightly the real causes and motives of their actions.
The twin realities of real-world complexity and the prevalence of lying about these matters suggest
the importance not only of knowing the just war criteria as a kind of list, but also of skillful and careful
reasoning using the just war framework as a strategic leader competency. Only if a leader is capable of
careful and judicious application of just war thinking can he or she distinguish valid application of just
war thinking from specious and self-serving attempts to cloak unjust action in its terms.
The Just War Framework.
Moral judgments about war fall into two discrete areas: the reasons for going to war in first place,
and the way the war is conducted. The first traditionally is called jus ad bellum, or justice of going to
war; and the second jus in bello, or law during war. Two interesting features of this two-part division
are that different agents are primarily responsible for each, and that they are, to a large degree, logically
independent of each other.
Judgments about going to war are, in the American context, made by the National Command
Authority and the Congress. Except at the highest levels where military officers advise those
decisionmakers, military leaders are not involved in those discussions and bear no moral responsibility
for the decisions that result. Still, military personnel and ordinary citizens can and do judge the reasons
given for entering into military conflict by those decisionmakers and make their own determinations
whether the reasons given make sense or not. A morally interesting but difficult question arises
concerning one’s obligations and responsibilities when one is convinced that recourse to war is not
justified in a particular case.
Just conduct in war concerns the rules of engagement, choice of weapons and targets, treatment of
civilian populations and prisoners of war, and so forth. These concern the “nuts and bolts” of how the
war actually is conducted. Here the primary responsibility shifts from the civilian policymakers to the
military leadership at all levels. Of course, political leaders and ordinary citizens have an interest in
and make judgments about how their troops conduct themselves in war. Militaries conduct themselves
in light of national values and must be seen as behaving in war in ways citizens at home can accept
morally.
Modern war, usually fought in plain sight of CNN and other media, is for good and for ill, especially
subject to immediate scrutiny. Political leaders and ordinary citizens react to virtually every event and
require of their leaders explanations for why they do what they do and conduct war as they do. This,
too, indicates why strategic leaders must be adept in explaining clearly and honestly the conduct of
their forces within the framework of the just war criteria.
I turn now to a discussion of the criteria of just war in some detail. These are the “tests” one uses to
determine the justification of recourse to war in particular circumstances.
We begin with the criteria for judging a war just ad bellum (in terms of going to war in the first place).
In detail, lists of these criteria vary somewhat, but the following captures the essential elements:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Just Cause,
Legitimate Authority,
Public Declaration,
Just Intent,
Proportionality,
Last Resort,
Reasonable Hope of Success.
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Recall that the moral impulse behind just war thinking is a strong sense of the moral evils involved
in taking human life. Consequently, the ad bellum tests of just war are meant to set a high bar to a tooeasy recourse to force and violence to resolve conflict. Each of the “tests” is meant to impose a restraint
on the decision to go to war.
Just Cause asks for a legitimate and morally weighty reason to go to war. Once, causes like “offended
honor” or religious difference were considered good reasons for war. As it has developed, just war
tradition and international law have restricted greatly the kinds of reasons deemed acceptable for
entering into military confrontation. The baseline standard in modern just war thinking is aggression.
States are justified in going to war to respond to aggression received. Classically, this means borders
have been crossed in force. Such direct attacks on the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of
an internationally recognized state provide the clear case of just cause, recognized in just war and in
international law (for example, in the Charter of the UN).
Of course, there are a number of justifications for war which do not fit this classic model. Humanitarian
interventions, preemptive strikes, assistance to a wronged party in an internal military conflict in a
state, just to name some examples, can in some circumstances also justify use of military force, even
though they do not fit the classic model of response to aggression. But the farther one departs from the
baseline model of response to aggression, the more difficult and confusing the arguments become.
As one moves into these justifications, the scope for states to lie and try to justify meddling in each
others affairs grows. For that reason, international law and ethics gives an especially hard look at
claims of just cause other than response to aggression already received. To do otherwise risks opening
too permissive a door for states to interfere with each other’s territory and sovereignty.
Legitimate authority restricts the number of agents who may authorize use of force. In the Middle
Ages, for example, there was the very real problem that local lords and their private armies would engage
in warfare without consulting with, let alone receiving authorization from, the national sovereign.
In the modern context, different countries will vary in their internal political structure and assign
legitimate authority for issues of war and peace of different functionaries and groups. In the American
context, there is the unresolved tension between the President as Commander-in-Chief and the authority
of Congress to declare war. The present War Powers Act (viewed by all presidents since it was enacted
as unconstitutional, but not yet subjected to judicial review) still has not clarified that issue. But while
one can invent a scenario where this lack of clarity would raise very real problems, in practice so far the
National Command Authority and the Congress have found pragmatic solutions in every deployment
of American forces so far.
The public declaration requirement has both a moral purpose and (in the American context) a legal
one. The legal one refers to the issue we were just discussing: the role of Congress in declaring war. As
we all know, few 20th century military conflicts in American history have been authorized by a formal
congressional declaration of war. While this is an important and unresolved constitutional issue for the
United States, it is not the moral point of the requirement.
The moral point perhaps is captured better as a requirement for delivery of an ultimatum before
initiation of hostilities. Recall that the moral concern of just war is to make recourse to armed conflict as
infrequent as possible. The requirement of a declaration or ultimatum gives a potential adversary formal
notice that the issue at hand is judged serious enough to warrant the use of military force, and that the
nation is prepared to do so unless that issue is resolved successfully and peacefully immediately.
The just intent requirement serves to keep the war aims limited and within the context of the just
cause used to authorize the war. Every conflict is subject to “mission creep.” Once hostilities commence,
there is always the temptation to forget what cause warranted the use of force and to press on to
achieve other purposes—purposes that, had they been offered as justifications for the use of force prior
to the conflict, clearly would have been seen as unjustifiable. The just intent requirement limits war
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aims by keeping the mind focused on the purpose of the war. Although there are justified exceptions,
the general rule is that the purpose of war is to restore the status quo ante bellum, the state of affairs that
existed before the violation that provided the war’s just cause.
Proportionality is a common sense requirement that the damage done in the war should be worth
it. That is to say, even if one has a just cause, it might be so costly in lives and property damage that it
is better to accept the loss rather than to pay highly disproportionately to redress the issue. In practice,
of course, this is a hard criterion to apply. It is a commonplace that leaders and nations notoriously are
inaccurate at predicting the costs of conflict as things snowball out of control.
But here, too, the moral point of just war criteria is to restrain war. And one important implication of
that requirement is the demand for a good faith and well-informed estimate of the costs and feasibility
of redressing grievances through the use of military force.
The requirement that war be the ultima ratio, the last resort, also stems from a commitment to
restrict the use of force to cases of sad necessity. No matter how just the cause and no matter how well
the other criteria may be met, the last resort requirement acknowledges that the actual commencement
of armed conflict crosses a decisive line. Diplomatic solutions to end conflicts, even if they are less than
perfect, are to be preferred to military ones in most, if not all, cases. This is because the costs of armed
conflict in terms of money and lives are so high and because armed conflict, once begun, is inherently
unpredictable.
In practical reality, judging that this criterion has been met is particularly difficult. Obviously, it
cannot require that one has done every conceivable thing short of use of force: there is always more
one could think to do. It has to mean doing everything that seems to a reasonable person promising.
But reasonable people disagree about this. In the First Gulf War, for example, many (including Colin
Powell) argued that more time for sanctions and diplomacy would be preferable to initiation of armed
conflict.
The last requirement ad bellum is reasonable hope of success. Because use of force inevitably entails
loss of human life, civilian and military, it is a morally grave decision to use it. The reasonable hope
criterion simply focuses thinking on the practical question: if you are going to do all that damage and
cause death, are you likely to get what you want as a result? If you are not, if, despite your best efforts,
it is unlikely that you will succeed in reversing the cause that brings you to war, then you are causing
death and destruction to no purpose.
An interesting question does arise whether heroic but futile resistance is ever justified. Some have
argued that the long-term welfare of a state or group may well require a memory of resistance and
noble struggle, even in the face of overwhelming odds. Since the alternative is acquiescence to conquest
and injustice, might it be justifiable for a group’s long-term self-understanding to be able look back and
say, “at least we didn’t die like sheep”?
This completes the overview of the jus ad bellum requirements of just war. Recall that the categories
and distinctions of the theory are not simple and clear. Neither individually nor together do they
provide an algorithm that can generate a clear-cut and obvious judgment about a particular war in the
minds of all fair-minded people.
On the other hand, it is important not to overemphasize the difficulty here. Although the language
of just war is used by virtually all states and leaders in the attempt to justify their actions, not all uses
are valid equally. Often it is not that difficult to identify uses that are inaccurate, dishonest, or selfserving. While there certainly are a range of cases where individuals of good will and intelligence will
disagree in their judgments, there is also a good range where the misuse is transparent.
Recall, for example, Iraq’s initial (and brief) attempt to justify its invasion of Kuwait on grounds that
there had been a revolution in the Kuwaiti government and the new legitimate government of Kuwait
had requested Iraq’s fraternal assistance in stabilizing the new government. Had this story been true,
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of course, Iraq would have been acting in conformity with international law and just war tradition by
being in Kuwait. It is important to note that Iraq apparently did feel obliged to tell a tale like this, since
that itself is a perverse testimony to the need of states to attempt to justify their actions in the court
of world opinion in just war terms. Of course, the story was so obviously false that even Iraq stopped
telling it in a matter of hours (how many of you even recall that they told it?).
My point in citing this example is to forestall an easy relativism. It is simple intellectual laziness to
conclude that, because these judgments are hard and people disagree about them in particular cases,
that the principles have no moral force or, worse, that all uses of them are mere window-dressing. In all
moral matters, as Aristotle pointed out, it is a mark of an educated person not to expect more precision
than the matter at hand permits. And in complex moral judgments of matters of international relations,
one cannot expect more than thoughtful, well-informed and good-faith judgments.
Jus in Bello.
I turn now to the jus in bello side of just war thinking. As I noted above, except at the highest levels
of the military command structure, officers do not make the decision to commit forces to conflict. The
moral weight of those judgments lies with the political leadership and its military advisors. On the
other hand, strategic military leaders, whether they are technically responsible for decisions to go to
war or not, often will be placed in the position of justifying military action to the press and the people.
Further, thoughtful officers often will feel a need to justify a particular use of force in which they
participate to themselves. For all these reasons, therefore, facility with just war reasoning in both its
dimensions (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) is a strategic leader competency.
The practical conduct of war is, however, the primary responsibility of military officers. They
bear the responsibility for the training and discipline of military personnel. They issue the orders that
determine what is attacked and with what weapons and tactics. They set the tone for how civilians are
treated and how prisoners of war are captured, confined, and cared for. They determine how soldiers
who violate order and the laws of war are disciplined, and what examples they allow to be set for
acceptable conduct in their commands.
Because of this weight of responsibility, the officer at all levels must incorporate thoroughly thought
about the jus in bello side of just war into standard operating procedure. It is an integral part of military
planning at all levels, from the tactical issues of employing small units to the highest levels of grand
strategy. U.S. policy, national and universal values, and political prudence combine to require officers at
all levels to plan and execute military operations with a clear understanding of just war requirements.
The major moral requirements of just war in bello boil down to two: discrimination and proportionality.
Together, they set limits in the conduct of war—limits on who can be deliberately attacked and on how
war can legitimately be conducted.
Although we use the term “discrimination” almost wholly negatively (as in racial discrimination)
the core meaning of the word is neutral morally. It refers to distinguishing between groups or people
or things on the basis of some characteristic that distinguishes one group from another.
In the context of thought about war, the relevant characteristic upon which just war requires us to
discriminate is combatant status. In any conflict, there are individuals who are combatants—actively
engaged in prosecuting the war efforts—and there are noncombatants. The central moral idea of just
war is that only the first, the combatants, are legitimate objects of deliberate attack. By virtue of their
“choosing” to be combatants, they have made themselves objects of attack and have lost that immunity
from deliberate attack all human beings have in normal life, and which civilians retain even in wartime.
I put “choosing” in quotes, of course, because we all know soldiers become soldiers in lots of ways,
many of which are highly coerced. But they are at least voluntary in this sense: they did not run away.
They allow themselves to be in harm’s way as combatants.
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Of course, in modern war, there are lots of borderline cases between combatant and noncombatant.
The definition of the war conventions is straightforward: combatants wear a fixed distinct sign, visible
at a distance and carry arms openly. But in guerilla war, to take the extreme case, combatants go
to great lengths to blend in to the civilian population. In such a war, discrimination poses very real
practical and moral problems.
But the presence of contractors on a battlefield, or combat in urban environments where fighters
(whether uniformed or not) are mixed in with civilian populations and property (to point to only two
examples) also make discrimination between combatants and noncombatants challenging both morally
and practically.
It is less critical to focus on the hard case than on the central moral point. War only can be conducted
justly insofar as a sustained and good faith commitment is made to discriminate between combatants
and noncombatants and to target only the combatants deliberately.
Of course, civilians die in war. And sometimes those deaths are the unavoidable byproduct of even
the most careful and conscientious planning and execution of military operations. Intelligence may
be mistaken and identify as a military target something that turns out in the even to be occupied by
civilians or dedicated only to civilian use. Weapons and guidance systems may malfunction; placing
weapons in places they were not intended to go.
Just war recognizes these realities. It has long used the “principle of double effect” to sort through
the morality of such events and justifies those which, no matter how terrible, do not result from deliberate
attacks on civilians. Such accidents in the context of an overall discriminate campaign conducted with
weapons that are not inherently indiscriminate are acceptable as “collateral damage.”
What is not acceptable in just war thinking is the deliberate targeting of civilians, their use as “human
shields,” or use of indiscriminate warfare on populations. In practice, this means choosing weapons,
tactics, and plans which strive to the limit of the possible to protect innocent civilian populations, even
if they place soldiers at (acceptably) greater risk.
The other major requirement of jus in bello is proportionality. It, too, attempts to place limits on
war by the apparently commonsense requirement that attacks be proportionate to the military value
of the target. Judgments about these matters are highly contextual and depend on many dimensions of
practical military reality. But a massive bombardment of a town, for example, would be disproportionate
if the military object of the attack is a single sniper.
It is true, of course, that all sides violated these rules in World War II, especially in the uses of
airpower. But the development of precision munitions and platforms for their delivery have, since that
conflict, allowed the U.S. military to return to more careful respect for the laws of war, even in air war.
Furthermore, it is a testimony to the moral need to do so that, at least in part, drove that development—
along with the obvious point that munitions that hit what they are aimed at with consistency and
regularity are more militarily effective as well.
Contemporary Challenges to the Westphalian Model of Just War.
Recent history has put considerable pressure on the understanding of just war described above.
From World War II forward, a growing body of human rights and humanitarian law has evolved
which, at least on paper, restrains the sovereignty of states in the name of protecting the rights of
individual citizens. The Genocide Convention, for example, sets limits to what states may do to their
own citizens and creates the right (and perhaps the obligation) of states to intervene to protect the rights
of individuals when their violation rises to an unacceptable (and unfortunately, somewhat vaguely
specified) degree.
The conflict in Kosovo was clearly an example of intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) into the “internal affairs” of Serbia (recall that Kosovo was an integral part of
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Serbia in the policy of all the states involved). Very little of the national interest of the NATO powers,
narrowly conceived, was involved in Kosovo. It was a case where humanitarian causes and human
rights were cited to “trump” Serbian sovereignty. Further, it was not authorized by resolution of
the UN Security Council, to a large degree because the Chinese and the Russians feared the “porous
sovereignty” precedent it would set.
Conversely, the failure to intervene in Rwanda was widely cited as a case where humanitarian
concerns ought to have overridden sovereignty and national interest questions.
These examples point to one large and unresolved issue in contemporary international ethics and law:
the harmonization of state sovereignty with issues of human rights and humanitarian intervention.
Another even deeper challenge is posed by the Global “War” against Terrorism. The terms “war”
is in quotations, of course, because in many respects the nature of the conflict with al Qaeda and similar
terrorist groups of global reach departs markedly from the model of war between Westphalian sovereign
states. Most obviously, terrorist groups are not state actors, so many of the conventions governing
conflict between states imply imperfectly at best.
Of course, unless terrorist groups are in international waters or in space, they necessarily exist in
some relationship to states. Some states deliberately and consciously sponsor and encourage them;
others harbor them unknowingly and perhaps even unwillingly; still others would like nothing better
than to be rid of them, but have weak or nonexistent governments with the capability to dislodge
them.
For states that deliberately harbor them, no great stretch is required to extend the Westphalian
paradigm to cover such cases. At some point, the existence of a threat within the border of such states
that the government is disinclined to rein in constitutes a just cause of war between the United States
and its allies and the harboring state. One way of construing the conflict in Afghanistan is precisely this:
that the Taliban government wished to shelter and protect al Qaeda on its territory and, after sufficient
warning, placed its own continued existence in jeopardy.
For states that lack the power to dislodge terrorist groups, if they can be persuaded to request
assistance from the United States or other powers to dislodge them, even if that “persuasion” results
from considerable pressure, the formalities of the current international system are maintained.
But other possibilities present themselves. On one interpretation of the Bush administration’s
National Security Strategy, the nature of the terrorist threat, combined with the possible destructive
power of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), warrants abandoning the “just cause” restriction to
aggression received in favor of a more aggressive “preemptive” (or, perhaps better, “preventative”)
use of military force. If this, indeed, becomes policy and customary international law, it might take
one of two forms. It might be a simple assertion of U.S. military supremacy and lead to a fundamental
recasting of the Westphalian assumption of the equality of sovereign states.
On the other hand, the nature of the threat also might lead to a reformulation of a common
understanding of “terrorism” among the major powers that generates a multilateral agreement, implicit
or explicit, that some threats warrant interventions that might not pass the inherited “just war” tests
of recent centuries. In that respect, just war would be returning to it origins: rather than seeing war
as a conflict among sovereign states in response to aggression, the international community might
see itself once again (as Augustine did in the 5th century) as defending a “tranquility of order” in
the international system against incursions of alien systems and ideologies whose sole purpose is a
disruption and displacement of that order. In other words, the globalized civilization grounded in
democracy, human rights, free trade and communication, technology, and science may be defending
its civilization itself against forces that seek its complete destruction.
These aspects of the contemporary scene more than any others point to the need to think about just
war in deeper historical terms than simply international law, precisely because existing international
law has been formed almost entirely in the European, post-Reformation and Enlightment, Westphalian
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system. If the second interpretation of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) has some validity, the
central point is precisely that those shared assumptions of the past several centuries may have less and
less relevance, and the original concerns of defending the stability of a system of civilization against
fundamental attack may be the better analog to present circumstances.
Conclusion.
The moral tradition of just war, and its partial embodiment in the laws of war at any moment are
part of on-going evolution. They represent a drive to make practical restraints on war that honor the
moral claim of individuals not to be attacked unjustly, while at the same time recognizing that use of
military force in defense of individuals and values is sometimes a necessity.
All military officers charged with the grave moral responsibility of commanding and controlling
military units and weapons must, if they are to conduct war morally, have a good working knowledge
of the just war tradition and of the moral principles it strives to enshrine.
Above all, strategic leaders who set large-scale military policy, control training and organizational
culture, and supervise the preparation of operational plans for national militaries need to understand
and think in ways deeply conditioned by just war principles. Because their responsibility is so great
and because the weapons and personnel under their control are capable of causing such destruction,
they above all bear the responsibility to ensure that those forces observe the greatest possible moral
responsibility in their actions.
No amount of knowledge of the terms and concepts of just war will make morally complex decisions
miraculously clear. But clear understanding of the concepts of just war theory and of the moral
principles that underlie them can provide clarity of thought and a way to sharpen one’s thinking about
those choices. And in the rapidly changing international scene characterized by American military
supremacy and nonstate actor attack, it may be that we are entering into a rare fundamental shift in the
understanding of the international system such as we have not seen in four centuries.
If our military is to conduct itself in war in ways compatible with American national values, and if
individual soldiers and officers are to be able to see themselves and their activities as morally acceptable,
they must be able to understand the moral structure of just conduct in war. Further, it is imperative that
they integrate that understanding into the routines of decisionmaking in military operations.
In the Gulf War, and in major operations since then, the language and concerns of just war are
integrated increasingly into planning and execution of military operations. Military lawyers are
integrated fully into modern targeting and operations planning cells of the U.S. military. In light of
those realities, facility in just war thinking is, indeed, a strategic leader competency. This chapter is
only an introduction to the terms and grammar of that thought. True facility in just war thinking will
come from careful and critical application of its categories to the complexities of real life and real
military operations.
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CHAPTER 4
ETHICS AND WAR IN COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
David L. Perry
This chapter highlights a wide range of ethical views on killing and war in the world’s major religious
traditions.1 One can learn a lot about a religion or culture simply by paying attention to how it answers
the question, Is it ever right to kill?2 People raised within particular religious faiths are sometimes led
to believe that their tradition always has held a consistent set of ethical principles. But what we find
when we look closely at virtually any religious tradition are teachings that are at least paradoxical,
and in some cases downright contradictory. Every major religious faith regards life (especially human
life) as sacred in some sense, and affirms mercy and compassion as basic human obligations. But
sacred scriptures and influential religious authorities also have taught that it is sometimes right to kill
other human beings. Some have gone so far as to rationalize wars of annihilation against heretics and
infidels.
Religion clearly is not the only catalyst of total war and other forms of indiscriminate violence.
People seem to be able to invent all sorts of rationales for mass killing without feeling the need to cite
the will of God. Some of the most appalling atrocities in history have been rooted not in religion per
se but rather in racial or class hatred. (Think of the 20th century victims of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol
Pot.) There may even be a genetic tendency in our species, like that of our chimpanzee relatives, to
attack and kill others for no reason except that they are not “one of us.”3
But religious violence can take on a particularly intense and ruthless character, if the objects of that
violence are seen as blaspheming or insulting God, and thus as enemies of God who must be humbled or
destroyed.4 This way of thinking continues to spark violence in countries as diverse as India, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Ireland, Indonesia, and the former Yugoslavia. I am confident, though, that some
ethical principles can be affirmed by all of the world’s major religions to limit violence, even when it
cannot—or should not—be prohibited completely.
Senior military, diplomatic and intelligence officials may profit from this chapter in at least the
following ways:
1) in recognizing the diversity of teachings within their own religion, especially its moments of violent intolerance
of other faiths, they ought to be less likely to proclaim their country’s wars as divinely ordained crusades or jihads
against enemies who might thus be denied basic rights;
2) in learning to appreciate certain ethical values and precepts in other traditions as similar to those of their own,
they will be better able to support diplomatic initiatives between countries and cultures to reduce the likelihood
of war and lessen its severity; and,
3) specifically in “the battle for hearts and minds” in places like Afghanistan and Iraq today, they may learn ways
to ally with moderate Muslims against the murderous ideologies of Al Qaeda, etc.

Eastern Traditions.
One of the oldest living religions is Hinduism. The Hindu tradition reveres all of life, and affirms an
ethical principle of ahimsa or avoiding injury to any sentient creature.5 This ethic has often led Hindus
to adopt vegetarianism and strict pacifism, and has been especially strong in Buddhism and Jainism,
both offshoots of Hinduism. The pacifist ethic nurtured by these faiths lives today among the followers
of Mahatma Gandhi and renowned Buddhist teachers like the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Thich Nhat Hanh
of Vietnam, and Maha Ghosananda of Cambodia.6
Buddhism stresses the need for people to be aware constantly of how hateful and greedy emotions
can arise in order to avoid being controlled by them and lashing out violently against others. Buddhism
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seeks to undermine social divisions like the Hindu caste system, while at the same time reinforcing its
virtue of compassion and the obligation of noninjury. As a result, the duty not to kill people or other
sentient animals applies to all Buddhists, though as an absolute duty, it often has been restricted in
practice to Buddhist monks and nuns.7 Similarly, a sacred Jain text says, “One may not kill, ill-use,
insult, torment, or persecute any kind of living being. . . .”8 Former Burmese prime minister U Nu even
renounced the use of force by the state, claiming that Buddhism “cannot sanction even such acts of
violence as are necessary for the preservation of public order and society.”9
How would pacifists within these faiths respond to a concern that nonviolence might have little or
no persuasive effect on a violent enemy and could result in the destruction of one’s community? Some
contend that violence only seems to be effective but usually ends up merely producing more violence.
Others would admit that nonviolence sometimes does not succeed in deterring or ending violence but
claim that success is not as important as doing the right thing. (The Christian pacifist John Howard
Yoder made the same point in many of his books.)
Hindus and Buddhists believe in the Law of Karma which rigorously enforces justice through an
indefinite series of rebirths. So even if evil people succeed in their present lives, Karma will ensure that
they will pay for it in their next life. Trusting in the Law of Karma can help to motivate adherents of
these faiths to overcome selfishness and hostility and resist succumbing to violence. (This functions
similarly to the Western belief in a heavenly reward for living a devout and moral life, even if one
suffers great injustice during one’s earthly life at the hands of evil people.)
In practice, though, Eastern traditions often permit some exceptions to the general rule against
killing. In mainstream Hinduism, there is an entire caste of warriors, the Ksatrias, whose role in
defending the community with force is considered to be just as important as that of the Brahmin or
priestly caste. If a Hindu man is born into the warrior caste, he is obligated to kill enemy soldiers in
defense of the community; his social role does not permit him to be a pacifist. He must kill with the
proper disposition, though, without greed or anger. (Read the “pep talk” given by the god, Krishna,
to the reluctant warrior, Arjuna, in the Bhagavad Gita.) Some Hindu gods like Indra are believed to
have warlike characteristics themselves, and are praised for destroying the enemies of orthodox Hindu
teachings and practices.10 So holy war is not entirely foreign to Hinduism.
On the other hand, total war in the sense of indiscriminate killing typically has been forbidden.
Hindu soldiers are not to kill unarmed prisoners or civilians, apparently due to a sense of chivalry: it
would be considered unprofessional for a Hindu soldier to harm defenseless people.11 (Similar values
of chivalry in the West helped to ground the modern principle of noncombatant immunity.)
Some Buddhists have argued that killing can be justified in rare cases as the lesser of evils, if the
Buddhist community or other innocent people are threatened by violent attackers, and if nonviolent
means of persuasion and protest have not succeeded. Interestingly, even when war might be waged
with just cause and as a last resort, Buddhists still regard it as inherently sinful.12 (Medieval Christians
held a similar view; see below.)
We should not infer, though, that Hindus and Buddhists have never engaged in total war or other
indiscriminate killing. Many of their leaders openly have advocated aggressive violence against people
of competing religions. Zen Buddhism was distorted in Japan to support a ruthless warrior ethic before
and during World War II. Some Buddhists in Sri Lanka have promoted the “ethnic cleansing” of Hindu
Tamils from the island. An influential Thai monk claimed in the 1970s that killing communists actually
would produce karmic merit.13 And the man who assassinated Gandhi in 1948 was a member of a
radical Hindu sect that opposed any political compromise with Islam or other faiths. But of course it is
very difficult to see how such things can be justified in light of their religions’ core values.
In the Western monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, we also encounter a
mixture of moral values—some restraining war, others promoting it. I think it is fair to say, though,
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that the problem of total war has been more frequent in these faiths than in Eastern traditions, due to a
more intense fear of unorthodox beliefs and idolatry (i.e., the worship of false gods).
Judaism.
Frequently in the Hebrew Bible14 (or what Christians call the Old Testament), love of one’s neighbor
is said to be a fundamental duty; in fact, love is to extend beyond one’s religious or ethnic kin to
include resident aliens as well (Leviticus 19:17-18, 33-34). Murder and other forms of unjust violence
are forbidden (Exodus 20:13).
The primary moral arguments underlying or reflected in those commandments appear to be: 1) God
is loving; so imitate God’s love; 2) God has shown compassion and mercy to you; so show gratitude
to God by being merciful to others; and 3) human beings are created in God’s image; so treat them as
such. (See Psalm 145:8-9, Micah 6:8, and Genesis 1:26-27, 9:6). If we considered those ideas in isolation
from some other biblical values and commandments, we might infer an ethic of strict pacifism toward
human beings, an absolute duty not to kill people, since killing even a murderous attacker might be
regarded as a kind of sacrilege as well as contradicting love.
But that apparently is not what the ancient Hebrews believed, since murder and other serious
offenses (Exodus 21-22) were subject to capital punishment, i.e., a form of intentional killing. Genesis
9:6 says, “Whoever sheds the blood of a human, by a human shall that person’s blood be shed; for in
his own image God made humankind.” I would interpret that to mean, “All persons have a basic right
not to be killed, rooted in their having been created in God’s image; but they can forfeit that right if they
commit a serious enough offense.”
So far, this would only permit those who are guilty of certain crimes to be executed, i.e., strict
retributive justice. Deuteronomy 24:16 states, “Parents are not to be put to death for their children, nor
children for their parents; each one may be put to death only for his own sin.” In addition, if this ethic
permitted war at all, it would seem to limit it to the defense of the innocent against unjust invaders, or
in punishment of their atrocities.
But collective punishment and indiscriminate war were also commanded or approved in the
Hebrew Bible, especially in cases of idolatry. The first of the Mosaic commandments prohibited the
Israelites from worshipping anyone but Yahweh. God demanded purity and strict obedience; idolatry
and blasphemy were punishable by death (Exodus 20:3, 5). Non-Israelites who lived within the area
believed by the Hebrews to have been promised to them by God were seen to pose a great temptation
to them to abandon their faith. This led them to rationalize the slaughter of entire communities, in some
of the most chilling passages in the Bible. Deuteronomy 20:16-18 says, “[In] the towns of the nations
whose land the LORD your God is giving you as your holding, you must not leave a soul alive. . . .
[Y]ou must destroy them . . . so that they may not teach you to imitate the abominable practices they
have carried on for their gods. . . .” Joshua 6:21 and 10:40 claim that “[Joshua’s army killed everyone
in Jericho], both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and donkeys. . . . Joshua defeated the
whole land . . . he left no one remaining, but utterly destroyed all that breathed, as the LORD God of
Israel commanded.”15
Israel’s external enemies were to be treated somewhat more leniently: they were first to be presented
with peace terms, and, if those were accepted, then the people would be subjugated, not killed. But if they
rejected the terms, the men would be slaughtered and the women and children enslaved (Deuteronomy
20:10-15). In those respects, the Hebrews were little different from other ancient cultures.
The later rabbinic commentators who compiled the Talmud relegated wars of annihilation and other
indiscriminate killing solely to the specific divine commands connected with the ancient conquest of
the Promised Land.16 But the Talmud also gave explicit permission for individuals to kill murderous
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pursuers, either in self-defense or in defense of others, based primarily on Genesis 9:6 (though that
verse seems to apply only to a murder that already has occurred). Maimonides even thought that killing
could be required, in light of his reading of Leviticus 19:16, “Do not stand idly by the blood of your
neighbor.” Defensive war was permitted on those grounds as well, and required if the survival of a
Jewish state were threatened. Pacifism was only recommended as a prudential option, when using force
against oppression or invasion would likely result in significantly more harm to the community.17
Even when just cause for war exists, though, Maimonides and most other rabbis urged that
nonviolent efforts to achieve justice and maintain peace be pursued first. If war begins, destruction
should not exceed what is minimally necessary to achieve important military objectives. And innocent
lives should be spared whenever possible.18
Drawing in part on those elements in the Jewish tradition, the contemporary Code of Ethics of
the Israeli Defense Forces19 requires soldiers to use minimal force and to spare civilian lives, and also
affirms the importance of respecting their dignity, property, values, and sacred sites. Clearly a war
of annihilation like Joshua’s would not be permitted under the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) Code. But
in practice the Code has not always been upheld in Palestinian areas occupied by Israel, nor during
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon during the 1980s. Israeli military force is not always discriminate or
proportionate; whole families of individual terrorists often are punished collectively (e.g., their houses
are bulldozed); and Palestinian civilians are intimidated and humiliated on a daily basis. Of course,
many Jewish people in Israel and elsewhere have criticized these tactics on moral grounds, drawing
upon centuries of Talmudic affirmations of compassion and respect for human dignity.
Christianity.
One question that has been the subject of considerable debate is whether Jesus was a pacifist, in
other words, whether he prohibited violence absolutely. Some passages in the Gospels seem to clearly
imply that, but others are more ambiguous.
Matthew, Chapter 5 reports Jesus as saying:
You have heard that it was said, “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” But I say to you, Do not resist an
evildoer. [I]f anyone strikes [or slaps] you on the right cheek, turn [and offer him] the other also. . . . You have
heard that it was said, “You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.” But I say to you, Love your enemies
and pray for those who persecute you.

These sayings seem to imply a strict rule of nonviolence.
By contrast, when Jesus spoke with Roman soldiers, he did not recommend that they abandon
their profession in order to serve God (Luke 7). Now an argument from silence is logically weak, but
it is puzzling how Jesus would have reconciled the military profession with nonresistance to evil and
love of enemies. Also, the Gospels portray Jesus as using some degree of intimidation or force to eject
the merchants from the Temple in Jerusalem (John 2:13-16). There is even a story where Jesus seems
explicitly to permit his disciples to carry swords, and by implication to use them in self-defense, though
that passage appears only in Luke 22 and is very mysterious.
Similar puzzles emerge from the stories of Jesus’ arrest. The four Gospels agree that when Jesus
was arrested by an armed group, one of his disciples drew a sword and wounded a servant of the
high priest. But the Gospels differ about what was said during that incident. In Mark’s version of the
story (14:43-52), Jesus says nothing to the disciple who inflicts the wound. Mark’s gospel is thought by
scholars to be the earliest of the four, and probably familiar at least to the writers of Matthew and Luke.
But only Mark’s gospel suggests that Jesus was silent at this point. Perhaps Mark meant to imply that
Jesus was speechless seeing one of his disciples lash out violently, but we cannot know for sure.
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In Luke’s account (22:47-51), alone among the gospels, Jesus’ disciples first ask him, “Lord, should
we strike with the sword?” But Jesus does not respond before one of them cuts the servant’s ear off.
(Perhaps he was not given enough time to reply.) Then Jesus says simply, “Stop! No more of that!” In
Luke’s version, there is only that brief command, with no supporting reasons given. It might reflect an
abhorrence of violence in general. But we might wonder why Luke’s Jesus would permit his disciples
to carry swords just a few verses earlier, yet forbid their use here in his defense.
In John’s version of the arrest (18:3-11), the disciple who uses his sword is identified as Simon
Peter, and the servant’s name is said to be Malchus. (In the other Gospels, they are nameless.) John
quotes Jesus as saying to Peter, “Put your sword back into its sheath. Am I not to drink the cup that
the Father has given me?” So John’s focus is on the need to permit Jesus’ divine mission to continue
(which includes his arrest and crucifixion), not a specific opposition to violence per se. The contrast
with Luke’s version is remarkable.
Matthew’s version of Jesus’ statement is lengthier and more complex than the others (26:51-54):
Suddenly, one of those with Jesus put his hand on his sword, drew it, and struck the slave of the high priest,
cutting off his ear. Then Jesus said to him, “Put your sword back into its place; for all who take the sword will
perish by the sword. Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once send me more than twelve
legions of angels? But how then would the scriptures be fulfilled, which say it must happen in this way?”

Note that Jesus gives at least two rationales in Matthew against the disciple’s use of his sword. One
sounds like a piece of prudential advice: if you do not want to be killed yourself, do not use lethal
weapons. (But then, would not the disciple respond, “I am perfectly willing to die to protect you”?) But
the other rationale, like John’s, might be restricted to this situation only: the disciple must not interfere
with Jesus’ mission. (We might wonder, though, how the legions of angel “reserves” are consistent
with pacifism!)
In light of this puzzling combination of texts, how did the early Christian community answer the
question of whether force could ever be justified morally? Many of them seem to have constructed
a dual ethic, one for Christians and another for the state. I will use Paul, Tertullian of Carthage, and
Origen of Alexandria to illustrate this. Those three influential Christians interpreted Jesus’ teaching
and example to prohibit all uses of force by Christians, not only in self-defense but apparently even in
defense of other innocent people.
Paul wrote to Roman Christians (ch. 12): “Do not repay anyone evil for evil, but take thought for
what is noble in the sight of all . . . . Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave room for the wrath of
God.” Over a century later, Tertullian wrote that when Jesus rebuked the disciple who defended him
at his arrest, in effect he disarmed every soldier.20 Tertullian explained to Roman rulers that Christians
believe it is better for them to be killed than to kill.21 And he stipulated that when soldiers convert
to Christianity, they must leave the military.22 His contemporary, Origen, also claimed that Jesus
prohibited homicide, so Christians may never kill or use violence for any reason.23
But all three of those early Christians, in spite of their apparently pacifist stances, also seemed to
think that God authorized the state to use lethal force for certain purposes. Paul wrote in Romans 13:
Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no authority except from God, and those
authorities that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore, whoever resists authority, resists what God has
appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Do
you wish to have no fear of the authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive its approval; for it is God’s
servant for your good. But if you do what is wrong, you should be afraid, for the authority does not bear the sword
in vain! It is the servant of God to execute wrath on the wrongdoer.24

Similarly, Tertullian said, “We [Christians] pray . . . for security to the empire; for protection to the
imperial house; for brave armies. . . .”25 And Origen claimed that although Christians will not serve in
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the military, they offer “prayers to God on behalf of those who are fighting in a righteous cause . . . that
whatever is opposed to those who act righteously may be destroyed.”26
Note that the combination of views I have cited from Paul, Tertullian, and Origen is internally
inconsistent: It is not possible to rule out killing entirely, and then permit it on the part of the state.
But it is important to recognize that those authors—and possibly most early Christians—thought strict
pacifism to be the only acceptable ethic for followers of Jesus. In light of that, no contemporary Christian
should assume that Jesus clearly approved of the use of violence, even in defense of the innocent.
Killing enemies to protect one’s family, community, or nation may be justified morally (perhaps on
nonreligious grounds), but doing so may well contradict the ethic of Jesus.27
A significant shift in Christian thinking about war occurred in the 4th and 5th centuries, after
Emperor Constantine began to use the Roman state to support the Church. According to an influential
bishop named Eusebius, absolute nonviolence was from then on to apply solely to clergy, monks,
and nuns; lay Christians now could be obligated to defend the empire with force.28 Ambrose, another
important bishop of that era, thought that Christian love entailed a duty to use force to defend innocent
third parties.29 He also shifted the focus of Christian moral concern from the act of violence to the
attitude of the agent: Christian soldiers should love their enemies—while using deadly force against
them!30
Augustine, who was influenced by Ambrose in many ways, recognized that Jesus had taught things
that seemed to entail strict nonviolence; but like Ambrose, he believed that they applied to dispositions
rather than to actions. Christians in his view are not only permitted to use force in defense of the
community, they are obligated to obey such orders from higher authorities. Augustine also came to
accept the use of force against heresy, believing it to be consistent with a benevolent desire of the
Church to correct its wayward children!31
However, Ambrose32 and Augustine33 also believed that there should be moral limits on Christian
uses of violence. Even in cases where Augustine considered war to be the lesser of evils, he regarded
all killing as ultimately tragic, always requiring an attitude of mourning and regret on the part of
Christians. Partly due to his influence, throughout most of the medieval period, killing in war was
considered a very serious sin. If a Christian soldier killed an enemy soldier, even in a war that was
considered just, he would have to do penance for the killing, often by fasting and prayer for a year or
more.34
We can also see Christian roots of the modern principle of noncombatant immunity develop in
the medieval period, when secular military ideals of chivalry combined with Christian decrees of
protection for clergy, peasants, women, and others who usually did not take part in combat.35 Thomas
Aquinas added another important ethical consideration in stipulating that Christians may only use the
minimal force needed to save lives from unjust attack,36 an early version of the just war principle of
proportionality.
But the medieval period also witnessed the emergence of total war in the name of Christianity. First,
there was increasing glorification of the Christian knight, and identification of military courage and
honor with Christian virtue. Consider how this German poem draws on John’s story of Jesus’ arrest:
Then boiled with wrath
The swift sword wielder
Simon Peter.
Speechless he,
Grieved his heart that any sought to bind his Master,
Grim the knight faced boldly the servants,
Shielding his Suzerain,
Not craven his heart,
Lightning swift unsheathed his sword,
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Strode to the first foe,
Smote a strong stroke,
Clave with the sharp blade
On the right side the ear from Malchus.37

(The glorification of Peter here is rather ironic, in that Jesus rebuked him for using his sword! But the
poem no doubt stirred its audience to imagine that if they had been with Jesus at his arrest, they might
have hoped to have the disciple’s courage and sense of moral outrage.)
Now by themselves, military courage and honor might help to reinforce limits on war conduct,
e.g., in protecting noncombatants from gratuitous harm. But many of the traditional restraints on war
advocated by the Church started to erode in the medieval period.
In the 9th century, the Vatican declared that death in battle could be beneficial for Christian soldiers
spiritually: their sins could be erased if they died in defense of the Church, and they would be guaranteed
entry into heaven.38 (This is not unlike the assurances given to contemporary Muslim suicide bombers
by recruiters from Al Qaeda, Hamas, etc.)
In the year 1095, Pope Urban II launched what later came to be called the First Crusade, urging
European leaders to rescue the Holy Land from its Muslim occupiers. The Pope referred to Muslims
as a “vile race” and an “unclean nation” that had polluted Christian holy places, and called for their
destruction. Killing Muslims became, in effect, a way for Christians to obtain remission of their sins.39
Moral rules governing the conduct of war were abandoned. No one was immune from attack by Christian
crusaders; whole cities were slaughtered. Even Jews in Germany were massacred by crusaders on their
way to Palestine.40 Thus, ironically and tragically, a religion that began with the largely nonviolent
teachings and example of Jesus evolved in its first millennium to the point where Christians were
waging total, indiscriminate war against heretics and “infidels.”
In the wake of a series of devastating wars in Europe between Catholics and Protestants, some
Christians like Francisco de Vitoria concluded that mere difference of religion should no longer be
considered just cause for war.41 Most Christians today would find total war morally repugnant, of
course, especially if waged in the name of God. Some even continue in the ancient path of pacifism
in obedience to Jesus’ sayings on love of enemies and nonretaliation against evil. But total holy war
against infidels also remains a continuing temptation for Christians, as suggested by the popularity of
the bloodthirsty Left Behind series of novels by Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins.42
Islam.
The Qur’an, the most sacred Muslim text, repeatedly refers to God as compassionate and just. It
also insists that “there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256), meaning that authentic submission to God
must be freely and sincerely chosen, not forced.43 (The word “Islam” means submission.) The Qur’an
urges Muslims to use “beautiful preaching” to persuade people to accept Islam, and to “argue nicely”
with Jews and Christians who are seen as worshipping the same God as their own (16:125, 29:46).44
Those ideas taken in isolation might tend to preclude holy war, and perhaps even ground some
form of pacifism. In fact, the Prophet Muhammad was said to have practiced nonviolence during the
first 12 years of his prophetic career, even in the face of serious persecution by polytheists in Mecca.45
The Prophet’s stance during that early Meccan period eventually served as the model for a nonviolent
Islamic movement in 20th century Afghanistan led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a friend and admirer of
Gandhi.46
But after the Prophet’s escape to Medina in 622, he came to believe that God permitted and even
commanded the use of force in defense of his growing religious community. Qur’an 22:39-40 says,
“Permission is given to those who fight because they have been wronged . . . unjustly expelled from
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their homes only because they say, ‘Our Lord is Allah.”47 Like the Hebrew Bible, the Qur’an mandates
capital punishment for certain offenses, though it also urges mercy and forgiveness in other cases.
Muhammad often urged diplomacy rather than war to resolve disputes.48
But some scholars believe that certain verses in the Qur’an (9:5 and 73) and other sayings of the
Prophet go beyond defensive and retributive uses of force to permit offensive jihad to expand the
territory of Islam. The word jihad, by the way, means struggle or effort. Jihad can refer to the struggle
of the individual Muslim to conform his or her will to Allah’s, or to a peaceful effort to persuade others
to accept Islam. But jihad also can mean holy war. In fact, there is a sense in which the only completely
just war in Islamic terms is a holy war, since it has to be approved by proper religious authorities and
waged to defend or promote Islam or the Muslim community.49
So in spite of the Qur’anic statement against forcing religion on others, Muslim leaders sometimes
have threatened to kill unbelievers if they did not accept Islam. Muhammad himself was said to condemn
Muslims to death if they abandoned their faith. Some of the early Muslim raids out of Medina against
trading caravans would be hard to interpret as strictly defensive. And although Islam spread to some
parts of the world like Indonesia mainly by means of “beautiful preaching,” much of its expansion
elsewhere was due to offensive war, first by Muhammad to unify Arabia, then by his followers in
conquering the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, for many years the caliphs (Muslim political
leaders) were expected to wage offensive jihad at least once a year!50
However, Muhammad and his successors did establish some important moral rules for fighting
holy wars: women, children, and the elderly were not to be killed intentionally, though they could be
enslaved. Monks, nuns, and the disabled also were to be spared from execution after a battle. Muslim
military leaders were able to draw upon some pre-Islamic principles of Arab chivalry against killing
defenseless people.51 In other words, Islamic holy wars were never supposed to be total wars involving
indiscriminate killing and scorched-earth tactics, in spite of what the leaders of Al Qaeda, Hamas, or
Hizbollah might say to the contrary.52
On the other hand, Muslim leaders explicitly were permitted by Muhammad to kill all captured
soldiers, and most adult male civilians if they were polytheists, or even if they were Jews or Christians
but had fought instead of paying the poll tax. So Islam traditionally did not uphold a comprehensive
principle of noncombatant immunity. Also, if civilians were likely to be killed in attacks on military
areas, Muslim ethics permitted that as regrettable but necessary “collateral damage”—in fact, the moral
blame rested entirely on the enemy leaders for putting their citizens in harm’s way.53
But many contemporary Muslim leaders strongly advocate noncombatant immunity, as well as a
duty to minimize harms to civilians in otherwise legitimate military attacks, i.e., in-bello proportionality.
Such leaders also have condemned terrorism committed in the name of Allah, including the September
11, 2001, attacks against the United States.54 However, the contemporary challenge facing moderate
Muslims to counter the misguided ethic of Muslim extremists can hardly be overestimated.55
Conclusions.
Tragically, some advocates of aggressive religious war can still be found today in all of the world’s
major religions. What they cannot legitimately claim, though, is that their position is the authentic
expression of their faith. Indeed, each of the traditions I have discussed contains ethical principles
that are incompatible with total war. Furthermore, in order for members of those faith communities
to continue to believe that God is compassionate and just, I think they must repudiate claims and values
in their own scriptures and traditions that are incompatible with those ideas. It does not blaspheme
or insult God to believe that God’s actions are limited by objective moral principles. To say that God
would never condone or command total war, cruelty, or the intentional killing of innocent people does
not represent a significant limit on God’s power.
38

Moreover, I think that people of many different faiths, as well as those of no religious faith, might
concur with the following ethical principles and rules, though some will not be acceptable to strict
pacifists:
1) All people have a prima facie right not to be killed. This right can only be forfeited if they intentionally try to kill
innocent people, or while they are combatants in war.56
2) Given the immense destruction and loss of life that war usually brings, all nonviolent means of realistically
achieving just objectives should be tried first.
3) War should only be waged when necessary to protect the rights and welfare of the innocent.
4) Innocent civilians should not be directly targeted.
5) Weapons and tactics should not be used against military targets in ways that are certain to cause civilian
casualties, unless that is the only way to protect one’s own soldiers or civilians. Even then, harms to enemy civilians
should be minimized.
6) Captured soldiers should not be tortured or summarily executed, but treated humanely.
7) Each side should be held accountable for any atrocities committed by its military forces.

Similar principles and rules arose out of the western just-war tradition and have been incorporated
into international treaties like the Hague and Geneva conventions. But as I have tried to suggest in
this chapter, such principles are not unique to the West or to Christianity in particular: every major
religious tradition has developed comparable ones. It ought to be possible for people of all faiths to
work in concert to implement such principles, without first having to agree on which views of God are
best.
The just-war tradition rejects strict pacifism as insufficient to protect the innocent from unjust attack.
But just-war rules, at least when applied in a careful and honest way, also guard against total war waged
in the name of religion or any other cause. Religious communities can help to ensure that political and
military leaders abide by these rules and inculcate respect for them in the training and management of
soldiers. But just as importantly, faith communities can nurture firmly rooted habits and dispositions of
compassion and nonviolence, reducing the likelihood and severity of war by dispelling the ignorance,
fear and hatred that too often inspire and escalate it.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER:
REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY
Thomas W. McShane
We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world
where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.
President George H. Bush

World events since 1648 have reflected the political, social, economic, and military aspirations of
people organized into sovereign states. Increasingly, they reflect the influence and authority, both
real and perceived, of international law, a development which has become evident since the end of
the Cold War, but whose roots go back much further. Recent international interventions in places as
diverse as Kuwait, Somalia, East Timor, Haiti, and Kosovo, conducted under the auspices of the United
Nations (UN), regional organizations such as North Atlantic Treaty Organiation (NATO), or by ad
hoc coalitions, are shaped by a large and growing body of treaties, practices, and customs collectively
referred to as international law.
Americans traditionally respect and support international law and, in fact, have been instrumental in
its development for more than a century.1 At the same time, they become frustrated when international
law restrains or limits the pursuit of national interests. This was illustrated vividly in the debates and
reactions surrounding American-led efforts to compel disarmament or regime change in Iraq throughout
2002 and 2003. Regardless, its is essential that strategic leaders understand the global environment as
it exists today. International law constitutes an important element of the geopolitical environment, one
we ignore at our peril.
This chapter traces the development and evolution of international law, its principal components
and characteristics, and its relative influence on international politics and events over time. It proposes
that international law has evolved to a level where it competes with sovereignty as an organizing
principal of international relations. Although sovereignty is likely to remain a critical component of
the international system, it faces a growing threat from international organizations and institutions
that pursue international order and individual rights at the expense of traditional rights enjoyed by
sovereign states.
Conventional wisdom would hold that this phenomenon sprung to life after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1990. To the contrary, as this chapter will demonstrate, the
“recent” ascendancy of international law represents major developments in religion, philosophy, and
law over centuries, and is shaped by the cataclysmic wars and associated excesses of the 20th century.
Critical components of today’s international system matured in relative obscurity during the Cold
War as groups and nations sought self-determination, peace, democracy, and individual freedoms.
While it is easy for scholars and statesmen alike to overlook historical trends, we must examine how
developments in international law have subtly but certainly redefined sovereignty and how states have
adapted, or not adapted, to this reality.
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FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Search for Order.
Humans seek order in life. Religion traditionally reflects our search for meaning and purpose, but
social institutions also reflect this desire. In ancient times, families organized themselves into tribes,
then cities, states, and empires. Social order implies security and a sense of predictability. Order
promotes prosperity and growth—both individual and collective. At the same time, order discourages
destructive social behavior and competition for scarce resources.2 Order requires a degree of cooperation
and sacrifice and, by definition, some inherent limitation on individual freedom. The political process
is the means usually used to create order and determine social rules and mores. Laws are crafted to
facilitate and support this process.
Order may be imposed within groups or nations or states. On occasion, international order may
be imposed by hegemonic powers, for example the Roman Empire, the British Empire at its height in
the 19th century, and by American power since 1945. But scholars typically describe the international
system as unstructured, or anarchic, in nature. States strive for supremacy, or hegemony, over other
states. International politics is a “ruthless and dangerous business . . . [t]his situation, which no one
consciously designed or intended, is genuinely tragic.”3 Others analyze the international system in
different terms: the dynamic of how states establish international order, e.g., balance of power, bipolar,
or hegemonic systems; the nature of state actors as determining state behavior, e.g., democracies act
one way, revolutionary states another, etc.; and the influence of individual decisionmakers, e.g., great
men drive events—Churchill, Hitler, etc.4
Rule of law is widely regarded as an independent basis of international order. The National Security
Strategy of the United States tells us that the “nonnegotiable demands of human dignity” include “the
rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice;
respect for women, religious tolerance; and respect for private property.”5 Establishing the rule of
law was a stated objective of international efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, among others.
Efforts to establish rule of law in places such as Kosovo, and more recently, Iraq, illustrate the tensions
between international law and sovereignty which we will examine in detail later.
Defining International Law.
Law prescribes norms of proper behavior, or as Blackstone says in his Commentaries, “a rule of civil
conduct, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.”6 These rules may be prescribed
by the sovereign, but they are usually based on religious, cultural, and moral values. As such, the law
often depends upon voluntary compliance, or more precisely on social pressure to conform. Sanctions
may be imposed in cases where individuals will not or cannot comply.
Others feel that laws by definition require sanctions:
It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment
for disobedience If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands, which pretend to
be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than advice. . . .7

Regardless, law provides a foundation for order, stability, predictability, and enjoys general acceptance
by the population at large. Laws not generally accepted, perhaps because they do not reflect widelyheld beliefs or morals, or serve no constructive purpose, often are ignored and prove particularly
difficult to enforce.8 Lastly, law evolves; it is not static. Laws change regularly, and considerably over
long periods of time. While all this is true with respect to municipal, or domestic, law, does it apply
equally to international law?
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International law has been defined as “the body of rules and principles of action which are binding
upon civilized states in their relations with one another.”9 Critics question, and we will examine later,
whether international law can be “binding,” and the efficacy of its application outside its Western
European incubator—the so-called “civilized” states. Yet a closer look reveals that international law
plays an essential role in global trade and commerce, regulating disputes, compensation, banking, and
laws applying to a given transaction. It is indispensable to international transportation, regulating
sea and air routes, privileges and immunities, and claims for loss or damage.10 International treaties
establish standards for the sciences, health, and the environment.11
The law of war is most familiar to us as that branch of public international law regulating armed
conflict between states, and increasingly within states suffering from civil war, or intrastate conflict.
This body of law provided the foundation for the war crimes tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo
following World War II, and later for the international tribunals organized to adjudicate war crimes
and crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Even more recently, the Rome Statute
established the International Criminal Court, a standing, rather than ad hoc, tribunal which recently
became operational and whose jurisdiction may be unlimited.12
In most aspects, international law serves the same purposes as and shares common attributes with
municipal law: it provides a foundation for order, is founded on religious, cultural, and moral values,
serves to provide stability and predictability, and enjoys general acceptance among the international
community. International law protects rights of states and individuals alike. In one important particular,
however, the international legal system differs from municipal systems—there is no sanction for
noncompliance, if by sanction is meant imposition of penalty by a higher authority. This theme recurs
in any discussion of international law, although its relevance is often overstated.13
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Classical Antecedents.
Historians refer to the “laws” of ancient Greece and Rome and their influence on modern western
institutions. Although recognizing that a sophisticated system of laws provided a foundation for order
and stability, as well as for a wide-ranging commercial system that stretched from Britain to Asia
Minor and ringed the Mediterranean, neither civilization understood the concept of international law
as we apply the term today.14 Ancient Greeks, Romans, and Chinese customarily did not treat outsiders
as their equals in an international system of equals. Greeks regarded non-Greeks as uncivilized; the
Roman Empire did not negotiate acquisitions, it simply took them. The Chinese considered any group
of peoples outside the “Middle Kingdom” as barbarians not worthy of their full attention.15
Natural Law, Feudalism, and Westphalia.
Elements of modern international law existed before creation of the Westphalian system in 1648.
Ancient philosophers, the Romans, and their heirs believed in “natural law,” a higher law of nature
that controlled all human endeavors, and to which all are bound, even kings and rulers. An expression
of this concept is found in the term ius gentium, meaning a principle of universal application that all
follow because it has been discovered independently by application of reason, a “natural law.” Our
contemporary use of the phrase “human rights,” examined in this context, becomes for us a form of
natural law or ius gentium, and a fundamental principle of international order.16
Other elements of international order evolved during the Middle Ages, particularly concepts of
property rights and loyalty to the sovereign, key elements of modern nation-states. Under feudalism,
property rights of the ruler shaped feudal society and dictated a network of complicated but well45

understood relationships that provided stability and order. Feudalism depended upon loyalty
up and loyalty down the social hierarchy. All were bound by reciprocal responsibilities. While the
Catholic Church provided legitimacy and support of feudal institutions, these principles survived
the Reformation. The idea that states enjoy sovereignty and the right to control territory is a feudal
legacy.17
Finally, following the self-destructive upheaval of the religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries,
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 provided needed order, stabilizing borders and relationships. Kings
could dictate any religion they wished within their borders, but foreswore any rights to interfere in
the religious affairs of other sovereign states. This principle was violated frequently for political, if not
religious, reasons, but the Treaty achieved its purpose.
Once states became sovereign, a way had to be found for them to interact on a nominal basis of
equality. Guiding principles of relations between sovereign states rested on five basic assumptions.
States had the right to: make laws; act independently in international affairs; control their territory and
people; issue currency; and utilize the resources of the state. Sovereignty thus became the organizing
element of modern history.
INTERNATIONAL LAW HIERARCHY
The sources of international law are divided into four categories, arranged in a hierarchy.18 At the top
are conventions, treaties, and agreements, such as the UN Charter, or the Law of the Sea Treaty. These
represent contractual relationships between sovereign states, and states are bound by their obligations
freely undertaken.19
The second source of international law is the practice of states, referred to as customary international
law. No hard and fast rule governs customary international law. It reflects the behavior of states over
time, acting in accordance with what they believe to be the dominant rules of international order.
Customary law exists independently of treaty law, although treaty law may help to shape customary
law.20
The third source is principles of law recognized by the leading, or so-called “civilized” nations.
International politics help to define these principles, which are also shaped by the municipal law of
states.21
The fourth and final source of international law represents judicial decisions and the writings
of jurists and scholars. These include the opinions issued by the International Court of Justice, its
predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and
the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). Writings
of scholars supplement these decisions, illustrating and explaining the state of the law based on their
experience and study. Changes in the law are often preceded by debate among jurists and scholars over
what the law should be. Their authority is persuasive and influential, not substantive.22
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOVEREIGNTY—AN EVOLUTIONARY RELATIONSHIP
A Marriage of Convenience.
International law has never existed in a vacuum. It reflects existing norms and mores, and illustrates
the difficulty of constructing international order in a disordered world. The Westphalian system has
provided the fundamental framework for order for over 3 centuries and has greatly influenced the
development of international law. Over time sovereignty has ebbed and flowed, as prevailing practices
and international politics shaped the behavior of the leading states. To the extent these practices and
politics establish binding precedent, they help to define international law.
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This portion of the chapter examines how recognized principles of international law and sovereignty
developed simultaneously over time. Although sovereignty has provided the dominant basis for
international order, it has consistently adapted to accommodate evolving concepts of government,
freedom, human rights, and the quest for predictability and stability,23 the historical attributes of
international law.
Sovereignty and the Divine Rights of Kings.
Early models of sovereignty were based on the prevailing form of government in 17th Century
Europe—monarchies ruled by hereditary dynasties of kings or emperors. Consistent with historical
political and religious practice, individuals were subordinate to the state, represented by the king.
Other precedents existed, going back to classical Greece and its democratic ideals,24 but prevailing
norms made kings absolute rulers of their states, and they exercised their authority with little regard
for the sensibilities of their subjects.
Contemporary writers described the nature of this relationship. Jean Bodin wrote in 1576 that law
comes from the king who, although not bound by his own laws, was not above the law of nature,
an important exception bearing on future developments.25 Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan: “It
appeareth plainly that the sovereign power . . . is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make
it.”26 Louis XIV of France, the “Sun King,” epitomized the classical sovereign—not merely the head of
the state, but its very embodiment, anointed by God to rule. Subjects owed unquestioningly loyalty to
the king, who might or might not act in their best interests. More precisely, the ling’s interests were
the state’s interests. Hence the dynastic wars of Louis XIV, waged to expand the glory of France and of
Louis XIV, were the business of the King and his advisors, not the people of France. As characterized
in popular culture: “It’s good to be the King!”27
Not everyone regarded sovereignty this way. Hugo de Groot, also known as Grotius, is referred to
as the father of international law for his treatises on international law and the law of war. He was also
a proponent of the law of nature and reason. He saw excesses in unbridled sovereignty:
I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations should
be ashamed; men resorting to arms for trivial or for no reasons at all, and . . . no reverence left for divine or human
law, exactly as if a single edict had released a madness driving men to all kinds of crime.28

As the culminating act of the English Civil War and the Thirty Years’ War, the British throne of Charles I
fell to the reformist Protestant armies of Oliver Cromwell. In 1649, one year after Westphalia, Cromwell
had King Charles beheaded. Sovereignty was no longer coexistent with monarchy.29
The Enlightenment and Age of Reason.
During the 18th century, philosophers, scholars, and popular writers rediscovered the writings
of the ancient Greeks, combining them with Christian philosophy and natural law into a doctrine of
Enlightenment. Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson, among others, emphasized individual rights and the
obligations of sovereigns toward their citizens.30 Their beliefs were incorporated into the Declaration of
Independence and the American and French Revolutions.
The established order elsewhere did not change, but regime change in America and France,
replacing monarchies with democratically-based governments, was a harbinger of things to come. It
advanced the idea that sovereignty vested in the people, rather than in the government or the ruler,
and demonstrated the efficacy of a higher law, themes that would resurface periodically in the 19th
century and erupt in the latter half of the 20th century. International agreements and treaties began to
recognize that individuals as well as states have rights.31
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The Concert of Europe, Industrialism, and Colonialism.
Following the 25-year struggle to suppress Revolutionary France and Napoleon Bonaparte, the major
powers of Europe in 1815 sought to reestablish order, stability, and a balance of power. In response
to Napoleon’s imperial ambitions, the political leaders who met in Vienna created a system firmly
grounded in sovereignty and balanced so as to preclude a return to revolution. Under the leadership
of Prince Metternich of Austria and Lord Castlereigh of Great Britain, they succeeded in establishing a
framework for peace that would survive essentially intact for 100 years.32
Other influences shaped the 19th century. Charles Darwin’s scientific work on evolution stimulated
development of a social philosophy known as social Darwinism, extrapolating Darwin’s theories of
natural selection and survival of the fittest species into international relations and politics. Those
nations which were strongest were most likely and best suited to survive. Social Darwinism heavily
influenced political leaders such as Bismarck and Theodore Roosevelt.33 Sovereign states exerted a sort
of muscular self-interest in their international relations, demonstrating their superiority by economic
growth and territorial acquisition. The last great era of Colonialism was the result, as France, Great
Britain, and Germany competed to acquire overseas colonies. The United States, too, succumbed to
temptation at the end of the century, acquiring overseas interests in the Hawaii, the Philippines, Cuba,
and Panama, among others.34 The sovereign rights of underdeveloped, militarily weak states counted
for little in this environment.
Facilitating economic expansion in an era of relative peace were the modern technologies of
steamships, railroads, and telegraphs. The speed of communication and transportation caused the
world to “shrink,” as trade, commerce, and banking connected the continents, creating the first era of
“globalization.” The modern unified industrial state came into its own as the United States, Germany,
and Italy consolidated their territorial boundaries and joined the ranks of the great powers.35 In many
regards, it was the apogee of sovereignty.
At the same time other, largely unseen developments reflected the dark side of unbridled sovereignty
and hinted at issues that would rise to prominence in the 20th century. The industrial revolution
prompted upward mobility and increased the size of the middle class in most western nations, yet it
also created a new urban underclass, with associated problems of disease, family breakup, and child
labor. Visible disparity in wealth and power in developed states caused socialism to flourish, creating
revolutionary pressures that threatened the established order. Karl Marx promulgated his economic
theories preaching class warfare. Modest political reform helped to defuse tensions and postpone the
final accounting for at least another generation.
Public international law played an important role in international affairs, particularly through
treaties regulating trade, communication, and finance. Henri Dunant founded the International Red
Cross in Geneva in 1863 to mitigate the destructive effect of modern war.36 The first Geneva Convention
covering treatment of sick and wounded on the battlefield was signed in 1864.37 Based largely on the
Lieber Code of 1863,38 promulgating laws of war for Union armies in the American Civil War, the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 190739 attempted to prescribe means and methods of warfare consistent
with existing humanitarian principles. Concerns over certain acts in the recent war with Iraq—use of
civilian hostages, fighting from protected places such as hospitals or mosques, combatants not wearing
military uniforms—can be traced directly to the Hague Conventions.40
The 20th Century—Age of Conflict and Ideology.
The 20th century was marked by tremendous highs and abysmal lows. The best and the worst
of human nature were on public display, often at the same time. The era was marked by three major
world wars, two hot and one cold, and the clash of powerful ideologies. Socialism, Communism,
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Nazism, and Fascism emerged fully-grown on the world stage, competing with democracy for primacy
in the hearts and minds of nations. Tentative steps to form world government were taken. Natural law
resurfaced in the guise of anti-colonialism, self-determination of peoples, the human rights movement,
and demands for equality by the non-Western world. Change accelerated development, redefining
political and cultural priorities. The second great era of globalization and progress brought the world
closer, yet left others even farther behind. The similarities between 1903 and 2003 are striking, as are
the differences. The maturation of international law and sovereignty’s accommodation to change is one
major highlight of the century that we will examine more closely.
The Great War—Changing of the Guard.
The period immediately following World War I is essential to understanding the rest of the 20th
century. The issues facing the allied powers in Versailles, and the choices made then and over the next
decade dictated the course of events for the remainder of the century. International law emerged as a
critical component of international order and would play a major role in international politics.
World War I, The Great War, caused tremendous upheaval in the established order. The victorious
allies attempted to address these problems at Versailles in 1919. First was the unexpected scope of
violence and destruction, prompting calls for vengeance—war reparations to be paid by the losers
and trials of those responsible for the conflict. Second was the collapse of major empires—the German,
Austrian-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires on the losing side, and the Russian Empire in 1917 on
the allied side—and the emergence of the United States as the predominant military and economic
power.41 The third problem was the creation of new nation-states out of the former empires. Lastly,
lack of consensus concerning the goals of the war and what the allies had won plagued the peace and
designs for international order.
Revolutionary efforts to create a world government fell short—the League of Nations was a start,
but not a sufficient one. President Woodrow Wilson’s visions for the postwar order clashed with the
national interests of the allies and frustrated effective, unified action. The Versailles Treaty became a
compromise. Complicating matters, Wilson failed to persuade the American public or the U.S. Senate to
ratify the treaty creating the League of Nations, and without American participation the League proved
too weak to enforce Wilson’s vision of collective security—peace through the rule of law supported
by military force when necessary.42 Wilson’s vision would be revived in 1945 and again in 1990 with
relatively greater success.
Attempts to try the Kaiser and others for War Crimes encountered similar problems. The allies
could not agree, and the Germans would not cooperate. Ambitious plans drawn up at the Paris Peace
Conference in 1920 called for some 900 war criminals to be tried, but allied disunity and German
recalcitrance prevailed. As a compromise, 12 German soldiers ranging from private to lieutenant general
were tried in German courts; six were convicted, with the most severe sentence being 4 years.43
One encouraging development at Versailles was public debate over rule of law and ethics superseding
national interests and international politics. The conflict between these poles of international order
would continue throughout the 20th century and still exists. As Kissinger characterizes it:
At the end of the First World War, the age-old debate about the relative roles of morality and interest in international
affairs seemed to have been resolved in favor of the dominance of law and ethics. Under the shock of the cataclysm,
many hoped for a better world as free as possible from the kind of Realpolitik which, in their view, had decimated
the youth of a generation.44

Efforts to enforce peace through rule of law continued for over a decade following Versailles. Arms
control agreements took the place of serious collective security enforcement. Examples include the
Naval Conferences at Washington in 1922 and London in 1930, regulating the number and size of
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battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, then considered the major strategic weapons of the
great powers.45 In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 the signatory parties agreed to renounce war as an
instrument of national policy.46
In the end, sovereignty and national interests proved too strong for the Wilsonians. International law
became just another diplomatic tool as the great states rearmed themselves for World War II. Former
President Theodore Roosevelt, still a keen observer of world events, captured the essence of power
politics when he said: “As yet there is no likelihood of establishing any kind of international power . . .
which can effectively check wrong-doing . . . I regard . . . trusting to fantastic peace treaties, to impossible
promises, to all kinds of scraps of paper without any backing in efficient force, as abhorrent.”47
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
World War II and the Search for International Order.
The world got a second chance in 1945 to recreate international order. The unprecedented destruction
of the second major war in a generation dwarfed that of 1914-18 and brought modern war to the home
front with a vengeance. Millions of noncombatants became casualties of war. The discovery of nuclear
fission at the end of the war threatened even greater destruction in any future conflict. Sovereignty had
to be checked, and international law was applied to the task. The problem was neatly defined by one
study:
A sovereign state at the present time claims the power to judge its own controversies, to enforce its own conception
of its rights, to increase its armaments without limit, to treat its own nationals as it sees fit, and to regulate its
economic life without regard to the effect of such regulations upon its neighbors. These attributes of sovereignty
must be limited.48

The creation of the UN in 1945 and the proceedings of the Nuremberg Tribunal immediately
following were watershed events that permanently altered the nature of the debate regarding a state’s
right to wage war and its treatment of its citizens. Together they announced to the world that aggressive
war would no longer be tolerated and that individuals who commit aggression and crimes against
humanity will be held criminally responsible for their acts. It was a sincere effort and a good start,
enjoying almost universal support.
One of the early UN proclamations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,49 outlined
fundamental human rights in terms reminiscent of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of
Rights. It was intended as common standard for “all peoples and all nations.”50 Although aspirational
in tone and lacking an enforcement mechanism, it has served for more than 50 years as a beacon for
people in search of freedom and justice. Over the following decades, International agreements outlawing
genocide, recognizing the rights of minorities, and emphasizing humanitarian concerns consistently
advanced individual rights at the expense of state sovereignty.51
Collective security acquired new life after World War II with the creation of the UN, NATO, the
Organization of American States (OAS), and other international and regional organizations. Although
the Cold War provided the initial impetus for NATO, it survives as a viable, productive organization.
With expanded membership and new missions, NATO today provides collective security while
extending democracy and prosperity to the nations of Eastern Europe, a development unimagined a
generation ago.
The Rule of Law and Human Rights Center Stage.
The rule of law in international affairs is manifest in many ways: by actions of the UN Security
Council and other UN organizations;52 by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) advancing collective
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western values and international humanitarian law; by treaties regulating strategic nuclear weapons,
conventional weapons, and chemical/biological weapons;53 by international agreement on global
warming; by creation of an international criminal court;54 and by the number of “coalitions of the
willing” contributing forces to intervene in intrastate conflicts.
A common misperception is that these developments emerged all at once in 1990 with the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.55 The incorporation of international law and human
rights into international relations since 1945 stems from historical trends and events. It reflects timeless
values, classical and modern philosophy, and the common experiences of mankind over centuries.
Although it is true that the bipolar system and threat of great power veto limited the ability of the United
Nations Security Council to take effective action throughout the Cold War, the quest for international
order based on rule of law consistently influenced political developments and discourse.
The struggle to end colonialism and promote self-determination of peoples following World War
II is illustrative. The UN Charter, firmly rooted in sovereignty, contemplated the end of Western
colonialism.56 The United States advocated renunciation of overseas imperial holdings and supported
self-determination.57 During World War II, in fact, our stance on this issue periodically created rifts
within the Anglo-French-U.S. partnership.58 After the war, at the same time we were developing a
Containment Policy against Communism, we were calling for an end to British and French rule in
Africa and Asia. When newly independent colonial states lapsed into Communism, as happened in
Vietnam, we suddenly found ourselves with a new problem on our hands, one as much political as
military in nature.59 The search for order, justice, and democracy stumbled on the rock of great power
politics. International law alone could not preserve the peace.
Cold War arms control agreements60 reflected not so much American and Soviet optimism as they
did global public opinion, uneasy over the prospect of annihilation at the hands of the two superpowers.
With the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, mutual assured destruction became a fact. With
satellite technology, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) acquired
the capacity to place nuclear weapons in earth orbit.61 Many states became fervent practitioners of
international law for purely parochial reasons, but the success of the international community,
particularly nonaligned states, in framing global debate demonstrated the force of western values and
the rule of law. These trends emerged in the 1950s, and acquired prominence in the 1960s and 1970s.
Neither the UN nor the international community could force the great powers to take specific actions
against their interests, but this does not mean that the great powers, including the United States and
USSR, were free to do as they pleased. Pressures to comply with world opinion were subtle and often
invisible, but real nonetheless.
Contributing to the force of international law was the proliferation of NGOs in the decades following
World War II. NGOs pursued their own special interests, but most had an underlying humanitarian
agenda, advancing the cause of human rights and promoting “International Humanitarian Law.”62 The
International Committee of the Red Cross is the oldest and best-known of the NGOs.63 Human Rights
Watch, Doctors without Border, CARE, and thousands of others effectively precipitated international
intervention in what had been considered previously the internal affairs of sovereign states.64
Two examples illustrate the power and influence NGOs have acquired. The first is the UN
intervention in Somalia in 1992, under American leadership, to ensure delivery of relief supplies and
avert a humanitarian disaster forecast by NGOs and highlighted on television screens around the world.
UN intervention alleviated the immediate problem, but failed to address the underlying problem of
stability. When it did, too little and too late, it led to the battle of Mogadishu and eventual withdrawal
of U.S. forces.
The second example of NGO influence is the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines.65 The preamble to
the Treaty states in part:
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Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total
ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban landmines, and numerous other nongovernmental
organizations around the world, Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the
right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, . . . 66

NGOs and international celebrities like Princess Diana of Britain actively participated in the Conference
process, dismissing security concerns raised by the United States. Humanitarian concerns over civilians
killed or maimed by abandoned land mines preoccupied the Conference and carried the day. While not
a party to the treaty, the United States has conceded substantial compliance by policy.67
THE STATE OF THE STATE—SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Trends and Developments.
Trends evident in 2003 reflect the foregoing discussion. In advanced states, post-industrial society
has replaced basic industry and manufacturing, which has migrated to less-developed countries with
lower labor costs. Globalization draws nations and peoples closer, despite recent economic setbacks.
The World Trade Organization is a powerful international force that influences decisions of the leading
economic powers, including the United States.68 International labor organizations demand basic
standards and benefits for workers and workplaces. These trends undermine sovereignty and reflect
a tightly structured international environment that constrains even the strongest states to behave in
ways promoting international order.
Human rights influence international agendas and domestic actions. International humanitarian
intervention, evident in Kosovo, East Timor, and possibly Iraq, is an emerging precedent that demands
attention. It is not yet customary international law, but lively debate on the subject tends to redefine
how we view sovereignty.69 This represents, ironically, the triumph of values advanced by Wilson at
Versailles almost a century ago. The principles of the American and French revolutions have become
universal, though not all states concede that individual rights supersede the welfare of the state, most
notably China, the world’s most populous state.
Themes for the 21st Century.
International law will play an important role in addressing issues and trends likely to persist for
decades to come. The most important of these include: a globalized economy; urbanization; intrastate
conflict; clash of cultures; unequal distribution of wealth; environmental degradation; transnational
crime; collective security; multilateralism; and humanitarian intervention. Global problems require
global solutions; sovereign states cannot solve them, although they can address symptoms within their
borders. Most, eventually, will require international cooperation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS
International law challenges strategic leaders to think globally, not nationally. The positivist
approach to international law expressed in the S.S. Lotus case: “Restrictions upon the independence
of States cannot therefore be presumed,”70 is threatened by a new paradigm: “a law more readily seen
as the reflection of a collective juridical conscience and as a response to the social necessities of States
organized as a community.”71 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan articulated this new paradigm as
follows:
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State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalization and
international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and
not vice versa.72

The implications of this principle are staggering. Yet Kofi Annan is no revolutionary; his language is
reminiscent of Thomas Jefferson’s in the Declaration of Independence: “That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed.”
States exist to promote and protect individual rights and freedoms. The challenge for international
leaders is what action the international community should take in those cases where states deliberately
and systematically violate the human rights of their citizens.73
None of this implies that sovereign states cannot guarantee, promote, and advance human rights.
To the contrary, the American experience teaches us that individual rights and rule of law are mutually
supportive and thrive in a strongly nationalistic, democratic environment. Ironically, the American
experience also encourages internationalism in the promotion of democratic values. As President
George Bush has stated in his National Security Strategy: “We will defend the peace by fighting
terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers.
We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”74 This sentiment
resembles Wilson’s and, indeed, those of most presidents since 1918. Henry Kissinger portrays this as
an essential element of American altruism motivating our actions abroad: “Wilson put forward the
unprecedented doctrine that the security of America was inseparable from the security of all the rest of
mankind. This implied that it was henceforth America’s duty to oppose aggression everywhere . . . .”75
The current world situation encourages debate over the scope and authority of international law.
Recent American actions in Iraq, taken contrary to international public opinion, without the endorsement
of the UN Security Council, and against the wishes of longstanding allies such as France, Germany,
and Turkey, support Mersheimer’s proposition that great powers behave as their interests dictate.76
Perhaps sovereignty is alive and well after all. Unilateral action can, at least in certain cases, achieve the
same results as multilateral efforts.
Proponents of international order and rule of law argue that lasting order cannot be imposed
unilaterally. The Congress of Vienna in 1815, which created the “Concert of Europe,” was a collective,
multilateral effort, albeit predicated on sovereignty. But it took enormous cooperation to maintain
international order for 100 years. Even the British Empire at its height in the 19th century realized its
limitations and attempted to construct a favorable balance of power. John Ikenberry, in After Victory,
analyzes the rebuilding of international order after major wars. He says the diplomats of 1815 created
a “constitutional order,” which are “political orders organized around agreed-upon legal and political
institutions that operate to allocate rights and limit the exercise of power.”77
Ikenberry’s concept of “constitutional order” helps to explain how the current international system
evolved after World War II, and how it operates today. At its heart was the sharing of power by the
United States, by far the most powerful state in the world in 1945. The framework was an extensive
system of multilateral institutions, including alliances, which bound the United States and its primary
partners in Europe together.78 The Cold War may have accelerated this process, but it did not create
it.79
If this theory is correct, then the primacy of international law and institutions is no accident, but
instead the direct and expected result of efforts to create a framework of mutually supporting and
binding ties. As we have seen, these international institutions have performed as designed. It should
come as no surprise, viewing the international system in this way, that international organizations and
politics restrain the choices and actions of sovereign states. From this perspective, international order
displays many of the characteristics of municipal order.80 Ikenberry explains this: “if institutions—
wielded by democracies—play a restraining role . . . it is possible to argue that international orders
under particular circumstances can indeed exhibit constitutional characteristics.”81
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THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND AMERICAN HEGEMONY
Who Owns International Law?
What is America’s role as the sole superpower in the current environment? How will the international
system respond to the threat of global terrorism? Can it maintain the security and prosperity created
by American leadership since 1945? Can the rule of law accommodate the national interests of the
great powers and protect the interests of weaker states threatened by demagogues, genocide, civil war,
and internal armed conflict? The remainder of this chapter will attempt to suggest answers to these
questions.
Dynamic, disparate forces challenge the international order. Globalization promises prosperity
and freedom, but failed states, disease, pollution, and rising birthrates hold large segments of the
world’s population hostage. Furthering individual rights and enforcing collective security requires
international cooperation, but depends at present upon the good will and determination of powerful
sovereign states.
A brief look at two recent developments illustrates the nature of the challenge and provides insights
as to possible courses of action. The first of these is the creation of the International Criminal Court; the
second is the American-led war on terrorism.
The International Criminal Court is an idea whose time has come. It fulfills the hopes and aspirations
of a majority of the world’s nations. Eighty years in the making, from Versailles in 1919 to the Rome
Statute in 1997, it reflects a new consensus on international justice and the rule of law. Recognizing that
sovereignty protected rulers and their agents from accountability for crimes ranging from aggressive
war to democide,82 the ICC provides a permanent forum for prosecution when state courts cannot
or will not act. As of this writing, 139 nations have signed the treaty, and 89 have ratified it. The
Court commenced operations on July 1, 2002, and according to its charter enjoys almost universal
jurisdiction.83 Its potential impact is enormous, even without U.S. participation.84
At the same time, the United States leads international efforts to locate, isolate, and destroy
international terrorist groups with global reach. These groups threaten international order and
prosperity. They promote extremist views and promise false hopes to states and individuals left behind
on the road of progress. While most states support and encourage American efforts to eradicate this
plague, the international system is not well-suited for the struggle. There is no international agreement
on terrorism, and none that even attempts to define the term. Several treaties address individual terrorist
acts—hijacking, murder, money laundering, illegal crossing of borders, etc., but their solutions require
state action—apprehension, extradition, and prosecution of individual terrorists.85
To date, therefore, the international response to terrorism depends upon American leadership, moral
and physical. Coalitions are formed to fight terrorism, but they form and reform constantly depending
on where American efforts are focused. In Afghanistan a multilateral effort enjoyed broad international
support;86 in Iraq, another theater in this global war, the coalition fell short of expectations, and the
intervention remains controversial.87 The search for order and the rule of law means different things to
different states. America may lead, but others need not follow.
These events are related closely. They represent opposite poles of debate over how we are to pursue
Ikenberry’s “constitutional order” on a global scale. While most states agree in theory with multilateral
institutions, the utility of the UN, and the need for rule of law within and among states, international
law must contend with the “friction” of sovereignty.88 This uneasy relationship is likely to continue.
Ironically, some states and prominent individuals have called for the ICC to investigate American
intervention in Iraq as an “illegal” use of force in violation of treaty law and customary law.89
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Unilateralism: What Price Sovereignty?
This situation is unhealthy for international order. The new world order described in preceding
sections of this chapter is real, and it is here to stay. The ties that bind the international community
are strong and enduring, and international institutions enjoy unprecedented support and influence.
Perhaps the most amazing point of all is that American values and leadership were instrumental in
creating this environment. We are reminded once again that we have to be careful what we wish for.
American actions are well-intended, although many people sympathetic to American interests do
not accept this proposition at face value. To the extent that American national interests must be served,
we can continue to make unpopular decisions and execute American grand strategy without broad
international support. But we cannot do so indefinitely. America may act unilaterally on a case-bycase basis, weighing costs and benefits. We need to be honest with ourselves when we do so, however.
Others may perceive our actions as excessive and bullying.
The cost of military intervention can be high: proponents must establish a legal basis, a jus ad bellum,
for action; they must apply force consistent with the laws of armed conflict and possible mandates of
the UN Security Council; the fighting must be controlled both in time and in space; fallout and political
reactions must be anticipated; and, lastly, those advocating intervention must expect the unexpected.
Murphy’s Law applies to all human endeavors. Given the national interest in defeating terrorism and
preserving international order, some degree of risk is normal and expected.
THE ROAD AHEAD: SURVIVING IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
We do not operate in a vacuum. The international environment outlined in this chapter demands
our attention, if not our cooperation. It provides several useful lessons to guide our conduct in the 21st
century.
First, multilateral action is preferred in most cases. America lacks the political and military strength
to go it alone in every instance. U.S. economic and military power provides the mobility and ability to
go anywhere, but coalitions provide additional resources, political support, and legal justification and
legitimacy for international operations. If international relations theorists are correct, states that pursue
hegemonic order motivate other powers to combine to frustrate their efforts. Although such a backlash
against American hegemony is not evident at present, no one can guarantee that further unilateral
adventures will not produce one.
Second, the United States has tremendous capabilities at its disposal without employing the
military element of power. Diplomatic, economic and informational tools provide enormous flexibility
in formulating strategy and handling complicated problems as they arise. Infrequent demonstration
of American military power will suffice to remind opponents of military capabilities while diplomats
pursue peaceful resolution of disputes by other means. This approach also will reassure friends, allies,
and critics alike of American intentions and demonstrates a willingness to exhaust all reasonable
alternatives before applying force. It will preserve valuable goodwill.
Third, every crisis does not require international intervention or the use of military forces.
Acknowledging the threat posed by global terrorist networks, most international crises are local and
have little impact on terrorism or global security. Many of them, we need to remind ourselves, may
be safely ignored and left to others to solve. Unless international stability is threatened seriously,
mobilizing the international community and its resources might prove counterproductive. We have
learned, since the heady days of 1991, of the great Gulf War Coalition forged by Bush, that the new
world order promised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has not come to
pass, at least not in the way we imagined it. But there is a new world order, and states have to live in
it.
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The fourth and final lesson we can draw from this analysis of international law and sovereignty is
that the international system as it exists (and as it was designed) reflects American values and American
visions for the future. It is a legitimate part of our heritage. When we presume that all institutions
oppose our interests because some do, or presume that all treaties are suspect because some are, we
deny that heritage. More often than not, international institutions and agreements further American
interests.
It is important for us to remember that democracies tolerate differences, and, in fact, thrive on them.
If the core of “constitutional order” in the world is Western democracy, then we must expect that there
will be disagreements and heated debate among states. We will not always agree on everything. But
in a constitutional system everyone must play, the rules do not allow a state to simply take its ball and
go home whenever it does not get its way. True, no referee will step in, blow a whistle, and impose
a penalty, but true international order, just like domestic order, depends upon mutual respect and
cooperation and responsible behavior. Those who claim global leadership within the system have the
greatest responsibility to ensure the system works. It is time to reassess America’s role and reclaim our
rightful position as the leader of the world community. Struggling against the ties that bind us, like a
modern Gulliver, is counterproductive.
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CHAPTER 6
REGIONAL STUDIES IN A GLOBAL AGE
R. Craig Nation
THE NEW REGIONALISM
Twentieth Century strategy was dominated by global conflict. The First and Second World Wars
were implacable struggles waged on the world stage, and they were followed by the Cold War, a
militarized contest between superpower rivals described by Colin Gray as “a virtual World War III.”1
Not surprisingly, interstate rivalry propelled by Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht (Strike for
World Power) gave rise to theoretical perspectives concerning the dynamic of international relations
dominated by globalist perspectives.2 From the founding of the first university department devoted
to the formal study of International Relations at the University of Aberystwyth (Wales) in 1919 to the
present, globalist and universalizing theoretical models have been at the core of the profession.
Such models also have defined the practice of American foreign and security policy. The venerable
traditions of American isolationism and exceptionalism, integral to the founding of the republic and
through most of the 19th century the inspiration for a cautious and discrete U.S. world role, were
pushed aside gradually against the background of the Great War by the liberal tradition of benign
engagement under the aegis of international law, international organization, and collective security.
Though President Woodrow Wilson’s project for a U.S.-led League of Nations was frustrated by
congressional opposition, in the larger picture there would be no return from “over there.” America
was a dominant world power from at least 1916 (when the United States became a creditor for the
major European powers), and the range of its interests no longer permitted the luxury of an exclusively
national or even hemispheric policy focus.
Already on the eve of World War II, in his seminal work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, E. H. Carr argued
that a relative neglect of the role of power and coercion in international affairs had paved the way
for the rise of fascism.3 Carr’s “realist” perspective lent theoretical substance in the United States
by transplanted Europeans such as Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Stanley Hoffman, who
viewed themselves as tutors for powerful but naive American elites, became the dominant conceptual
framework for postwar U.S. policy.4 The classical realism of postwar theorists was never a vulgar
philosophy of might makes right, though it is sometimes interpreted in that way. Its most prominent
promulgators, often European Jews like Morgenthau who had fled the holocaust and were lucidly
aware of what unchecked power set to evil ends could affect, were preoccupied with ethical concerns
and the need to constrain the inherent violence of anarchic interstate competition.5 But the realist
tradition made no bones about the need to place power, the global balance of power, and strategic
rivalry between competing sovereignties at the center of a globalist worldview. During World War II,
State Department planners carefully prepared for policy of engagement based upon the purposeful use
of U.S. power to shape a congenial international environment.6 George Kennan’s containment doctrine,
the backbone of U.S. security policy through most of the cold war decades, was little more than an
astute application of realist premises to the management of U.S.-Soviet relations.7
Regional conflict was a significant part of cold war competition, but it, too, usually was interpreted
in a global perspective, as a projection of superpower rivalry into peripheral regions. Architects of
U.S. cold war strategy like Henry Kissinger could opine publicly about the marginality of third world
regions, and assert a great power orientation that perceived the essence of foreign policy as an elegant
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game of balance between power centers in Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Beijing.8
Nuclear competition between the superpowers, and the theory of strategic deterrence that was crafted
to direct it, encouraged ever more abstract modeling of interstate rivalry. These trends culminated in
the 1980s with the emergence of “neo” versions of traditional theoretical paradigms that consciously
sought to void international theory of its historicist and humanistic foundations. Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist argument used austere logic in interpreting interstate competition as an abstract calculus of
power.9 The related schools of game and rational choice theory sought to use mathematical modeling
to reproduce the dynamics of foreign policy decisionmaking. Neo-liberal institutionalist models built
alternatives to realism upon the universalizing trends of interdependence and globalization, sometimes
built upon a simplistic Benthamite utilitarianism.10 By the end of the Cold War, much of the rationale for
U.S. foreign and security policy rested upon assumptions integral to these approaches—the centrality
of great power rivalry, the balance of power as the axis of interstate competition, the changing nature of
power in an age of globalization where economic strength and various soft power options have accrued
in importance, and the need for a competitive strategy to maintain and extend U.S. advantage.
Part of the reigning confusion surrounding the nature of post-Cold War world order derives from
the fact that it is no longer defined by an all-consuming rivalry between peer competitors. With a
Gross Domestic Product far outdistancing the nearest competitor, levels of defense spending superior
to any imaginable combination of rivals, a clear-cut technological advantage, and a strong and stable
domestic order, the United States stands head and shoulders above any real or potential rival. The
current distribution of world power is objectively hegemonic, and American leadership is less a goal
than a fact. In the absence, now and for the foreseeable future, of an authentic peer competitor capable
of posing a serious challenge to U.S. dominance, balancing strategies such as that promulgated by
Russia’s former Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov, seeking to regenerate a “multipolar” world order in
which America would be limited to the status of first among equals, must remain essentially rhetorical.11
Maintaining U.S. status and using the advantages of preeminence to good ends have become primary
responsibilities for U.S. security planners.12 These are tasks that demand different kinds of perceptions
and priorities than those motivating policy during the Cold War.
Analyses of new directions in global security policy tend to similar conclusions concerning the
kinds of threats to which the United States will be required to respond. In contrast with the focused
strategic environment of the cold war years, these threats will be dispersed rather than concentrated,
unpredictable and often unexpected, and significantly derived from regional and state-centered
contingencies. The threat of global terrorism, in particular driven forward by widely dispersed
terror networks, is rooted in failed states and marginalized regions denied the benefits of balanced
modernization and development. These conclusions rest upon shared assumptions about the emerging
21st century world order, the changing contours of global security, and the evolving U.S. world role.
The new configuration of global power, which combines U.S. preeminence with considerable regional
fragmentation and turbulence, ensures that major world regions will be an ever more important
target for U.S. engagement—as sources of critical strategic resources, as platforms for geostrategic
leverage, as breeding grounds for terrorism, as integral parts of an increasingly interdependent global
economy, and as testing grounds for great power will and determination to impose rules of the game.
Preeminence does not imply total control. Influence in key world regions will be a significant apple
of discord between the hegemonic leader, great power rivals, and influential local powers. Regions
and subregions will remain the primary forums for armed conflict and instability, with a variety of
small wars and protracted stabilization operations posing the greatest demands upon a U.S. military
committed to engagement and shaping strategies. Aspiring regional hegemons, sometimes tempted
by hopes of gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, will continue to promote disorder and
pose direct threats to important U.S. interests. To navigate effectively under these circumstances, U.S.
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strategists will have to base international engagement upon a sophisticated understanding of major
world regions, viewed not only in regard to their place within an overarching structure of world power,
but as entities in their own right, including the underlying social, political, and cultural processes that
make the national and regional context unique.
For all of these reasons, regional studies will remain a necessary foundation for an integrated
curriculum in national security policy and planning. If the 20th century has been the century of global
conflagration, the 21st century seems poised to become the century of regional disaggregation. New
directions in international relations theory, cast around concepts such as turbulence and chaos theory,
have been honed to highlight these trends.13 For U.S. policymakers, the challenge will be to integrate
regional perspectives, and sensitivities to national and regional dynamics, into a realistic and balanced
approach to the pursuit of global security; not to question the relevance of regional perspectives
(which should be self-evident), but to better understand the ways in which they need to be joined to a
comprehensive strategy for the pursuit of national interest.
WHAT IS A REGION?
Regions may be defined and distinguished according to an approximate combination of geographic,
social, cultural, and political variables. Unambiguous distinctions, however, will always be elusive.
As an analytical category in international relations, the “region” is fated to remain contingent and
contentious. Geographical contiguity is clearly a prerequisite for regional identity, but drawing
uncontested boundaries is usually an impossible task.14 The concept of “eastern Europe” once had a
fairly high degree of integrity, but since 1989, it has virtually disappeared from the political lexicon.
The phrase “Middle East,” which was originally the product of colonialist and Eurocentric world
views, continues to be used (often rendered as a “Greater Middle East”) to describe an extremely
diverse area stretching from the Maghreb into distant Central Asia. Meanwhile, the designation of an
eastern Mediterranean Levant has fallen out of fashion. The Balkans has been regarded as a distinctive
European subregion for well over a century, but almost any Balkan state with elsewhere to turn rejects
the designation unambiguously.15 “All regions,” writes Andrew Hurrell with some justification, “are
socially constructed and hence politically contested.”16
One of the more influential recent attempts to delineate regions according to cultural criteria has been
Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis. Huntington identifies nine world civilizational zones
based significantly, though not entirely, upon confessional affiliation.17 The argument that geostrategy
will be dominated increasingly by civilizational conflict waged along the “faultlines” dividing these
zones has been used widely to explain the apparent upsurge in ethnic conflict of the recent past.
Huntington’s argument, however, is neither entirely novel nor altogether convincing. Geopolitical
analysis long has used the idea of the “shatterbelt,” defined as a politically fragmented and ethnically
divided zone that serves as a field of competition between continental and maritime powers.18 Great
civilizations cannot be bounded precisely spatially, and they are rarely either entirely homogenous or
mutually exclusive. Huntington’s attempt to designate geographically bounded civilizational zones,
and to use these zones as the foundation for a theory of geostrategy, rests on suspect premises.
Barry Buzan has developed the concept of the “regional security complex” in an effort “to offset the
tendency of power theorists to underplay the importance of the regional level in international security
affairs.”19 He makes the assertion that in security terms, “‘region’ means that a distinct and significant
subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into
geographical proximity with each other.”20 The existence of a “subsystem” of security relations presumes
high levels of interdependence, multiple interactions, and shared sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Any
attempt to identify such complexes empirically, however, poses obvious problems.21 Regional security
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complexes are rarely, if ever, defined exclusively by geographical proximity; they are often dominated
by external powers, and they sometimes are held hostage by national-cultural variables or systemic
dynamics. The United States is the focus of functioning security complexes in both Europe and Asia.
Turkey and Israel lie within different security complexes according to most of Buzan’s criteria, but
they have developed a close bilateral relationship that impacts significantly upon their relations with
contiguous states. Transnational threats such as terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illegal
migration, or environmental disintegration also overlap regions and create dynamics of association
that prevent security complexes from becoming significantly self-contained.
The United States makes an approximate distinction between geographic regions in the Unified
Command Plan that lies at the basis of its warfighting strategy, by fixing the contours of unified
command areas assigned to combatant commanders. This approach originally evolved from the
division of responsibilities adapted by the United States to fight World War II, and was formalized
by the National Security Act of 1947. Over the years, the geographic division of responsibility has
been adapted repeatedly, on the basis of changes in the international security structure, technological
advances, and strategic calculation, but also bureaucratic infighting over areas of responsibility and
access to resources. Combatant commanders recently have been required to draw up an annual
Theater Engagement Plan defining regional shaping priorities, but they are primarily warfighters, and
the division of responsibility which the current unified command plan structure embodies is geared
to position the United States to prevail in armed confrontations. Contemporary U.S. national security
strategy, mandating readiness to fight two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, has concentrated
the attention of the combatant commanders on the areas where such conflicts are presumed to be
most likely—in the Middle East/Southwest Asian and Western Pacific/Northeast Asian theaters.
The regional distinctions built into the Unified Command Plan are arbitrary, but they are geared to
the performance of the functional tasks of warriors and do not always rest upon careful conceptual
distinctions.
David Lake and Patrick Morgan define region minimally, as “a set of countries linked by geography
and one or more common trends, such as level of development, culture, or political institutions.”22 Their
definition has the advantages of simplicity, but it is potentially too broad to be really useful, and also
possibly misleading. The nation-state is sometimes an inadequate building bloc for regional complexes.
Any viable definition of the post-Soviet Central Asian region would have to include China’s Xinjiang
province, whose population is composed of 60 percent Turkic Muslims. Russia’s far eastern provinces
are an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region, while the core of historic Russia is an extension, both
geographically and culturally, of a greater Europe. Ukraine’s population is divided politically along the
line of the Dnipro River, with the western provinces affiliating with an enlarged central Europe and the
eastern provinces oriented toward the Russian Federation and Eurasia. Northern Mexico and southern
California have become intimately associated as a result of high levels of economic interaction and crossborder movement of peoples.23 The European Union has even sought to institutionalize transnational
communities, by creating multistate districts designated as “Euro-regions.”24 The commonalities used to
distinguish regions cannot be terminated artificially at national boundaries, and “one or more common
trends” is too weak a foundation for association to give regional designations analytical substance.
In its regional studies curriculum, the U.S. Army War College designates six major world regions
on the basis of broad geographical criteria—Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Russia and Eurasia, the
Asia-Pacific region, and the Americas. These are designations of convenience intended primarily for
pedagogical purposes. Our working definition of what constitutes a region is, of necessity, broad and
multidimensional. Geographical propinquity; a sense of identity and self-awareness based upon shared
experience, ascribed traits, or language; a degree of autonomy within the international state system;
relatively high levels of transactions; economic interdependencies; and political and cultural affinity
may all be cited as relevant criteria. It is presumed that there will be gray areas and significant overlap
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between regions, however, they are defined. The Turkish Republic, for example, is simultaneously
part of a wider Europe, a greater Middle East, and post-Soviet Eurasia. No single set of associations
is essential, and, in the best of cases, fixing the contours of major world regions and subregions will
remain a problematic exercise.
WORLD REGIONS AND WORLD ORDER
However regions are defined and differentiated, the impact of local, national, and regional dynamics
upon world politics is substantial and destined to grow larger. For the foreseeable future, effective
strategy will require sensitivity to the various ways in which regional affairs condition the global
security agenda, channel and constrain U.S. priorities, and affect a changing world order.
Regional Instability, Regional Conflict, and Embedded Terrorism.
Regional instability poses diverse kinds of challenges to U.S. interests. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait
in 1990 placed a critical mass of Middle Eastern oil reserves in the hands of an ambitious and hostile
regional power, thus posing a clear threat to vital interests. Such dramatic scenarios will not occur very
often, but the potential consequences are so great as to demand high degrees of readiness. “Rogue
states,” which aspire to regional hegemony and whose leaders often are defiant of international norms,
are now acknowledged as a distinct threat in their own right. The most persistent challenges of recent
years have been the chronic instability born of flawed regional orders marked by severe impoverishment,
unequal development, frustrated nationalism, ethnic rivalry, and the “failed state” phenomenon,
where weak polities lose the capacity to carry out the basic tasks of governance. Embedded terrorism,
exploiting failed regional systems as sanctuaries for the pursuit of global agendas, has been a dramatic
consequence.
In the post-Cold War period, the U.S. armed forces have been called upon to participate in an
unprecedented number of complex contingency operations ranging from simple noncombatant
evacuations to extensive, protracted, and dangerous peace enforcement and peacekeeping duties. The
logic of U.S. engagement usually is impeccable. Unchecked regional or civil conflicts risk escalation with
broadening consequences; threaten the credibility of the United States, its allies, and major international
instances as guarantors of world order; and confront decisionmakers with horrendous and morally
intolerable humanitarian abuses. But the United States should not feel obligated, nor can it afford, to
take on the role of global policeman. Protracted and open-ended peacekeeping deployments risk to
undermine combat readiness by disrupting training routines, erode the morale of the volunteer force,
and pose the constant possibility of deeper and higher-risk engagement. Shaping regional complexes
to head off resorts to coercive conflict behavior, and responding to regional challenges, if possible
preemptively and under the aegis of international organizations or multinational coalitions, have as a
result become pillars of U.S. security policy.
The challenges of civil war and low-intensity regional conflict will not go away or diminish. In a
larger historical perspective, it seems clear that the total wars of the 20th century have been exceptional
events rather than typical ones. Prior to our century, technological limitations made the concept of
“world” war unthinkable—warfare, of necessity, was waged within physically constrained theaters
on the regional level. Ironically, the technological possibilities unveiled with the creation of massive
nuclear arsenals during the Cold War have once again made the outbreak of hegemonic warfare
between great power rivals highly unlikely, as well an eminently undesirable. The increasing lethality
(and expense) of modern conventional armaments only further raises the threshold of total war. While
the Kantian thesis—that great power warfare has become obsolete—may or may not be credible, it rests
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upon substantial foundations.25 If for no other reasons than those imposed by the evolving technology
of violence, wars and armed confrontations are once again being contested almost exclusively as low
and medium intensity conflicts on the local and regional level. “In the foreseeable future,” write Lake
and Morgan, “violent conflict will mostly arise out of regional concerns and will be viewed by political
actors through a regional, rather than global, lens.”26
In some ways, cold war bipolarity worked to constrain regional conflict. Neither superpower could
afford to tolerate an uncontrolled escalation of regional rivalry that risked to draw it into a direct
confrontation, and regional allies were consistently pressured to limit their aspirations and bend to
the will of their great power sponsors.27 It is difficult to imagine that the anarchic disintegration of the
Yugoslav Federation would have been allowed to proceed unchecked in 1991 had the fragile European
balance of terror of the cold war system still been at risk. The extent of such constraint nonetheless
may be exaggerated. Many of the regional conflicts of the cold war era—in southern Africa, the Horn
of Africa, Afghanistan, the Middle East, or southern Asia—have perpetuated themselves into the postCold War period. Cumulatively, post-World War II regional conflicts have occasioned the deaths of
over 25 million individuals, and the incidence and intensity of such conflicts continue to increase.
A composite portrait of post-Cold War regional conflict calls attention to the difficulties involved
in programming effective responses. The large majority of contemporary “limited” wars are civil wars
or wars of secession waged with the ferocity that is typical of such contests. Combat operations often
include the significant engagement of poorly controlled and disciplined irregular forces. The bulk of
casualties are imposed upon innocent civilians, sometimes including genocidal massacre and forced
population transfers (ethnic cleansing). While often obscure in terms of their origins, such conflicts
are usually highly visible. The modern mass media, commercially driven and chronically in search of
sensation, brings regional chaos “into the living room” and generates popular pressure to respond that
political leaders often find difficult to ignore. Limited and often frustrated or only partly successful
intervention by the international community in the role of would-be peacemaker is another shared trait
that gives many contemporary regional conflicts a fairly uniform contour. Wayne Burt notes correctly
that, in comparison with the structured context of cold war bipolarity, the “post-Cold War world is a
much ‘messier’ world where limited conflict will be fought for limited and often shifting objectives,
and with strategies that are difficult to formulate, costs that are uncertain, and entrance and exit points
that are not obvious.”28
As undisputed world leader, and the only major power with significant global power projection
capacity, the United States often is compelled to react to such conflicts whether or not it has truly vital
interests at stake. America’s ability to manage and shape the conflict process nonetheless is limited
severely. A decade of struggling with regional conflict in post-communist Yugoslavia, including
intensive diplomatic efforts, punitive air strikes, large and open-ended peacekeeping deployments,
and a full-scale war over Kosovo have led to what at best may be described as a mixed result.29 Peace
enforcement and peacekeeping responsibilities have been carried out with impressive efficiency, but
the much more problematic and politically charged task of post-conflict peace building has proven to
be something close to a mission impossible.30
Since the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the phenomenon
of embedded terrorism has become another manifestation of how regional instability may provoke
intense political violence. U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been designed to strike at
terror nests, but it quickly has become apparent that defeating designated enemies is only part of the
challenge. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts have demanded an increasingly sophisticated awareness
of local norms and values and heightened sensitivities to the cultural context within which stability
operations are being pursued. Army Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan have striven to
develop closer working relations with local populations and build a foundation of trust based upon
mutual understanding that will make it more difficult for terrorist cells to relocate in the areas in the
future.
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The United States has made the maintenance of regional stability a pillar of its security strategy, but
the forces of disintegration at work within many world regions are daunting. Effective responses, first
of all, will require some selectivity in choosing targets for intervention. When we do elect to become
involved, our efforts should be based upon a much greater awareness of regional realities than has
been manifested in the recent past. We also will need to make better use of friends and allies. Regional
instability often is addressed best by local actors, who usually have the largest vested interest in blocking
escalation, and, in some cases, regionally based conflict management initiatives can become a significant
stimulus to broader patterns of regional cooperation. Engaging allies and relevant multilateral forums
in managing regional conflict, as the United States has sought to do with the African Crisis Response
Initiative, should be a high national priority.
Geopolitics.
Many currently fashionable approaches to international relations assume the decline of territoriality as
a motive for state behavior. The dominant trend in world politics is persistently, albeit vaguely, described
as globalization, implying a rapid increase in interactions fueled by revolutions in communications and
information management, the emergence of a truly global market and world economy, the primacy of
economic competition as a mode of interstate rivalry, and an unprecedented space-time compression
that places unique demands upon decisionmakers.31 The globalization scenario is built on overarching
generalizations about world order and rests upon universalizing premises that leave little space for
sticky concern with the intricacies of regional affairs. There are alternatives to theoretical perspectives
cast on so high a level of abstraction, however, and they bring regional issues into the forefront of
international discourse. Most important among them is the tradition of geopolitics.
The core challenge of geopolitical analysis is to link the systematic study of spatial and geographical
relations with the dynamic of interstate politics. As a formal discipline, geopolitics dates from the late
19th century work of the Leipzig professor Friedrich Ratzel. His 1897 study, Politische Geographie (Political
Geography), presents states as organisms with a quasi-biological character, rooted in their native soil,
embedded in a distinctive spatial context or Lebensraum (living space), and condemned to either grow
and expand or wither away.32 In the works of various contemporaries and successors, including Alfred
Thayer Mahan, Rudolf Kjellén, Halford Mackinder, Alfred de Severing, Klaus Haushofer, and Nicholas
John Spykman, these insights have been pushed in a number of directions. The strong influence of
geopolitical categories, especially as transmitted through the work of Haushofer, upon Adolf Hitler’s
strategic program during the 1930s has brought enduring discredit upon the discipline, widely but
unfairly regarded as a vulgar amalgam of social Darwinism and military expansionism. In fact, in its
manifold and not always consistent manifestations, geopolitical analysis presents a range of alternative
strategic perceptions whose common ground is a sense of the permanent and enduring relevance of
spatial, cultural, and environmental factors in world politics.33 These are also the factors that stand at
the foundation of regional studies.
Geopolitics is rooted in the study of geography, broadly but relevantly defined by Saul Cohen as
“spatial patterns and relations that reflect dynamic physical and human processes.”34 Geography is a
rich and complex construct that provides a context for weighing the impact of a number of significant
but often neglected variables. These include ethnicity, nationalism, and the politics of identity; access
to natural and strategic resources; geostrategy and the role of lines of communication and strategic
choke points; relations between human communities and their natural environment; and the strategic
implications of increasing environmental stress. It encompasses demographic issues such as population
growth, cycles of migration and changing patterns of population distribution, and “decisionmaking
milieus” including Huntingtonian civilizational zones, political systems and political cultures, as well
as the spatial distribution of power within the world system.
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Geopolitical analysis is known best in the West as refracted by Halford Mackinder’s heartland concept,
which defines control of the Eurasian landmass as the key to world power. Mackinder distinguished
between a World-Island encompassing the joined continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Eurasian
Heartland approximately equivalent to Russia and Central Asia, and the Rimlands (including eastcentral Europe) along the Eurasian periphery. “Who rules East Europe,” he wrote in a famous passage,
“controls the Heartland. Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the WorldIsland commands the World.”35 Mackinder was not a fascist militarist, but a moderate professor and
civil servant, whose thinking lay at the foundation of British strategy through much of the 20th century.
By calling attention to the spatial dimensions of grand strategy, his work points out the extent to which
geostrategic concepts have been and continue to be at the heart of modern statecraft.
A striking contemporary illustration of the continuing impact of geopolitical perspectives is
provided by the heartland power par excellence, the Russian Federation, where disillusionment with
the gilded promises of globalization and integration with the U.S.-led world economy have led to a
rapid and broadly influential revival of geopolitical theory.36 The new Russian geopolitics has been
dismissed in the West as a manifestation of radical extremism, a sort of Russian fascism born of the
post-communist malaise.37 In fact, core geopolitical perceptions (the need to maintain the integrity of the
Russian Federation, the call to reassert a strong sphere of influence in the territories of the former Soviet
Union, the cultural distinctiveness of the Russian Idea and its historical role as a force for integration
in the expanses of Eurasia, the need for alliances to balance and contest American hegemony) have
moved into the mainstream of Russian strategic thought and enjoy strong support.
Haushofer has written that “geopolitics is the science of the conditioning of political processes by the
earth,” and that “the essence of regions as comprehended from the geopolitical point of view provides
the framework for geopolitics.”38 This is a plaidoyer for the concrete and substantial, for a theory of
world politics built from the ground up. Effective geopolitical reasoning leads us back to the earth, to
the distinctive political communities nested upon it, to the patterns of association that develop between
them, and to the conflicts that emerge from their interactions. It is not the only school of thought that
prioritizes the relevance of geography and regional studies, but it provides a particularly good example
of the relevance of the textured study of peoples and places as a foundation for effective strategy.
The Cultural Dimension of Warfare.
The maxim “know thy enemy” often is counted as the acme of strategic wisdom. It is unfortunately a
maxim that has not always been highly respected in the U.S. military and security communities. War has
organizational and technological dimensions which make it a rigorous, practical, and precise enterprise,
but wars also are waged between calculating rivals in a domain of uncertainty, and by distinctive
political communities in ways that reflect deeply rooted, culturally conditioned preferences.
During the Cold War, the United States made an intense effort to understand the societal and
cultural dynamics shaping the perceptions of its Soviet rival, arguably to good effect. In general,
however, in-depth knowledge of national and regional cultural dynamics has not been a strong point
for U.S. strategy, which has tended to rest upon the sturdy pillars of relative invulnerability and the
capacity to mobilize overwhelming force.39 In the volatile and uncertain security environment of the
years to come, however, the assumption of technological and material advantage may not be a safe
one, nor will these advantages always suffice to ensure superiority in every possible contingency. The
People’s Republic of China represents a potential long-term rival with considerable assets and great
self-confidence, derived in part from a highly distinctive and ancient culture.40 Russia’s current Time of
Troubles has temporarily brought her low, but eventually the inherent strengths that made the Union
of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) so formidable a rival during the cold war decades will reassert
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themselves. We confront a long-term struggle to manage the dilemmas of modernization in the Arab
and Muslim worlds, and the associated dynamic of terrorism, that will demand sophisticated cultural
awareness. The United States will need to know “what makes them tick” if it wants to manage its
relations with potential peer competitors and troubled world regions successfully. Effective intervention
in complex contingencies likewise will demand in-depth knowledge of real or potential rivals. Strategy
is not uniquely the product of culture, and culture itself is not a lucid or unambiguous construct. But
all strategy unfolds in a cultural context and cannot be fully or properly understood outside it.
Colin Gray defines strategic culture as “the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions,
habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operation . . . that are more or less specific to
a particular geographically based security community.”41 The foundations of strategic culture are
the fundaments of culture itself; shared experience, language, common governance, and values. The
cultural orientation that derives from these commonalities, it can be argued, affects the ways in which
polities conduct diplomacy, define and pursue interests, and wage war. In his controversial History
of Warfare, John Keegan suggests that throughout history war has always been an essentially cultural
phenomenon, an atavism derived from patterns of group identification and interaction rather than the
purposeful activity implied in Clausewitz’s famous dictum that “war is the continuation of politics
by other means.”42 Victor Hanson argues that the ancient Greek preference for physical confrontation
and quick decision has created a “Western way of war,” dominated by a search for decisive battle and
strategies of annihilation, a tradition that remains alive to this day.43 Such conclusions are extreme, but
they are useful in underlining that wars are conceived, plotted, and waged by socially conditioned
human agents.
As a dominant global power, the United States will be called upon to wage war in a variety of contexts
in the years to come. A better understanding of the strategic cultures of real or potential adversaries will
place another weapon in its arsenal and strengthen prospects for success. In Bernard Brodie’s classic
formulation, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military
blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department.”44 Knowing the enemy
goes well beyond order of battle, to the sources of strategic preference and military operational codes
that are grounded in the social and cultural context of distinctive nations and regions.45
Espaces de Sens: Regional Alliance and Association.
The Cold War was a phase of intense global competition manifested in ideological polarization,
arms racing, and militarized regional rivalry. It nonetheless offered a structure of purposeful endeavor
for its leading protagonists, as well as for critics who sought alternatives to what they perceived as
the dead-end of belligerent bipolarity. The USSR justified its international policy on the basis of a
distinctively Soviet variant of Marxism-Leninism. The United States consciously developed its cold
war strategy as a defense of the values of freedom and democracy. Various nonaligned alternatives
called for a plague upon both houses, and sought to develop a third way independent of either power
bloc. Regardless of where one stood, world politics took on the contours of a moral tale infused with
meaning.
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a certain euphoria, captured by Francis Fukuyama’s
“End of History” thesis, according to which the demise of the communist challenge meant “the end
of history as such: that is, the end point in mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization
of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”46 Fukuyama’s sweepingly
optimistic argument promised an era of global harmony in which interstate strategic rivalry would give
way to cooperation under the impetus of democratization, development, and consumerism, promoted
by a benign American hegemony. In place of a contest of values, Fukuyama’s Hegelian vision looked
forward to the unchallenged primacy of the culture of the West.
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Needless to say, nothing of the kind has transpired. The post-Cold War period has been marked by
regional turbulence, torturous and sometimes unsuccessful post-communist transitions, violent ethnic
conflict, the rise of global terrorism as a major challenge to the premises of world order, and continued,
if sometimes muted, great power rivalry. Western values are contested rather than embraced, and the
absence of a compelling sense of overall direction, of a larger domestic or international project, of a
source of signification and meaning, arguably has become a problem in its own right. Uncertainly about
direction also has contributed to strategic confusion. The suspicion or rejection of large civilizational
projects that has become so prominent a part of contemporary post-structuralist and social constructivist
approaches to international theory, often accompanied by quasi-indifference to any kind of strategic
analysis whatsoever, reflects the state of affairs with great clarity.47
The United Nations, symbol of an earlier generation’s aspirations for a more peaceful world order,
has languished during the post-Cold War decade. In contrast, projects for regional association have
flourished. Realist theory portrays the formation of alliances and regional blocs as an “outside-in”
phenomenon, occurring as a response to real or perceived external challenges, whether via “balancing”
efforts to correct a maldistribution of power, or “bandwagoning,” whereby weak polities seek to dilute
threats through association with a hegemonic leader.48 Neo-mercantilist approaches follow an identical
pattern in explaining regional association as a logical response to enhanced international economic
competition. But regional association also may be understood as a function of “inside-out” dynamics
driven by social and cultural trends. Zaki Laïdi has argued that, in the face of the universalizing
tendencies of globalization, meaningful civilizational projects can be constructed only on a regional
basis, as espaces de sens (spaces of meaning) bound together by a complex of historical, social, cultural,
political, and economic associations.49 These are contrasting arguments, but they are not mutually
exclusive. Both “outside-in” and “inside-out” approaches to regional association need to be combined
in an effort to come to terms with a phenomenon that has the potential to transform world politics root
and branch.50
The “new regionalism” is manifested both by the revitalization of traditional regional organizations
and the creation of new forms of regional association. Large regional or subregional blocs with a history of
institutionalization, such as the European Union (EU), the African Union, the Organization of American
States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), often have a strong security orientation, though today their focus more often is placed upon
internal conflict management than external threats.51 The proliferation of regional projects for economic
integration, including some of the organizations listed above as well as others such as the North
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC),
the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Arab Magreb Union (AMU), the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean
Pact, the Central America Common Market (CACM), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), has an obvious economic logic,
but also a strong cultural foundation; within these broadly drawn and sometimes overlapping zones
of association one may observe a powerful revival of regional and subregional awareness and identity.
In other cases, functionalist logic prevails. Regional associations sometimes are appropriate forums for
approaching large global problems such as environmental disintegration, occasioned on the systemic
level, but not always effectively addressed on that level.
Regional alliances and associations play a critical role in U.S. strategy. The most important by far is
the Atlantic alliance, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), uniquely successful as a formal
security association over many decades, but an organization whose raison d’être has been called into
question in the new circumstances of the post-Cold War. NATO originally was built up and maintained
as an organization for collective defense against a clear and present external threat. The collapse of the
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USSR and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact have made this aspect of its identity considerably less
important, if not altogether irrelevant, but the Alliance has adapted by restructuring itself as a “new
NATO,” including commitments to enlargement, out of area peace operations, and gradual movement
toward a broader collective security orientation. Former Secretary General Javier Solana describes the
process extravagantly, as a “root and branch transformation” aimed to create “a new Alliance, far
removed in purpose and structure from its Cold War ancestor,” inspired by the premise of “cooperative
security.”52 This “new” NATO is arguably more important than ever in the broader context of U.S.
security policy, as a platform for power projection, as a forum for managing relations with key allies,
as an instrument for reaching out to the emerging democracies of eastern Europe, as the foundation for
a new European security order, and as a context for engaging the Russian Federation in a cooperative
security effort.
The Atlantic Alliance is also a regional pact, whose stability always HAS been presumed to rest in
part upon close historical and cultural associations between the United States and its European partners.
Unfortunately, the new NATO will not have the luxury of assuming that a close cultural affinity will
continue to link both sides of the Atlantic indefinitely. Changing demographic balances in the United
States are reducing the proportion of citizens with European roots and heritage. Enlargement has made
NATO itself a politically and culturally more diverse organization, where decision by consensus will be
harder to achieve. Most of all, the project for European unification is moving slowly but steadily toward
the goal of a more autonomous European subject possessed of the capacity to pursue an independent
foreign and security policy. Managing regional conflict in the Balkans placed strains upon Alliance
mechanisms. The Kosovo conflict generated considerable tension between the United States and its
European allies, key allies were disappointed by the U.S. decision not to leverage the Alliance in a
more significant way during its initial campaign in Afghanistan, and differences over the choice of
a military option against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003 brought alliance partners to the brink of an
overt break. NATO continues to rest upon secure foundations, but friction in trans-Atlantic relations
persists, and it likely to grow stronger as the European project continues to unfold and efforts to bolster
a European defense identity progress. Alliance management, based upon a careful appreciation of
changing European realities and awareness of the cultural specificities of key European partners, will
be an ever more important strategic task.
Other forms of regional association represent potential dangers. At least since the Iranian revolution
of 1979, concern for an emerging “Islamic threat” has been prominent in U.S. policy circles. These
concerns, to some extent understandably, have become considerably more prominent since the attacks
of September 11, 2001. Somewhat less prominent, unfortunately, has been an informed understanding
of what Islam is and is not, as a religion, as a philosophy of governance, and a way of life.53 The
possible solidification of a Russian-Chinese strategic axis, which would rest in large measure upon
mutual alienation from the West, has the potential to effect global power balances significantly, and
the European Union clearly aspires to challenge the U.S. economically. Contesting, co-opting, and
counteracting these kinds of patterns will remain an important priority for U.S. planners.
There is an unmistakable momentum pushing in the direction of stronger local and regional identities,
and more robust regional association. For some analysts, the trend is part and parcel of a “retreat from
the state” occasioned by changes in the locus of power in the global political economy, whose logical
endpoint will be a “new medievalism” in which alternative forms of political association, with a more
pronounced regional character, eventually will come to prevail.54 Whether or not such forecasts are
correct, shifting patterns of association and the heightened visibility of a variety of regional forums are
clear manifestations of the increased relevance of regional perspectives in global security affairs.
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CONCLUSIONS
The foundations of regional studies have changed remarkably little over time. Substantive
understanding of major world regions demands a thorough mastery of the relevant specialized
literature, careful and persistent monitoring of events and trends, appropriate language skills, and a
period of sustained residence allowing for immersion in regional realities, accompanied by periodic
visits to keep perceptions up-to-date. Regionalists need refined skills that demand a considerable
investment of time and resources to create and maintain. If the argument presented in this chapter is
correct, however, and regional dynamics, in fact, will become an increasingly important part of the
international security agenda in the years to come, the investment will be well worth making.
Although the confines of major world regions and subregions are difficult to fix with a great deal of
consistency and rigor, the relevance of local, national, and regional perspectives in international political
analysis is more or less uncontested. For U.S. strategists in the post-Cold War period the importance
of such perspectives is particularly great. In the absence of a peer competitor, significant challenges to
U.S. interests are most likely to emerge from various kinds of regional instability, including threatened
access to critical strategic resources, the emergence of “rogue” states with revisionist agendas, embedded
terrorism, and persistent low and medium intensity conflict. In an increasingly integrated world system,
geographic, cultural, and environmental factors that are importantly or uniquely manifested in the
regional context will play an increasingly important role in shaping national priorities and international
realities. Strategic culture is a vital context for warfighting, as relevant to contests with peer competitors
as it is to clashes with less imposing adversaries in regional contingencies. Shifting patterns of regional
association, often motivated by a heightened sense of regional identity and a search for meaning and
relative security in the face of the impersonal and sometimes dehumanizing forces of globalization, is
an important worldwide trend. None of these dynamics can be incorporated properly into U.S. security
strategy without a solid understanding of regional decisionmaking milieus and cultural proclivities.
To assert the importance of regional approaches in a balanced strategic studies curriculum is not
to deny the relevance of alternative perspectives. Universalizing theory is essential and unavoidable.
The formal and technical specializations necessary to make sense of political and military affairs are
ineluctable. And there is the ever-present danger of regionalists falling into a narrow preoccupation
with local problems and personalities, while missing the larger, structural forces at work in the
background. In context, however, and approached with appropriate modesty, regional perspectives
have an essential place in strategy formulation.
The U.S. Army War College builds a regional studies component into its core curriculum, structured
around the six major world regions mentioned above and focused on the effort to define and understand
U.S. interests at stake on the regional level. Students are exposed to an in-depth study of a particular
region, and to an overview of all six world regions, as a foundation for the school’s capstone exercise,
which tests their ability to manage a series of overlapping regional crises in an integrated politicalmilitary framework. Students are expected to become familiar with the general historical, cultural,
political, military, and economic characteristics of the six major world regions; to evaluate U.S. national
and security interests in these regions, and to identify the kinds of challenges that are most likely to
emerge; and to develop a regional strategic assessment that identifies alternative courses of action that
can lead toward the achievement of U.S. national security objectives. The skills and expertise garnered
during this bloc of instruction should make a vital contribution to the cultivation of future strategic
leaders.
Regional strategic analysis is also of particular relevance to Army leaders. Though we live in the age
of jointness, the Army remains the service branch primarily charged with placing boots on the ground
in regional contingencies. Its operational environment is the land, where people live and societies are
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rooted, and it, at a minimum, must come to terms with the geographical realities of the places where
it is constrained to operate and the cultural characteristics of the peoples it is charged to fight or to
protect. The emphasis on regional studies in the U.S. Army War College strategy curriculum stands out
among our senior service schools. Experience, as well as common sense, shows that it is an emphasis
well-placed.
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PART II
STRATEGIC THEORY AND FORMULATION

CHAPTER 7
A SURVEY OF THE THEORY OF STRATEGY
J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.
A common language is both the product of and basis of any effective theory; people conversant
in the theory habitually use words in the same way to mean the same thing. Such meanings may be
unique to the theoretical context, even if the word has other nontheoretical usages. Thus, the word
passion used in a Christian context has an entirely different meaning than in secular usage. Similarly,
doctrinal military terms, while hopefully used consistently by military individuals and organizations,
may differ slightly (or even radically) in common usage. Strategy is such a word. Defining it is not as
easy as one would think, and the definition is critical.
Part of the problem is that our understanding of strategy has changed over the years. The word has
a military heritage, and classic theory considered it a purely wartime military activity—how generals
employed their forces to win wars. In the classic usage, strategy was military maneuvers to get to a
battlefield, and tactics took over once the forces were engaged. That purely military concept has given
way to a more inclusive interpretation. The result is at least threefold: 1) Strategists generally insist that
their art includes not only the traditional military element of power but also other elements of power
like politics and economics. Most would also accept a peacetime as well as a wartime role for strategy.
2) With increased inclusiveness, the word strategy became available outside the military context and
is now used in a variety of disciplines ranging from business to medicine and even sports. 3) As the
concept mutated, the military had to invent another term—the United Staates settled on operations
or operational art—to describe the high-level military art that had once been strategy.1 All this, of
course, effects any survey of strategy. Thus, this chapter acknowledges that strategy is now commonly
used in nonmilitary fields, and both the definition and overall theory must be compatible with such
usage. Nevertheless, this discussion focuses on the national security arena and particularly on grand
strategy and military strategy. In that context, we also follow the modern interpretation that strategy
involves both military and nonmilitary elements of power and has equal applicability for peace and
war, although much of the existing theory we discuss deals exclusively with war.
Surprisingly for such a significant term, there is no consensus on the definition of strategy, even
in the national security arena. The military community has an approved definition, but it is not wellknown and is not accepted by nonmilitary national security professionals. As a consequence, every
writer must either develop his or her own definition or pick from the numerous extant alternatives. We
begin by surveying some of those alternatives.
Clausewitz wrote,
Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for
the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the
plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the
individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.2

Because this is a classic definition, it is not satisfactory—it deals only with the military element and is at
the operational level rather than the strategic. What Clausewitz described is really the development of a
theater or campaign strategy. Historian Jay Luvaas used to say that because Clausewitz said something
did not necessarily make it true, but did make it worth considering. In this case, we can consider and
then ignore Clausewitz.
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The 19th century Swiss soldier and theorist Antoine Henri Jomini had his own definition.
Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of war. Grand Tactics is the
art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action,
and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradiction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over
a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans
of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides
the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.3

This, again, is military only and theater-specific.
Civil War era soldier and author Henry Lee Scott had an interesting definition derived from the
basic Jominian concept: “. . . the art of concerting a plan of campaign, combining a system of military
operations determined by the end to be attained, the character of the enemy, the nature and resources
of the country, and the means of attack and defence [sic].”4 This actually has all the elements we look
for and states them as a relationship that is more conceptually complex and satisfying than Jomini’s.
However, reflecting the classic paradigm Scott still limited strategy to military endeavors and to
theaters.
Military historian Basil H. Liddell Hart had another unique approach to the subject. Because he
wrote as the concept of strategy was expanding to include more nonmilitary aspects, his definition is
more modern. Liddell Hart defined strategy as: “the art of distributing and applying military means to
fulfill the ends of policy.” Also,
Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and co-ordination of the ends and the means.
The end must be proportioned to the total means, and the means used in gaining each intermediate end which
contributes to the ultimate must be proportioned to the value and needs of that intermediate end—whether it be
to gain an object of to fulfill a contributory purpose. An excess may be as harmful as a deficiency.”

He was talking specifically about military strategy, and he thought strategy was something akin to, but
different from, the more expansive concept of grand strategy.
As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on a lower plane of ‘grand
strategy’ . . . . While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from
the more fundamental policy which should govern its objective, the term “grand strategy” serves to bring out the
sense of “policy in execution.” For the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to co-ordinate all the resources
of a nation, or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war—the goal defined by
fundamental policy.

Liddell Hart went on to say,
Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order
to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources—for to foster the people’s willing spirit is often as
important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution
of power between the services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of
the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of
diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent’s will.
. . . Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to
the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid
damage to the future state of peace—for its security and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that
has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most
part terra incognita—still awaiting exploration, and understanding.5

That is very close to modern doctrine, although the use of words is different. But Liddell Hart’s entire
exposition was really a means to get past all this uninteresting grand strategic stuff and on to his pet
theory of the indirect approach—a technique of implementation that we will consider later.
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Contemporary strategist Colin Gray has a more comprehensive definition. “By strategy, I mean the
use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy [emphasis in original].”6 The problem
with that definition is that Gray ties himself down when he links the definition of strategy to force—in
actuality, he is mixing definitions of war and strategy.
The U.S. military has an approved joint definition of strategy: “The art and science of developing and
employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater,
national, and/or multinational objectives.” Unfortunately, that definition only recognizes strategy as
a national security function, and, although it is significantly better than earlier definitions, it remains
fairly broad. The explanation in the Joint Encyclopedia goes a little further: “These strategies integrate
national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national
resources and military forces and supplies (means).” That is more satisfactory, although still focused
exclusively on national security issues, which is understandable considering the source. However,
the joint definition of national military strategy shows that the joint community is divided or at least
inconsistent on this subject. “National Military Strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying
military power to attain national objectives in peace or war.” That is a pure “how to” definition—at
best a correlation of objectives with methods with the emphasis on methods. There is no consideration
of or recognition of the importance of developing means; there is also no consideration of developing
military objectives to accomplish national objectives. The encyclopedia’s further explanation on that
term goes into the formal document of the National Military Strategy rather than the concept.7
The U.S. Army War College defines strategy in two ways: “Conceptually, we define strategy as the
relationship among ends, ways, and means.” Alternatively, “Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore:
The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action),
and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.” The second definition
is really closer to a definition of grand strategic art, but if one cut it off after “means,” it would be
essentially the same as the first definition.8
In my own view, strategy is simply a problem solving process. It is a common and logical way to
approach any problem—military, national security, personal, business, or any other category one might
determine. Strategy asks three basic questions: what is it I want to do, What do I have or what can I
reasonably get that might help me do what I want to do, and What is the best way to use what I have
to do what I want to do? Thus, I agree with the War College that strategy is the considered relationship
among ends, ways, and means. That sounds deceptively simple—even simplistic. Is it actually more
than that relationship? Is there some deeper secret? I do not believe there is; however, the relationship
is not as simple as it appears at first blush. First, a true strategy must consider all three components
to be complete. For example, if one thinks about strategy as a relationship of variables (almost an
equation but there is no equal sign) one can “solve” for different variables. Ends, which hopefully
come from a different process and serve as the basis for strategy, generally will be given. If we assume
a strategist wants to achieve those ends by specific ways, he can determine the necessary means by one
of the traditional exercises of strategic art—force development. If a strategist knows both the ends to be
achieved and means available, he can determine the possible ways. People, particularly military writers,
often define strategy in exactly that way—as a relation between ends and means—essentially equating
strategy with ways or at least converting strategy into an exercise of determining ways. That was the
traditional approach of classic strategists like Jomini and Liddell Hart, who unabashedly thought of
strategy as ways. That is also the typical short-term planning process that a theater commander might
do. He cannot quickly change the means available, so he has to determine how to best use what is on
hand to accomplish the mission.
Before we proceed, it is useful to address the issue of whether strategy really is necessary. It is
certainly possible to conduct a war without a strategy. One can imagine very fierce combat divorced
from any coherent (or even incoherent) plan for how that fighting would achieve the aims of the war—
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fighting for the sake of fighting. Alternatively, preemptive surrender is always an option for the state
interested in avoiding strategic decisions; the only drawback is that preemptive surrender is incapable
of achieving positive political objectives other than avoidance of conflict. Rational states, however, will
always attempt to address their interests by relating ends with ways and means. Given that they are
fighting for some reason—that is, they have an end—there will be some (even if unconscious) design
of how to use the available means to achieve it. Thus, while strategy may not technically be necessary,
it is almost always present—even if poorly conceived and executed.
TESTS FOR STRATEGY
One can test a possible strategy by examining it for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility. Those
three nouns test each of the three components of strategy. Suitability tests whether the proposed strategy
achieves the desired end—if it does not, it is not a potential strategy. Acceptability tests ways. Does
the proposed course of action or concept produce results without excessive expenditure of resources
and within accepted modes of conduct? Feasibility tests means. Are the means at hand or reasonably
available sufficient to execute the proposed concept? A strategy must meet or at least have a reasonable
expectation of meting all three tests to be valid, but there is no upper limit on the number of possible
solutions. The art becomes the analysis necessary to select the best or most efficient or least risky.
Of the three tests, suitability and feasibility are fairly straightforward and require no further
explication. Acceptability, however, has some complicating features. The morality and legality
of strategies is an obvious case in point—morality and legality vary widely by nation, culture, and
even individual. But those are not the only complicating features of acceptability. For example, Colin
Gray talks about what he calls the social dimension of strategy “. . . strategy is made and executed
by the institutions of particular societies in ways that express cultural preferences.”9 That is really an
expression of the relation of the acceptability of a strategy to the Clausewitzian trinity. Beyond morality
and legality, a truly acceptable strategy must fit the norms of the military, government, and people.
Strategies that only meet the norms of one or two of the legs are possible if they are not in major conflict
with deeply held norms of the other legs, but they must be achievable very quickly to avoid possibly
disastrous conflict over acceptability.
The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 is an example of this phenomenon. It was an invasion of a
sovereign foreign nation justified by fairly innocuous (certainly not vital) political issues. That was
against the norms of all three legs of the American trinity; however, the government had convinced
itself that action was necessary, and the military agreed or at least obeyed orders. The potential glitch
was the response of the American people. Initial reaction was the predictable support for troops being
deployed in harm’s way. That support could have quickly turned into opposition had the operation not
been extremely rapid and relatively casualty-free.
Even though one might occasionally get away with violating norms, one cannot safely violate
deeply-held norms even briefly. Thus, the United States has a norm against assassination (reinforced
by a self-imposed presidential directive that adds a legal dimension). Our current mode of declaring
that the people of an adversarial country are good but their leader is evil screams for a decapitation
strategy executed by assassination. That will not happen. Beyond the question of legality, it would
never pass the acceptability test of any of the trinitarian elements.
It is also important to note that these tests are not designed to determine if a strategy is either
good or will work. The tests are for appropriateness, and they are not even conclusive in that respect.
Although failure to meet the requirements of suitability, acceptability, and feasibility is often obvious,
passing those same requirements is a matter both subjective, open to interpretation, and inconclusive.
The best analysis may suggest that a strategy is suitable, feasible, and acceptable, but that absolutely
does not guarantee success. There will always be risk and unforeseen consequences of action with
which the strategist must cope. The best the tests can do is weed out inappropriate strategies.
82

CATEGORIZING STRATEGY
There are several ways to categorize strategies. One has a conceptual basis: strategy can be declaratory,
actual, or ideal. Declaratory strategy is what a nation says its strategy is. Declaratory strategy may
or may not be the nation’s true strategy, and the nation may or may not actually believe it. A good
example is America’s two Major Theater of War (MTW) strategy. For years the official (declared)
strategy of the United States was to be able to fight two near-simultaneous MTWs; however, most
analysts and many military personnel were convinced such a strategy was impossible to execute with
existing means. Regardless, the United States must maintain some form of two MTW strategy, despite
recent modifications and adjustments, as its declared strategy, even if the administration in power
determines that it does not have and is unwilling to buy the resources to execute the strategy. A nation
with pretensions to world power cannot easily change or back down from long-declared strategies,
and a declared two MTW capability provides useful deterrent effect. Actual strategy addresses the
difference between the declared strategy and reality. It asks the question, “Assuming the United States
cannot execute its declared two MTW strategy, what is its real strategy?” That real strategy would be
an actual strategy. An ideal strategy is what a strategist would prefer to do if he had unlimited access
to all the necessary resources (both quantitative and qualitative). It is a textbook strategy and may or
may not correspond to reality.
A second method of categorization is based on the pattern of execution: sequential, simultaneous,
and cumulative. This paradigm attempts to make distinctions between strategies based on whether
the strategist is attacking objectives progressively, simultaneously, or in essentially random order.
Thus, a typical sequential campaign would involve actions to gain control of the air, followed by
efforts to defeat the enemy’s fielded forces, and culminate in the attack on or occupation of political
objectives. A simultaneous campaign would include near-simultaneous attacks on each of those
target sets. A cumulative strategy produces results not by any single action or sequence of actions,
but by the cumulative effect of numerous actions over time. A commerce raiding strategy is a classic
example. The loss of a single ship is not especially significant; there is no need to sink ships in any
order; while specific types of ships (like tankers) might be more valuable than others, the loss of any
ship contributes directly to victory. The effectiveness of the strategy comes from cumulative losses over
time. Although cumulative strategies have never taken on the luster that Admiral J. C. Wylie, the man
who first recognized them as a separate category of strategy, hoped, they do allow conceptualization
or categorization of strategy based on the pattern of execution.10
Attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation are standard strategic categories, although Joint Pub 1-02
does not mention them. The late 19th century German military historian Hans Delbrück made the
distinction between exhaustion and annihilation. Attrition sometimes is used synonymously with
exhaustion, but they are actually different concepts. Annihilation seeks political victory through the
complete destruction (often in a single battle or short campaign) of the enemy armed forces. Attrition
seeks victory through the gradual destruction (by a long campaign or series of campaigns) of the
enemy’s armed forces. Exhaustion seeks to erode the will and resources of the enemy nation/state
rather than the armed forces. Recently, Russell Weigley has opined that, at least in his classic book
The American Way of War, he should have replaced attrition with erosion as a characterization of U.S.
strategy. He believes the term is less confusing and actually better portrays certain aspects of American
strategy. Erosion would be closer in meaning to exhaustion than attrition, except that—and this is only
a tentative interpretation of Weigley’s brief and incomplete explanation of the concept—it would aim
more directly at the political or governmental will than at popular support or resources.11 It is not clear
how the term erosion fits into the paradigm, but it would seem to be either a new category or a sub-set
of exhaustion. Regardless, Professor Weigley’s modification to the traditional categories of attrition,
exhaustion, and annihilation is neither widely known nor accepted.
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The historian Michael Howard postulated a strategic paradigm based on deterrence, compellence,
and reassurance. Military power can deter other states from doing something, or it can compel them to
do something. “Reassurance provides a general sense of security that is not specific to any particular
threat or scenario.” Pax Britannia is the best example. The British navy provided world-wide security
through its control of the seas. That security translated into general peace.12 Howard proposes these
as the broad categories of the ways in which military force can be used. Although deterrence and
compellence are widely accepted concepts, the addition of reassurance to create a general paradigm is
not widely known or accepted.
Another way, as mentioned briefly above, to categorize strategy is organizational or hierarchical.
That is the method that talks about grand or national strategy at one level and theater, campaign, or
operational strategy at another level. The term operational strategy is one that theorist Andre Beaufré
and historian Alan T. Nolan use, but it is confusing, unnecessarily mixes terms, and is uncommon at
best in the literature. We will omit it from further discussions, but it does highlight one significant issue.
There is a basic theoretical question about the legitimacy of strategy at the operational level—we are
purposefully mixing apples and oranges for no discernable gain in clarity, utility, or comprehension.
This confusion only expands as operational art edges more into the strategic realm. While I personally
oppose calling theater plans strategic, current U.S. joint doctrine accepts it, and I will follow that
doctrine.
Grand or national strategy is associated with actions at the state/national level. The U.S. Army
War College defines it as “. . . a country’s broadest approach to the pursuit of its national objectives in
the international system.”13 Good grand strategies include or at least consider all elements of national
power. These are the means of grand strategy. One could develop a lopsided grand strategy that was
purely military or purely economic, but that is not ideal even if some elements contribute only minimally
to the final product. This broaches the subject of elements of power—a simple but useful way to classify
or categorize power.
Current U.S. military doctrine recognizes four categories of power available to a nation or strategist:
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (often referred to using the shorthand DIME). Other
potential candidates include social/psychological, which was an accepted category until recently, and
political. While political and diplomatic appear to be similar and frequently are used synonymously,
I believe they actually are different. To me, political refers to the power generated internally or
domestically, while diplomatic refers exclusively to power in the international arena—the ability to
influence adversaries, allies, and neutrals. Political power is important for generating or sustaining
support for the policy/strategy or popular will. Regimes with little domestic support (and thus little
political power) have difficulty executing their international policies. Social/psychological power
was very similar to political power in some respects, but also contained elements of informational
power. Since its major components were subsumed in other terms, social/psychological power fell into
disuse.
In a war, the other elements of power (and the strategies developed for their employment) tend to
support the military element; however, there is always a symbiotic relationship between the elements.
Thus diplomatic strategy may support military strategy, but military success may be an essential
precursor for diplomatic success. Similarly, economic strategy may be designed to provide military
means, but the military capture or loss of economic assets may directly influence the effectiveness of
the economic strategy. Additionally, different types of warfare emphasize different elements of power.
For example, in a civil war, the political element becomes especially important. It is for just this reason
that the Washington community dealing with the War on Terrorism (WOT) has adopted a new model
to think about power. Besides the traditional DIME elements, the counterterrorist community has
added intelligence, legal or law enforcement, and financial to their list of elements of power—giving
the acronym MIDLIFE. Those are useful tools to consider in the WOT, although it remains to be seen if
the expanded categories of national power will gain broad acceptance.
84

STRATEGY AND THE TYPE OF THE WAR
Does (or should) one’s strategy necessarily change based on the type of war he is fighting? If strategy
is a function of ends, then it ought to change or be different as the political ends change. The alternative
view, however, is that destroying the enemy’s military force is always the best (to some theorists the
only legitimate) objective for the military regardless of political goals. This gets to what Clausewitz
called the supreme judgment about a war—its nature.
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is
to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it
into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.14

Based on the characteristics of the war, the military’s objective may or may not have anything to do
with destroying the enemy’s military force. For example, one might have political goals that make
avoiding battle at all costs and instead maneuvering to seize specific locations not only a viable but a
desirable strategy. The strategist will only recognize this if he or she understands the kind of the war
they are waging, recognizes when that changes, and adapts strategy accordingly.
The inclusion of potential changes in the nature of a war during its conduct raises another important
question. If the nature of a war can change, then is not trying to shape that nature into a form that suits
the strategist a legitimate strategic exercise? Is Clausewitz overlooking a useful strategic tool when he
warns against trying to turn a war into something alien to its nature? Strategists should certainly try to
control or influence the nature of a war as much as possible. The problem is when they do not recognize
that their efforts have failed and persist in fighting the wrong kind of war. Thus, in the 1960s, the
United States legitimately might have tried to turn the Vietnam war into a conventional international
war between North and South Vietnam—that was the war the U.S. military was best prepared to win.
However, when that effort failed, the strategists should have recognized that fact and adapted to the
true nature of the war they were fighting. Unfortunately, that did not occur until it was too late to win
that war, and paradoxically, the nature of the war changed again in 1975, and the war became precisely
the conventional international war the United States had wanted initially.
EXECUTING STRATEGY
Next we need to consider a few theories on potential ways to execute strategy. Knowing that strategy
is a considered relation among ends, ways, and means is a necessary first step, but it does not help one
actually do anything. Fortunately, hundreds of authors have given their thoughts on how to conduct
strategy. Some are better than others. Most are “ways” determinations rather than comprehensive
ends-ways-means analyses. Still, they are worth consideration. As a minimum a competent strategist
should be aware of each.
Sun Tzu.
The ancient Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu did not define strategy, but he offered pointers on its
practice. At times, Sun Tzu can be so straightforward, he is simplistic. For example, the statement,
“Victory is the main object of war” is not especially informative. One can make all the tortuous
interpretations one likes, but the statement is blunt and obvious in its intent. That is not to say it is
trivial—in fact, it is well for anyone involved with war to remember that the object is to win—it is just
wrong as an absolute. The object of war is not victory, but as Liddell Hart says, “a better peace—even of
only from your own point of view.” One can strive so hard for victory that he destroys the subsequent
peace. Liddell Hart again says,
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A State which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future. If you concentrate
exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while
it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

Victory is certainly better than the alternative, but it cannot be the exclusive aim of war. I expound on that
for two reasons. First, Sun Tzu should be treated like Jay Luvass recommended using Clausewitz—the
fact that he said something only makes it worthy of consideration. Second, the fact that Sun Tzu is both
an ancient and an Asian author does not mean automatically he had all the answers or even addressed
all the questions. There is a tendency to read volumes into fairly straightforward passages of Sun Tzu
on the assumption that there must be something of deep significance behind each phrase of the book.
In many (if not most) cases, the phrases actually mean exactly what they say. Sun Tzu was not saying
that war is a political act when he said, “War is a matter of vital importance to the State”—reading the
rest of the quote makes it quite apparent he was simply saying war is important and must be studied.15
That does not need tortured interpretation to be significant.
It is commonplace to acknowledge that Sun Tzu advocated deception and winning without fighting.
For example, he wrote, “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of
skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Sun Tzu has become the intellectual
father of a school of warfare that advocates winning by maneuver or by psychologically dislocating
the opponent. Although undesirable, the ancient Chinese soldier might not be as pleased about that
paternity as his advocates believe. Sun Tzu expended lots of effort explaining how to maneuver and
fight. In some respects, he is very like Jomini (of all people). For example, Sun Tzu advocated attacking
portions of the enemy with your whole force: “If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while
at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while
he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his.” Sun Tzu thought that the defense
was the stronger form of warfare, but that offensive action was necessary for victory. “Invincibility
lies in the defence [sic]; the possibility of victory in the attack. . . . One defends when his strength is
inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant.” He sometimes did incomplete analysis and thus provided
advice that might be wrong, depending on the circumstances. For example, Sun Tzu said, “To be certain
to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect.” It is easy to use that quote as
an advocacy for Liddell Hart’s indirect approach. That is, attack where the enemy does not expect. The
problem is that there is almost always a reason why the enemy does not defend a place, and it usually
has to do with the limited value of that place. However, Sun Tzu was not setting up Liddell Hart. The
line after the original quote changes the meaning of the entire passage: “To be certain to hold what
you defend is to defend a place the enemy does not attack.”16 We now have a statement on chance
and uncertainty in war—that is, the only certain way to take a place is if the enemy is not there—not
advice on the indirect approach. Nevertheless, Sun Tzu is known as the advocate of deception, surprise,
intelligence, and maneuver to win without fighting. He is mandatory reading for the strategist.
Clausewitz.
Clausewitz is generally more useful for his philosophical musings on the nature of war than his
“how to” strategic advice. In that arena, much of what he preached was either commonplace or 19th
century specific. The exceptions are three. First was his advocacy of seeking battle. This obviously sets
him apart from Sun Tzu and many others, and Clausewitz is quite specific about his expectations of
decisive battle. He wrote,
. . . the importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate pursuit is carried
out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and in many cases is more important than the
first. Strategy at this point draws near to tactics in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its first
exercise of authority is to demand that the victory should really be complete.17
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Next, Clausewitz originated the concept of attacking what he called the enemy’s center of gravity.
The center of gravity comes from the characteristics of the belligerents and is “the hub of all power and
movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be
directed.”18 He offered several possibilities but decided that attacking the enemy’s army was usually
the best way to start a campaign, followed by seizing his capital and attacking his alliances. The
concept, which the U.S. military adopted almost verbatim until the most recent doctrinal publications,
has caused interminable debate both in the active force and the schoolhouses. Tactically, the U.S.
military has always identified and attacked vulnerabilities—now, some dead Prussian is telling us that
strategically we should attack strengths (for whatever else one might believe, it is clear that a center of
gravity is a strength, not a weakness). We thus see attempts to mix the two concepts and essentially do
both—usually described as attacking strengths through vulnerabilities.
Clausewitz’s final significant “how to” idea is the concept of the culminating point. “There are
strategic attacks that have led directly to peace, but these are the minority. Most of them only lead up
to the point where their remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.
Beyond that point, the scale turns, and the reaction follows with a small force that is usually much
stronger than that of the original attack. This is what we mean by the culminating point of the attack.”19
Although Clausewitz only discusses culmination in terms of the attack (his later discussion of the
culminating point of victory is a different concept), modern U.S. doctrine also identifies a culminating
point for the defense—essentially a breaking point.
Jomini.
The Baron Antoine Jomini, a contemporary of Clausewitz with service in the French and Russian
armies during the Napoleonic wars, also gave modern U.S. theory and doctrine several terms. He was
much more specific in his “how to” analysis than Clausewitz. Jomini believed war was a science, and
consequently one could discover, by careful study, rules about how it should be conducted. He offered
the results of his study. Jomini often is criticized for being geometric—although such a depiction
overlooks some aspects of his work, it is not totally unfair. Jomini was specific about how to plan a
campaign. First one selected the theater of war. Next, he determined the decisive points in the theater.
Selection of bases and zones of operation followed. Then one designated the objective point. The line
of operations was then the line from the base through the decisive points to the objective point. Thus,
the great principle of war “which must be followed in all good combinations” was contained in four
maxims:
1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points
of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without
compromising one’s own.
2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces.
3. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion
of the hostile line which it is of first importance to overthrow.
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they
shall engage at the proper time and with energy.20
Jomini’s maxims remain good advice if not elevated to dogma, and his terms, such as lines of
operations, decisive points, etc., form the basis of much of the language of modern operational art.
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Liddell Hart.
B. H. Liddell Hart had his own approach to strategy that has become famous as the indirect
approach.
Strategy has not to overcome resistance, except from nature. Its purpose is to diminish the possibility of resistance, and
it seeks to fulfill this purpose by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise. . . . Although strategy may aim
more at exploiting movement than at exploiting surprise, or conversely, the two elements react on each other.
Movement generates surprise, and surprise gives impetus to movement.21
Just as the military means is only one of the means of grand strategy—one of the instruments in the surgeon’s
case—so battle is only one of the means to the end of strategy. If the conditions are suitable, it is usually the quickest
in effect, but if the conditions are unfavorable it is folly to use it. . . . His [a military strategist’s] responsibility is to
seek it [a military decision] under the most advantageous circumstances in order to produce the most profitable
results. Hence his true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not
of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. In other words, dislocation is the aim of
strategy.”22

The strategist produces dislocation physically by forcing the enemy to change front or by threatening
his forces or lines of communication. Dislocation also is achieved psychologically in the enemy
commander’s mind as a result of the physical dislocation. “In studying the physical aspect, we must
never lose sight of the psychological, and only when both are combined is the strategy truly an indirect
approach, calculated to dislocate the opponent’s balance.” Although Liddell Hart would be appalled
at being compared with Clausewitz, this statement is similar to the Prussian’s comment, “Military
activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral
forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated.”23
Liddell Hart and his indirect approach have won a wide following among strategists. However,
the issue of direct versus indirect is actually a smoke screen. The indirect approach is a tactical
concept elevated to the strategic level, and it loses some of its validity in the transition. Strategically,
it is sometimes (if not often) advantageous to take a direct approach. This is particularly true in
cases when the contending parties have disproportionate power—that is, when one side possesses
overwhelming force. In such cases, the stronger side invariably benefits from direct action. The concept
of the indirect approach is also a downright silly notion when talking about simultaneous operations
across the spectrum of conflict. Advocates will cry that I have missed the point. Liddell Hart seeks an
indirect approach only because what he really wants is the mental dislocation it produces. I would
counter that his real point was the avoidance of battle and winning without fighting. Surprise, which
Liddell Hart acknowledges is how an indirect approach produces mental dislocation, is a tremendous
advantage; however, designing strategies purely or even primarily to achieve surprise overlooks the
rest of the equation—surprise to do what? Surprise for what purpose? If a strategist can accomplish
his purpose in a direct manner, it might be more desirable than contending with the disadvantages
inherent in achieving surprise. Nevertheless, the indirect approach is a recognized strategic tool that
has tremendous utility if used intelligently.
Beaufré.
The French general and theoretician Andre Beaufré provided another way to think about strategy.
He made significant contributions to deterrence theory, especially in his skepticism of the deterrent
effect of conventional forces and his advocacy of an independent French nuclear force; however, his
main contribution was in the realm of general strategy. Beaufré published an influential trilogy of short
books in the mid-1960s: An Introduction to Strategy, Deterrence and Strategy, and Strategy of Action.24 He
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was generally Clausewitzian in his acceptance both of the political and psychological natures of war
and his characterization of war as a dialectic struggle between opposing wills. He was adamant that
wars are not won by military means alone (destroying the enemy army) but only by the collapse of
will.
Beaufré recognized the criticality of non-military elements of power—political, economic, etc. He
also recognized that strategy was neither an exclusively wartime activity nor restricted to planning
against an enemy—one might have strategies for relations with friends or allies as well. Beaufré
sometimes is credited with expanding the concept of strategy beyond the purely military, although
contemporaries already were doing that under the rubric of grand strategy—a term Beaufré disliked
and replaced in his own writing with “total strategy.” Total strategy defined at the highest national
level how the war would be fought and coordinated the application of all the elements of power. Below
total strategy was a level Beaufré called overall strategy, which allocated tasks and coordinated the
activities for a single element of power (essentially national-level sub- or supporting strategies like a
National Military Strategy or a National Economic Strategy). Below overall strategy was operational
strategy, which corresponded fairly closely to the modern concept of operational art.25
All these strategic levels directed strategies that fell into “patterns,” depending on the levels or
resources available and the intensity of the interests at stake. The first pattern Beaufré called the direct
threat; it occurred when the objective was only of moderate importance, and the resources available
were large. A threat of action often was sufficient to achieve the objective. If the objective was of
moderate importance but resources were inadequate to back a direct threat, nations usually resorted
to indirect pressure operationalized as political, diplomatic, or economic pressure. If freedom of action
was restricted, resources limited, and objectives important, a third pattern resulted. That pattern was
the use of successive actions employing both direct threat and indirect pressure—often with a limited
use of military force. The fourth pattern was another possibility if freedom of action was great but
the resources inadequate and the stakes high—“protracted struggle, but at a low level of military activity
[emphasis in original].” If military resources were sufficient, a nation might try the fifth and final
pattern: “violent military conflict aimed a military victory [emphasis in original].” Strategic analysis based
on synthesizing both material and psychological data rather than habit or “the fashion of the moment”
should dictate the selection of the pattern and the specific strategies.26
According to Beaufré, there were two general principles of strategy, which he borrowed from
Foch: freedom of action and economy of force. There were also two distinct but vital components to
any strategy—“1. Selection of the decisive point to be attacked (this depends on the enemy’s vulnerable
points). 2. Selection of the preparatory maneuvers which will enable the decisive points to be reached [italics
in original].”27 Beaufré then developed a list of 19 components of maneuver: eight offensive—attack,
threat, surprise, feint, deceive, thrust, wear down, follow-up; six defensive—on guard, parry, riposte
(counterattack), disengage, retire, break-off; and five related to force posture—concentrate, disperse,
economize, increase, and reduce. All of these aim at gaining, retaining, or depriving the enemy of
freedom of action. Retaining the initiative was vital in every case.28
For Beaufré, total strategy might be executed in one of two modes: direct or indirect. All elements
of power played in both modes, but the direct mode emphasized the military instrument. Indirect
strategy, which he carefully distinguished from Liddell Hart’s indirect approach, used primarily the
nonmilitary instruments to achieve political goals. Beaufré also developed a universal formula for
strategy: S=KFψt. S represented strategy, K was any specific factor applicable to the case, F equated to
material force, ψ represented psychological factors, and t was time. That formula is too general to be
useful beyond illustrating the point that in direct strategy, F is the predominant factor while in indirect
strategy ψ prevails.29 Fortunately, that is all Beaufré really tried to do with his formula.
Another of Beaufré’s major concepts was the strategy of action. This was a counterpart to deterrence.
When deterring, the state wanted its opponent to refrain from doing something, while an action strategy
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aimed at causing someone to do something. The aim of one was negative and the other positive.
Other authors at the time and since have called this coercion, and Beaufré used that term, but he
thought coercion too often implied use of military force and wanted action to include a broader range
of options.30 His broader interpretation and insistence on the high nature of total strategy actually
pushed his strategic theory into potential collision or overlap with policy, which Beaufré had difficulty
explaining away other than the different mindset of the practitioner of each (intuitive, philosophical,
and creative for policy; pragmatic, rational, and policy subordinate for strategy).31
Beaufré’s work is not well known in the United States. His books are not in modern reprint in English
(a French reprint of one came out in 1998), are difficult to locate, and are not frequently consulted. He
was innovative, but his ideas were not unique. His insistence on coining new language with which to
discuss familiar topics probably worked against his long-term acceptance. Much of his thought has
come to modern U.S. theory from, or at least through, other sources.
Luttwak.
Edward Luttwak, an economist and historian who has written extensively on strategic theory
talks about attrition and maneuver as the forms of strategy. For Luttwak, attrition is the application
of superior firepower and material strength to eventually destroy the enemy’s entire force unless he
surrenders or retreats. The enemy is nothing more than a target array to be serviced by industrial
methods. The opposite of attrition warfare is relational maneuver—“action related to the specifics of the
objective.” The goal of relational maneuver, instead of physically destroying the enemy as in attrition,
is to incapacitate his systems. Those systems might be the enemy’s command and control or his fielded
forces or even his doctrine or perhaps the spatial deployment of his force, as in the penetration of
a linear position. In some cases it might entail the attack of actual technical systems—Luttwak uses
deception of radar rather than its destruction or jamming to illustrate the final category.32
Instead of seeking out the enemy’s concentration of strength, since that is where the targets are to be found in bulk,
the starting point of relational maneuver is the avoidance of the enemy’s strengths, followed by the application
of some selective superiority against presumed enemy weaknesses, physical or psychological, technical or
organizational.33

Luttwak recognizes that neither attrition nor relational maneuver are ever employed alone—there
is always some mix of the two, even if one or the other is decidedly dominant. Relational maneuver is
more difficult to execute than attrition, although it can produce better results more quickly. Conversely,
relational maneuver can fail completely if the force applied is too weak to do the task or it encounters
unexpected resistance. Relational maneuver does not usually allow “free substitution of quantity for
quality.” There is always a basic quality floor beneath which one cannot safely pass. Only after that
floor has been exceeded will quantity substitutions be possible.34
Luttwak also says that strategy is paradoxical.
The large claim I advance here is that strategy does not merely entail this or that paradoxical proposition,
contradictory and yet recognized as valid, but rather that the entire realm of strategy is pervaded by a paradoxical logic
of its own, standing against the ordinary linear logic by which we live in all other spheres of life (except for warlike
games, of course).

He believes paradoxical logic pervades the five levels (technical, tactical, operational, theater strategic,
and grand strategic) and two dimensions (vertical across levels and horizontal in levels) of warfare.35
At the most basic level, Luttwak demonstrates both the presence and the desirability of choices
in war that defy peacetime logic. His base example is the choice of an approach road to an objective.
The alternatives are a wide, straight, well-surfaced road and a narrow, winding, poorly-surfaced
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road. “Only in the conflictual realm of strategy would the choice arise at all, for it is only if combat
is possible that the bad road can be good precisely because it is bad and may therefore be less strongly
held or even left unguarded by the enemy.” Thus, commanders make choices contrary to normal logic
because they produce valuable advantages—advantages arising directly from the nature of war. Like
Clausewitz, Luttwak believes the competitive aspect of war, that it is always a competition between
active opponents, is one of the defining aspects of war. “On the contrary, the paradoxical preference for
inconvenient times and directions, preparations visibly and deliberately incomplete, approaches seemly
too dangerous, for combat at night and in bad weather, is a common aspect of tactical ingenuity—and
for a reason that derives from the essential nature of war.”36 Commanders make paradoxical choices
primarily to gain surprise and thus reduce the risk of combat.
To have the advantage of an enemy who cannot react because he is surprised and unready, or at least who cannot
react promptly and in full force, all sorts of paradoxical choices may be justified. . . . Surprise can now be recognized
for what it is: not merely one factor of advantage in warfare among many others, but rather the suspension, if only
briefly, if only partially, of the entire predicament of strategy, even as the struggle continues. Without a reacting
enemy, or rather according to the extent and degree that surprise is achieved, the conduct of war becomes mere
administration.37

Gaining surprise, therefore, becomes one of the key objectives of strategy. In fact, whole schools
of strategy (Luttwak refers specifically to Liddell Hart’s indirect approach) have been founded on the
principle of surprise. The problem is that paradoxical choices—those necessary to achieve surprise—
are never free or even necessarily safe because every “paradoxical choice made for the sake of surprise
must have its cost, manifest in some loss of strength that would otherwise be available.” The choice
itself may make execution more difficult (it is harder to fight at night); secrecy can inhibit preparations
and is almost never total; deception may contain relatively cost-free elements (like false information
leaked to the enemy); but as it becomes more sophisticated, complex, and convincing, it soaks up
resources (units conducting faints are not available at the main point of contact). At the theoretical
extreme, one could expend so much force gaining surprise that insufficient combat power remained for
the real fight.38
Obviously the paradoxical course of “least expectation” must stop short of self-defeating extremes, but beyond
that the decision is a matter of calculations neither safe nor precise. Although the loss of strength potentially
available is certain, success in achieving surprise can only be hoped for; and although the cost can usually be
tightly calculated, the benefit must remain a matter of speculation until the deed is done.39

All of this, of course, is complicated by friction, which Luttwak calls organizational risk. Also,
acting paradoxically can become predictable. Thus, by 1982 in Lebanon, the Israelis had established
such a reputation for paradoxical action that they were unable to achieve surprise until they broke
their established paradigm and conducted the obvious frontal attack down the Bekka Valley. Luttwak
recognizes that some situations call for straightforward, logical solutions. “If the enemy is so weakened
that his forces are best treated as a passive array of targets that might as well be inanimate, the normal
linear logic of industrial production, with all the derived criteria of productive efficiency, is fully valid,
and the paradoxical logic of strategy is irrelevant.”40
While he has some interesting and valid points, especially in the details, Luttwak’s insistence on the
paradoxical nature of war is too broad a generalization. There is much that is paradoxical in warfare;
however, if war were completely paradoxical as Luttwak asserts (his exceptions are too trivial to be
significant), war would not yield to study. In fact, much of warfare—including its paradox—is very
logical. In a sense, Luttwak’s argument proves that proposition and refutes itself.

91

Van Creveld.
Martin Van Creveld’s The Transformation of War is, at least according to the cover, “The most radical
reinterpretation of armed conflict since Clausewitz.” He represents a segment of modern scholars that
believe Clausewitz no longer explains why, how, or by whom wars are fought. To Van Creveld, war
is no longer a rational political act conducted among states—if it ever was. He points out that warfare
waged by nonstate actors dominated conflict in 1991 rather than the organized, political, interstate
warfare between great powers that the international community seemed to expect (and Clausewitz
seemed to predict). War is no longer fought by the entities we always assumed fought wars. The
combatants in modern wars no longer fight for the reasons we always believed. Finally, they do not
fight in the manner we always accepted as standard.41
Modern war takes many forms—the Clausewitzian trinitarian form of war being one, but by no
means the dominant one, of them. For Van Creveld, Clausewitz does not apply in any case that does
not involve exclusively state-on-state warfare. Since he sees a resurgence of “Low-Intensity Conflict,”
he believes war will be dominated by nonstate actors. “We are entering an era, not of peaceful economic
competition between trading blocks, but of warfare between ethnic and religious groups.” Current
fielded military forces are irrelevant to the tasks they will likely face. Should the states in question fail
to recognize the changed reality, they will first become incapable of wielding appropriate force at all
and eventually cease to exist as recognizable states.42
The nature of the participants dictates the nature of the reasons they fight. Because the participants
are not states, they will not be fighting for state-like reasons. This follows logically from Van Creveld’s
assertion that politics applies only to states—not a more broadly defined interest in a more broadly
defined community. Nonstate actors fight wars for abstract concepts like justice or religion. Frequently,
groups feel their existence is threatened and lash out violently in response. In any case, reasons are
highly individualistic and do not yield easily to analysis—especially analysis based on the inappropriate
model of the Clausewitzian universe.43
Finally, Van Creveld believes that Clausewitz did not understand how wars are fought—at least
his assertion that they would tend naturally toward totality is wrong. He cites international law and
convention, among other factors, as major inhibitors on the drift toward totality in state-on-state war.
More significant is his critique of strategy. Like Luttwak, Van Creveld sees strategy as paradoxical. He
believes pairs of paradoxes define strategy. If the object of war is to beat our opponent’s force with our
own, then we must design maneuvers to pit strength against weakness. Because war is competitive,
our enemy is doing the same thing, and we must conceal or protect our weakness from the opponent’s
strength. Thus, the essence of strategy is “. . . the ability to feint, deceive, and mislead.” Eventually one
can work so hard on concealing that he and his side may be deceived—where the distinction between
feint and main effort is unclear. Van Creveld also discusses the paradox in time and space using the
same argument as Luttwak that the shortest distance between two points may not be the straight line.
Other paradoxes include that between concentration and dispersion (concentration is necessary to apply
power, but concentration increases the chance of discovery) and between effectiveness and efficiency
(the more economical, streamlined, or efficient a military organization becomes, the more vulnerable it
is).44
Perhaps uniquely in the field of strategic theory, Martin Van Creveld has provided a critique of
his own thesis. In a chapter of a book published in 2003, Van Creveld finds, not surprisingly, that on
balance his earlier work, written in 1988-89, holds up very well. The Gulf War was an aberration—the
outcome of which was almost preordained. Otherwise, “. . . the main thesis of The Transformation of War,
namely that major armed conflict between major powers is on the way out, seems to have been borne
out during the 10 years since the book’s publication.” Conversely, nontrinitarian wars are on the rise,
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and conventional forces do not seem able to bring them to satisfactory closure. “. . . [T]he prediction
that history is witnessing a major shift from trinitarian to nontrinitarian war seems to have fulfilled
itself and is still fulfilling itself on an almost daily basis.” He believes information warfare might be a
wild card that could disrupt his predictions; however, on balance he sees information as advantageous
to (or at least an equalizing factor for) nonstate actors, and hence a confirmation of the trend toward
nontrinitarianism. Thus, Van Creveld sticks with his criticism of Clausewitz and essentially every
element of his original thesis.45
MISCELLANEOUS ALTERNATIVES
There are also whole categories we can only classify as miscellaneous, alternative, possibly-strategic
concepts.
Denial, Punishment, and Coercion.
These are proposed replacements for attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation. They actually describe
the ends of strategy (or perhaps a limited set of ways) rather than a complete strategic concept. Their
utility is limited and their acceptance as a group by the strategic community is minimal at best. Coercion,
of course, is a recognized strategic concept on its own; it is just not commonly grouped with denial and
punishment as a paradigm.
Jones.
Historian Archer Jones has a unique approach to strategy.
The object for military strategy used herein is the depletion of the military force of an adversary. The definition
of political-military strategy, a companion term, is the use of military force to attain political or related objectives
directly, rather than by depleting an adversary’s military force. Of course, military strategy usually endeavored to
implement political or comparable objectives but sought to attain them indirectly, by depleting the hostile military
force sufficiently to gain an ascendancy adequate to attain the war’s political goals.46

Jones does not use attrition because of its association with a particular form of military strategy.
Instead, he asserts that military force can achieve its objective of depleting the enemy through one of
two methods. Combat strategies deplete the enemy by directly destroying his force in the field. Logistic
strategies deprive the opponent of supplies, forces, weapons, recruits, or other resources. Either of
these strategies can be executed in one of two ways. One can use “a transitory presence in hostile
territory to make a destructive incursion,” which Jones labels a raiding strategy, or one can conquer
and permanently occupy significant segments of enemy territory, which he calls a persisting strategy.
The two pairs—combat and logistics and raiding and persisting—define comprehensive strategy.47
Jones then puts the factors into a matrix and uses them for all kinds of warfare—air, land, and sea.
Air war, however, can really only be raiding because of the nature of the medium. This is a military only,
ways only approach to strategy that works best as Jones applies it—in retrospect to analyze historical
campaigns. The separation of a purely political strategy from military strategy based on whether or
not the aim is depleting the enemy force is awkward to say the least. Jones has an interesting concept
of “political attrition.” This means that victory in battle raises morale and engenders optimism about
winning in a reasonable time with acceptable casualties. Conversely, defeat in battle makes victory
look less certain, farther away in time, and attainable only at high cost. He does not think that political
attrition necessarily works in reverse—that is, you cannot store up good will during good times to tide
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you over during the bad times. (Although presumably you would start the bad times at a higher overall
level of morale.) Elsewhere, Jones compares popular will to win with the classic economic supply and
demand theory of elastic and inelastic demand.48 That is a much less satisfying explanation. While
perhaps of little use to practical strategists, Archer Jones’ concepts are creative and not completely
without merit. His ideas show up with increasing frequency in historical works.
Decapitation.
An attractive recent concept is a strategy we might characterize as decapitation where one targets
specifically and selectively the enemy leader or at least a fairly limited set of upper-echelon leaders.
This has most recently found expression in the expressed strategic objective of regime change, which
tends to automatically focus on the enemy regime leadership regardless of the potential scope of the
mission. Strategic treatises like the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Strategy that
use regime change as an evaluative factor, hint at a widening acceptance of the concept. A primary
assumption, generally implied or asserted without proof, is that the current leader (perhaps aided by
a small group of accomplices) is the whole cause of the international dispute. A corollary assumption
is that eliminating the current evil leadership will result in its replacement by a regime willing to grant
the concessions demanded by the opposing state or coalition.
There are several problems with this approach—most related to the validity of the assumptions.
First, the assumption that the common people of a country are good and could not possibly support
the policies of their evil ruler is (as a minimum) unproven in most cases and palpably false in many.
Thus, decapitation will not solve the problem. In Clausewitzian terms, taking out the government does
not automatically destroy or break the will of either the people or the military. Second, a potential
follow-on regime can be either better than, about the same as, or worse than the current leadership.
Hence, the odds of achieving one’s policy objectives by decapitation are actually fairly poor. The U.S.
experience in Iraq after successfully removing Saddam Hussein’s regime demonstrate these caveats.
The old saw about contending with the devil one knows may be worn, but that does not make it any
less worthwhile advice, and while decapitation may work, it is neither easy nor a panacea.
Boyd.
U.S. Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd talks about the “OODA loop”—that is the decision cycle of
observation, orientation, decision, and action. The concept is derived from a fighter pilot in a dogfight.
Like the pilot, a strategist wins by out-thinking and out-maneuvering his opponent; by the time the
opponent decides what to do and initiates action, it is too late since you already have anticipated and
countered his move or made a countermove that makes his action meaningless. One accomplishes this
by possessing sufficient agility to be able, both mental and physical, to act a step or more ahead of the
enemy. Thus, the successful strategist always works inside his enemy’s decision cycle.49 This theory
describes a way, and really is a new and unnecessarily complicated rephrasing of the ancient concept
of the initiative. Initiative is not critical or essential, and alone it is not decisive. Robert E. Lee had
tactical, operational, and even strategic initiative at Gettysburg and lost tactically, operationally, and
strategically. However, initiative is a tremendous advantage—if Boyd’s paradigm makes it more clear
or obvious to the strategist, it has provided a service. The caution is that one can think and act so swiftly
and outpace the enemy so dramatically as to actually create friendly vulnerability. The OODA loop
concept predicts that the enemy will not be able to react effectively to an action; however, it does not
postulate enemy paralysis and complete immobility. One can envision circumstances where a confused
enemy reacting to information or situations hours or days behind its opponent makes a devastatingly
successful move that its opponent has long since discounted or thought negated.
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Warden.
Another U.S. Air Force Colonel, John A. Warden III, translated his targeteering experience into a
strategic theory, thus elevating the tactical process of allocating aircraft sorties to specific targets to
a strategic theory. Warden views the enemy as a system of targets arrayed in five strategic rings; the
innermost and most important is leadership. One can win by striking that inner ring so frequently and
violently that the enemy essentially is paralyzed and never able to mount an effective defense. It is
unnecessary to take on the outer and much more difficult target rings like the enemy’s armed forces,
although modern advances like stealth technology make simultaneous attack of the entire target array
possible (instead of the traditional sequential attacks where one array had to be neutralized before
proceeding to the next).50 This is often considered an air power theory—and Warden used it to push the
decisiveness of air power—but the conceptual approach has boarder application. Its major drawback
as a general theory of strategy is that it works best (if not exclusively) when one side has or can quickly
gain total dominance of its opponent’s airspace.
UNDERDOG STRATEGIES
There are also a number of alternative strategies that seem to be intended specifically for, or at least
be most appropriate for, weaker powers or underdogs.
Fabian.
Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus was a Roman general during the Second Punic War. He
advocated avoiding open battle because he was convinced the Romans would lose, which they
proceeded to do when they abandoned his strategy. Thus, Fabian strategy is a strategy in which one
side intentionally avoids large-scale battle for fear of the outcome. Victory depends on wearing down
(attriting) one’s opponent over time—usually by an unrelenting campaign of skirmishes between
detachments. Somewhat akin to a Fabian strategy is a strategy of survival. In that case, however, the
weaker power does not necessarily avoid battle. Instead, one reacts to his opponent’s moves rather
than making an effort to seize the initiative. The object is to survive rather than to win in the classic
sense—hopefully, sheer survival achieves (or perhaps comprises) one’s political aim. This is a favorite
alternative strategy of modern critics for the Confederate States of America. Scorched earth strategies
are another variant of the basic Fabian strategy. The concept is to withdraw slowly before an enemy,
while devastating the countryside over which he must advance so he cannot subsist his force on your
terrain. Attrition eventually will halt the attack—it will reach what Clausewitz called a culminating
point—and the retreating side can assume the offensive safely. This is actually the addition of a tactical
technique to the basic Fabian strategy and not a major new school of strategy.
There is a whole subset of doctrine under the general heading of strategies for the weak that
advocates guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and/or terrorism.
Lawrence.
T. E. (Thomas Edward) Lawrence was the first of the theorist of insurgency or revolutionary
warfare. His Seven Pillars of Wisdom, originally published in 1926, recounted his experiences with
Arab insurgent forces fighting the Turks in World War I.51 The title—a reference to Proverbs that
Lawrence carried over from an earlier incomplete book about seven Arab cities—is misleading since
Lawrence did not have seven theoretical pillars of guerrilla war. Lawrence’s narrative explained
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the war in the desert by clearly defining the objective; carefully analyzing the Arab and Turkish
forces; describing the execution of raids to maintain the initiative; and emphasizing the importance
of intelligence, psychological warfare, and propaganda. The objective of the guerrilla was not the
traditional objective of conventional forces—decisive battle. In fact, the guerrilla sought exactly the
opposite—the longest possible defense.52 Lawrence believed that successful guerillas needed safe bases
and support of at least some of the populace—perhaps as little as 20 percent, although an insurgency
might be successful with as little as two percent of the population in active support as long as the
other 98 percent remained at least neutral. A technologically sophisticated enemy (so the guerrilla
could attack his lines of communications) that was not strong enough to occupy the entire country was
also advantageous. Tactically, the guerrilla relied on speed, endurance, logistic independence, and at
least a minimal amount of weaponry. Lawrence compared guerillas to a gas operating around a fixed
enemy and talked about them as raiders versus regulars. Their operations always were offensive and
conducted in precise fashion by the smallest possible forces. The news media was their friend and tool.
Lawrence thought the Arabs were ideally suited for such warfare, and that “granted mobility, security,
time, and doctrine,” the guerrillas would win.53 His theory got entangled in his flamboyant personality,
so although he was a society darling, he had less impact on military circles.54
Mao.
Mao Zedong developed the most famous and influential theory of insurgency warfare. His concepts,
designed initially for the Chinese fight against the Japanese in World War II, have been expanded and
adapted by himself and others to become a general theory of revolutionary warfare. Moa emphasizes
the political nature of war and the reliance of the army on the civilian population, especially the Chinese
peasant population. He advocated a protracted war against the Japanese; victory would come in time
through attrition. He believed the Chinese should avoid large battles except in the rare instances when
they had the advantage. Guerrillas normally should operate dispersed across the countryside and
concentrate only to attack. Because the Chinese had a regular army contending with the Japanese, Mao
had to pay particular attention to how guerrilla and regular operations complemented each other. He
postulated a progressive campaign that would move slowly and deliberately from a stage when the
Chinese were on the strategic defensive, through a period of strategic stalemate, to the final stage when
Chinese forces assumed the strategic offensive. The ratio of forces and their tactical activities in each
stage reflected the strategic realities of the environment. Thus, guerrilla forces and tactics dominated
the phase of the strategic defensive. During the strategic stalemate, mobile and guerrilla warfare would
compliment each other, and guerrilla and regular forces would reach approximate equilibrium (largely
by guerrilla forces combining and training into progressively larger regular units). Mobile warfare
conducted by regular units would dominate the period of strategic offensive. Although guerrilla units
would never completely disappear, the regular forces would achieve the final victory.55 Mao has had
an enormous impact on the field of revolutionary warfare theory.
Guevara.
Ernesto “Che” Guevara de la Serna based his theory of revolutionary warfare on the Cuban model.
He offered a definition of strategy that highlighted his variation of the basic guerrilla theme—especially
his divergence from the Maoist emphasis on the political nature of the conflict and reliance on the
people. Che wrote,
In guerrilla terminology, strategy means the analysis of the objectives we wish to attain. First, determine how the
enemy will operate, his manpower, mobility, popular support, weapons, and leadership, Then, plan a strategy to
best confront these factors, always keeping in mind that the final objective is to destroy the enemy army.
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To Che, the major lessons of the Cuban Revolution were that guerrillas could defeat regular armies;
that it was unnecessary to wait for all the political preconditions to be met before beginning the
fight—the insurrection itself would produce them; and that the countryside was the arena for conflict
in underdeveloped Latin America. Gradual progress through the Maoist stages of revolution was
unnecessary—the guerrilla effort could not only establish the political preconditions of revolution but
also win the war on its own. Parties, doctrine, theories, and even political causes were unimportant. The
armed insurgency eventually would produce them all.56 That was incredibly naive and even dangerous
as an insurgent strategic concept, but Che became very well-known—if unsuccessful—pursuing it.
Terrorism.
Although there is no outstanding single theorist of terrorism, it is not a new strategic concept. Often
used as a tactical part or preliminary stage of a larger campaign or insurgency, terrorism can in fact be
a strategy, and sometimes even a goal in itself. Many ideological terrorists—perhaps the best examples
are ecological terrorists—have no desire or intent to progress militarily beyond terrorism. Although
political, most are not interested in overthrowing a government or seizing control of conventional
political power. They simply want their espoused policies, ideologies, or political agendas adopted.
Alternatively, anarchists, who traditionally have used terror, just want to destroy government without
replacing it. They have no positive goal whatever.
The theory behind terrorism is fairly straightforward. A weak, usually nongovernmental actor uses
violence, either random or carefully targeted and often directed against civilian targets, to produce
terror. The aim is to make life so uncertain and miserable that the state against which the terror is
directed concedes whatever political, social, economic, environmental, or theological point the terrorist
pursues. The technique has not proven particularly effective as a stand-alone strategy in changing
important policies in even marginally effective states. It is, however, comparatively cheap, easy to
conceptualize and execute, requires minimal training, is relatively safe since competent terrorist groups
are extremely difficult to eradicate, and is demonstrably effective in gaining the terrorist publicity for
himself and his cause.
COUNTER UNDERDOG STRATEGIES
If there are strategies for the weak, the strong are sure to develop counterstrategies. Opponents
generally fight a Fabian strategy by trying to exert enough pressure or threaten some critical location
or capability to bring about the battle the Fabian strategist is trying to avoid. There is (and needs to
be) no body of theoretical work on countering Fabian strategies. The same, however, cannot be said of
countering insurgencies and terrorism.
Formal modern counterinsurgency theory developed as a result of the insurgencies that sprung up
after World War II in the decolonizing world. It tended to be symmetric in the sense that it analyzed
insurgencies and then attempted to beat them at their own game and in their chosen arena. Modern
counterinsurgency theory tends to recognize the political nature of most insurgencies and approach
them holistically rather than from a primarily military point of view. That is a fairly big break with
traditional counterinsurgency techniques that concentrated on locating and destroying the guerrillas
and often relied heavily on punishing the local population for guerrilla activity as the sole means
of separating the guerrilla from his base of support. Discussion of some representative modern
counterinsurgency theorists follows.
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Caldwell.
British Colonel Charles E. Caldwell wrote Small Wars—Their Principles and Practice at the end of the
19th century. This was a guide for the conduct of colonial wars. Caldwell distinguished three broad
categories of small wars, which he defined as any war in which one side was not a regular army. His
categories were campaigns of conquest or annexation; campaigns to suppress insurgents; and campaigns
to punish or overthrow dangerous enemies. Each was fundamentally different from any form of regular
warfare. Small wars could take almost any shape—the most dangerous of which was guerrilla warfare.
Caldwell gave sound tactical advice about fighting a colonial or guerrilla enemy, but, from a theoretical
or strategic point of view, it is of limited value. He recognized that colonial enemies could be skilled
and dedicated warriors and recommended treating them as such—a refreshing change from standard
colonial views. However, Caldwell thought the small wars experience was both exclusively military
and unique to the colonies. He thus both did not develop the multidisciplinary approach common
to modern counterinsurgency strategy and did not recommend translating the colonial military
lessons into lessons for the big wars of the European colonial powers. He thought the strategic aim of
counterinsurgency was to fight because the counterinsurgents had the tactical advantage but were at
a strategic disadvantage. Caldwell, while still touted today and worth a look for his tactical precepts,
was a theoretical dead end for the strategist.57
Trinquier.
Roger Trinquier published Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency in 1961. Trinquier
served with the French paramilitary in Indochina and Algeria. Those experiences shaped his views,
and his theory heavily reflects French counterinsurgency practice in the 1950s. Trinquier argued that
nuclear weapons were decreasing the significance of major traditional wars and replacing them with
guerrilla war, insurgency, terrorism, and subversion. He approached the study of counterinsurgency
by examining how the goals and techniques of insurgents differed from traditional warfare. His
conclusion was that traditional methods and organizations would not work in counterinsurgencies.
Trinquier’s concept of modern warfare sought to destroy the insurgent organization as a whole, not
simply its military arm. For him, the central tenet of counterinsurgency was winning the support of the
people. He advocated an interlocking system of political, economic, psychological, and military actions
to undermine the insurgents’ strategies.
Trinquier suggested three principles: separate the guerrilla from the population, occupy the zones
the guerrilla previously used to deny him reentry, and coordinate actions over a wide enough area and
long enough time to deny the guerrillas access to the population. Following the successful technique
of quadrillage used by the French in Algeria, Trinquier advocated a gridding system to divide up
the country administratively and to facilitate sweeping and controlling the nation sequentially. He
also was a strong advocate of eliminating safe havens both inside and outside the national borders.58
Trinquier’s basic approach is found in all modern counterinsurgency theory.
Galula.
David Galula wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice in 1964. He postulated a simple
construct for counterinsurgencies that emphasized the political nature of the conflict, especially the
relationship between the insurgent and his cause. His definition of “[i]nsurgency is the of the policy
of a party, inside a country, by every means” was designed to emphasize that insurgencies could
start before the use of force. Insurgencies are by their nature asymmetric because of the disparity of
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resources between the contenders. The counterinsurgent has all the tangible assets—military, police,
finance, court systems, etc., while the insurgent’s advantages are intangible—the ideological power of
his cause. Insurgents base their strategies on powerful ideologies, while the counterinsurgent has to
maintain order without undermining the government. The rules applicable to one side do not always
fit the other. The logic of this asymmetric power relationship forced the insurgent to avoid military
confrontation and instead move the contest to a new arena where his ideological power was effective—
the population became the seat of war. Politics becomes the instrument of war rather than force, and
that remains true throughout the war. Politics takes longer to produce effects, so all insurgencies are
protracted.59
The counterinsurgent warrior must begin by understanding the political-social-economic cause of
his opponent. Large parts of the population must be able to identify with that cause. The cause must
be unique in the sense that the counterinsurgent cannot co-opt it. The cause can change over time
as the insurgency adapts. The power of the cause increases as the guerrilla gains strength and has
success. Good causes attract large numbers of supporters and repel the minimum number of neutrals.
An artificial or concocted cause makes the guerrilla work harder to sell his position, but an efficient
propaganda machine can do that.60
Galula discussed several approaches to immunizing the population against the insurgent cause
or message. Counterinsurgents must continuously reassess the nature and scope of the problem with
which they deal; address problems proactively; isolate the battlefield from external support; and work
to increase support for the regime. They must be vigilant—do not interpret a strategic pause by the
insurgents as victory. Intelligence is critical. The counterinsurgent organization must have the authority
to direct political, social, economic, and military efforts. The military cannot have a free hand—it must
work within and be subordinate to the overall political campaign. Like Tranquier, Galula recommended
a systematic division of the country and sequential search, clear, and hold operations. Counterinsurgent
propaganda should focus on gaining and maintaining the neutrality of the population.61 Galula is
having a major influence on the development (or rediscovery) of U.S. counterinsurgency theory in
2006.
Kitson.
Frank Kitson wrote Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping in 1971. He
added details to the basic structure of counterinsurgency theory already constructed by the French.
Like the other theorists Kitson recognized that counterinsurgency is a multidiscipline job. He warned
against abuses, but recommended that heavy force be used early to squash an insurgency while still in
a manageable state. The military campaign must be coordinated with good psychological operations.
Kitson conceptualized two kinds of intelligence—political and operational. Political intelligence is an
ongoing process while operational intelligence supports specific military operations. The military must
be involved in the intelligence gathering process (political as well as operational). Counterinsurgency
forces must be attuned to the environment, able to optimize resources by phases of the campaign, and
able to coordinate all the resources at their disposal.62
STRATEGIC ADVICE
There are also numerous advice books that give leaders and decisionmakers more or less specific
advice about what to do or how to do it without necessarily offering a comprehensive strategic or
theoretical paradigm. Examples include Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Art of War, The Discourses, and The
Prince written to influence 16th century Florentine leaders and Frederick the Great’s Instructions for
His Generals, the title of which explains its intent. Alternatively, there are collections like The Military
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Maxims of Napoleon of military advice culled from the writings of great soldiers. As historian David
Chandler noted in his introduction to a recent reprint of that work, “The practical value of military
maxims can be debatable. . . . Consequently the collecting of his [Napoleon’s] obiter dicta into any kind
of military rule-book for future generations to apply is a process fraught with perils and pitfalls.”
In a more modern vein, Michele A. Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s
Security essentially is an advice book that presents a specific strategic solution without developing
an overarching strategic theory.63 Advice books are often beneficial; however, their generally narrow
focus and frequent bumper sticker quality limit that utility.
DETERRENCE
During the Cold War, the nuclear weapons field developed its own set of specific strategies based
on deterrence theory. Deterrence theory itself is a useful strategic concept. Conversely, concepts like
mutual assured destruction, counterforce or countervalue targeting, launch on warning, and first strike
versus retaliation are terms of nuclear art that will retain some relevance as long as major nations
maintain large nuclear stockpiles, but they no longer dominate the strategic debate as they once did.
According to the Department of Defense, deterrence is “the prevention from action by fear of the
consequences.”64 It is altogether different from compellence where one is attempting to make another
party do something. Theoretically, one party can deter another either by threat of punishment or by
denial. Threat of punishment implies performing an act will evoke a response so undesirable that the
actor decides against acting. Deterrence by denial seeks to avert an action by convincing the actor
that he cannot achieve his purpose. In either case, deterrence theory assumes rational decisionmakers
with similar value systems. To be deterred, one must be convinced that his adversary possesses both
the capability to punish or deny and the will to use that capability. Demonstrating the effectiveness
of deterrence is difficult, since it involves proving the absence of something resulted from a specific
cause; however, politicians and strategists generally agree that nuclear deterrence worked during the
Cold War. It is not as clear that conventional deterrence works, although that concept has numerous
advocates and is deeply embedded in modern joint doctrine.
Deterrence theory had many fathers, but some of the most prominent deserve mention. Albert
Wohlstetter established his credentials when he wrote The Delicate Balance of Terror for RAND in 1958.
Bernard Brodie wrote, among other things, Strategy in the Missile Age in 1959. Herman Kahn’s On
Thermonuclear War was ground breaking in 1960. Thomas C. Schelling published The Strategy of Conflict
in 1960 and Arms and Influence 6 years later; both remain classics.65
SEAPOWER
Mahan.
There are also schools of single service strategies devoted to sea power or airpower. In the sea power
arena, the most famous strategic theorists are Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian S. Corbett. American
naval officer Mahan wrote several books and articles around the turn of the 20th century advocating
sea power. Perhaps the most famous was The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. Mahan
developed a set of criteria that he believed facilitated sea power, but his major contribution was in
the realm of the exercise of that capability through what he called command of the sea. His study of
history convinced Mahan that the powerful maritime nations had dominated history, and specifically
that England had parlayed its command of the sea into world dominance. At the grand strategic level,
Mahan believed that countries with the proper prerequisites should pursue sea power (and especially
naval power) as the key to prosperity.
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To Mahan, oceans were highways of commerce. Navies existed to protect friendly commerce and
interrupt that of their enemies. The way to do both was to gain command of the sea.66 For Mahan, the
essence of naval strategy was to mass one’s navy, seek out the enemy navy, and destroy it in a decisive
naval battle. With the enemy’s navy at the bottom of the ocean—that is, with command of the sea—
your merchantmen were free to sail where they pleased, while the enemy’s merchantmen were either
confined to port or subject to capture. Diversion of naval power to subsidiary tasks like commerce
raiding (a favorite U.S. naval strategy in the early years of the republic) was a waste of resources,
although in his later writing, Mahan acknowledged some contribution from such tactics. The key to
Mahanian naval warfare was thus the concentrated fleet of major combatants that would fight for and
hopefully win command of the sea. Ideally, that fleet would have global reach, which required secure
bases for refueling conveniently located worldwide. Although Mahan’s theories actively supported
his political agenda of navalism and imperialism, they contained enough pure and original thought to
survive both the author and his age.
Corbett.
British author Julian S. Corbett had a different interpretation of naval warfare. A contemporary
of Mahan, Corbett saw British success not so much as a result of dominance of the sea as from its
ability to wield effectively what we call today all the elements of national power. Corbett differentiated
between maritime power and strategy and naval power and strategy. Maritime strategy encompassed
all the aspects of sea power—military, commercial, political, etc. Naval strategy dealt specifically with
the actions and maneuvers of the fleet. Like Mahan, Corbett saw oceans as highways of commerce
and understood their importance. However, he emphasized not the uniqueness of sea power, but its
relationship with other elements of power. For Corbett, the importance of navies was not their ability
to gain command of the sea, but their ability to effect events on land. He believed that navies rarely
won wars on their own—they often made it possible for armies to do so. The navy’s role was thus to
protect the homeland, while isolating and facilitating the insertion of ground forces into the overseas
objective area. Neither command of the sea nor decisive naval battle necessarily were required to
accomplish either of those tasks. Although Corbett admitted that winning the decisive naval clash
remained the supreme function of a fleet, he believed there were times when that was neither necessary
nor desirable.67 His theories most closely approximate current U.S. naval doctrine.
Jeune Ecolé.
Another school of sea power was the Jeune Ecolé that was popular on the continent in the early
1880s. Its primary advocate was Admiral Théophile Aube of the French Navy. Unlike the theories of
either Mahan or Corbett, which were intended for major naval powers, the Jeune Ecolé was a classic
small navy strategy. It was a way for land powers to fight sea powers. Advocates claimed that a nation
did not have to command the sea to use it. In fact, modern technology made gaining command of
the sea impossible. And one certainly did not have to have a large fleet of capital ships or win a big
fleet battle. Rather than capital ships, one could rely on torpedo boats and cruisers (later versions
would emphasize submarines). The naval strategist could either use those smaller vessels against the
enemy’s fleet in specific situations like countering an amphibious invasion, or more commonly against
his commerce (to deny him the value of commanding the sea). Either use could be decisive without
the expense of building and maintaining a large fleet or the dangers inherent in a major naval battle.68
The Jeune Ecolé was an asymmetric naval strategy. It had a brief spurt of popularity and faded. Its
advocates probably chuckled knowingly during World Wars I and II as submarines executed their pet
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theory without the benefit of a name other than unrestricted submarine warfare. It is still available as
an asymmetric approach to war at sea.
AIRPOWER
Douhet.
The basis of classic airpower theory—although paternity is debatable—is The Command of the Air
published first in 1921 by Italian general and author, Giulio Douhet. Reacting to the horrors he saw
in World War I, Douhet became an advocate of airpower. He believed that the airplane could restore
decisiveness to warfare that ground combat seemed incapable of achieving. It could fly over the
ground battlefield to directly attack the enemy’s will. Because of technical problems with detection and
interception, stopping an air raid would be impossible. Big bombers carrying a mix of high explosive,
incendiary, and poison gas weapons could target enemy cities. Civilian populations, which were the
key to modern warfare, would be unable to stand such bombardment and would soon force their
governments to surrender. Although civilian casualties might be high, this would be a more humane
method of warfare than prolonged ground combat.
There were a few strategic dicta beyond that. First, a prerequisite for success was command of the
air—a theory closely related to command of the sea. Command of the air granted one side the ability
to fly where and when it desired while the enemy was unable to fly. Next, because the airplane was
an offensive weapon, one gained command of the air by strategic bombardment—ideally catching the
enemy’s air force on the ground. Recognizing the technological limitations of his day, Douhet believed
there was no need for anti-aircraft artillery or interceptors since neither worked effectively. In fact,
resources devoted to air defense or any type of auxiliary aircraft (anything that was not a large bomber)
were wasted. The resource argument also featured shifting funding from the traditional land and sea
services to the air service—a position not designed to win friends in the wider defense community.
Like other airmen, Douhet believed that airplanes were employed best in an independent air force.69
Douhet captured the imagination of early airmen with his vision of decisiveness through command
of the air. Generations of later airpower enthusiasts continue to seek to fulfill his prophecy. Nuclear
weapons were supposed to have fixed the technological shortfalls that prevented airpower alone from
winning World War II. That they were unusable made little difference. Precision guided munitions
are the current mantra of the airpower enthusiast—they finally have made decisive air attack possible.
There may actually be something to the precision guided munitions claim; only time will tell. Douhet’s
assertion of the futility of air defense proved wrong when radar made locating aircraft possible, and
fighters became capable of catching and shooting down big bombers. Douhet’s assertion of the fragility
of civilian morale under air attack also proved false. Nevertheless, he still has a major influence on
airpower doctrine and is the father of all modern airpower theory.
Other Airpower Theories.
Douhet may have been the father of airpower theory, but others followed him quickly. Most of the
later airpower theorists worked on one or both of two primary issues that Douhet had first surfaced:
the most efficient way to organize airpower, a debate generally about an independent air force, or the
proper mix of fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft. The debate about separate air forces was
important but not a true strategic issue. Conversely, the issue of proper mix of aircraft got directly
to the issue of the proper role of airpower. The early theorists presented a variety of views on the
issue. William “Billy” Mitchell saw America’s strategic problem as one of defense against sea-borne
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attack. A Douhet-like offensive air strategy was inappropriate. He also believed that aerial combat
could provide effective defense against air attack. Thus, he developed a strategy based on a mix of
fighters and bombers. In terms of both the necessity of command of the air and the potential strategic
decisiveness of airpower, Mitchell agreed completely with Douhet.70
Another early airpower theorist was British Wing Commander John C. “Jack” Slessor. Slessor
served a tour as an instructor at the Army Staff College at Camberley. His book Air Power and Armies is
a collection of his lectures at the War College. Slessor was a believer in strategic bombing, but, perhaps
because of his audience, he also emphasized the relationship between airpower and ground operations.
The first requirement was gaining command of the air. Next, airpower could interdict the enemy’s lines
of communication. Using airpower in direct support of committed troops (the flying artillery/close air
support concept) was ineffective. Slessor did believe that both aspects of the air campaign could occur
simultaneously—one did not need complete air superiority to begin interdiction. From the standpoint
of the ground commander, supporting airpower was most effective in facilitating a breakthrough, in
the pursuit, and in the defense.71
Slessor’s advocacy of interdiction was not, however, the only way one might approach the air-ground
support issue. German Chief of Air Staff during the interwar years Helmut Wilberg was a pioneer in
direct air-ground support. He wrote some of and edited and approved all of Germany’s immediate
post-war studies on air force operations. Those studies concluded that strategic bombardment did
not work, but that close air support did. Thus, it is not surprising that, unlike either the British or the
Americans, the Germans developed a tactical air force oriented on close support of ground forces.
The opportunity for Germany to develop a strategic air force or doctrine occurred during the tenure
of Walter Weaver as Chief of Air Staff between 1934 and 1936. Weaver was a bomber advocate of the
Douhetian ilk. However, when he died in an airplane crash in 1936, the Luftwaffe canceled Weaver’s
pet four-engine bomber development program and slipped comfortably back into its ground support
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Which of these approaches to strategy is the best? What is the approved solution? The answer is
simple—there is no best solution. All the above have utility for specific purposes but are lacking as
generalizations on strategy. They tend to be: 1) war-oriented rather than general (i.e., military strategy
rather than strategy in general); 2) too narrowly focused even within the wartime realm (that is,
they address military-specific strategies rather than more general grand strategies and in some cases
represent single service approaches); and 3) even in the military arena, are too focused on one aspect
of a multidimensional problem (i.e., they attempt to skip the basic ends-ways-means relationship and
go straight to the solution). They generally are concerned with the how, while ignoring the what or
why. The exceptions were the broad concepts like attrition, exhaustion, and annihilation and nuclear
strategy that always aimed at deterrence and clearly linked ways with means to achieve that end.
So why present all these strategic concepts if they do not work? Remember that, although none
of the paradigms works as a generalization, each has merit in specific circumstances. The strategist
needs to be familiar with each so he can select the best approach or combination of approaches for the
situation he faces. In that respect strategy is much like carpentry. Both are skills intended for solving
problems. The carpenter uses a saw to cut, a hammer to drive, sandpaper to smooth, and myriad other
tools depending on the need—there is a tool for every job. Similarly, the strategist needs to have a wide
assortment of tools in his kitbag and be able to select the proper one for the task at hand. There is an old
saying that if the only tool one has is a hammer, all problems look like a nail. That is as bad a solution
in strategy as it is in carpentry.
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CHAPTER 8
TOWARD A THEORY OF STRATEGY:
ART LYKKE AND THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGY MODEL
Harry R. Yarger
Gregory D. Foster argued in a Washington Quarterly article that there is no official or accepted general
theory of strategy in the United States. In fact, he notes that as a people, Americans seem to regard
theorizing in general as a futile intellectual exercise. If one were to construct such a theory, Foster
continues, it should incorporate those elements found in any complete theory: essential terminology
and definitions; an explanation of the assumptions and premises underlying the theory; substantive
propositions translated into testable hypothesis; and methods that can be used to test the hypotheses
and modify the theory as appropriate.1 Foster may have this theory thing right. There is little evidence
that, collectively as a nation, there is any agreement on just what constitutes a theory of strategy. This
is very unfortunate because the pieces for a good theory of strategy have been laying around the
U.S. Army War College for years—although sometimes hard to identify amongst all the intellectual
clutter. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.’s Army War College strategy model, with its ends, ways, and means, is the
centerpiece of this theory.2 The theory is quite simple, but it often appears unduly complex as a result
of confusion over terminology and definitions and the underlying assumptions and premises.
One sees the term strategy misapplied often. There is a tendency to use it as a general term for a
plan, concept, course of action, or “idea” of a direction in which to proceed. Such use is inappropriate.
Strategy is the domain of the senior leader at the higher echelons of the state, the military, business
corporations, or other institutions. Henry Eccles describes strategy as “. . . the comprehensive direction
of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives.”3 His definition captures much
of the essence of strategy. It is comprehensive, it provides direction, its purpose is control, and it is
fundamentally concerned with the application of power.4 Strategy as used in the U.S. Army War College
curriculum focuses on the nation-state and the use of the elements of power to serve state interests. In
this context, strategy is the employment of the instruments (elements) of power (political/diplomatic,
economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or
in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives.5
The underlying assumption of strategy from a national perspective is that states and other competitive
entities have interests that they will pursue to the best of their abilities. Interests are desired end states
such as survival, economic well-being, and enduring national values. The national elements of power
are the resources used to promote or advance national interests. Strategy is the pursuit, protection,
or advancement of these interests through the application of the instruments of power. Strategy is
fundamentally a choice; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition. In doing so, strategy
confronts adversaries, and some things simply remain beyond control or unforeseen.6
Strategy is all about how (way or concept) leadership will use the power (means or resources) available
to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives
(ends) that support state interests. Strategy provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of
this power to achieve specified objectives. This direction is by nature proactive. It seeks to control the
environment as opposed to reacting to it. Strategy is not crisis management. It is its antithesis. Crisis
management occurs when there is no strategy or the strategy fails. Thus, the first premise of a theory of
strategy is that strategy is proactive and anticipatory.7
A second premise of a theory of strategy is that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished—
that is, he must know the end state that he is trying to achieve. Only by analyzing and understanding
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the desired end state in the context of the internal and external environment can the strategist develop
appropriate objectives leading to the desired end state.
A third premise of a theory of strategy is that the strategy must identify an appropriate balance
among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources available. In
formulating a strategy, the ends, ways, and means are part of an integral whole, and if one is discussing
a strategy at the national (grand) level with a national level end, the ways and means similarly would
refer to national level concepts and resources. That is, ends, ways, and means must be consistent.
Thus a National Security Strategy end could be supported by concepts based on all the instruments of
power and the associated resources. For the military element of power, the National Military Strategy
would identify appropriate ends for the military to be accomplished through national military concepts
with national military resources. In a similar manner, a Theater or Regional Combatant Commander
would have specific theater level objectives for which he would develop theater concepts and use
resources allocated to his theater. In some cases, these might include other than military instruments of
power if those resources are available. The levels of strategy are distinct but interrelated because of the
hierarchical and comprehensive nature of strategy.
A fourth premise of strategy is that political purpose must dominate all strategy; thus, Clausewitz’
famous dictum, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”8 Political purpose is stated
in policy. Policy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the government. In its finest
form, it is clear articulation of guidance for the employment of the instruments of power towards
the attainment of one or more end states. In practice, it tends to be much vaguer. Nonetheless, policy
dominates strategy by its articulation of the end state and its guidance. The analysis of the end state
and guidance yields objectives leading to the desired end state. Objectives provide purpose, focus, and
justification for the actions embodied in a strategy.9 National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of
objectives that is determined by the political purpose of the state. Policy ensures that strategy pursues
appropriate aims.
A fifth premise is that strategy is hierarchical. Foster argues that true strategy is the purview of
the leader and is a “weltanschauung” (world view) that represents both national consensus and
comprehensive direction. In the cosmic scheme of things, Foster may well be right, but reality requires
more than a “weltanschauung.” Political leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence
through the hierarchical nature of state strategy. Strategy cascades from the national level down to
the lower levels. Generally strategy emerges at the top as a consequence of policy statements and a
stated National Security Strategy (sometimes referred to as Grand Strategy). National Security Strategy
lays out broad objectives and direction for the use of all the instruments of power. From this National
Security Strategy, the major activities and departments develop subordinate strategies. For the military,
this is the National Military Strategy. In turn, the National Military Strategy leads to lower strategies
appropriate to the various levels of war.
The U.S. Army War College (in consonance with Joint Pub 1-02) defines the levels of strategy within
the state as:
• National Security Strategy (also referred to as Grand Strategy and National Strategy). The art
and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power
(diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to
national security (Joint Pub 1-02).
• National Military Strategy. The art and science of distributing and applying military power to
attain national objectives in peace and war (Joint Pub 1-02).
• Theater Strategy. The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses
of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security
policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the
use of force within a theater (Joint Pub 1-02).
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The hierarchical nature of strategy facilitates span of control. It represents a logical means of delegating
responsibility and authority among senior leadership. It also suggests that if strategy consists of
objectives, concepts, and resources, each should be appropriate to the level of strategy and consistent
with one another. Thus strategy at the national military level should articulate military objectives at
the national level and express the concepts and resources in terms appropriate to the national level for
the specified objective.
At some level, planning and action fall below the strategic threshold. Under the National Military
Strategy, the Combatant Commanders develop Theater Strategy and subsequent campaign plans. At
this juncture, the line between strategy and planning merges with campaign planning that may be
either at the theater strategic level or in the realm of Operational Art. Graphically, the relationship
between strategy and the levels of war appear as:10

Levels of
Strategy
Overlapping
Boundaries
Between Strategic
and Operational
Levels of War

National Security Strategy
National Defense Strategy (OSD)
National Military Strategy (CJCS)
Theater Strategy & Campaign Planning (COCOM)
Operational (JTF)
Tactical (Divisions & Corps)

Figure 1. Strategic and Operational Art.
Strategy differs from operational art and tactics in functional, temporal, and geographic aspects.
Functionally and temporally, tactics is the domain of battles, engagements of relatively short duration.
Operational art is the domain of the campaign, a series of battles occurring over a longer period of time.
Strategy is the domain of war which encompasses the protracted level of conflict among nations, armed
or unarmed. Tactics concerns itself with the parts or pieces, operational art with the combination of
the pieces, and strategy with the combinations of combinations. Geographically, tactics is narrowly
defined, operational level is broader and more regional in orientation, and strategy is theater-wide,
intercontinental, or global. It should also be noted that with the advances in transportation and
communications, there has been a spatial and temporal convergence of strategy, operational art, and
tactics. Increasingly, events at the tactical level have strategic consequences.11
A sixth premise is that strategy is comprehensive. That is to say, while the strategist may be devising
a strategy from a particular perspective, he must consider the whole of the strategic environment in his
analysis to arrive at a proper strategy to serve his purpose at his level. He is concerned with external
and internal factors at all levels. On the other hand, in formulating a strategy, the strategist must also be
cognizant that each aspect—objectives, concepts, and resources—has effects on the environment around
him. Thus, the strategist must have a comprehensive knowledge of what else is happening and the potential
first, second, third, etc., order effects of his own choices on the efforts of those above, below, and on his
same level. The strategist’s efforts must be integrated fully with the strategies or efforts of senior, co-equal,
and subordinate elements. Strategists must think holistically—that is, comprehensively. They must be
cognizant of both the “big picture,” their own institution’s capabilities and resources, and the impact of
their actions on the whole of the environment. Good strategy is never developed in isolation. (See Figure 2.)

109

External Environment

Domestic and international circumstances and conditions
affecting the welfare of the state.

National Interests

Desired endstates based on values and strategic analysis.
Expressed as policies.

National Security Strategy
Political, Economic, Military,
Informational Elements of Power

National Military Strategy
Military Element of Power

Theater Strategy
Operational Art
Tactics

Figure 2. Comprehensiveness of Strategy.
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A seventh premise is that strategy is developed from a thorough analysis and knowledge of the
strategic situation/environment. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight the internal and external
factors that help define or may affect the specific objectives, concepts, and resources of the strategy.
The last premise of a theory of strategy is that some risk is inherent to all strategy, and the best any
strategy can offer is a favorable balance against failure. Failure can be either the failure to achieve one’s
own objectives and/or providing a significant advantage to one’s adversaries.
Art Lykke gave coherent form to a theory of strategy with his articulation of the three-legged stool
model of strategy which illustrated that strategy = ends + ways + means, and if these were not in
balance, the assumption of greater risk. In the Lykke proposition (model), the ends are “objectives,”
the ways are the “concepts” for accomplishing the objectives, and the means are the “resources” for
supporting the concepts. The stool tilts if the three legs are not kept in balance. If any leg is too short,
the risk is too great and the strategy falls over (see Figure 3).12

RISK
Figure 3. The Lykke Model.
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It should be evident that the model poses three key questions for strategists. What is to be done?
How is it to be done? What resources are required to do it in this manner? Lykke argues that if any leg
of the stool is out of balance, then one accepts a corresponding risk unless one adjusts the legs. One
might add resources, use a different concept, or change the objective. Or one might decide to accept
the risk. The theory is quite clear—a valid strategy must have an appropriate balance of objectives,
concepts, and resources, or its success is at greater risk.13 Lykke’s theory, like all good theory, does
not necessarily provide a strategy. It is a paradigm that describes the questions to ask and the rules to
follow. His strategic theory is supported by the underlying premises and assumptions above, and its
practice is facilitated by the sharing of common definitions and formats.
Art Lykke wrestled with his proposition for many years and taught thousands of Army War
College students to use his model properly through definition and illustration. These definitions and
illustrations are important because they provide the common understanding by which strategists
communicate. They include:
• Ends (objectives) explain “what” is to be accomplished. Ends are objectives that, if accomplished,
create, or contribute to, the achievement of the desired end state at the level of strategy being
analyzed and, ultimately, serve national interests. Ends are expressed with verbs (i.e., deter
war, promote regional stability, destroy Iraqi armed forces).
• Ways (strategic concepts/courses of action) explain “how” the ends are to be accomplished by
the employment of resources. The concept must be explicit enough to provide planning
guidance to those who must implement and resource it. Since ways convey action, they often
have a verb, but ways are statements of “how,” not “what,” in relation to the objective of
a strategy. Some confusion exists because the concept for higher strategy often defines the
objectives of the next lower level of strategy. A simple test for a way is to ask “in order to do
what?” That should lead to the real objective. Some concepts are so accepted that their names
have been given to specific strategies (containment, forward defense, assured destruction,
forward presence are illustrations). But note that in actual practice, these strategies have
specific objectives and forces associated with them and the concept is better developed than
the short title suggests.
• Means (resources) explain what specific resources are to be used in applying the concepts to
accomplish the objectives and use no verb. Means can be tangible or intangible. Examples of
tangible means include forces, people, equipment, money, and facilities. Intangible resources
include things like “will,” courage, or intellect.
• Risk explains the gap between what is to be achieved and the concepts and resources
available to achieve the objective. Since there are never enough resources or a clever enough
concept to assure 100 percent success in the competitive international environment, there is
always some risk. The strategist seeks to minimize this risk through his development of the
strategy—the balance of ends, ways, and means.
Ends, ways, and means often get confusing in the development or analysis of a specific strategy.
The trick is to focus on the questions. Objectives always will answer the question of what one is trying
to achieve. Concepts always explain “how” the resources will be used. Resources always explain what
will be used to execute the concept. If the objective is “defend the United States (what?)”; “to develop,
build, or establish a larger force” is a way (how?); and, “national manpower reserves, money, and
training facilities” are examples of the means (resources to be used to support the “how”). The rule of
thumb to apply here is that resources are usually physical and countable: Army, Air Force, Navy, units
and armed forces of United States; personnel; dollars; facilities; equipment—trucks, planes, ships, etc.;
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and resources of organizations—Red Cross, NATO, etc. Means might also include such intangibles
as “will, industrial capacity, intellect. etc.,” but state them as resources. Do not use means to describe
concepts and do not articulate resources as ways or concepts. In a very simplified manner, “diplomacy”
is a way to promote regional stability (objective), but diplomats are the means. In the same manner,
Clausewitz preferred “overthrow of the enemy’s government” as the end, to fight a decisive battle as
the way, and a larger army as the means. He saw the larger army as an appropriate resource to support
his way—the decisive battle. To say “use of a larger army” infers a different concept for success and is
an inappropriate statement of means (resources).
Over time thousands of students at the Army War College have tested Art Lykke’s theory of
strategy, using the historical case study approach. His proposition is a common model for analyzing
and evaluating the strategy of historical and current strategic level leadership. By using the theory to
break a strategy into its component parts, Art Lykke argued any strategy can be examined for suitability,
feasibility, and acceptability, and an assessment made of the proper balance among the component
parts. In addition, his lecturing and presentations have led to the adoption of the basic model by a
cohort of military and political strategists. This has, in turn, led to the proactive evaluation of strategy
during development against the same standards of:
• Suitability—will its attainment accomplish the effect desired (relates to objective)?
• Feasibility—can the action be accomplished by the means available (relates to concept)?
• Acceptability—are the consequences of cost justified by the importance of the effect desired
(relates to resources/concept)?14
Not only has the basic proposition been tested in historical case studies and practical application,
it also has proven itself adaptable to explaining differing aspects of strategic thought. Art Lykke’s
argument that nations engage in two distinct types of military strategy concurrently—operational and
force developmental—illustrate the theory’s adaptability. Operational strategies are based on existing
military capabilities. Force developmental strategies are based on future threats and objectives and
are not limited by existing capabilities. In fact, their primary role is to help determine and develop
future capabilities.15 Thus, the theory lends itself to both warfighters and force developers within the
military.
Art Lykke’s theory of strategy is an important contribution to strategic thought. In encouraging the
strategist to use the term “strategy” correctly while applying the strategy model and its four parts—
ends, ways, means and risk, he provided a viable theory of strategy. The assumptions and premises of
this theory have proven valid for analyzing and developing strategy. Above all, a valid strategy must
find a balance among ends, ways, and means consistent with the risk the nation is willing to accept.
Art Lykke’s theory of strategy provides the basis for clearly articulating and objectively evaluating any
strategy.
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CHAPTER 9
WHY IS STRATEGY DIFFICULT?
David Jablonsky
Colonel (Ret.) Arthur Lykke has taught an entire generation of U.S. Army War College students
that strategy at any level consists of ends or objectives, ways or concepts, and means or resources. This
three‑element framework is nothing more than a reworking of the traditional definition of strategy
as the calculated relationship of ends and means. Yet the student response always is overwhelmingly
favorable, with Lykke’s framework invariably forming the structure for subsequent seminar problems
on subjects ranging from the U.S. Civil War to nuclear strategy. This is due, in part, to the fact that
students weaned on the structural certitude of the five‑paragraph field order and the Commander’s
Estimate naturally find such structure comforting in dealing with the complexities of strategy. But those
students also know from their experience in the field that there are limits to the scientific approach
when dealing with human endeavors. As a consequence, they also can appreciate the art of mixing
ends, ways, and means, using for each element the part subjective, part objective criteria of suitability,
feasibility, and applicability—the essence of strategic calculation.11
The ends‑ways‑means paradigm also provides a structure at ally level of strategy to avoid confusing
the scientific product with the scientific process. The former involves production propositions that are
related logically and valid across time and space. The search for these immutable principles over the
centuries by students of war failed because they looked at classical strategy as something like physical
science that could produce verities in accordance with certain regularities. This was compounded
further by military thinkers who made claims for scientific products without subjecting those products
to a scientific process. Both Jomini and Mahan, for instance, ignored evidence in cases that did not
fit their theories or principles of strategy.22 The strategic paradigm, then, serves as a lowest common
denominator reminder that a true scientific product is not possible from the study of strategy. At the
same time, however, that paradigm provides a framework for the systematic treatment of facts and
evidence—the very essence of the scientific process. In this regard, Admiral Wylie has pointed out:
I do not claim that strategy is or can be a “science” in the sense of the physical sciences. It can and should be
in intellectual discipline of the highest order, and the strategist should prepare himself to manage ideas with
precision and clarity and imagination. . . . Thus, while strategy itself may not be a science, strategic judgment can
be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive.33

All that notwithstanding, the limitations of the strategic paradigm bring the focus full circle back
to the art involved in producing the optimal mix of ends, ways, and means. Strategy, of course, does
depend on the general regularities of that paradigm. But strategy does not always obey the logic of that
framework, remaining, as the German Army Regulations Truppen-fuhrung of 1936 described it, “a free
creative activity resting upon scientific foundations.”44 The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate
why, despite increasingly scientific approaches to formulation and implementation, strategy remains
principally an art rather than a science, and why, within that art, the “creative activity” of blending the
elements in the strategic paradigm has become progressively more difficult over the centuries.
From Revolutions to Total War.
In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, there was a growing recognition of the increased complexity
of strategy, summarized in Karl von Clausewitz’s warning that “there can be no question of a purely
military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it.”55 At the tactical
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level, the Prussian philosopher wrote, “the means are fighting forces trained for combat; the end is
victory.” For the strategic, however, Clausewitz concluded that military victories were meaningless
unless they were the means to obtain a political end, “those objects which lead directly to peace.”66
Thus, strategy was “the linking together (Verbindung) of separate battle engagements into a single
whole, for the final object of the war.”77 And only the political or policy level could determine that
objective. “To bring a war, or any one of its campaigns to a successful close requires a thorough grasp
of national policy,” he pointed out. “On that level, strategy and policy coalesce.”88 For Clausewitz, this
vertical continuum (see Figure 1) was best exemplified by Frederick the Great, who embodied both
policy and strategy and whose Silesian conquests of 1741 lie considered to be the classic example of
strategic art by demonstrating “an element of restrained strength, . . . ready to adjust to the smallest
shift in the political situation.”99

POLICY

STRATEGY

TACTICS

Figure 1. The Policy Continuum.
With his deceptively simple description of the vertical continuum of war, Clausewitz set the
stage for the equivalent of a Copernican shift in the strategic ends‑ways‑means paradigm. Now that
paradigm was more complex, operating on both the military and policy levels with the totality of the
ends, ways, and means at the lower levels interconnected with the political application at the policy
level of those same strategic elements. This connection was the essence of Clausewitz’s description of
war as a continuation of political intercourse (Verkehr) with the addition of other means. He explained
that
We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we also want to make it clear ‘ that war
in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. . . . The main lines
along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout
the war into the subsequent peace. . . . War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our
thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something
pointless and devoid of sense.1010

The Industrial and French Revolutions.
This growing complexity in dealing with the strategic paradigm was compounded by two upheavals.
Clausewitz was profoundly aware of one, the French Revolution; he was totally ignorant of the other, the
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industrial/technological revolution. Prior to the French Revolution, 18th century rulers had acquired
such effective political and economic control over their people that they were able to create their war
machines as separate and distinct from the rest of society. The Revolution changed all that with the
appearance of a force “that beggared all imagination” as Clausewitz described it,
Suddenly, war again became the business of the people‑a people of thirty millions, all of whom considered
themselves to be citizens. There seemed no end to the resources mobilized; all limits disappeared in the vigor and
enthusiasm shown by governments and their subjects.... War, untrammelled by any, conventional restraints, had
broken loose in all its elemental fury. This was due to the peoples’ new share in these great affairs of state; and
their participation, in its turn, resulted partly from the impact that the Revolution had on the internal conditions
of every state and partly from the danger that France posed to everyone.1111

For Clausewitz, the people greatly complicated the formulation and implementation of strategy by
adding “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force”
to form with the army and the government what he termed the remarkable trinity (see Figure 2). The
army he saw as a “creative spirit,” roaming freely within “the play of chance and probability,” but
always bound to the government, the third element, in “subordination, as an instrument of policy,
which makes it subject to reason alone.1212
GOVERNMENT

MILITARY

PEOPLE

Figure 2. The Remarkable Trinity.
It was the complex totality of this trinity that, Clausewitz realized, had altered and complicated
strategy so completely.
Clearly the tremendous effects of the French Revolution . . . were caused not so much by new military methods
and concepts as by radical changes in policies and administration, by the new character of government, altered
conditions of the French people, and the like. . . . It follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from
the transformation of politics.1313

But while that transformation had made it absolutely essential to consider the elements of the
Clausewitzian trinity within the strategic paradigm, the variations possible in the interplay of those
elements moved strategy even farther from the realm of scientific certitude. “A theory that ignores
any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them,” Clausewitz warned in this
regard, “would conflict with reality to such an extent that, for this reason alone, it would be totally
useless.”1414
Like most of his contemporaries, Clausewitz had no idea that he was living on the eve of a technological
transformation born of the Industrial Revolution. But that transformation, as it gathered momentum
throughout the remainder of the 19th century, fundamentally altered the interplay of elements within
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the Clausewitzian trinity, further complicating the formulation and application process within the
strategic paradigm (see Figure 3).
GOVERNMENT

TECHNOLOGY

MILITARY
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Figure 3. The Impact of Technology.
In terms of the military element, technology would change the basic nature of weapons and
modes of transportation, the former stable for a hundred years, the latter for a thousand. Within a
decade of Clausewitz’s death in 1831, that process would begin in armaments with the introduction of
breech‑loading firearms and in transportation with the development of the railroads.”1515
Technology had a more gradual effect on the role of the people. There were, for example, the great
European population increases of the 19th century as the Industrial Revolution moved to the continent
from Great Britain. This trend led, in turn, to urbanization: the mass movement of people from the
extended families of rural life to the “atomized,” impersonal life of the city. There, the urge to belong,
to find a familial substitute, led to a more focused allegiance to the nation‑state manifested in a new,
more blatant and aggressive nationalism.
This nationalism was fueled by the progressive side effects of the Industrial Revolution, particularly
in the area of public education, which meant, in turn, mass literacy throughout Europe by the end of the
19th century. One result was that an increasingly literate public could be manipulated by governments
as technology spawned more sophisticated methods of mass communications. On the other hand,
those same developments also helped democratize societies, which then demanded a greater share
in government, particularly over strategic question,, involving war and peace. In Clausewitz’s time,
strategic decisions dealing with such matters were rationally based on Realpolitik considerations to
further state interests, not on domestic issues. By the end of the 19th century, the Rankeian Primat
der Aussenpolitik was challenged increasingly throughout Europe by the need of governments for
domestic consensus—a development with far-reaching implications for the conduct of strategy at the
national level within the basic ends‑ways‑means paradigm.1616
During much of that century, as the social and ideological upheavals unleashed by the French
Revolution developed, military leaders in Europe generally attempted to distance their armed forces
from their people. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Prussian cum German military, where
the leaders worked hard over the years to prevent the adulteration of their forces by liberal ideas. “The
army is now our fatherland,” General von Roon wrote to his wife during the 1848 revolutions, “for there
alone have the unclean and violent elements who put everything into turmoil failed to penetrate.”1717
The revolutions in industry and technology, however, rendered this ideal unattainable. To begin with,
the so‑called Technisierung of warfare meant the mass production of more complex weapons foreverlarger standing military forces. The key ingredients for these forces were the great population increases
and the rise of nationalism, as well as improved communications and governmental efficiency—the
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latter directed at general conscription of national manhood, which, thanks to progress in railroad
development, could be brought to the battlefield in unlimited numbers.
At the same time, this increased interaction between the government/military and the people also was
tied to other aspects of the impact of technology on the Clausewitzian trinity. Technological innovations
in weaponry during this period, for example, were not always followed by an understanding of their
implications, societal as well as military. Certainly, there was the inability on the part of all European
powers to perceive the growing advantage of defensive over offensive weapons demonstrated in
the Boer and Russo‑Japanese wars. That inability was tied in with a trend in Europe at the time to
combine elan with a military focus on moral force, bloodshed, and decisive battles. The result was that
the military leaders of France, Germany, and Russia all adopted offensive military doctrines in some
form.1818
The fact that these doctrines led to the self‑defeating offensive strategies of World War I ultimately
had to do with the transformation of civil‑military relations within the Clausewitzian trinity in their
countries. In France, as an example, the officer corps distrusted the trend by the leaders of the Third
Republic toward shorter terms of military service, which it believed threatened the army’s professional
character and tradition. Adopting an offensive doctrine and elevating it to the highest level was a means
to combat this trend, since there was general agreement that an army consisting primarily of reservists
and short‑term conscripts could only be used in the defense. “Reserves are so much eyewash,” one
French general wrote at the time, “and take in only, short‑sighted mathematicians who equate the
value of armies with the size of their effectives, without considering their moral value.”1919 Although
these were setbacks for those who shared this sentiment in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair and the
consequent military reforms, it only required the harsher international climate after the Agadir crisis of
1911 for General Joffre and his young Turks to gain the ascendancy. Their philosophy was summed up
by their leader, who explained that, in planning for the next war, he had “no preconceived idea other
than a full determination to take the offensive with all my forces assembled.2020
Under these circumstances, French offensive doctrine became increasingly unhinged from strategic
reality as it responded to the more immediate demands of domestic and intragovernmental politics.
The result was France’s ill‑conceived strategic lunge in 1914 toward its former possessions in the East, a
lunge that almost provided sufficient margin of assistance for Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, another result
of military operational doctrine driving policy. In the end, only the miracle of the Marne prevented a
victory for the Germans as rapid and complete as that of 1870.2121
There were other equally significant results as the full brunt of technological change continued to
alter the relationship between the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity in all the European powers.
The larger, more complex armies resulted in the growing specialization and compartmentalization of
the military—a trend that culminated in the emulation of the German General Staff system by most of
the European powers. It is significant that Clausewitz had ignored Carnot, the “organizer of victory”
for Napoleon, when considering military genius. Now with the increase in military branches as well
as combat service and combat service support organizations, the age of the “military‑organizational”
genius had arrived. All this, in turn, affected the relationship in all countries between the military and the
government. For the very increase in professional knowledge and skill caused by technology’s advance
in military affairs undermined the ability of political leaders to understand and control the military,
just as technology was making that control more important than ever by extending strategy from the
battlefield to the civilian rear, thus blurring the difference between combatant and noncombatant.2222
At the same time, the military expansion in the peacetime preparation for war began to enlarge the
economic dimensions of conflict beyond the simple financial support of Clausewitz’s era. As Europe
entered the 20th century, new areas of concern began to emerge ranging from industrial capacity and the
availability and distribution of raw materials to research and development of weapons and equipment.
All this, in turn, increased the size and role of the European governments prior to World War I—with
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the result, as William James perceptively noted, that “the intensely sharp competitive preparation for
war by the nation is the real war, permanently increasing, so that the battles are only a sort of public
verification of mastery gained during the ‘peace’ intervals.”2323
Nevertheless, the full impact of the government’s strategic role in terms of national instruments of
power beyond that of the military generally was not perceived in Europe, despite some of the more
salient lessons of the American Civil War. In that conflict, the South lost because its strategic means did
not match its strategic ends and ways. Consequently, no amount of operational finesse on the part of
the South’s great captains could compensate for the superior industrial strength and manpower that the
North could deploy. Ultimately, this meant for the North, as Michael Howard has pointed out, “that the
operational skills of their adversaries were rendered almost irrelevant.”2424 The Civil War also illustrated
another aspect of the changes within the strategic paradigm: the growing importance of the national
will of the people in achieving political as well as military strategic objectives. That social dimension
of strategy on the part of the Union was what prevented the early southern operational victories from
being strategically decisive and what ultimately allowed the enormous industrial‑logistical potential
north of the Potomac to be realized.
The Revolutions Joined: The Age of Total Wars.
Strategy changed irrevocably with the full confluence in World War I of the trends set in train by
the Industrial and French revolutions. In particular, the technology in that war provided, as Hanson
Baldwin has pointed out, “a preview of the Pandora’s box of evils that the linkage of science with
industry in the service of war was to mean.”2525 How unexpected the results of that linkage could be
was illustrated by a young British subaltern’s report to his commanding general after one of the first
British attacks in Flanders. “Sorry, sir,” he concluded. “We didn’t know it would be like that. We’ll do
better next time.”2626
But of course there was no doing better next time, not by British and French commanders in
Flanders, not by Austrian troops on the Drina and Galician fronts in 1914, not by the Russian officers
on the Gorlice‑Tarnow line in 1915. The frustration at this turn of events was captured by Alexander
Solzhenitsyn in his novel, August 1914. “How disastrously the conditions of warfare had changed,”
he wrote, “making a commander as impotent as a rag doll! Where now was the battlefield . . ., across
which he could gallop over to a faltering commander and summon him to his side?”2727 It was this
milieu that demonstrated the inadequacy of classical strategy to deal with the intricacies of modern
warfare. Napoleon had defined that strategy, as the “art of making use of time and space.”2828 But the
dimensions of these two variables had been stretched and rendered more complex by the interaction of
technology, with the elements of the Clausewitz’s trinity. And that very complexity, augmented by the
lack of decisiveness it the tactical level, impeded the vertical continuum of war outlined in Clausewitz’s
definition of strategy as the use of engagements to achieve policy objectives. Only when the continuum
was enlarged, as the Great War demonstrated, was it possible to restore warfighting coherence to
modern combat. And that, in turn, required the classical concept of strategy, to be positioned at a
midpoint, an operational level, designed to orchestrate individual tactical engagements and battles
in order to achieve strategic results (see Figure 4). Now, a military strategy level, operating within
the ends‑ways‑means paradigm on its own horizontal plane, was added as another way station on
the vertical road to the fulfillment of policy objectives. This left the concept of strategy, as it had been
understood since the time of Clausewitz, transformed into:
the level of war at which campaigns and major operations arc planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish
strategic objectives. . . . Activities at this level link tactics and strategy. . . . These activities imply a broader
dimension of time or space than do tactics; they provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to
achieve strategic objectives.2929
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Figure 4. The Continuum of War.
At the same time, the full impact of technology on the Clausewitzian trinity in each of the combatant
states during World War I substituted the infinitely more complex concept of national strategy for that
of policy. To begin with, the growing sophistication and quantity of arms and munitions, as well as
the vast demands of equipment and supply made by the armies, involved the national resources of
industry, science, and agriculture—variables with which the military leaders were not prepared to
deal. To cope with these variables, governments soon were forced to transform the national lives of
their states in order to provide the sinews of total war.
Looking back over 50 years on the totality of this change in what Clausewitz had termed policy,
Admiral Eccles defined the concept of national strategy that emerged in World War I as “the
comprehensive direction of all the elements of national power to achieve the national objectives.”3030
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is more explicit, defining the new level of strategy that emerged
at the national level after 1914 as the “art and science of developing and using the political, economic,
and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and war, to secure
national objectives.”3131
National strategy, then, involves all the elements of national power. Those elements, in turn, can be
conveniently broken down on a horizontal plane into the categories described in the DoD definition of
national strategy: political, economic, psychological, and military (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5. National Strategy: The Horizontal Plane.
The linchpin in this horizontal design is the military instrument of power at the national strategic
level‑the apex, as we have seen emerging in World War 1, of the vertical continuum of war (see Figure
6).
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Figure 6. National Strategy and the Vertical Continuum of War.
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Thus, the mix of ends, ways, and means at the national military strategic level will affect directly
(and be affected by) the same paradigm operating at each level of the vertical continuum. Adding to the
complexity is the interplay on the horizontal plane of national military strategy with the other strategies
derived from the elements of national power, each operating within its own strategic paradigm and
all contributing to the grand design of national strategy, as that strategy evolves within its own overall
mix of ends, ways, and means. That this horizontal and vertical interplay has rendered the formulation
and implementation of strategy at every level more difficult has become increasingly obvious. “Because
these various elements of power cannot be precisely defined, compartmented, or divided,” Admiral
Eccles concluded about the “fog” of strategy, “it is normal to expect areas of ambiguity, overlap, and
contention about authority among the various elements and members of any government.”3232
Conclusion.
The United States is in an era in which the strategic landscape has changed and is continuing to
change. Nevertheless, the core problems that make strategy so difficult for a global power remain
essentially the same as they did for earlier powers ranging from Rome to Great Britain. To begin
with, there are challenges to U.S. interests throughout the globe. In a constantly changing strategic
environment, however, it is difficult in many cases to distinguish which of those interests are vital, not
to mention the nature of the challenge or threat to them. In any case, there are never enough armed
forces to reduce the risk everywhere; strategic priorities have to be established.
In addition, like the leaders of earlier great powers, U.S. governmental elites have to grapple with
the paradox of preparing for war, even in peacetime if they wish to maintain the peace. The dilemma
in the paradox that makes strategy in any era so difficult is that to overdo such preparations may
weaken the economic, psychological, and political elements of power in the long run. The solution is to
so balance the total ends, ways, and means that the natural tension in national security affairs between
domestic and foreign policy is kept to a minimum, while still securing the nation’s vital interests with
a minimum of risk. This solution, as the leaders of the great global powers of the past assuredly would
agree, is not easy to achieve. In an ever more interdependent world in which variables for the strategist
within the ends‑ways‑means paradigm have increased exponentially, strategists are no nearer to a
“Philosopher’s Stone” than they ever were. Strategy remains the most difficult of all art.3333
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CHAPTER 10
NATIONAL POWER
David Jablonsky
I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth
only in death.1
Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes personifies the realist approach to international relations in a world of anarchy
and self-help in which individual man and men aggregated into states seek to maintain or to increase
power. In the modern era, this approach is reflected quintessentially by Hans Morgenthau, who presents
national power not only as an end in the Hobbesian sense that “power is always the immediate aim,”
but as a means to that end.2 The study of strategy also deals with power primarily from the national
security perspective, an acknowledgment that the nation-state is still the most important actor in the
international arena.
Most scholars focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity that provides the “ability to
influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one’s own objectives.”3 At the national level,
this influence is based on relations between nation-state A and another actor (B), with A seeking to
influence B to act in A’s interest by doing x, by continuing to do x, or by not doing x. Some governments
or statesmen may seek influence for its own sake. But for most, influence, like money, is instrumental,
to be used primarily for achieving or defending other goals, which could include prestige, territory,
raw material, or alliances. To achieve these ends, state A can use various techniques of influencing,
ranging from persuasion or the offering of rewards to threats or the actual use of force.4
From this standpoint, the use of a nation’s power in national security strategy is a simple relational
exercise. But in dealing with the concept of national power, as Clausewitz remarked of war, “everything
. . . is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”5 To begin with, there are subtle characteristics of
power that render its use in the national strategic formulation process more art than science. Moreover,
relationships among the elements of national power, as well as the context in which they are to be
used to further a nation’s interests, are seldom clear-cut propositions. All this means that in the end,
national power defies any attempts at rigorous, scientific assessment. The purpose of this chapter is to
demonstrate why this is so and, more important, why, all the complexity notwithstanding, the concept
of national power remains a key building block for understanding and developing national security
strategy.
THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL POWER
National power is contextual in that it can be evaluated only in terms of all the power elements and
only in relation to another player or players and the situation in which power is being exercised. A
nation may appear powerful because it possesses many military assets, but the assets may be inadequate
against those of a potential enemy or inappropriate to the nature of the conflict. The question should
always be: power over whom, and with respect to what?6
Multidimensional Interrelationship.
National power is linked historically with military capacity, a natural relationship since war in
the international arena is the ultima ratio of power. Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot
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determine national power. For instance, there is the huge size of Brazil, the large population of Pakistan,
the industrial makeup of Belgium, and the first-class army of Switzerland. Yet none of these states is
a first-rank power. Morgenthau calls the mistaken attempt to define national power in terms of one
element of that power, the “Fallacy of the Single Factor.” Another aspect of this fallacy is the failure to
distinguish between potential and actual power. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the term
“power” has taken on the meaning of both the capacity to do something and the actual exercise of the
capacity. And yet a nation’s ability to convert potential power into operational power is based on many
considerations, not the least of which is the political and psychological interrelationship of such factors
as government effectiveness and national unity.7
In this context, the elements of national power, no matter how defined, can be separated only
artificially. Together, they constitute the resources for the attainment of national objectives and goals.
And while those goals may be judged as moral, immoral, or amoral, the elements of power are simply
means to national strategic ends and, as such, are morally neutral. It is possible, in other words, to reject
the cynic’s belief that God is on the side of the largest number of battalions, as well as the assumption
that the side with the smallest number always fights for the right.8
Relations and Dynamics.
National power is relative, not absolute. Simply put, a nation does not have abstract power in and
of itself, but only power in relation to another actor or actors in the international arena. To say that
the United States is the most powerful nation on earth is to compare American power with that of all
nations as they currently exist. Nevertheless, leaders of a nation at the peak of its power can come to
believe that such power has an absolute quality that can be lost only through stupidity or neglect. In
reality, the superior power of a nation is derived not only from its own qualities, but from that of other
actors compared with its own. Many observers in the late 1930s, for example, perceived France as
more than a match for Nazi Germany, since the French military of that era was superior in quality and
quantity of troops and weaponry to the victorious French forces of 1919. But the French military power
of 1919 was supreme only in the context of a defeated and disarmed Germany; that supremacy was
not intrinsic to the French nation in the manner of its geographic location and natural resources. Thus,
while the French military of 1939 was superior to that of 1919, a comparison of 1939 French military
power to that of Germany in the same year would have shown a vastly different picture for many
reasons, not the least of which was the German adoption of the military doctrine of blitzkrieg.9
Closely allied to all this is that national power is dynamic, not permanent. No particular power
factor or relationship is immune to change. In this century, in particular, rapid changes in military
technologies have accelerated this dynamism. America’s explosion of a nuclear device instantly
transformed its power position, the nature of warfare, and the very conduct of international relations. A
war or revolution can have an equally sudden effect on power. The two world wars devastated Europe,
caused the rise of the flank powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and set the developing
world on a road to decolonization that in less than 50 years dismantled a system that had been in
existence for over 3 centuries. Economic growth also can change a nation’s power position quickly, as
was the case with Japan and Germany after World War II. In addition, the discovery of new resources,
or their depletion, can alter the balance of power. Certainly the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries’ (OPEC) control over a diminishing supply of oil, coupled with its effectiveness as a cartel,
caused a dramatic shift in power relations after 1973.10
Such shifts are not always so immediately discernible. Power, as Hobbes long ago pointed out, is
what people believe it is until it is exercised. Reputation for power, in other words, confers power on
a nation-state regardless of whether that power is real or not. At the same time, there are examples
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throughout history of nations that continued to trade on past reputations, only to see them shattered by
a single event. For France, the battles of Sedan produced just such effects in 1870 and again in 1940.11
This subjective characteristic of power also plays a key role in deterrence, the exercise of negative
power as state A influences actor B not to do x. The influence is exercised effectively because B perceives
that A not only has the capability to prevent B from doing x, but the willingness to use that capability as
well. In other words, national credibility must be a concomitant of national capability for deterrence to
work. When the combination does not occur, as Britain and France discovered when Hitler discounted
their guarantee of Poland in the summer of 1939, the result can be war. “The men of Munich will not take
the risk,” the Nazi leader explained to his commanders on August 14, 1939.12
Situational.
Some elements of national power or combinations of power cannot be applied to certain situations
involving certain actors. The United States in 1979-80, for instance, was powerless to rescue American
citizens held hostage in Teheran, and American nuclear power during the Cold War had little value in
causing nonaligned countries to modify their policies; nor did it deter North Korea or North Vietnam
in their attempts to unify their countries.
The Vietnam War also illustrates another contextual aspect of national power, that of cost-risk-benefit
analysis, in which power can be exercised, but the costs and risks are perceived to be disproportionate
to the benefit achieved. Power, in other words, must be relevant in the existing circumstances for the
particular situation. This explains why, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States was not able
to persuade its European allies to allow American planes to use North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) bases for refueling and maintenance. The overall economic and military strength of the
United States, as well as the political bonds of alliance solidarity, proved less influential on European
decisionmakers than the possible economic loss of their access to oil. This type of American power was
equally irrelevant in late 1994 when Britain and France, with troops involved in peace operations on
the ground in Bosnia, turned down a U.S. plan for NATO air strikes to support Muslims in the besieged
town of Bihac.13
This aspect of the contextual nature of national power introduces even more complications when
the diversity of actors in the international arena is taken into account. In an increasingly multicentric
world, nation-states increasingly will deal with transnational actors in the exercise of national power.
The European Union is just one example of international government organizations in which the
confluence of political and economic trends has created a supra-national regional unit that transcends
in many ways both the legal-territorial aspects of the state and the psychological unity of the nation.
This type of challenge is abetted by international nongovernmental actors ranging from multinational
corporations focused on self-interested profit and national liberation movements seeking to establish
new governments within existing states, to organizations such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace,
seeking to mobilize international public opinion in order to bring pressure on national governments to
alter particular policies.14
Some of these actors respond more willingly to one aspect of national power than to another.
Multinational corporations, for example, generally will react to economic factors more rapidly than
the United Nations (UN) or a national liberation movement. Conversely, negotiations and appeals to
human morality may prove to be more powerful at the UN than in the corporate boardroom or in the
field. And the allegiance of an uneducated people in a newly independent country may help create a
powerful national liberation movement, yet be meaningless for a multinational corporation or the UN.
National power, then, is contextual not only in its application to other states, but to other global actors
as well.15
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THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
It is convenient to organize the study of national power by distinguishing between natural and
social determinants of power. The natural determinants (geography, resources, and population)
are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical environment. Social
determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, and, more recently, informational) concern
the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their
environment. In practice, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between natural and social elements.
For instance, resources are a natural factor, but the degree to which they are used is determined socially.
Population factors, in particular, cut across the dividing line between both categories. The number of
people of working age in the population affects the degree of industrialization of a nation, but the
process of industrialization, in turn, can greatly alter the composition of the population.16
NATURAL DETERMINANTS OF POWER
Geography.
Geographical factors, whether they are location and climate or size and topography, influence a
nation’s outlook and capacity. Location, in particular, is tied closely to the foreign policy of a state.
Vulnerable nations, like Poland caught geographically between Russia and Germany, have even had
to deal with the loss of national existence. Conversely, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan have
been protected by large bodies of water throughout their histories. Each, in turn, used the combination
of a large navy and overseas trade to become a great power. With its oceanic moats, the United States
was able to follow George Washington’s advice to avoid entangling alliances and expand peacefully
for almost a century, free of external interference. In addition, that expansion came about primarily
without conquest, through the purchase of huge land tracts from European powers that found the
location of the territories too remote to defend easily.
The connection between foreign policy and location is, in fact, so fundamental that it gave rise in this
century to geopolitics as a field of study. At its most extreme, geopolitics can succumb to Morgenthau’s
“Fallacy of the Single Factor” or be distorted as it was at the hands of Karl Haushofer and his disciples
into a kind of political metaphysics with a call for adequate national living space (Lebensraum) that
was put into ideological service for Nazi Germany. At its best, geopolitics has many insights to offer.
Consider, for instance, the connection between the British and American development of democracy
and civil rights and the relatively secure strategic locations of both countries, as opposed to the
authoritarian regimes of Germany and Russia, direct neighbors for much of history, lying exposed
on the North European plain. Or consider the continuing Russian drive for warm-water ports and the
continuing value of choke points, as was demonstrated when Egypt’s closure of the Straits of Tiran in
May 1967 led to war. The persistence of this field of study was reflected in the Cold War by Raymond
Aaron, who described the forward deployment of U.S. troops as analogous in geographical terms to
earlier British policy:
In relation to the Eurasian land mass, the American continent occupied a position comparable to that of the British
Isles in relation to Europe: the United States was continuing the tradition of the insular state by attempting to bar
the dominant continental state’s expansion in central Germany and in Korea.17

Location also is tied closely to climate, which, in turn, has a significant effect on national power.
The poorest and weakest states in modern times all have been located outside the temperate climate
zones in either the tropics or in the frigid zone. Even Russia has chronic agricultural problems because
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all but a small part of that country lies north of the latitude of the U.S.-Canadian border. Russia is
also a good example of how geographical factors such as size and topography can have advantages
and disadvantages for a nation. The Soviet Union, with its 11 time zones, was able to use its vast size
during World War II to repeat the historical Russian military method of trading space for time when
invaded. At the same time, that immense size certainly played a role in the complex ethnic and political
centrifugal forces that eventually pulled apart the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In a similar
manner, the predominantly north-south Russian rivers are great natural resources that would have
been economically and politically more valuable had they run in an east-west direction. In the future,
technology may mitigate some of these factors in the same way that intercontinental missiles affected
the importance of insular locations. But here, as in other areas, there are many geographical obstacles
to the acquisition of power that are costly or impossible to overcome.18
Population.
Demographics in the form of size, trends, and structure are an important aspect of national power.
A large population is a key prerequisite, but not an automatic guarantee of strength. Thus, there is
Canada, more powerful than the more populous but less industrialized Mexico. And Japan, with a
small population marked by widespread technical skills, has been able to exercise national power far
in excess of China for all its masses. At the same time, trends in population growth and decline can
have significant effects on national power. The Prussian unification of the German-speaking peoples in
1870, for example, instantly created a great power with a population that grew by 27 million between
then and 1940, even as that of France reflected the shift in European power, increasing by only four
million in the same period. In another example, the historical increase in American power was due
partly to the arrival of more than 100 million immigrants between 1824 and 1924. During the same
century, Canada and Australia, comparable in territory and developmental level but with populations
less than a 10th of America’s, remained secondary powers. That such trends could have more complex
causes dealing with other elements of power was illustrated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which
had a large and growing population during most of that period but also remained a secondary power
because it was divided ethnically, weak politically, and at an extremely low level in terms of industrial
development.19
In the future, global trends also will affect the structure and balance of national populations,
particularly those of the poorest countries. In 1830, the global population reached one billion for the
first time; it required 100 years to double. It took only 45 more years (1975) for the population to double
again to four billion. In the next 21 years, the population increased almost two billion, reflecting a
growth rate of about 90 million a year. For the next several decades, 90 percent of this growth will occur
in the lesser-developed countries, many already burdened by extreme overpopulation for which there
is no remedy in the form of economic infrastructure, skills, and capital.20
Population structure and balance also are significant for developed nations. Important here is the
percentage of the population in the most productive cohort, generally considered to be somewhere
between the ages of 18 and 45, that can best meet the needs of the nation’s military and industry, as
well as create the following generation. Comparing the numbers in this group to those in the younger
cohort also provides a more accurate picture of population trends and the interaction of demographics
with all power elements. Israel, for example, has to deal with its relatively small population and the fact
that the military siphons off a significant segment of the civilian workforce in the middle cohort. One
consequence is government emphasis on education across all age groups. Another is the government’s
military focus on sophisticated weaponry, mobility, air power, and the preemptive strike in order to
avoid drawn-out land warfare that could be costly in manpower. Finally, a comparison of the middle
population group to the older will provide a picture of trends that can have significant consequences
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for a nation’s power. For example, any nation with an increasing cohort of retired people, coupled with
generous social welfare benefits, eventually will have to face hard choices between guns and butter on
the one hand, and possible limits to its national power, as well as to its investment and economic growth
potential, on the other. These choices already face the United States as the “baby boomer” generation
approaches retirement age against the backdrop of a staggering explosion in social entitlements.21
Natural Resources.
Large amounts of natural resources are essential for a modern nation to wage war, to operate an
industrial base, and to reward other international actors through trade and aid, either in modern
industrial products or in the raw materials themselves. But these resources, whether they be arable land
and water or coal and oil, are distributed unevenly around the world and are becoming increasingly
scarce. Moreover, as in the case of the geopolitical ownership of strategic places, the physical possession
of natural resources is not necessarily a source of power unless a nation also can develop those resources
and maintain political control over their disposition. In their raw state, for example, minerals and
energy sources are generally useless. Thus, the Mesabi iron deposits had no value to the Indian tribes
near Lake Superior, and Arabian oil a century ago was a matter of indifference to the nomads who
roamed above it. Conversely, those nations with great industrial organizations and manufacturing
infrastructures traditionally have been able to convert the potential power of natural resources into
actual national power.
Very few nations, however, are self-sufficient. A country like the United States has a rich store
of natural resources and yet may be dependent on imports because of its voracious consumption.
Japan, on the other hand, has few natural resources; it is dependent on imports for 100 percent of its
petroleum, bauxite, wool, and cotton; 95 percent of its wheat; 90 percent of its copper; and 70 percent
of its timber and grain.22 Nations traditionally have made up for such difficulties in several ways. One
time-honored method is to conquer the resources, a principal motivation for the Japanese expansion
that led to World War II and the Iraqi invasion that led to the Gulf War. A second method is to develop
resources in another country by means of concessions, political manipulation, and even a judicious
use of force—all used earlier to considerable effect by the United States in Latin America. In an age
of increasing interdependence, this type of economic penetration long since has lost its neocolonial
identity, particularly since both of America’s principal World War II adversaries now regularly exercise
such penetration in the United States.
The third and most common method for obtaining natural resources is to buy them. In recent years,
however, the combination of rapid industrial growth and decline of resources has changed the global
economy into a seller’s market, while providing considerable economic leverage to nations in control
of vital commodities. OPEC’s control of oil, for example, provided its members influence all out of
proportion to their economic and military power. A similar transformation may occur in the future
with those nations that are major food producers as the so-called “Green Revolution” faces the prospect
of more depleted lands and encroaching deserts. Finally, there is the short supply of strategic and often
esoteric minerals so necessary for high technology and modern weapons. One consequence of this
diminishment of raw materials has been the emergence of the sea bed, with its oil and manganese
reserves, as a new venue of international competition, in which those nations with long coastlines
and extensive territorial waters have the advantage. Such shortages are a reminder of how closely
connected is the acquisition of natural resources to all the elements of power, particularly for a truly
dependent nation like Japan, which can neither feed its people nor fuel its high-technology economy
without access to overseas markets. Absent its alliance with the United States as a means to ensure its
access to such resources as Persian Gulf oil, Japan would be forced to expand its “self-defense” military
force, perhaps even becoming a declared nuclear power.23
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SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF POWER
Economic.
Economic capacity and development are key links to both natural and social determinants of power.
In terms of natural resources, as we have seen, a nation may be well endowed but lack the ability to
convert those resources into military hardware, high-technology exports, and other manifestations of
power. Ultimately, however, economic development in a nation flows from the social determinants of
power, whether they be political modernization and widespread formal education, or geographic and
social mobility and the ready acceptance of innovation. All this, of course, is worked out against the
backdrop of balanced military investment. An excess of military spending can erode the underlying
basis for a nation’s power if it occurs at the expense of a larger economy and reduces the national ability
to invest in future economic growth. For developing countries already short of economic investment
capital, military spending represents a serious allocation of resources. But even advanced countries,
especially since the end of the Cold War, have to make some choices between guns and butter. Because
a nation’s political stability, as well as the legitimacy of its government, increasingly are linked to
domestic economic performance, excessive military spending, as the former Soviet Union discovered,
can be dangerous for large and small countries alike.
Strong domestic economies also produce nonmilitary national power in the international arena.
Leading industrial nations have available all the techniques for exercising power, including rewards
or punishment by means of foreign trade, foreign aid, and investment and loans, as well as the mere
consequences their domestic policies can have on the global economy. This type of power can be
weakened, however, if a nation suffers from high inflation, a large foreign debt, or chronic balanceof-payment deficits. In short, the strength of a nation’s economy has a direct effect on the variety,
resiliency, and credibility of its international economic options. The size of the U.S. budget and trade
deficits, for example, means that the Federal Reserve must maintain interest rates high enough for deficit
financing, which limits its ability to stimulate the economy with lower rates. And American foreign aid
is becoming less influential as an economic instrument of power as budgets decline. On the other hand,
U.S. trade policy has become increasingly important to the U.S. economy, with American exports, as an
example, expected to create 16 million jobs by the year 2000.24 That such economic considerations are
interrelated closely to other elements of power is demonstrated by the perennial question of whether
most-favored-nation status, which is nothing more than normal access to U.S. markets, should be made
conditional on progress in human rights by countries such as China.
Finally, increasing interdependence has caused major changes in the economic element of national
power. National economies have become more dependent on international trade and on financial
markets that have become truly global in scope. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for a nation
to raise short-term interest rates or to coordinate monetary policy with other international actors. In
a similar manner, the ability of nations to use exchange rates to further their national interests has
declined as governments deal more and more with international capital flows that dwarf the resources
available to any nation to defend its currency. From a security perspective, this type of economic
interpenetration is reflected in the mutual vulnerability of national economies. Moreover, a nation’s
economic policy is now influenced by myriad international governmental organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), while
multinational corporations stand ready to manipulate the domestic politics of nation-states to further
their transnational interests.25
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Military.
Military strength historically is the gauge for national power. Defeat in war normally has signaled
the decline, if not the end, of a nation’s power, while military victory has usually heralded the ascent
of a new power. But military power is more than just the aggregation of personnel, equipment, and
weaponry. Leadership, morale, and discipline also remain vital factors of military power. Despite rough
quantitative parity between the Iraqi military and the allied coalition, the dismal Iraqi performance
in the Gulf War demonstrated the enduring relevance of those intangibles. That performance also
showed how political interference or the gradual infection of a nation or its military by incompetence,
waste, and corruption can weaken a nation’s armed forces. By contrast, there is the example of the U.S.
military working over the years in tandem with political authorities to move from the hollow force of
the immediate post-Vietnam period to the joint military machine of Operation DESERT STORM.26
The Gulf War also highlights how important power projection and sustainability are in the modern
era for military effectiveness. For a global power like the United States, the focus on these factors
produced not only the unique air and sea lift capability that provided transportation for a half million
troops to the Persian Gulf in 1990-91, but incredible resupply feats in an environment in which a single
division during the 100-hour ground offensive consumed 2.4 million gallons of fuel, brought forward
in 475 5,000-gallon tankers.27 Allied to these factors, of course, are readiness considerations ranging
from training and maneuver opportunities to the availability of fuel and repair parts. In a similar
manner, a nation’s potential for rapid mobilization may also play a key role. Israel, for example, has
a permanent force of only 164,000 highly trained and ready soldiers. But that force can be augmented
within 24 hours by almost three times that many combat-ready troops. And Sweden has the capability
to mobilize a force almost overnight that can equal many European standing armies.28
The quality of arms technology also has become a vital military factor for all nations in a period
marked by rapid and important scientific breakthroughs. Timely inventions ranging from the crossbow
to the airplane often have been decisive when accompanied by appropriate changes in military
organization and doctrine. When these two components lag technological change, however, as they
did in the American Civil War and World War I, the results can be horrific diminishment and waste of
military power. In addition, new technologies in the hands of rogue states or nonstate actors such as
terrorist groups will continue to be an important consideration for nations in the exercise of military
power. Weapons of mass destruction are, and will probably continue to be, of primary concern in this
regard. But even relatively cheap, recently developed conventional weapons in the appropriate situation
can be decisive, as was illustrated by the American-built, shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
that enabled the Afghan mujahedeen guerrillas to neutralize Soviet air power. Finally, technological
advances are a useful reminder once again that military power, like all elements of national power, is
contextual. Technology is not an automatic panacea for producing quick victories and low casualties,
particularly absent clear political direction and coherent strategy. There comes a time, as Britain’s thin
red line discovered under the weight of the Zulu offensive at Isandhewana, when quantity has a quality
all its own.29
Political.
This element of power addresses key questions, many of which are related to the psychological
element: What is the form of government, what is the attitude of the population toward it, how strong
do the people want it to be, and how strong and efficient is it? These questions cannot be answered
with simple statistics, yet they may be paramount in any assessment of national power. If a government
is inadequate and cannot bring the nation’s potential power to bear on an issue, that power might as
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well not exist. Nor can an analysis turn on the type of government a state claims to have, for even the
constitution of a state may be misleading. The 1936 Soviet Constitution, for example, was a democraticsounding organic law that had little in common with the actual operation of the Soviet regime. And
the German Weimar Constitution, a model of democratic devices, did not prevent Hitler from reaching
power and from creating his own “constitutional law” as he proceeded.
What is clear is that the actual forms of government, each with its own strengths and weaknesses,
play a role in the application of national power. An authoritarian system, for instance, restricts in
varying degrees individual freedom and initiative, but permits formulation of a highly organized state
strategy. Democratic systems, by comparison, require policy formation by consensus-building and
persuasion in an open, pluralistic society. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for democracies to
develop and implement a long-range state strategy or to change policy direction as abruptly as, for
example, Nazi Germany and the USSR did in the ideological volte-face marked by the August 1939
nonaggression treaty. In addition, the level of political development within a state is also important.
This development involves both the capability, and more particularly the efficiency and effectiveness, of
a national government in using its human and material resources in pursuit of national interests. Thus,
administrative and management skills are crucial if a nation is to realize its full power potential.
A government also takes the shape and operates the way it does for very complex reasons, many
of which reflect the experience of a people and their attitude toward, and expectations of, what the
government is to do and how strong, as a consequence, it should be. For example, a fear of too much state
power caused the Founding Fathers deliberately to make the U.S. Government inefficient (in the sense
of a quick, smooth operation) by means of “checks and balances.” In a similar manner, the French fear
of a “man on horseback” in the wake of their second experience with Bonapartism caused a curtailment
of executive powers that resulted in the weakness of the French governments after the Franco-Prussian
War. Under both the Third and Fourth French Republics, as a result, the French strengthened the
legislative branch to a degree that made strong executive leadership almost impossible. The French
preferred to suffer the executive weakness rather than run the risks entailed in a strong government.
Consequently, while the United States had 14 administrations between 1875 and 1940, and the British
20, France had 102. After World War II, the Fourth French Republic averaged two regimes a year.30
Psychological.
The psychological element of power consists of national will and morale, national character, and
degree of national integration. It is this most ephemeral of the social power determinants that repeatedly
has caused nations with superior economic and military power to be defeated or have their policies
frustrated by less capable actors. Thus there was Mao’s defeat of Chiang Kai-shek when Chiang, at
least initially, possessed most of China’s wealth and military capability, the ability of Gandhi to drive
the British from India, and that of Khomeni to undermine the Shah. And it is almost a cliché that
any measurement of U.S. economic and military power vis-à-vis that of the North Vietnam-Vietcong
combination during the late 1960s would have led to the conclusion that U.S. superiority in these two
categories would result in an American victory. Harry Summers recounts a story, in this regard, that
was circulating during the final days of the U.S. retreat from Vietnam:
When the Nixon Administration took over in 1969, all the data on North Vietnam and on the United States was fed
into a Pentagon computer—population, gross national product, manufacturing capability, number of tanks, ships,
and aircraft, size of the armed forces, and the like.
The computer was then asked, “When will we win?”
It took only a moment to give the answer: “You won in 1964!”31
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National will and morale are defined as the degree of determination that any actor manifests in the
pursuit of its internal or external objectives. For a given international actor, however, will and morale
need not be identical at all levels of society. During 1916 and early 1917, the Russian nobility continued
to plan for new offensive action even as Russian troops were abandoning their weapons and their
battlefield positions. National character has an equally complex relation to national power inasmuch
as that character favors or proscribes certain policies and strategies. Americans, for example, like to
justify their actions. Thus, the United States did not enter World War I until Wilsonian idealism had to
confront the loss of American ships and American lives. The elevation of “moralism” in the conduct
of foreign policy, in turn, diminishes the ability of the United States to initiate a truly preemptive
action. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, the choice of a blockade over an air strike was based
in part on the argument that from the standpoint of both morality and tradition, the United States
could not perpetrate a “Pearl Harbor in reverse.”32 In all such cases, as with will and morale, it is
extremely difficult to identify the constituent parts of and sources behind national character. Historical
experiences and traditional values undoubtedly are important, as are such factors as geographic location
and environment. Russian mistrust of the external world, for instance, is verifiable historically as part
of the national character, whether it is because of the centuries of Tartar rule, three invasions from
Western Europe in little more than a century, or something else. And Russian stoicism is a character
trait, whether the cause is Russian Orthodox Christianity, communism, or the long Russian winters.33
Finally, there is the degree of integration, which refers simply to the sense of belonging and
identification of a nation’s people. In many ways, this contributes to both national will and morale as
well as character. In most cases, there is a direct correlation between the degree of perceived integration
and the extent of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity, all of which contribute to a
sense of belonging, manifested in a sense of citizenship. On the other hand, despite examples to the
contrary (Belgium, Canada, and the states of the former Yugoslavia), a lack of integration need not
necessarily cause a lack of identity. Swiss unity has continued across the centuries despite low degrees
of integration in ethnicity, language, and religion.34
Informational.
The communications revolution, which began over a century ago with the advent of global
transmission of information, has taken on new momentum in recent decades with the development of
fax machines, television satellites, and computer linkages. As the revolutions in Central and Eastern
Europe demonstrated in the fall of 1989, a new fact of life in the international arena is that it is no longer
possible for any nation-state to deny its citizens knowledge of what is taking place elsewhere. Ideas,
in other words, move more freely around the world than at any other time in the past. This has had
particularly fortunate results for the United States. Even as some other aspects of power have gone into
relative decline, America’s influence as a source of ideas and as a shaper of culture has increased. This
“soft power,” in Joseph Nye’s words, has been a major factor in formulating the U.S. national security
strategic objective of “enlargement.”35 So in one sense, information has contributed to the concept of the
world as a global village.
This combination of enhanced communication and dissemination of information, however, is a twoedged sword that cuts across all the social determinants of power in national strategy. In the economic
realm, for instance, global interdependence has been enhanced by information-communication
improvements. On the other hand, near instantaneous downturns of major economies are always a
possibility with the immediate transmission of adverse economic news concerning any nation-state or
transnational economic actor. Politically, instantaneous and pervasive communication can enhance the
ability of governmental elites to lead the people in a democracy or to act as a national consoler in times
of tragedy, such as the Challenger explosion or the Oklahoma City bombing. At the same time, these
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developments also can aid the demagogues, the great simplifiers always waiting in the wings to stir
fundamental discontents and the dark side of nationalism. In terms of psychological power, Winston
Churchill demonstrated repeatedly that the pervasive distribution of targeted information can have
momentous effects on intangibles such as national will. Conversely, however, this type of ubiquity
has the pernicious potential of altering in a matter of years basic values and cultural beliefs that take
generations to create.
Nowhere is the effect of developments in communications and access to information more farreaching than on warfare. In the purely military realm, information dominance can create operational
synergies by allowing those systems that provide battlespace awareness, enhance command and
control, and create precision force to be integrated into the so-called “system of systems.” One result
of all this is to compress the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, previously considered as
separate and distinct loci of command and functional responsibilities. The commander will be faced in
the future with the much more complex job of recognizing those events occurring simultaneously at
all three levels and integrating them into the calculation that results from the traditional consideration
at the operational level of which tactical battles and engagements to join and which to avoid. Equally
important, shorter time for decisions—occasioned by both the compressed continuum of war and
electronically gathered information—means less time to discover ambiguities or to analyze those
ambiguities that are already apparent.
At the higher level of cyberwar, the two-edged potential of communications and information is
even more evident. In the future, nations will wage offensive information warfare on another state’s
computer systems, targeting assets ranging from telecommunications and power to safety and banking.
Such an onslaught could undermine the more advanced aspects of an adversary’s economy, interrupt
its mobilization of military power, and by affecting the integrity of highly visible services to the
population, create almost immediate pressure on government at all levels. As activities rely increasingly
on information systems rather than manual processes and procedures, information infrastructures of
the most developed nations, such as the United States, become progressively more vulnerable to state
and nonstate actors. Even as there are advances in information security technologies, hacker tools are
becoming more sophisticated and easier to obtain and use. One analyst concludes in this regard that,
for the United States, “the possibility of a digital Pearl Harbor cannot be dismissed out of hand.”36
EVALUATION
Evaluation of national power is difficult. The basic problem, as we have seen, is that all elements
of power are interrelated. Where people live will influence what they possess; how many they are will
influence how much they possess; what their historical experience has been will affect how they look at
life; how they look at life will influence how they organize and govern themselves; and all these elements
weighed in relation to the problem of national security will influence the nature, size, and effectiveness
of the armed forces. As a consequence, not only must each separate element be analyzed, but the effects
of those elements on one another must be considered. These complexities are compounded because
national power is both dynamic and relative. Nation-states and other international actors change each
day in potential and realized power, although the rate of change may vary from one actor to another.
And because these changes go on continually, an estimate of a state’s national power vis-à-vis the
power of another actor is obsolescent even as the estimate is made. The greater the rate of change in the
actors being compared, the greater the obsolescence of the estimate.
In other words, like all strategic endeavors, more art than science is involved in the evaluation of
where one nation-state stands in relation to the power of other regional and global actors. This has
not deterred one former government official from creating a formula to develop a rough estimate of
“perceived” national power—focused primarily on a state’s capacity to wage war:37
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Pp = (C + E + M) x (S + W) in which:
Pp = Perceived power
C = Critical mass: population and territory
E = Economic capability
M = Military capability
S = Strategic purpose
W = Will to pursue national strategy
Regardless of its prospective contribution in calculating a Pp value, this formula has some important
lessons. The more tangible elements (C, E, M) that can be quantified objectively also involve varying
degrees of subjective qualifications: territory that is vast but covered with mountain ranges and has few
navigable rivers; a population that is large but unskilled and uneducated; or cases in which, despite
qualitative military superiority in technology and weapons on one side, the opponent is able to prevail
through superior intangibles ranging from leadership to morale. Most important, by demonstrating
that national power is a product—not a sum—of its components, the formula is a reminder of how
important the relational and contextual aspects are. The United States discovered in Vietnam that no
matter how large the sum of the more tangible economic and military capabilities in relation to an
adversary, their utility is determined by the intangibles of strategic purpose(S) and national will(W).
Zero times any number, no matter how large, is still zero.
These considerations are particularly important in evaluating what some might consider to be
irrational acts by states that use force to alter the status quo. In fact, these states may differ from others
simply in the perception of low risks where others perceive high ones, rather than in the willingness
to take risks. There is growing evidence that the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait falls into this category.
In another era, many of Hitler’s “Saturday surprises” in the 1930s were considered reckless by those
who eventually would have to redress their consequences. These incidents came about, however, not
because the Nazi leader willingly tolerated a high probability of conflict, but because he was certain that
the other side would back down. When the German military opposed such policies as the Rhineland
coup and the Anschluss with Austin on the basis that they were too dangerous, Hitler did not argue that
the risks were worth the prizes, but that instead, taking the social determinants of power in Germany
and the other countries into consideration, the risks were negligible. In terms of the concept of gain and
risk assessment displayed in Figure 1 below, Hitler’s analysis of potential opposition came to rest at the
MAXIMIN approach of Quadrant 2, not that of MAXIMAX in Quadrant 1.38
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Figure 1. Gain and Risk Assessment.
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In the Rhineland episode of March 7, 1936, for example, the military correlation of forces was
quantifiably against Germany, as Hitler was well aware. “We had no army worth mentioning,” he
reflected later; “at that time, it would not even have had the fighting strength to maintain itself against
the Poles.”39 But unlike his military advisors, who were focused firmly on French military capabilities,
the Nazi leader considered other elements of power, particularly the lack of political integration and
coherency in the French Popular Front government and the connection to the psychological component
of French national will. As a result, he concluded that France had no intention of responding militarily to
the German military incursion. On March 9, the Wehrmacht commander received warning of impending
French military countermoves and asked to withdraw troops from major cities in the Rhineland. Hitler,
however, was still taking an essentially MAXIMIN (Quadrant 2) approach and correctly discounted
the possibility of intervention by a French government vacillating between two incorrect positions:
MAXIMAX (Quadrant 1) and MINIMAX (Quadrant 3).40
THINKING IN THE BOX
A great deal of lip service has been paid of late to the need for students of strategy to “think outside
the box.” The “box” in this case presumably contains the traditional approaches to those issues that
affect America’s national security. It is natural, of course, in a time of great change to search for a
“Philosopher’s Stone,” or to look for the sword that can, in one clean stroke, preclude the tedious
unraveling of the Gordian knot of post-Cold War strategy. And perhaps this will all be possible in an
extra-box environment of the future. But such explorations cannot and should not be made until the
student of national security has learned to think inside the box, and that begins with an understanding
of concepts like national power.
The concept of national power helps to provide an initial organizational focus as students deal with
the deceptively simple thought process that links strategic ends, ways, and means. National elements of
power, however they are described, provide the conceptual foundation for this process at the national
strategic level. An understanding of the characteristics and the interrelationships of these elements
allows the student to expand the process to comprehend how derivative instruments of power can be
combined most effectively as policy options to achieve national strategic objectives. This is a key step
in strategic maturation that will play an increasingly larger role in the future for military and civilian
professionals concerned with national security strategy.
Military planners already deal with Flexible Deterrent Options, in which military instruments
of power are matched with instruments derived from other elements of power. Military options in
response to a challenge could include an increase in specific reconnaissance activities, the exercise
of certain prepositioned equipment, or the deployment of small units. Politically, this could mean
consultation by executive branch elites with congressional leaders or initiation of a specific diplomatic
demarche. At the same time, economic options might include, alone or in combination, the enactment
of trade sanctions, the freezing of assets, and the restriction of corporate transactions. In all this, the
effectiveness of small discrete response options depends on how well the instruments of power are
wielded together. And that will depend to a great deal on how well military strategists and their civilian
counterparts understand the elements of national power from which those instruments are derived.41
The focus on these elements of national power as means to national strategic ends also serves as an
organizational link to the overall strategic formulation process. That process begins by demonstrating
how national strategic objectives are derived from national interests, which in turn owe their articulation
and degree of intensity to national values. This linkage is also a useful reminder that power, the
“means” in the strategic equation, ultimately takes its meaning from the values it serves. Absent the
legitimation provided by this connection to national values, national power may come to be perceived
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as a resource or means that invites suspicion and challenge; at worst it could be associated with tyranny
and aggrandizement. Without the bond of popular support and the justification that comes from an
overarching purpose, national power can be quick to erode and ephemeral as a source of national
security.
What takes place within the box in dealing with concepts like national power is an educational
process, a not inconsiderable achievement in an era mesmerized by techno-chic innovations which
tend to confuse training with that process and data collection with knowledge.
In the final analysis, the study of national power is a valuable educational objective because it is
so difficult. Aspiring national security strategists must grapple with concepts that overlap, that are
subjective in many cases, that are relative and situational, and that defy scientific measurement. All this
teaches flexible thinking—the sine qua non for a strategist. In short, it is this very complexity that causes
students to mature intellectually, to understand that within the box there is no such thing as a free
strategic lunch. Equally important, students learn that they cannot escape these limitations by moving
outside the box, a lesson that many futurists need to absorb.
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CHAPTER 11
MANAGING STRATEGIC RISK
James F. Holcomb
In a tactical situation one is able to see at least half the problem with the naked eye, whereas in strategy everything
has to be guessed at and presumed.1
Carl von Clausewitz

The hierarchical chart of the strategy formulation model (Figure 1, Appendix I) shows a final block
labeled “Risk Assessment.” The implication of the diagram is that risk assessment is peculiar to the
development of military strategy. Indeed, it figures prominently in that process, but not uniquely
so. Policy and strategy properly arrived at, demand a continuous and thorough assessment and
reassessment of risk throughout the total process.
Strategists and strategic theorists throughout history have grappled with the concept of risk and
methodologies for its assessment. The motivation to eliminate uncertainty in policy and strategy
development, as well as execution, is natural, if at times chimerical. There will always be uncertainty. It
often will be unmeasurable. The very nature of war and conflict and the increasingly complex strategic
environment ensures that this is so. Where then does this leave the aspiring student of strategy? Is risk
assessment simply the “comfort level that senior planners experience as they assess key variables”?2
It is this and more. The concept of risk assessment is worth examining in more detail to put some
substance to the form.
Defining Risk.
Defining risk is a relatively simple task. John Collins, in his primer on grand strategy, reduces it to
its essentials: “Discrepancies between ends, which we have identified as interests and objectives, and
means-available resources-create risks, which can rarely be quantified.”3 At its core, risk arises when
ends and means are not in consonance. This is known as an “ends-means mismatch.” Collins is on solid
ground with this definition, the legacy of which springs from Clausewitz and his discussion of “the
political object of war and the effort to be made.”4 B. H. Liddell-Hart also focused on this basic truth:
“Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and coordination of the end and
the means . . . An excess may be as harmful as a deficiency.”5 Strategic risk then is the probability of
failure in achieving a strategic objective at an acceptable cost. The concept is simple to articulate and
easy to understand. But, as in war, the simplest things in strategy are the most difficult.
The first difficulty is in understanding what Clausewitz and others meant by “means” in the
ends-means equation. Current use of the term generally accepts that means constitute resources, that
is, personnel, treasure, equipment, political will, time, and so on. Clausewitz also intended a larger
meaning that includes concepts or courses of action to achieve particular objectives; these coupled with
resources constitute the means or “effort to be made.”6 It has become increasingly useful to separate
these two components of Clausewitz’ “means” for consideration in strategy formulation without
confusing Clausewitz’ original intent. Consequently, risk can be represented by a mismatch in ends
and ways or means.
Art Lykke makes the case for this approach, developing a model comprising three variables: ends
(objectives), ways (concepts, options or courses of action for achieving them), and means (resources).
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Using a simple metaphor of a three-legged stool, he points out that if the ends, ways, and means
(the legs of the stool) are not of equal length, then we are left with a stool (and a strategy) that is
out of balance. Continuing the analogy, he defines this angle of imbalance as risk. The greater the
mismatch between ends, ways, and/or means, the greater the risk of achieving ones objectives.7 This is
a subtle but important addition to the simple ends-means equation. One can identify the objective to be
achieved correctly and accurately and provide adequate resources to achieve it. However, if the “way”
of achieving it is not in balance, then there is an inherent risk of failure to achieve the strategic objective.
For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the objective of the Kennedy administration was fairly
straightforward: Get the missiles out of Cuba. The means available were adequate and deliverable.
However, there were several different ways to achieve the objective. Graham Allison identifies six
major categories of possible response: Do nothing, apply diplomatic pressure, secretly approach Castro,
conduct an invasion, conduct air strikes, or blockade.8 One also can see this in the continuing debate
over the strategy for Kosovo and the use solely of airpower to achieve particular political objectives.
In the Lykke model of the stool, the balance varies depending on which option is chosen. The degree
of lopsidedness or imbalance defines risk. Choosing the right policy option (or way) to achieve the
strategic objective is therefore a critical consideration, even assuming a clear objective and adequate
means. That is, an adequately resourced “way” that is inappropriate to the “end” would still create risk
of failure to achieve the strategic objective.
Thus, the definition of risk is the degree to which strategic objectives, concepts and resources are
in or out of balance. Since strategy is a dynamic process, one must understand that all three elements
are variable and subject to change over time. The formulation of effective strategy for any endeavor is
a constant quest to ensure balance among the variables. The definition applies to all aspects of strategy
development whether dealing with national security (grand) strategy, defense, military or theater
strategies, business strategy or even personal strategies.
Why is Strategic Risk Assessment Difficult?
The subtitle is borrowed from David Jablonsky’s piece, “Why is Strategy Difficult?”9 The very nature
of war and conflict presupposes a relationship between thinking adversaries. This, in turn, ensures
that a degree of ambiguity, uncertainty, and yes, risk will exist in any developed strategy. Indeed,
Clausewitz devotes the central theme of On War to this very premise; that is what distinguishes his
work from his predecessors and ensures its continued relevance to the present day. Clausewitz was not
the only one to recognize the subjective nature of war, but he was the first to mark that characteristic as
preeminent. Throughout his work, there are allusions to “chance,” “luck,” “guesswork,” “uncertainty,”
“probabilities,” and so on. The search for hard truths is a frustrating one. This in itself is a lesson.
The analogies and metaphors the Prussian philosopher provides to help understand the nature of
war are not based on chess, but reflect “a duel on a larger scale,” “a pair of wrestlers,” “commerce,”
a “collision of living forces” or a “game of chance.” Formulating strategy presupposes “an animate
object that reacts,” and moreover, reacts unpredictably. This equates to Andre Beufre’s definition of
strategy as the “art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to solve their dispute.”10 Just as one
actor identifies objectives, develops concepts and allocates resources, so does the potential or actual
adversary. The variables in the strategic equation have now doubled, further complicating the task.
Moreover, ambiguity and uncertainty increase as one climbs up the strategic ladder as moral factors
gain primacy over material ones.11 The problem is that these moral factors can only be guessed at.
Clausewitz explicitly refers to this transition from certainty to uncertainty in strategic analysis:
At this point, then, intellectual activity leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then
becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term-the faculty of using judgement to detect the most important
and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations.12
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The strategist now faces a prospect “that Newton himself would quail before the algebraic problems
it could pose.”13 Risk assessment is difficult because strategy is difficult; strategy is difficult because
war is the most complex of human undertakings and filled with unknowns. Liddell-Hart concludes in
this regard: “This complicates calculation, because no man can exactly calculate the capacity of human
genius and stupidity, nor the incapacity of will.”14 It is the inherent nature of war itself that sets the
student adrift in a strategic sea of uncertainty.
Genius and Uncertainty.
Despite this uncertainty, there is comfort in the knowledge that others have navigated these waters
before. The challenge is to somehow structure or frame the strategic problem to minimize the unknown
or more importantly, to account for it. The effective strategist strives for the “closest approximation of
the truth” knowing that full knowledge is an impossibility.15
Clausewitz identifies two preeminent qualities in a successful strategist that bear consideration:
If the mind is to emerge unscathed from this relentless struggle with the unforeseen, two qualities are indispensable:
first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth;
and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead (emphasis in the original).16

These are the elements that define what Clausewitz terms “genius.” The aspiring strategist should not
be misled or discouraged by the use of the term however. Clausewitz does not refer to the result of good
genetics, but to the development of a mind through study and experience. He is clear on this point as
he continues his discussion: “It is the average result that indicates the presence of military genius.”17 In
other words, “genius” as Clausewitz describes it is not solely the unique gift of a Napoleon or Gustavus
or Hannibal. It is an achievable skill and the “inner light” can be taught and learned.
Von Moltke the Elder took up the same theme several generations later:
What is necessary is to discover the situation, such as it is, in spite of its being surrounded by the fog of the
unknown; then to appreciate soundly what is seen, to guess what is not seen, to take a decision quickly, finally to act with
vigour, without hesitation18

The message is that an education in strategic subjects, followed by continuous historical study
to maintain mental suppleness combined with vicarious experience through exercise, and actual
experience, all contribute to acquiring the skills necessary for finding the “closest approximation of the
truth.” Strategic ability is rarely born, more often learned, but eminently achievable.
Acknowledging the theoretical uncertainties inherent in war, conflict and policy and strategy
development is an important, if unsatisfying, step in understanding risk assessment. It allows a better
framing of the strategic puzzle. It is simply a matter of knowing what is not known in order to make
better use of what is known and, as von Moltke suggests, to guess what is not seen. Guessing well is an
inherent part of the art of Grand Strategy.
The Ends, Ways, Means Conundrum in Risk Assessment.
The essence of the challenge of strategy in general and risk assessment in particular is the core
problem of relating ends to ways and means. Compounding this basic conundrum is that most often
the ends will be abstract, while the ways and means will be relatively well-defined.19 In addition, the
real test of the master of strategic art is to translate obtuse, politically couched objectives into specific
actions. This is likely to become more of a challenge as the nature, scope, and direction of potential
threats multiply. Articulating the political objective in the event of a Major Theater War is relatively
easy; however, achieving significant clarity in political objectives in multiplying crises around the
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world, especially where vital U.S. interests are not at stake, will become increasingly problematic. One
analyst notes in a critique of the U.S. foreign policy process:
Any ambiguity in the ends-means relationship, any loss in the value roots of policy, or any failure to maintain a
firm commitment to the achievement of the national purpose cannot help but deprive a foreign policy of essential
meaning and effectiveness.20

A second related potential pitfall facing the grand strategist is the “tail wagging the dog” phenomenon.
In the absence of clear political objectives or policy guidance, the means can in fact “deflect the direction
of ends.”21 What gets done becomes what one has the capability of doing. The ways and means can
develop a momentum of their own and the result is strategy by default, usually at the risk of desired
political outcomes. The von Schlieffen Plan and America’s experience in Vietnam are two stark historic
examples of this effect.
This problem has been ascribed to the “triumph of technique” in American foreign policy. One
critic specifically targets the militarization of foreign affairs during the Cold War and an emphasis on
quantitative assessments based solely on capabilities.22 In such cases, Clausewitz’ “ephemeral factors”
are discounted, and “consideration of political subtleties tends to be shunted aside.”23 Ferdinand Foch,
writing in 1903, complained of the same phenomenon but went further: “while the moral factors
were depressed as causes [of war], they were also suppressed as effects.” The unintended result is that
strategy can become a function solely of material factors.24 The dramatic changes of the last decade
and the growing complexities and dimensions of current and future world problems make simplistic,
capabilities-based approaches dangerous at their worst, or potentially ineffective at best. Getting ends,
ways, and means right has always been hard; it is becoming harder.
Determining Risk.
The simple definition of risk as an imbalance in ends, ways, and/or means is straightforward but
clearly incomplete. How does one measure the degree of risk in any particular strategic endeavor? This
is the heart of the dilemma.
Neuchterlein and National Interests.
Risk assessment is inherent to the entire strategy formulation process. Donald Neuchterlein
addresses risk in his discussion on identifying national interests and their intensities, a fundamental
prerequisite to policy and strategy development. He posits 16 criteria for assessing a particular issue as
a vital interest.25 These are divided into value and cost/risk factors26*:
Value Factors

Cost/Risk Factors

Proximity of the danger
Nature of the threat
Economic stake
Sentimental attachment
Type of government and
Effect on the balance of power
National prestige at stake
Support of allies

Economic costs of hostilities
Estimated casualties
Risk of protracted conflict
Risk of enlarged conflict
Cost of defeat or stalemate
Cost of public opposition
Risk of UN opposition
Risk of congressional opposition

*Note there is no direct correlation between values and cost/risk factors; they are randomly listed.

Figure 1. Value and Cost/Risk Factors.
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Neuchterlein advocates using a simple valuation process by rating each factor high, medium, or
low, or even assigning numerical scores to the factors. Likewise, for a particular issue, some factors
may be more important than others and can be appropriately weighted or prioritized. The factor scores
are then totaled. If the value totals of a particular issue are high compared to a low or medium cost/risk
valuation, then the issue probably constitutes a vital interest. Neuchterlein does not claim a scientific
basis for his methodology, only that “[i]t provides for systematic analysis of specific foreign policy
issues; it should therefore lead to better judgments about levels of interest for the United States and
its antagonists and, one would hope, to wiser policies than would otherwise be the case.”27 Thus, it
provides a simple tool that assists in the discrimination of interests in relative terms. Having determined
“vitalness,” the policymaker/strategist is in a better position to articulate a balanced set of ends, ways,
and means in the strategy formulation process by accounting for degrees of risk up front.
Calculated Risk.
The noted naval theorist, Admiral J. C. Wylie, took a more rigorous approach to the problem in a
tongue-in-cheek article published in 1953 entitled “The Calculation of Risk.”28 The impetus for the short
article apparently arose from the 1953 budget hearings in which the Army representative answered
difficult questions with the rejoinder “Mr. Congressman, that is a calculated risk.” Of course, no one
knew what a calculated risk was or how to calculate it, so Wylie decided to try.29 Although intended
facetiously, Wylie’s little paper does merit consideration in its own right. Using a series of variables
and equations, he describes various strategic characteristics.30
P = Profit if successful
Cn = Cost if not attempted
Cf = Cost of attempt that fails
Cs = Cost of attempt that succeeds
S = Probability of success
Wylie defines risk as P/Cf, or the potential profit divided by the cost of a failed attempt. As long as
this is greater than 1, the enterprise (or strategy) is “encouraged”; likewise, if less than 1, “discouraged.”
These machinations result in general determining equations:
If P x S < Cf (1-S) then “no go”
If P x S > Cf (1-S) then “go”
These equations describe what is already known instinctively: If the payoff times the probability
of success is greater than the cost of failure times the probability of failure, the result is a winning
strategy.
Risk is further defined by an equation: Cf/Cs < S/(1-S)
That is, the cost of a failed attempt over the cost of a successful attempt must be less than the probability
of success divided by the probability of failure.
Having had his fun with the reader, Wylie further stipulates that “To ensure success in its use, there
is only one condition that must be met: the factors involved must never be expressed in arithmetic
quantities. That would blunt the fine edge of judgment and obscure the true balance of intangibles.”
Wylie clearly subscribes to the Clausewitzian notions of uncertainty and unpredictability in war,
and he makes this clear in his important and short book, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power
Control. In it, he further admonishes the reader to plan for a complete spectrum of strategies in order
to have a “reserve” of strategies for the inevitable changes that will occur. He also warns that “the
player who plans for only one strategy runs a great risk simply because his opponent soon detects the
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single strategy—and counters it . . . planning for certitude is the greatest of all military mistakes . . .”31
Wylie’s reserve of strategies is essentially conceptual hedging for uncertainty with its inherent risk.
This, to borrow from operational art, is planning for strategic branches and sequels or for potential
developments requiring adjustments in ends, ways, or means as a particular strategy is implemented.
Although Wylie’s formulations were intended to ridicule early whiz kids, he actually produced a
relatively sophisticated approach to a difficult concept. For example, an examination of a recent study
prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency to address risk assessment and management of threats to
security, uses an identical formulation.32 Defining risk as the potential of damage or loss to an asset,
the study assesses the level of risk as the impact of loss or damage to the asset and the likelihood
(probability) that a specific vulnerability could be exploited by a particular threat.33 The formulation
is defensive in nature since it is addressing security protection issues. Nevertheless, it equates exactly
to Wylie’s Cf (1-S), that is, the Cost of Failure times the Probability of Failure. Strategy and risk
assessment are indeed eternal.34
Risk Management.
The process of risk assessment is dynamic in nature over time and circumstance. That is, the variables
are in constant flux. Risk assessment is simply the constant effort to identify and correct imbalances
among the key variables. The first ability of the strategist is to recognize when variables change. The
second is to adjust the remaining variables to account for the “delta” or, as it has been defined, the risk.
This is known as risk management. In simplest terms, the strategist has several clear options:35
Modify Ends. When the price to achieve a particular objective is too high or the ability to affect
a “center of gravity” is limited, it may become necessary to reduce the overall objective to more
realistic terms. Examples include the decision to forego a cross-channel attack in 1942 in favor of North
Africa, or accepting a lesser objective than the unification of the Korean peninsula after the Chinese
intervention.
Modify Means. An increase or reallocation of resources may affect the ability to implement a strategy
and achieve the objective. This is, however, not simply a quantitative solution. A definition of resources
includes unpredictable and changeable elements as well. For example, public support of a particular
policy/strategy is a key consideration in a democracy and must be accounted for, even if difficult to
measure. Vietnam is a classic example of not adequately modifying means by calling up the reserves
and generating sufficient public support for the effort.
Modify Ways. Assuming that the objective is sound and resources are adequate, there will likely
be multiple ways to achieve the desired end-state. Use of the various elements of power (political,
military, economic, informational) in differing combinations with varying emphasis may enhance the
ability to achieve the same overall objective. The recent Kosovo experience serves as a good case of
modifying ways: The deployment of Task Force Hawk and increasing information about planning for
possible ground options coupled with retargeting the air operation are thought to have contributed to
Milosevic’s decision to withdraw forces.
Reassess the Risk. Over time some of the going-in assumptions may be proven invalid. Additional
information may become available or gaps in knowledge filled. The strategist needs to recognize the
potential strategic effect of more or less information, recognizing that the 100 percent solution will
always be elusive due to the “ephemeral factors.” It is important to reemphasize that this process is
dynamic and “at once abstract and rational, [and] must be capable of synthesizing both psychological
and material data.”36 Indeed, one man’s risk is another man’s certitude and therefore grist for the
continuously grinding strategic mill.
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Five Patterns of Strategy for Risk Assessment and Management.
Andre Beaufre addresses the “ends-means” conundrum in his classic book Introduction to Strategy.
His intent is to provide a series of models, what he calls patterns of strategy, to assist in the process
of strategic thinking.37 The models are intended to show how various and fundamentally differing
strategies can spring from the dynamic relationship between ends, ways, and means. These five patterns
are macro-descriptors and it is clear to see that countless variations are possible.
Ends Moderate, Means Large. This is described as a strategy of “direct threat”; nuclear deterrence
strategy is given as example of this pattern.
Ends Moderate, Means Limited. Consisting of a pattern of “indirect pressure,” this pattern is useful
when freedom of action is limited. It emphasizes political, diplomatic, and economic elements of power
at the expense of direct military action. It models the basis of Soviet strategy, that is, avoiding direct
military confrontation with the United States.
Ends Important, Ways Limited (Low Freedom of Action), Means Limited. This pattern constitutes a
combination of “direct threat” and “indirect pressure” applied in successive actions and reflects the
strategy of indirect approach as described by Liddell-Hart. It is most appropriate to nations strong
defensively but with limited resources.
Ends Important, Ways Unlimited (High Freedom of Action), Means Inadequate. This reflects a strategy
of protracted war but at a low level of military intensity. It is the theoretical basis for Mao Tse-Tung’s
theory of protracted struggle.
Ends Important, Means Unlimited. This traditional pattern is characterized by “violent conflict aiming
at military victory.” Beufre describes it as the classic strategy of the Napoleonic era with Clausewitz as
its principle theorist.
With these five patterns of strategy as a basis, Collins addresses risk specifically with seven examples
of how to balance the strategic equation:38
• Eliminate waste [modifying ways and/or means]
• Compress objectives [modifying ends]
• Adjust strategy [modifying ways]
• Augment assets [modifying means]
• Reduce ends and increase means [modifying ends and means]
• Bluff [adversary misinterprets your ends, ways, means]
• Give up on the objective [the ultimate modification of ends].
Intended as examples, achieving strategic balance, and hence strategic effectiveness, may require
application of one, more, or other creative elements to induce change in the strategic equation.
Readiness and Risk.
There does exist detailed and rigorously institutionalized processes for measuring risk within the
U.S. defense establishment. The roots of these processes spring from the era of Robert McNamara and
the introduction of systems analysis to defense planning. In general, these methodologies represent an
attempt to account for the unknown institutionally and help to “guess well.” For example, the Joint Net
Assessment (JNA) is the informal process that “provides a strategic level risk assessment and provides
the basis for developing risk associated with alternative force structures and strategies.”39 The JNA
draws on multiple sources of information and contributes to other strategic assessments and potentially

149

to changes in the National Military Strategy. Normally a net assessment is developed every 4 years
but dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment can result in more frequent assessments. One
of the sources of information feeding the JNA process is the regularized readiness reporting system.
Therefore, bureaucratically and institutionally, at least in the Department of Defense, strategic risk is
related closely to readiness. That is the system. But as recent events in Kosovo have demonstrated, the
reality of risk assessment can have as much to do with art as with science.
The Chairman’s Readiness System.
The Chairman’s Readiness System is the process by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
assesses the military’s readiness to fulfill the requirements of the National Military Strategy (NMS). The
vehicle for assessing and reporting readiness across the armed forces is the Joint Monthly Readiness
Review (JMRR).40
The Chairman’s overall strategic assessment draws on three sources of information: The individual
services unit readiness reports, the Unified Combatant Commanders (CinCs) joint readiness assessments,
and the Combat Support Agencies reports on their ability to support the CinCs. A full JMRR takes place
quarterly with an assessment of capabilities and risk currently and out 12 months in the future.
The assessments are scenario driven and derive from the current NMS. The scenarios normally
start with a real-world operation currently underway and include a Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC)
or one or two Major Theater Wars (MTW) “in two distant theaters in overlapping timeframes”41 CinCs
are then required to address potential deficiencies in their ability to execute the scenario-based mission
requirements. Deficiencies are identified and categorized. Fixes are suggested or they are forwarded
for consideration and solution by other working bodies. Unresolved deficiencies are aggregated and
considered collectively. These are then termed “key risk elements.” Further aggregation may intensify
into “overall strategic concerns”; these are potential risks to implementation of the NMS itself and
constitute an overall strategic risk assessment.42
The system is largely score-based, that is, commanders at all levels are charged with assessing
their own readiness and that of their subordinates and assigning a value to it. Scores are aggregated
as assessments are forwarded upward. The process would appear at first glance to be relatively sound
based as it is on seemingly quantitative assessments. However, the “granularity” of assessment becomes
less clear as the reports are progressively aggregated. In fact, there are substantial opportunities for
commanders to inject subjective assessments into the process.43 It is here, as Clausewitz says, that
“intellectual activity leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an
art in the broadest meaning of the term.”44 Differing perceptions of readiness, in turn, drive differing
perceptions of the degree of ultimate risk for the armed forces to implement the NMS, and by extension,
elements of the National Security Strategy (NSS). This is the basis of the readiness debate within the
services, the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Congress today.45
Although the system would appear to guess well on the surface, there is growing concern that
an ends-ways-means mismatch exists. Culturally, commanders naturally are reluctant to report their
commands unready to execute their missions. Likewise, senior commanders are adverse to less than
capable readiness assessments from their subordinates. Further clouding the process is the political
scrutiny under which it takes place. The measure of risk may depend on how one interprets the current
strategic mandate: “The United States [must be] able to deter and defeat large-scale cross-border
aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. In short, we must be able to fight and
win two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.”46 The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs assesses
the risk factors for fighting and winning the first Major Theater War as “moderate,” but the second as
“high.”47 What does this mean in real terms, especially with the occasional Smaller Scale Contingency
thrown in for good measure? One’s point of view depends on where one sits. “Moderate” risk to
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the Department of Defense may be acceptable to the Senate Armed Services Committee, but as it is
derived from an aggregated assessment, it may be considered downright dangerous by CENTCOM or
TRANSCOM.
The Case of Kosovo and Two MTWs.
The conflict in Kosovo provides a fitting vehicle for examining in more real terms the nature of risk
in strategy formulation and implementation. It is not the intent to examine the strategy for the conflict
itself although this has proven to be a rich field of discussion and debate, especially with regard to
matching political ends to military objectives, courses of action, and resources. More interesting is the
impact the conflict had on the ability to execute, if need be, declared elements of the National Security
and National Miltitary Strategies and the risk thereby incurred as a result of the commitment to the
Kosovo operation.
As established, the NMS (as well as the National Security and Defense Strategies) posit as a
fundamental element the ability to “deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border
aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames.” Moreover, this obtains in an environment
in which the United States is globally engaged and, indeed, conducting “multiple concurrent smallerscale contingency operations” at the same time.
The NSS addresses the possibility that in the event of one or two MTWs, of withdrawing from
ongoing contingency operations. In doing so, the NSS acknowledges accepting a “degree of risk,” since
such a course is necessary to “reduce the greater risk incurred if we failed to respond adequately to
major theater wars.” What happens when a smaller scale contingency takes on the characteristics, at
least in part, of a major theater war?
As outlined earlier, the JMRR is the Chairman’s snapshot of the U.S. Armed Forces ability to execute
the NMS. The two JMRRs crafted during and immediately following the Kosovo conflict highlighted
some of the risk entailed in the two-MTW component of the NMS.
The JMRR covering the April to June 1999 timeframe posited as a scenario an expanding Kosovo
operation lasting until September with a simultaneous outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula.48
It assessed the risk of not prevailing in the Korean MTW as “moderate” and the risk of successfully
responding to a second, unstated MTW as “high.” Moderate risk under the given scenario was defined
in terms of time and potential casualties:
This does not mean that U.S. forces would not prevail in either contingency [Kosovo and Korea], but rather, that
potentially longer timelines required to initiate the counter-offensive increase the potential for higher casualties to
forces in the interim and during the warfight.

As might be expected, the Air Force was particularly affected due to its significant commitment
to Kosovo. In fact, the Air Force level of effort in Kosovo constituted an MTW in its own right.49 The
strategic concerns listed included mobility shortfalls, logistics/sustainment shortfalls, and C4 and ISR
deficiencies. Since strategic concerns are “an aggregation of key risk elements that impact [on] readiness
to execute the NMS,” the JMRR in effect provides an overall and general articulation of risk.50
The overall strategic effect of this risk was well-articulated in the Kosovo After Action Report to
Congress:
Without question, a situation in which the United States would have to prosecute two major theater wars nearly
simultaneously would be extraordinarily demanding-well beyond that required for Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. It would involve our complete commitment as a nation and would entail all
elements of our total force . . . Consistent with our defense strategy, U.S. forces could not have continued the
intense campaign in Kosovo and, at the same time, conducted two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.51
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In fact, in the course of operations in Kosovo, higher levels of risk were reassessed, and some
measures were taken to bring the strategic variables into better balance. One assumption notes that the
forces in and around Southwest Asia, coupled with elements enforcing the no-fly zone constituted an
effective deterrent to Saddam. The air-bridge supporting the Kosovo operation also was considered
to be a positive asset if operations had to be redirected to the Gulf. However, in Northeast Asia, some
units were repositioned and others put on a “tighter string” for a quicker response in the event of crisis.
The objective was to “maintain a very visible defense capability to discourage leaders in Baghdad and
Pyongyang. . . .”52 In other words, some adjustments in ways and means were undertaken to reduce
potential strategic risk in undertaking the Kosovo operation.
If all this language leaves readers slightly dissatisfied with the ability of the defense establishment
to measure and articulate risk, then they are in good company. Both the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also acknowledge a shortcoming in this particular strategic skill. The
Kosovo experience brought home the potential impact that smaller scale contingencies could have on
the execution of the NMS, especially the two-MTW capability.
Risk analysis is important in judging force readiness where commitments are made to support important and
necessary operations but do not involve our vital interests. Some smaller scale contingencies may be in this
category.53

In fact, the statement of the Secretary and Chairman before Congress acknowledged that “managing
these risks is a highly complicated endeavor that would benefit from a more structured and dynamic
set of tools for assessing our ability to conduct major wars when we respond to contingencies.”54 The
search for “the closest approximation of the truth,” like strategy, is eternal.
Conclusion.
Assessing and managing strategic risk is an inherently inexact process. It encompasses a combination
of inputs, both material and moral, that defy empirical resolution. Weighing these inputs, identifying
possible outcomes, and planning for uncertainty should be done with the clear understanding that a
complete solution is impossible to achieve but always striven for. Once a strategy is developed, the
most important strategic skill and the true mark of strategic “genius” is accounting for potential change
and recognizing actual change in a timely enough manner to adjust the strategic variables and thereby
ensure a valid strategic equation oriented firmly on achieving the political objectives at hand. This
is increasingly difficult to do in a dynamically changing strategic environment with myriad threats,
challenges, actors, and unclear potential effects. This is why the development and execution of strategy
is primarily an art and why the requirement for developing masters of that art is so essential. In the
end, though, the essential elements of strategic risk are unchanged through the ages and consist in the
proper balancing of ends, ways, and means to achieve the desired strategic outcome. Understanding
that fundamental relationship and “guessing well” through study, exercise, and experience will ensure
that assessing and managing strategic risk rises above simply “the comfort level of strategic planners.”
A gastro-intestinal assessment is not good enough. It never was.
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CHAPTER 12
LANDPOWER IN TRADITIONAL THEORY
AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION
G. K. Cunningham
Our distant ancestors, wise for all their Neolithic lack of elegant refinement, were quick to note
that the world was divided into mediums, a model of thought so adequate for most human endeavors
that it lasted for millennia. In this worldview, the universe seemed to consist of varying mixes of
these elements: air, water, fire, earth, and void.1 We moderns view ourselves as more knowledgeable
and sophisticated, but the technological explosion of the last few centuries, while it has altered the
hard sciences of chemistry and physics, has not had much impact on our strategic thinking. We still
conceptualize military power in terms of the same basic mediums: airpower, seapower, landpower,
and space power. (Firepower, it would seem, is common to all of them.)
In the 20th century, airpower dominated major conflict so much that each U.S. service now has
its own air arm specifically adapted for its primary medium—sea for the Navy and Marine Corps
and land for the Army. Of course, the Air Force reigns supreme in the air and also has concurrently
(and reasonably) assumed primary responsibility for the realm of space. In fact, dominance of space
may be an essential characteristic of the American way of war in the 21st century, as the medium
of space is home to constellations of satellite systems used for position and location determination,
communications, intelligence gathering, and targeting.2 However, for all its usefulness, no one lives
there. People live on the land (barring a few hardy seadogs), commerce takes place on land (and merely
across seas), and ideas are acculturated on the land. As T. R. Fehrenbach so eloquently pointed out in
his masterpiece history of the Korea War, This Kind of War:
You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life—but if you
desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman
legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.3

Complementing Medium-based Visions of Strategic Warfighting Theory.
In 1904, when Sir Halford Mackinder postulated the first nascent modern version of what we now
call “geopolitics,” he did so in the context of the end of the colonial era. Mackinder claimed that, during
the preceding 4 centuries of expansion, the world had been divided up about as far as it was going
to be, and that politics in the 20th century would be played out in a closed system of vying states. To
Mackinder, the geography of the world was the stage on which such political, ideological, military,
economic, and social affairs were carried out.4 Hence, anyone wishing to know more about the drama
of human interaction should start with a thorough study of stagecraft as the foundation of the rest of
the art.
His approach was not without merit. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American proponent of seapower,
had earlier published his seminal work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, in which
he postulated that the then preeminent dominance of the maritime nation of Great Britain rested on
its ability to control sea lines of communication to resource-rich colonies. Any nation, like the United
States for instance, that desired to expand its power had best follow that model. Mahan was indeed
innovative in this regard, for he was the principal author of the notion that the seas were not obstacles
to be overcome, but avenues of approach for military forces and wide-open lanes of commerce for
economic ventures.5 Thus, far from being barriers to trade, transportation, and power projection, the
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seas provided the very means by which a nation might exert its national power and enlarge its influence.
However, while Mackinder recognized the validity of Mahan’s approach, he believed the land, and not
the sea, was the key to national prosperity and power. The expansion of modern transportation across
continents was fast shrinking nations to mere islands across which railroads, the sea lanes of the land,
would carry commerce.
At the time Mackinder and Mahan were making these initial sweeping statements, World War I
had not been fought, so the impact of air power had yet to be felt. Air power made dramatic advances
during the war. One spectacular raid conducted late in the war hinted at the potential of air power.
On August 9, 1918, Italian Major Gabriele D’Annunzio commanding the 87th fighter squadron, “La
Serenissima,” organized one of the great feats of the war. The flamboyant and dashing D’Annunzio
was an accomplished novelist, poet, and dramatist, as well as a daring pilot. Leading a small squadron
of nine SVA-5 two-seat warplanes, D’Annunzio flew a 700-mile round trip mission over Vienna,
dropping thousands of leaflets, written in Italian and German and sporting the tricolors of Italy, urging
the Viennese to surrender. This pioneer roundtrip flight of over 700 miles exemplified the potential of
aviation to dominate both the air and sea mediums.6
It is no surprise, then, that the foremost proponent of airpower was an Italian, Giulio Douhet, who
constructed a general theory of air power that has defined the parameters of discussion on warfare
in this medium since the early 20th century. He was the first military theorist to grasp the impact of
the airplane as an offensive weapon and translate it into a comprehensive mode of warfare in a new
medium.7 His insightful, visionary analysis would be championed by others, such as British airpower
advocate Hugh M. Trenchard and American aviation enthusiast Billy Mitchell. While it would take the
massive strategic bombing campaigns of World War II to provide practical evidence of the validity of
their approach, the flight of the B-29 bomber Enola Gay was ample and definitive proof that control of
the air was the fundamental prerequisite of modern warfare.8
All that said, the American approach to warfare is inherently joint, so much so that jointness is a
fundamental precept of all national security planning:
The campaign is the central organizing instrument for joint warfare. Campaigns, by their nature, are joint
undertakings. They are planned and executed by applying operational art. The joint operational art encompasses
the translation of national security and military strategies into operational design for the joint employment of forces
at all levels of war. Combatant commands develop command and theater strategies to apply the joint operational
art to their contemporary missions and situations.9

In the Department of Defense (DoD) the various services, organized by medium of action, are tasked
by DoD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, among
other things, “to recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable force for assignments to combatant
commands” and also “to conduct research; develop tactics, techniques and organization; and develop
and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions [so
prescribed].”10 While service cultures produce norms of behavior and institutionalized perspectives
that are medium-dominated, the employment of U.S. armed forces takes place under the command
and control of combatant commanders, organized by regional theater or global function.
Even though joint doctrine specifically defines all military planning and operation a joint campaigns
under the combatant command of unified, joint commanders, the particularization of warfare into
separate operations on land, sea, air, and space makes intuitive sense insofar as the actual manning,
equipping, and organizing of forces for employment is concerned. And in that context, landpower
remains a foremost strategic consideration unlikely to be supplanted by control of the seas, supremacy
in the air, or control of space and cyberspace. Colin Gray points out:
First, the land matters most. Whether or not land constitutes the principal geographical medium on which combat
is waged, strategic effect ultimately must have its way in a territorial context. Most wars entail some fighting on
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the geography where the belligerents live, the land. Even if a war is dominated by the ebb and flow of combat at
sea and in the air, still the whole object of the exercise is to influence the behavior on an enemy who needs to be
controlled where he lives, on land. . . . Human beings do not live at sea, or in cyberspace.11

Mackinder and the Continental Theory of Landpower.
For Halford Mackinder, the abstract and somewhat emblematic debate over the relative worth of
seapower or landpower (or subsequently, airpower) often overshadows his more important contribution
to the military theory of landpower. While it is true that the prestige of Mahan probably was greater
among Mackinder’s fellow Britons than among Mahan’s own American citizenry, Mackinder’s work
was not predominantly a refutation of that popular strategic theory. Rather, it was a reminder that
geopolitics is a subject that transcended single mediums of conflict. Geography was not a matter of
static boundaries and coastlines, but an ever-transforming element of a global world organism that
was subject to change and interpretation. Mackinder began his commentary on seapower by stating,
“The influence of geographical conditions upon human activities has depended, however, not merely
on the realities as we know them to be and to have been, but in even greater degree on what men
imagine in regard to them.”12 To Mackinder, then, the geography actually was less important than the
perceptions men had of it and the uses to which it was put. His own detailed charts and illustrations, as
well as the detail in which he presented the seaman’s and the landsman’s points of view, often appear
to overshadow his real intent, which was to explain to a complacent United Kingdom after the victory
of World War I that continental powers were still a threat with which they must reckon.
Indeed, Mackinder’s most widely regarded work, Democratic Ideals and Reality, was first published in
1919 and was routinely ignored until World War II proved it to be a foresighted and penetrating treatise.
As the title suggests, the book was predominantly a work of social strategy, or geopolitics, not pure
geography. Mackinder grasped as an absolute what other strategic theorists from Corbett to Mitchell
overlooked: people live on land, and power projection alone cannot disrupt national culture and state
ambition for long. “In this war,” Mackinder wrote of World War I, “German anticipations have proven
wrong in many regards, but that has been because we have made them so by a few wise principles
of government, and by strenuous effort, notwithstanding our mistakes in policy.” Prophetically, he
continued, “Our greatest test is yet to come.”13 The euphoria emerging from the defeat of Germany in
World War I seemed to result from, in part, a conviction on the part of many of his countrymen that
Britannia did indeed rule the waves, that democracy was a predestined condition for all mankind,
and that a democratic seapower such as England could contain a continental power and was hence
invulnerable.
But what Mackinder postulated was that such an interpretation was idealistic and not at all
predictable. He based his premise not only on world geography, but also on an analysis of cultures and
national intents. The central issue was not the absolute supremacy of either seapower or landpower,
but that the two concepts represented rival nationalistic intentions that would inevitably come into
competition and conflict. Great Britain was able to maintain a global empire because of its ability to
quickly exert national elements of power over sea lines of communication around littoral parts of the
world. In fact, its empire was largely a matter of access to littoral areas, and only extended inward in
places such as the Indian subcontinent and central Africa, where land-based rivals could exert threatening
influence outward into those littoral areas. From this condition, Mackinder extrapolated that a power
acting from a geographical base somewhere in Eastern Europe—the Heartland of a Eurasian World
Island—could indeed become a rival empire. Mackinder was never really specific in defining a precise
location for the Heartland, but always referred to this in political terms as an area relative to German
(that is, Prussian) and Russian interests. What was clear, though, was that this heartland was a split
interest, and should it become a unified political entity, its power would become immense.

157

Again, this conclusion evolved from a conviction on Mackinder’s part that the world stage was
fixed. Even the poles had been explored and categorized. “In outline our geographical knowledge is
now complete . . . claims to the political ownership of all the dry land [have] been pegged out. Whether
we think of the physical, economic, military, or political interconnection of things on the surface of the
globe, we are now for the first time presented with a closed system.”14
Hence, any geopolitical considerations in the 20th century would involve rehashing of past conflicts,
struggles over the same finite resources, and determinations of political control over the same regions
as had characterized the past. If one analyzed that as a struggle of sea powers against land powers,
the outcome in the 20th century was not guaranteed by past outcomes. The internal combustion
engine and the extension of railroads throughout Eurasia created a different construct—one in which a
landpower acting on interior lines of communication could marshal resources and employ manpower
to effectively rule the world. Seen in this light, Mackinder was not prescriptive, but cautionary. Given
state political ambition in a closed system, the reality was that conflict was quite a likely outcome in the
times ahead. While the Great War to Save Democracy was won, and the optimistic hope for a successful
and effective League of Nations was a fine ideal, those were Anglo-French perceptions not held by
Germany, Russian, or the Chinese for that matter—not to mention a plethora of minor, outer rim states
like Japan or the United States. The geopolitical reality was likely to prove that:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.15
But just who did rule East Europe in 1919? The social and political fact was that it was a divided
region, not one ruled by any particular nationality. Rather, it was an area torn by rivalry, as the past
World War had demonstrated. Mackinder emphasized, “But it cannot be too often repeated that these
events were the result of a fundamental antagonism between the Germans, who wished to be masters
in East Europe, and the Slavs, who refused to submit to them.”16 With Germany soundly defeated,
and Russia impeded by social turmoil following a disruptive revolution, this division was likely to
be a standing condition for the immediate post-World War I period. However, that condition, for
Mackinder, could in no way be interpreted as a certain future. Should either the Slavs or the Germans
command the Heartland, freedom-loving and democratically organized states had best be prepared to
defend themselves.
Mackinder’s proffered solution was a good one, simple, reasonable, and politically attainable:
divide the Heartland into more than two states, one Germanic and one Slavic. Since the Heartland was
never definitely delineated, the extent of the division was rather a fluid concept, but it most certainly
demanded an independent and economically viable Poland.
In other words, we must settle this question between the Germans and the Slavs, and we must see to it that East
Europe, like West Europe, is divided into self-contained nations. . . . If you do not now secure the full results of
your victory and close this issue between the German and the Slav, you will leave ill-feeling which will not be
based on the fading memory of a defeat, but on the daily irritation of millions of proud people.17

The central foundation of the geopolitical theory that Mackinder espoused was not the concept of
Heartland, which, in fact, he periodically revised and redefined, but his pioneering assertion that in
the post-World War I world rivalries would take place in a closed system.18 He was more prescient
than he may have realized, had he lived to see the division of the world between bipolar superpowers
for much of the latter half of the 20th century. In that world, the United States assumed the mantle
of predominant seapower, and the Soviet Union became undisputed master of the Heartland of East
Europe, a stable division that demonstrated the supremacy of neither seapower nor landpower alone,
nor the ability of air and space power to tilt the balance in any particular direction.
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Interpretations of Landpower and Strategic Intent.
In retrospect, the varying comparison of maritime power with continental power should not be
surprising, as it is, at least as far as geography is concerned, a repetition of the lines of operations
maxims Jomini postulated in the 19th century on a global scale:
Interior lines of operations are those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having
such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with a whole force in a shorter period
of time than it would require the enemy to oppose to them a greater force. Exterior lines lead to the opposite result,
and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several
of his masses.19

Seapower as Mahan described it was not just a military theory, but encompassed the full range of
elements of national power. But insofar as military operations go, seapower is operationally an approach
working from exterior lines. The mobility of the sea enables a power to move forces rapidly around
the periphery of a continental power, gaining and retaining initiative by exerting power at times and
places of its choosing. In contrast, Mackinder accepted the Jominian principle that interior lines of
operation generally were superior to exterior.20 Hence, a power operating from the strategic center of a
continent would have an advantage over a maritime power circumnavigating the littorals. It is a valid,
if somewhat simplistic, point.
Jomini based his analysis predominately on the operations of the supreme commander of his era,
Napoleon Bonaparte. It was fundamentally a historical approach that retains its validity, since the
spectrum of human endeavor is the source of any conclusions regarding the theory of any subset of
human endeavor like warfare. However, in any field of study so complex, conclusions and perspectives
will differ, and historian-analysts and military theorists often have approached the fundamentals of
armed conflict as a means to achieve national policy objectives from a variety of perspectives.
Even earlier commentators offer contrasts. Sun Tzu, a Chinese theorist writing about 500 BC, is
perhaps the earliest landpower theorist who presented a coherent approach to land operations. His era
was one of warring states, in which rival kingdoms and king-like warlords struggled for supremacy
between the decline of the Zhou dynasty and the establishment of central order under the Qin and Han
dynasties.21 His observations took the Confucian mode of terse aphorisms, not always well organized,
but consistently emphasizing what B. H. Liddell Hart would later famously label “the indirect
approach.”22 Maneuver was highly valued, especially if it avoided actual battle until conditions were
favorable. Sun Tzu encouraged indirect methods of action, exploiting intelligence, resource depletion,
and subterfuge:
For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without
fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of extreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy; next best
is to disrupt his alliances; the next best is to attack his army. The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only
when there is no alternative.23

Such an outlook is consistent with the geopolitical exigencies of the use of landpower in Sun Tzu’s era.
In the case of warring principalities, prolonged conflict depleted resources, emptied treasuries, and
sacrificed manpower. He pointed out that military power is only one element of state power and that
its use is problematic: “When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will
not suffice.”24
But the advent of firearms changed the balance considerably, and when military power was
concentrated in the hands of two or three antagonists, as developed in feudal Japan, Sun Tzu’s advocacy
of skillful battlefield gymnastics was not as efficient a means to the end as a powerful, well-aimed
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thrust at the heart. After the death of Emperor Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1598, rival feudal lords (daimyo)
struggled for control. Tokugawa Ieyasu quickly surfaced as the dominant figure in an alliance of about
half the diamyo and defeated his western rivals in the pivotal set-piece battle of Sekigahara in 1600,
becoming the Shogun. During the great battle of Sekigahara, an estimated 60,000 matchlock firearms
were used, a vast quantity compared, say, to the mere 3,000 matchlocks then employed in the French
army. This technological advance in killing efficiency in terms of range and lethality was balanced by
the inherent inaccuracies of the weaponry that mandated the massing of forces and direct action to
achieve a culminating battle.25 The outcome of this decisive battle was a shogunate that lasted until
the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry to Japan in 1853, and hence Japanese strategy emphasized
directness and thoroughness as not only a means to military victory, but also to national security and
prolonged peace.
Miyamoto Musashi, a samurai who survived the battle of Sekigahara (almost miraculously, as he
was a part of the defeated alliance, most of which were hunted down and slaughtered), became the
strongest Asian proponent of directness in warfare. After a life of legendary proportions, in which
he fought over 60 duels without a defeat, he retired to complete his notable work on strategy, Go Rin
No Sho, that is, A Book of Five Rings. This work remains both enigmatic, as it is largely an extended
allegory, and routinely ignored outside of Japan, as it was only translated into English in a readily
available published version in 1974. But the work is clearly one with broad conceptual intent, designed
as a strategic treatise rather than a fencing manual. As Musashi writes, “The principles of strategy
are written down here in terms of single combat, but you must think broadly so that you attain an
understanding for ten-thousand-a-side battles.”26
Key to Musashi’s approach to strategy is directness. He advocates no flourishes, teaching instead
that success depends on clear focus on the objective of defeating the enemy:
The primary thing when you take a sword in your hands is your intention to cut the enemy, whatever the means.
Whenever you parry, hit, spring, strike or touch the enemy’s cutting sword, you must cut the enemy in the same
movement. It is essential to attain this. If you think only of hitting, springing, striking or touching the enemy, you
will not be able actually to cut him. More than anything, you must be thinking of carrying your movement through
to cutting him. You must thoroughly research this.27

Whatever stance one takes, or whatever strategic ends, ways, and means one considers, Musashi
advises a direct, no-nonsense attitude: “Think only of cutting.”28 It is ironic, perhaps, that the Japanese
theorist’s concepts were most represented in World War II in use against his nation by the bellicose
American advocate of unrestrained strategic bombing, Curtis LeMay.29
Another way of viewing the direct-indirect dichotomy is through the portal of technological or
tactical advances and their impact on operational art. In his book, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design
for Landpower in the 21st Century, Douglas A. Macgregor takes exactly that approach, which is largely
a contrast of mass versus maneuver. Macgregor postulates that the Roman legions, in order to counter
the crushing weight and shock of massed spears that was the Macedonian phalanx, had to devise
more flexible and maneuverable formations. By deploying legionaries in boxed, offset “checkerboard”
formations, depending on the coordinated use of stabbing sword and shield rather than pikes, Roman
commanders gained maneuverability at the expense of Macedonian mass. 30 In the crucial battle of
Cynoscephalae in 197 BC, an alert tribune, acting on initiative, diverted 20 mandibles into an attack on
the exposed rear of the Macedonian phalanx. The phalanx, like the modern battle tank, was designed
to fight from the front. The Macedonians, unable to turn because of their powerful but unidirectional
formation and unwieldy long pikes, were slaughtered.31
To Macgregor, this battle illustrates the swing of a long pendulum. He draws from it the conclusion
that the U.S. Army of the 21st century must be light, agile, and rapidly deployable. In fact, historian
Lynn Montross characterized much of military history as a cyclic interplay of mass versus maneuver.
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He pointed out that the very mobility of the Roman legions that Macgregor cited, when faced with
increasingly active Gothic and Persian horsemen centuries after Cynoscephalae, shifted gradually into
more stable, massed formations of phalangial density to counter the speed and tactical agility of light
cavalry.32
The Macedonia phalanx was proof against both the Greek hoplites, who were typically organized
in a less dense array, and the lightly armored Persian skirmishers that the Macedonians faced as
Alexander conquered the Hellenic world—mass over maneuver. However, the flexible Roman
mandibles countered the massed Macedonian pikemen, proving to be more adaptable in rugged terrain
and faster to reorient in pitched battle—maneuver over mass. By the end of the Roman era, massed
Frankish infantry would fight, again shoulder to shoulder, against barbarian horsemen in the form of
Moors and Goths, degenerating into a simple human wall formation that repulsed the Moorish assault
at Poitiers—mass over maneuver once again. This stubborn shoulder-to-shoulder human wall tactic
succumbed to mail-armored cavalry at Hastings in 1066, when William defeated the massed housecarls
of Harold Goodwinson. Such cavalry, in turn, fell before the increased range and penetrating power of
English longbows and later firearms, until cavalry again countered by armoring themselves and their
horses with thick plate armor.33 Montross postulates that this mass-maneuver cycle typifies most land
warfare, as when in World War I, the massed firepower of entrenched machine guns and artillery,
which had forced land battle into a stalemate on the Western front, was challenged once again by
maneuverable forces in the form of the British technological advance of the tank, which proved decisive
and dominant in 1917 at Cambrai.34
The lethality of firepower, whether first seen as a basic ball of rock propelled from a metal tube, as in
a primitive harquebus, or the massive potential of contemporary improved conventional munitions, or
cluster bombs, whether delivered by warplanes or ground-based artillery or missiles, has itself generated
another way of viewing the historical transformation of land warfare as an element of landpower. As
modern armies, over the past few centuries, have slugged it out in the pursuit of national policies, the
focus has shifted from battles and campaigns to the ability of a nation-state to bear the costs of warfare
at the strategic level. As described by Russell F. Weigley, one pole of the spectrum is attrition, a strategy
based on the continuous, perhaps even gradual, wearing down of a nation’s capability to resist. In this
concept, the ultimate will of the people to replace lost manpower and to fund the interminable costs of
the war effort become paramount.
In America, George Washington successfully practiced such an attrition strategy in the American
Revolution—eventually the costs of continuing the conflict simply became more than the British king
and parliament were willing to bear. Washington, according to Weigley, was foredoomed to a strategy
of attrition out of the necessity of military poverty. The weak colonial states could not withstand the
disciplined, well-armed, and well-led British forces on any contested field. Moreover, the mobility of
the British Navy made it possible to maneuver the length of the colonial coastline virtually without
interference. Washington’s only hope for success lay in an erosion of British will to continue the conflict.
Operationally, Washington had to become a master of disengagement, avoiding decisive battles and
preserving his minimal fighting strength for as long as possible.35
The protracted 20th century Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union similarly
is an example of attrition strategy in a simmering conflict with occasional violent eruptions in Korea,
Vietnam, and the Middle East. That long competition was finally won, at least in part, when the costs
of countering a massive military build-up under President Ronald Reagan proved more than the Soviet
Union could support economically and socially, resulting in the collapse and dismemberment of the
Soviet empire. Of course, the very nature of attrition warfare postulates a protracted conflict—the
Cold War lasted from the end of World War II until 1989. Inherent in that extended effort to attrite
enemy resources and will power is the potential for one’s own resources and willpower to erode in the
process. Hence, a strategy of attrition warfare is not without risk. In regard to Weigley’s example of
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the American Revolution, one might wonder, for example, what would have become of the rebellious
colonies had not the French fleet fortuitously weighed in heavily on their side to counter the British
domination of sea lines of operation.36
Hence, American history also includes periods in which Weigley’s antipodal concept, annihilation,
bears sway. The quintessential example of annihilation strategy at work, in an American context is the
American Civil War. In the dual strategy of Ulysses S. Grant, the operative concept was the annihilation
of the enemy’s capability to resist, both in terms of military forces and also in terms of the will of the
people to continue the struggle. Grant’s experiences in the West had convinced him that the South
simply did not have enough forces or resources to sustain a drawn-out conflict. His strategic vision
was simple and hence all the more effective. In concert with the reliable George G. Meade, he would
put unrelenting pressure on Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, allowing him no chance to
regroup and resupply his Confederate forces. Meanwhile, in the West, William T. Sherman would
slash the Confederacy to pieces, so that no forces, arms, or supplies could find their way to Lee. To
Meade he issued clear intent: “Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you
will go also.”37 To Sherman, he wrote: “You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up,
and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as it is possible, inflicting all the damage you
can against their war resources.”38
Annihilation policy dominates Grant’s prosecution of the war, in which the aim was the complete
destruction of any enemy capability to continue, both by the defeat of armies in the field and by the
terrorizing of the civilian population into political capitulation. Weigley writes:
Sherman’s war against the enemy’s mind like Grant’s war for the complete destruction of the enemy armies was
a recipe for the achievement of total victory. The Northern generals were pulled toward both methods because
their aim was the utter and complete conquest of the South. . . . Considerations of the possible dangerous effects of
military means upon the ultimate ends of postwar sectional understanding had to be sacrificed to the immediate
quest for victory, because nothing less than total victory seemed to offer an prospects for reunification at all.39

The strategic approach of Grant, one of unrelenting pursuit of total victory, is repeated in the next
century in the American demand for unconditional surrender of the Japanese and German nations
during World War II. Indeed, one of Weigley’s basic premises is that the American way of war is
largely one of annihilation rather than attrition.
As callous and rough-handed as Sherman’s destruction of Southern resources and intimidation
of its population may seem, it pales before the determination of Curtis Lemay to firebomb the Axis
powers into submission. Hamburg, Dresden, and Kassel in Germany; and Tokyo and Kobe in Japan
were wiped off the map by incendiary munitions. LeMay’s prosecution of a war of annihilation in
the Pacific particularly was brutal. The aerial campaign against Japan may have killed more than one
million Japanese civilians. Official estimates from the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey suggest that the
aerial campaign directed by LeMay between March and August 1945 killed 330,000 people and injured
another 476,000, with 8.5 million people made homeless. In that regard, nearly half the built-up areas
of 64 cities were totally destroyed, an astonishing count of 2.5 million buildings. LeMay accepted the
viciousness of the incendiary and nuclear attacks, and had America perchance lost the war, he fully
expected retaliatory treatment as a war criminal. However, he never flinched from what he considered
his patriotic professional duty in carrying out such destructive and, more importantly, demoralizing
attacks.40
Annihilation remains the preferred method of joint warfare. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the
Armed Forces of the United States, states that “the Armed Forces of the United States employ decisive
force—powerful enough to unequivocally and rapidly defeat an opponent.”41 This declaration of
doctrine is accompanied by a quotation from Lieutenant General Mike Short, U.S. Air Force, that clearly
and colorfully extends the limits of the doctrine:
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We use force as a last resort . . . then we need to go in with overwhelming force, quite frankly, extraordinary
violence that the speed of it, the lethality of it . . . the weight of it has to make an incredible impression on the
adversary, to such a degree that he is stunned and shocked . . . you take the fight to the enemy. You go after the
head of the snake, put a dagger in the heart of the adversary, and you bring to bear all the force that you have at
your command.42

Short’s emphasis on lethality as well as weight is significant, for American military muscle depends
more on technological superiority than sheer weight of numbers. While emphasizing that “the design
of future capabilities must avoid dependence on unique systems whose malfunction may cause
mission failure,”43 the capstone doctrine of Joint Publication 1 states that the foremost responsibility
of joint and Service research and development programs is to “remain abreast of the leading edge of
American and foreign science and technology so that new developments and their promise can be
professionally incorporated into military statements of future requirements.”44 But Frederick W. Kagan
points out that technological advantage requires continuous updating and advances to be effective,
stating, “asymmetrical advantages gained by one state do not normally last very long. Technology
and technique inevitably spreads. Other states acquire either similar or counteracting capabilities.”45
Hence, technology alone is not likely to prove able to maintain supremacy without counterbalancing
supremacies in conventional forces in terms of both concentrated mass and strategic maneuverability.
This cursory glance at the history of the application of landpower theory in terms of principles of war
and operational perspectives suggests that Mackinder was, by and large, right. The exact location and
extent of the Heartland, however, is not as critical as the understanding that landpower is more than
a military construct. It is as Mackinder asserted a function of culture, resources, and social fabric. The
military application of landpower is in practice both cyclical and evolutionary. Mass versus maneuver,
attrition versus annihilation, or indirect versus direct approaches all demonstrate that the application of
landpower is a contextual issue. The operational applications are influenced heavily by the technology
available to the antagonists, whether better armor or better firepower, and change as opposing forces
seek advantage on the battlefield. However, regardless of the angle from which a theorist may look at it
or the historical context in which it is employed, the strategic importance of landpower remains a stable
and enduring concept.
Landpower in the 21st Century.
What, then, is the situational context of landpower at the beginning of the 21st century, and what
direction should the U.S. Army move in regard to it?
Certainly in the modern world, mass armies and industrialized military forces predominate.
Even in irregular or partisan armies in far-flung and obscure hotspots in areas of crisis, the sources of
munitions, weapons, supplies and equipment are the industrialized nations. What may be a break from
the historical precedents on which a Baron Antoine Jomini or a Carl von Clausewitz46 theorized is that
today tactical supremacy alone is unlikely to achieve national strategic objectives except in the most
particularized of cases.
One can only speculate about the state of affairs in the century ahead, and any prognostication
assumes risk. However, there is a general consensus of opinion that guides the development of national
security policy and the transformation of military preparedness in the decades ahead. Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld sums up the central matter as one of ambiguity:
We live in a time of unconventional challenges and strategic uncertainty. We are confronting challenges
fundamentally different than those faced by the American defense establishment in the Cold War and previous
eras. The strategy we adopt today will help influence the world’s strategic environment, for the Untied States is an
unusually powerful player in world affairs.47
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This changing security environment is not a total departure from the past, but is an enlargement of it.
Traditional challengers remain among states with strong military capabilities. While none challenge
U.S. global dominance, many could become significant regional actors in historical modalities of
confrontation and conflict. Irregular challengers will employ terrorism and guerilla methods to
oppose, and in some ways negate, the immense technological advantages of American armed forces
operating jointly. In fact, disruptive challenges may seek to employ widely available high technology
breakthroughs to counter the technology-dependent American network-centric approach to warfare.
And increasingly, both nonstate actors and nations may seek to counter U.S. hegemony through the
catastrophic use of weapons of mass destruction or effects.48 Indeed, this particular scenario is among
the most compelling drivers of national policy: “America is now threatened less by conquering states
than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies
in the hands of an embittered few.”49
Thus the potential sources of disorder and destruction are varied and great. The apparent lack of
usefulness of conventional military force against the United States should not be taken as a guarantee
that it will never be used. Particularly in terms of regional ambitions, even minor powers can marshal
enough military might to give the United States pause for concern. The use of convention military
force is not always a judicious decision made by rational actors. “Passion will always dominate reason.
People will find reasons to fight even when they should not,” points out Charles M. Maynes. 50 Indeed,
the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein was based on exactly that premise, that a regional
power could muster the local concentration of forces necessary to act against the national interests of
the United States. That Saddam Hussein was wrong will not preclude others from making the same
mistake.
In some respects, especially as regards weak multicultural, failed, or undergoverned states, the current
world system of states is likely to prove rather fragile. While in the past, industrially based economies
favored the nation state, current high technologies contribute to the formation of nonstate actors—both
commercially and politically. In a globalized economic system, many multinational corporations have
assets and resources that exceed the gross domestic products of many nations, hence, they cannot avoid
an increasing interest in political affairs.51 While multinational businesses tend to favor stability, they
make decisions based on profit and thus can produce, even if unintentionally, conditions conducive to
political instability. Affordable, reliable, and globally accessible communications facilitate interactions
not only of decentralized businesses, but also of political groups. Ethnic nationalism, tribalism, and a
resurgence of religious identification act centrifugally to pull multicultural nations apart, whether as
large as the former Soviet Union or as small as Rwanda. As William G. Heyland suggested in 1993,
“Those who argue that the purpose of American policy is to safeguard democracy and democratic
practices, also have to confront its handmaiden—self-determination.”52 It is extremely unlikely that the
United States as a nation with global interests will be immune to the disorders that state fragmentations
will cause.
In this tumultuous state of instability, nonstate actors are likely to proliferate and even thrive. The
sanctuaries created by the chaotic conditions in ungoverned territories and failed states allow such
menaces to operate with anonymity and lack of effective interference. Even in well-established states
with intact governance, criminality and politics may prove to be synergistic as criminal elements find
they can exert political power, and political entities find they can profit from criminal activities. In the
Western hemisphere, narcotraffickers assume just this position in many Latin American countries, and
Al Qaeda and other terrorist cells depend on criminal activities for much of their revenue.53
In such chaotic and unpredictable geopolitical terrain, military responsibilities are not likely to be
confined to decisive military operations. Landpower will perforce be expended in occupation duties
and nation-building operations, a historical truism that many military planners and strategists overlook.
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The Defense Science Board pointed out that “Stabilization and reconstruction [S&R] operations are not a
lesser included task of a combat mission, but a separate and distinct mission with unique requirements
for equipping and training. Thus, S&R requirements should be a major driver for the future force.”54
Naturally, as this is a distinctly population-oriented activity, one can well expect it will take place just
as Halford Mackinder stipulated—where the people are, to wit: the land. Landpower forces will play
the predominant role in these operations, with the Army designated as the lead executive agent for
stabilization and reconstruction.
Landpower, then, as an element of this 21st century geopolitical environment will extend beyond
combat situations and encompass much more than land-oriented military forces, which leads to a wider
definition of landpower as “the ability in peace, crisis, and war to exert prompt and sustained influence
on or from land.”55 Landpower, so defined, must be employed in concert with other components of
military power. Such joint orchestration will be essential at all stages of implementation of this national
strategy, woven into a context of integrated application of all elements of national power: diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic. This will require broader interagency cooperation and increasing
joint military interdependence. However, landpower and land forces will be central to the process of
transformation:
Aggression flowing from internal instability thus demands the actual transformation of an unstable or aggressive
state into one which is both stable and willing to adhere to the norms of the international community. …Landpower
is crucial for this new grand strategy since it is the tool by which aggressive or conflict-ridden states can be
transformed into stable ones.56

The challenge for the U.S. Army is to respond appropriately to all, some, or none of the potential
threats deriving from this global geopolitical environment of ambiguity. It must become and remain
a more ready, adaptable, and strategically deployable landpower force with a modular mix of flexible
forces that can respond appropriately to any future challenges to U.S. interests.57 Chief of Staff of the
Army General Peter J. Schoomaker declared, “Whereas for most of our lives the default condition has
been peace, now our default expectation must be conflict. This new strategic context is the logic for
reshaping the Army to be an Army of campaign quality with joint and expeditionary capabilities.”58
Landpower: Adding Versatility to National Security Strategy.
William T. Johnsen postulates that landpower’s principal contribution to military strategy in the
21st century will stem in great measure from its inherent versatility. In analyzing the application of
military power across the potential range of employment options, Johnsen concluded that landpower
uniquely spans the widest portion of the spectrum. (See Figure 1.) He does not discount the importance
of air-and seapower in an overall deterrence posture, particularly when the employment of nuclear
options is concerned at the upper end of the spectrum, when national survival may well be at stake. But
that eventuality, while a quintessential one from the standpoint of catastrophic danger, is an unlikely
one in terms of probability. Hence, landpower offers the most options for practical employment of the
military component of national power in pursuit of United States security policies:
[Land power] offers significant contributions to the key roles of supporting the nation, shaping geostrategic
conditions, and deterring or compelling adversaries. Land power also offers the greatest operational and strategic
flexibility across the spectrum of conflict, throughout the full range of military operations, and in all roles that the
Armed Forces of the United States can be expected to perform.59
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This conceptualization is important in implementing the kinds of decisions essential to prosecuting
the National Defense Strategy in the context of an unstable and uncertain world order. In the broad
range of smaller-scale contingencies such as civil support operations, counterinsurgency operations,
peacekeeping missions, or counterterrorism operations that are essential to the promotion of peace and
deterring war, land forces may have far greater utility than their more technology-oriented counterparts
on the sea or in the air. Thus, from the standpoint of the variety of military operations that land forces
can undertake, the ability of land forces to operate in direct proximity to other forces, host nations, and
civilian populations, and the scalability of both kinetic and nonkinetic response capabilities, land forces
represent a powerful arrow in the national military quiver.
Landpower, then, retains a preeminent role in national defense, as it represents the nation’s ability
to influence events and persons before challenges to national security and international stability
degenerate to become more fractious, more volatile, and less manageable. In times of relative calm, when
theater combatant commanders are charged with engagement strategies for bolstering relationship
and reassure potential partners, landpower is invaluable in developing the close personal relationships
among regional nations that prepare later avenues for the employment of landpower in concert with
coalition partners.
In the advent of crisis, land forces can act aggressively to intercede to deter continued aggression,
dissuade potential adversaries from further hostile actions, and reassure multinational partners of the
U.S. commitment to regional stability and a peaceful world order. In the unfortunate instance of natural
disasters, land power can provide relief from suffering and establish the preconditions for a return to
normalcy and a restoration of essential civil functions.
Should deterrence fail, land forces can exert decisive military force to defeat adversary combat
forces or deny access to territory, resources, and supportive populations. The technological overmatch
of U.S. conventional forces assures American dominance of global battlespace for the foreseeable future.
Despite the theoretical advantages of asymmetric approaches for countering U.S. superiorities, it is
unlikely that any state or nonstate actors employing such tactics or techniques will seriously threaten

166

U.S. national security. That said, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction or effects into this
equation will, of course, change that potential. However, the persistent use of lower level asymmetric
threats over extended periods can, in fact, act as an impediment to the furtherance of U.S. interests and
can become a particularly virulent form of conflict. Thus, while large-scale traditional warfare may
well become less prevalent in the 21st century, particularly compared to the last one, overall small
scale violence may, in fact, increase in both frequency and intensity. As ethnic struggles, confrontations
caused by competition in a globalized economic environment, and population pressures on scarce
resources of petrochemicals, water, minerals, and arable land proliferate, violence may be seen as an
increasing viable course of action despite its inherent risks. Truly desperate or hopeless people may
resort to violence simply because they believe they have nothing to lose. The ideologically extreme
may not recognize or consider the risks. In any case, the widespread use of handheld communications
technologies will act to facilitate small group connectivity and global networking, making coordination
of such violence feasible on a worldwide scope.61
Once combat-intensive military operations cease, a full range of national effort will likely be needed
to reestablish good governance, defeat pockets of organized resistance, and establish the kinds of
security conditions incident to stability and reconstruction activities. It is clear that many reconstruction
activities would be performed best by host nation agencies, nongovernmental and private sector
organizations, or professionals from international agencies such as the United Nations. However,
these kinds of organizations are generally ill-equipped to maintain their own security, and it will be
incumbent on military forces to do so. In fact, U.S. military forces must be prepared to assist in rebuilding
local institutions, encouraging economic activity, and even establishing representative government.62
Such activities will necessitate increased attention to organizational design and manning issues, as
they have prerequisite call on foreign area officers, civil affairs units, military police, engineer units,
and psychological operations specialists. The U.S. Army as the landpower service of the United States
will, in large part, determine the direction of joint concept development, experimentation, acquisition,
training, and capabilities expansion.
However, the global potential for violence, the wide spectrum of possible military force scenarios,
and uncertainty of time and place will mandate sourcing of forces from a global pool of available forces,
rather than the 20th century’s regional perspective. To shorten response times and maximize use of
available strategic lift assets, U.S. Army planners must coordinate very thoroughly on the positioning
of Army formations. Heavier, more potent combat formations will likely be located in the United States,
while more expeditionary airborne, infantry, and Stryker brigades are situated in forward deployed
locations to shorten immediate response times.63 Hence, even from a landpower focus, the capabilities
of seapower and airpower remain an active part of the national strategic equation, and the old paradigm
of the sequential duality of strategic movement and operational maneuver will become inseparably
compressed in to a single perspective of strategic dominant maneuver. Strategic dominant maneuver
will not only require Army initiatives to enhance mobility improvements in terms of deployment
infrastructure (railway and airfield improvements and container handling facilities), but also a joint
approach to equipment prepositioning and sealift vessels and enhanced airlift capabilities, notably by
the U.S. acquisition of C-17 cargo aircraft.64 Moreover, the military capabilities of space and cyberspace
will become increasingly central to command and control of combat forces operating from dispersed
global locations.
The Army as a Joint Land Component: Applying Landpower in a Theater.
In the context of land forces employed by joint, regional combatant commanders, the role of large
army formations in theater is complex and fluid. As part of joint and combined theater assets, the land
force commander makes key contributions to the ability of a combatant commander to further national
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security objectives. First and foremost, in peace or war, forward deployed ground forces provide an
on-site ability to continuously assess the theater’s posture and potential threats to stability, since their
very deployment forward provides physical presence and frequent interactive contact. Moreover, in
terms of actual Title 10 responsibilities and apportionment of national resources, the U.S. Army has
specific requirements in setting the theater for the joint use of military forces, either as unified U.S.
action or as part of an international combined task force. In the areas of force protection, theater-level
logistics, command and control, and in many other enabling capacities, only the Army has forces
trained, organized, and equipped to carry out essential theater-wide functions. For example, while
strategic movement of forces into a theater of operations is most likely the purview of Air Force and
Navy planners, intra-theater joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of these forces
into a coherently organized land component of the joint force will usually be an Army-run function.
It also is typically the U.S. Army’s lot to develop the joint and combined land operations plan
that supports and augments the combatant commander’s own campaign plans. Of course, in actual
decisive combat operations, it will be the land component commander’s role to actual command and
control the land forces fight as well as integrate that action with the operational activities of the air
component commander and the maritime component commander. Additionally, any land operation
of major combat forces will need to be integrated with theater-wide special operations missions, as the
likelihood of such actions taking place on contiguous or overlapping terrain is high.
But as operations in Iraq have illustrated most distinctly, it is landpower that assures longterm campaign success. The structures for reconstruction, stability operations, interagency and
intergovernmental action, and sustainment of coalition resolve all take place on that element of
geography where people actually work, farm, go to school, travel, and live—the land. Uniquely
among the armed services, Army forces are trained, organized and equipped for three principal
types of operations across a full spectrum of military action: offensive, defensive, and stability and
reconstruction operations.65 These operations may well be simultaneous and continuous, but stability
and reconstruction operations tend to coalesce at the lower end of the range of military actions. These
sorts of civil support operations, while neither glamorous nor effortless, are essential to the sustained
application of landpower beyond decisive combat operations. They may lead to the kind of stable and
secure national environment in which other elements of national power—diplomatic, economic, and
informational—can generate more effective results in cooperation with legitimate and functional local
self-government.66
To affect this broad range of landpower activities, Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs)
support geographic unified commands and also some designated sub unified commands. Commanders
of ASCCs normally are the senior Army officer not assigned to specific and primary joint duties within
a combatant command. However, this commander also may well have other joint and multinational
titles, and may well be designated as the joint force land component commander. ASCC organizational
structures are neither mandated nor uniform, but rather are modular and scaleable to provide a
combatant commander with a range of army capabilities in accordance with anticipated missions. In
peacetime, they may vary from less than 2,000 in a deferred theater such as U.S. Army South as an
economy-of-force theater, to the some 65,000 in U.S. Army Europe. For a major theater war, U.S. Army
Central Command would grow to over 300,000. Some selected ASCCs have the embedded capability
to establish numbered armies, when augmented, as an operational-level headquarters for multicorps
operations.67
The ASCC commander need not be collocated in the theater of operations to which assigned, but
regardless of actual physical location, must be able to perform essential functions for the combatant
commander. As mentioned, this command constitutes the component headquarters necessary to
accomplish joint planning tasks and also to act as a liaison headquarters for the U.S. Army, as the
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principal proponent Service for landpower. Of course, it also sources and supports those U.S. Army
forces that may be assigned to the theater of operations, and it also conducts joint and combined land
operations, if assigned that role by the combatant commander. If fact, when designated, this commander
may act as the joint or combined land component commander.
Figure 2 depicts the varying and overlapping responsibilities of the Army Service Component
Commanders. The block outlined by large dashes lists those functions an ASCC exercises in support
of the combatant commander. These responsibilities have both joint (J) and Army (A) objectives.
While not all-inclusive, they do serve to illustrate what functions an ASCC performs on an ongoing
basis. However, an Army commander at any level can be designated as an Army forces commander
in any joint task force formation. As an Army representative, this commander has the same service
responsibilities for any Army element in the joint force. But he also assumes joint responsibilities, as
depicted in the figure in the short dashoutlined block.

Figure 2. Responsibilities of a Theater Army in Joint and Combined Operations.68
Finally, the Army commander also is a combat commander who must accomplish warfighting
missions, as depicted in the solid-outlined block. If he is designated as a joint or combined land
component commander, his responsibilities increase relative to the overall joint and combined joint
force organization. Again, these functions pertain to both joint and Army functions. This requires
that the ASCC and combatant commanders and their staffs must understand the roles, missions, and
functions required of both headquarters for joint and Army-centric operations. To do this, the ASCC
commander and his or her staff must organize for the mission and identify any critical augmentation
requirements with regard to force posturing, sustainment capabilities, and command, control, and
communications arrangements.
While this concept focuses on joint capabilities and processes, it is probable that 21st century conflicts
will be multinational in character, and that any such architecture will be shifting and multipolar in
169

nature. Stable alliances will continue, but any joint force land component commander will need to deal
with ad hoc security arrangements, necessitating imaginative approaches to dealing with the reception
and employment of forces from coalition partners from a wide range of readiness postures, with regard
to manning, equipping, and training.69
There are several options available for the designation of an Army forces commander, for any
size joint task force in a joint or combined operation. That is, in every joint or coalition organization
that includes an Army force there must be a commander who is charged with the responsibilities of
ensuring support and control of those Army forces. In every case where he is appointed as a joint
commander, as the senior Army commander in the command, this Army forces commander retains
his Army-specific responsibilities unless he, in turn, establishes a separate, subordinate army forces
command. This delegation must be done by directive in order to avoid confusion with regard to who
the joint Army forces commander actually is.
Thus, if the Army forces commander is, in fact, the senior Army commander in a joint or multinational
force he may have several other hats. For example, he may be the actual Army Service Component
Commander for a unified or subunified commander, as Commander, Army Forces Central Command
was in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He may be a tactical-level commander in smaller contingencies,
as was XVIII Corps in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The commander, Army forces may also be
tasked to function as a joint land forces component commander, when forces outside the U.S. Army are
committed to ground operations in the theater of operations as part of a larger joint or combined land
force, as was Commander Army Forces Central Command when designated the Combined Force Land
Component Commander in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He alternatively may be assigned as a joint
task force commander in his own right, as was XVIII Corps as CJTF-180 for Operation JUST CAUSE.
Regardless of designation, any such commander must still perform all the Title 10 responsibilities for
all Army forces in the command unless another, separate commander is delegated those duties within
a specific joint force.
Any Army Service Component Commander, then, functions not as a mere administrative
headquarters, but as the combatant commander’s chief soldier, the main headquarters for planning,
conducting, and sustaining land-based campaigns. He or she must provide authoritative direction to
any land forces assigned, attached, or otherwise under the operational or tactical control, especially if
designated as a combined or joint force land component commander, as determined by the combatant
commander. He or she must create synergies among land forces, as well as synchronization with
other joint and multinational forces in peacetime operations and open warfare and in any type of
conflict between those extremes. That includes providing the operational-level theater structure for
the prosecution of a land campaign. Beyond operational responsibilities in theater, the Army Service
Component Commander is the combatant commander’s principal link with the Department of the
Army in the execution of Title 10 responsibilities. Other mandated support operations include Army
support to other services and common-user logistics mandates, which typically extend in practice to
include coalition partner forces as well as U.S. joint formations.
Landpower, the Foundation of Pax Americana.
The steady tramp of the booted feet of thousands of legionaries over centuries ensured the crowning
achievement of the Roman empire, the Pax Romana, which marked an era in which peaceful commerce
and relative security were the dominant characteristics of the Western world. In sunny Hispania or the
damp forests of Germania, the forts and patrols of the Roman legions represented the determination
of the people of the Roman state to maintain their frontiers and fend off the inroads of barbarian
hordes on the move. Behind the shields of the legionaries, commerce, engineering, arts, language, and
social institutions took on distinctly Roman characteristics, so much so that much of what we today
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acknowledge as Western culture is Roman in origin. If the 21st century is to see a parallel state of
affairs, a Pax Americana, it will surely rest on a similar foundation.
Landpower is more than military forces deployed to far-flung places. Rather, it is a conglomerate
of elements, each interacting so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Certainly military
forces are the power projection element of landpower, but governments; commercial and financial
corporations and industrial systems; nongovernmental organizations and institutions; science and
technology; agriculture; social and political factors; and cultural norms all play a significant part in
preparing and sustaining those forces in action. In concert with other mediums of military operations,
landpower’s major contribution to U.S. national security objectives lies in its versatility and scalability.
Land forces can be tailored precisely to address specific situations with many component variables.
From the mere presence of soldiers on the ground to the lethal employment of a wide range of kinetic
and nonkinetic weapons, the U.S. Army is uniquely postured to provide the military force necessary to
influence human activity in the domain where human beings dwell, where their business is conducted,
and where their values are maintained—the land.
Land forces provide the capability to sustain peace by proactively shaping the security environment
of the theaters to which they are deployed. They provide visible, personal, face-to-face contact with
other people and other governments, creating lasting relationships and enduring demonstrations of
American commitment. Particularly at the lower, less kinetic ranges of the spectrum of conflict, land
forces interact with people and provide unmatched flexibility in reassuring allies, persuading potential
coalition partners, and deterring would-be aggressors. Land forces extend landpower in virtually
countless ways for as far or fast or long a national policy dictates, limited only by the strategic reach of
deployment means, and bounded only by the speed and clarity of policy formulation, the resoluteness
of leadership decisions, and the national will to persevere.
It is landpower that interrupts the security environments of enemies of the nation, whether
structured as political territories or as nonstate organizations. Seapower, airpower, space power, and
even cyberspace power have enabling roles to play and may even actually prove decisive in the outcome
of a war, but they will only rarely prove definitive in determining a conclusive and persistent change
for the course of the future. The final outcomes always will be relative to landpower. In this way,
landpower is uniquely the final arbiter of national defense policy, as it works synergistically with other
elements of military power to curtail the flexibility and freedom of movement of adversaries, to deny
them sustainment and support, to defeat their open challenges, and to squelch organized resistance
and create the conditions for a secure peace.
After the decisive conclusion of major combat actions, the duties and responsibilities of a combined
or joint force land component commander are not likely to cease, but will merely take on new policy
objectives and a more wide-reaching axis of advance. When the warship’s missiles and the warplane’s
bombs no longer descend, the land warrior’s work still remains, often as active and dangerous as
combat operations were, for landpower is the essential enabler for the stability operations necessary
to secure territory, for the creation of the conditions conducive to infrastructure reconstruction and
renewal, and for the facilitation of an atmosphere of change so that interagency and intergovernmental
objectives aimed at stabilization, economic progress, and political self-sufficiency can be attained.
So long as America is to remain the beacon of liberty, the protector of democratic principles, and the
endorser of free enterprise, landpower offers the nation the versatile, sustained potential to accomplish
national security objectives, demonstrate and defend the American way of life, and act as an agent of
good for all humanity.
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CHAPTER 13
THUCYDIDES AND CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY
R. Craig Nation
A POSSESSION FOR ALL TIME
Nearly 2 1/2 millennia have passed since the Greek historian Thucydides composed his famous
history of the Peloponnesian War (432-404 B.C.E.).1 Although well-known among scholars, the text
was not translated from the Greek original until 1478.2 Contemporary interest in Thucydides dates
to the European renaissance and emergence of the modern state system, whose dynamic of armed
competition between contending sovereignties his work is often presumed to represent. Ever since,
Thucydides has been a source of inspiration for policymakers as well as scholars. In our time, no armed
conflict anywhere in the world is fought to a conclusion without some attempt to use his work as a
vehicle for interpretation.3
Thucydides’ influence has been manifest in modern American strategic thought. In 1947 U.S. Secretary
of State George Marshall turned to Thucydides to fathom the emerging Cold War: “I doubt seriously,”
he proposed, “whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep conviction regarding certain
of the basic issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian
War and the fall of Athens.”4 A latter U.S. Secretary of State and former general officer, Colin Powell,
speaking upon his retirement as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993, cited Thucydides to the
effect that “of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most.” Powell kept the passage
posted at his desk for many years.5 When Stanfield Turner set out to revamp instruction at the U.S.
Naval War College in the 1970s, he made Thucydides the focal point of the curriculum. Today Carl von
Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Thucydides are the only strategic theorists whose work predates the 20th
century that are studied systematically at U.S. senior service schools.
In the past several decades, there has been an explosion of work devoted to Thucydides, no longer
addressed primarily to an audience of classical scholars, but rather the larger community of security
and strategic studies.6 This attention rests on an appreciation of his work’s multifaceted relevance. Leo
Strauss represents Thucydides’ text as a commentary upon war itself: “The Peloponnesian war is that
singular event which reveals fully, in an unsurpassable manner, for all times, the nature of war.”7 Clifford
Orwin sees it as a political primer; “Of all writers on politics, none stays closer than Thucydides to the
world of citizen and statesman,” whose work belongs “to students of political life of whatever time
and place.”8 Richard Ned Lebow concentrates on Thucydides’ contributions to international relations
theory, as “the first writer to analyze the origin of war, the role of power in international relations, the
relationship between domestic and foreign politics, the process by which civil and international orders
unravel and what might be done to restore them.”9 Such commendations can be multiplied many fold.
Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War is, without question, a seminal study of warfare and a “possession for
all time” as the author aspired for it to be.10
Why is this so? What does The Peloponnesian War have to teach us about the problems of war and
strategy? It is, in fact, generally easier to assert the text’s importance than to discern the character of its
insights. Like any great work, its message is ambiguous and has been read in different ways depending
on the prevailing Zeitgeist. In the early modern centuries, Thucydides was viewed as a guide to the
primacy of power and raison d’état in the Westphalian state system. The young Thomas Hobbes, who
in 1624 authored one of the first English translations of The Peloponnesian War, provides an example.
Hobbes’ philosophical work, which considered the urge to power to be integral to human nature and
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emphasized the insecurity that results from an anarchic state of nature, was influenced deeply by his
classical predecessor.11 The realist tradition in international relations theory consistently has claimed
Thucydides as a progenitor—Joseph Nye calls him “the founding father of Realism.”12 For Marshall,
the war between Athens and Sparta became a prototype for the bipolar confrontation of the emerging
Cold War, and the clash of values between democracy and totalitarianism that informed it. Others see
the work as a humane reflection on the human condition whose overarching theme is “the suffering
of war.”13 Powell, from the perspective of the victorious United States of the post-Cold War, found a
cautionary tale about the limits of power. Today, Thucydides’ work is being applied as a vehicle for
understanding the logic of terrorism in the world after September 11, 2001 (9/11).14 This is as it should
be. Classic works of strategic literature cannot be read as users manuals. They offer illuminations rather
than answers—their status as “timeless” works in a sense demands that it be so.
Policy and strategy, defined as the craft of statesmanship and the use of military force in the pursuit
of political aims, are practical undertakings. Many U.S. commanders carried copies of Antoine Jomini’s
work onto the battlefields of the American Civil War—the Swiss theorist made a conscious attempt
to provide maxims that could be applied to tactical and operational problems. Alexander the Great
is reported to have slept on campaign with a version of The Iliad prepared by his tutor Aristotle at his
bedside (as modern commanders might carry a Bible or Koran)—cultural inspiration also may serve
as a foundation for waging war. It is difficult to imagine Thucydides in a knapsack on campaign; his
insights are too complex to serve as guides on the tactical level, and his conclusions too elusive to
provide cultural inspiration. His work has a different kind of merit, however, that is perhaps no less
relevant and profound.
What Thucydides provides is strategic insight. He offers invaluable points of orientation for
statecraft and supreme command in the domain of national policy, as well as searing judgments about
the factors that lead states to victory or defeat in protracted strategic competition. His subject is the
institution of war in all its dimensions, and his text illustrates that although we no longer fight with
shields and stabbing spears, on the strategic level, warfare has remained remarkably constant over
time. Those who read Thucydides for the first time usually are struck by his work’s astonishing current
relevance—not so much as an agenda for action as a guide to understanding.15 As a reflection on war
intended to help us to come to terms with the larger strategic environment, The Peloponnesian War
remains unsurpassed.
A WAR LIKE ALL OTHERS
Much of the current literature concerning the Peloponnesian War is focused on the conflict itself,
considered as an event in space and time that can be understood empirically. Victor David Hanson’s
recent study, A War Like No Other, emphasizes the distinctiveness of the struggle, which he portrays as
an armed conflict virtually unique in history in its scope and complexity.16 This is potentially misleading.
Almost everything that we know about the Peloponnesian War is based on what Thucydides tells us,
and, despite the best efforts of archeologists and classical scholars, that is not likely to change.
There is an ongoing debate about the accuracy of Thucydides’ narrative, but it rests on distressingly
few supplementary sources (essentially stone tablets containing state records and a very small number
of fragmentary primary and secondary accounts). Basically, much of Thucydides’ story must either be
accepted on faith or rejected as improbable. Thucydides was in an excellent position to assemble an
accurate record of events. His appreciation for the importance of the war gave him a strong motive to
do so. And he went out of his way to demonstrate his objectivity, a trait for which his work has long
been appreciated. David Hume, later echoed by Immanuel Kant, famously remarked that the first page
of his text “was the commencement of real history,” while even the skeptical George Cawkwell lauds
his “monstrous passion for the truth.”17
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Up to the publication of Jacqueline de Romilly’s seminal study of Athenian imperialism in 1947,
the issue of chronology dominated Thucydides scholarship—when the work was composed, the
stages of composition, and how much the author was in a position to know.18 Today, scholars broadly
accept that The Peloponnesian War was conceived and composed as a whole. Scholarship has shifted
from issues of accuracy in narration toward an immanent reading of the text, viewed as an artful
reconstruction used to convey the author’s personal view of Greek political life.19 This kind of research
agenda may be exaggerated in its own right, but it is certainly true that Thucydides interprets as well
as describes—his account is infused with the author’s perspective. “Thucydides has imposed his will,”
notes the commentator Arnold Gomme, “as no other historian has ever done.”20 The Peloponnesian
War was indeed a great armed conflict, but it was not the only one waged in classical antiquity. It may
be perceived as a “war like no other” only because of the brilliance of Thucydides’ rendition of events.
And as a 19th century commentator warns, Thucydides’ masterly text can lead us to neglect the fact that
“history does not consist of events in and of themselves, but rather in the impact that they have upon
others.”21 For the purposes of strategic studies, as distinct from classical studies and historiography, it
is Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War that matters.
What do we know about Thucydides? Three vitae survive from the Byzantine period, but they
are contradictory and sometimes clearly erroneous. Most of what we can assert derives from what
Thucydides himself tells us in four brief references to his personal circumstances in The Peloponnesian
War, and perhaps more importantly from what we can infer about the author from reading his text.22
Thucydides was born in the 5th century, around 460. He was therefore 29 years old and in the prime
of life in 431 when the Peloponnesian War began, and 55 in 404 when it ended with Athens’ defeat.
The date of his death is not known with certainty, but probably occurred around 400-397. The author
records his full name as Thucydides, son of Olorus from the deme of Halimous. This indicates Thracian
origin and possible familial ties to the powerful and conservative Philaidea clan, which included the
Athenian statesman Miltiades (550-489, the victor at Marathon in 490) and his son Cimon (510-450,
ostracized from Athens in 461). Thucydides was clearly of high social standing, and a man of means.
At one point, he mentions that his family possesses the Athenian concession for gold mining in all of
Thrace. In 424 the citizens of Athens elected him to the post of general, one of only ten individuals to
hold that post annually and therefore a leading figure in the state. In the same year, ordered to come
to the relief of the commercial center of Amphipolis in Thrace with a small fleet of seven triremes
(warships), he arrived too late to prevent the city’s fall to the Spartan general Brasidas. Returning to
Athens, Thucydides was condemned as a sign of disfavor and exiled from the city for 20 years (a fairly
common punishment in the era). For the remainder of the conflict, he was therefore able to observe,
from the perspective of a not entirely disinterested onlooker, the war swirling around him. During the
war, when he may have spent much of his time on his Thracian estate, and after his return to Athens on
its conclusion, he composed on a series of papyrus scrolls, what was in effect a contemporary history,
recording in great detail the course of events from 431 to 411. Thucydides’ history is left unfinished,
and, in fact, breaks off abruptly in the midst of a paragraph.23
More important than the details of this modest biography is what it seems to indicate about the
author’s intellectual orientation. Thucydides’ life ran parallel to the golden age of classical Hellenic
civilization. He lived to see the triumph of Athenian material civilization with the raising of the great
temples on the Acropolis, the construction of the long walls linking Athens to the port of Piraeus, and
the constant expansion of an Athenian maritime empire. He was contemporary with the political leader
Pericles (495-429); the historian Herodotus (484-425); the sculptor Phidias (490-430); the philosophers
Gorgias (483-375) and Socrates (469-399); and the dramatists Sophocles (497-406), Euripides (480-406),
and Aristophanes (448-380).24 Thucydides was therefore a participant in one of the greatest cultural
flowerings in all of history, and present at the creation of what we call Western Civilization. He also
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lived to see the defeat and ruin of his native city, an event whose cultural as well as strategic importance
he fully appreciated. Thucydides begins his history by remarking that its subject is “the war between
the Peloponnesians and the Athenians . . . believing that it would be a great war, and more worthy of
relation than any that had preceded it.”25 He makes no attempt to justify this focus, and, in fact, none
is required. “War is the father and king of all,” wrote the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus (535-475)
in a passage that is not incongruous for a civilization whose founding text was Homer’s Iliad.26 It was
a valuation that Thucydides shared. The sentiment was echoed from the other side of the world by
Thucydides’ approximate contemporary Sun Tzu, for whom: “Warfare is the greatest affair of state,
the basis of life and death, the way to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and
analyzed.”27 Thucydides’ experience with hegemonic warfare led him to validate these conclusions, and
to perceive war as the essential focus for all political life. The political, social, and cultural implications
of the great war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians are the real subject of his history.
One might surmise that as a young man Thucydides turned away from the oligarchic political
preferences that would come naturally to someone of his social standing, and embraced the idealism of
Periclean Athens. The tribute to the civic culture of democratic Athens that he transcribes in Pericles’
funeral oration in Book Two of The Peloponnesian War, where the Athenian leader honors the city’s fallen
soldiers by evoking the cause for which they offered their lives, obviously is sincere.28 Thucydides also
sees and describes in brutal detail the dark side of democratic governance, but his allegiance to Pericles
as the embodiment of the ideal of an open society never wavers. In this sense, his history takes on the
contours of a tragedy—the account of the downfall, occasioned by its own hubris and tragic flaws, of a
great civilization. W. Robert Connor notes a “recurring paradox” in Thucydides’ history; “the intense
emotional power of a work ostensibly so detached.”29 The paradox is only apparent. Thucydides’ major
themes, the harsh reality of warfare as a locus of political intercourse and the corruption of a civilized
polity exposed to the pressures of total war, are passionately felt. It is the importance of these themes
that leads him to insist on a dispassionate investigation of the questions of causation and responsibility.
“The absence of romance in my history,” he writes, “will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest;
but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the
understanding of the future . . . I shall be content.”30 Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War is important not
primarily for what makes it unique, but for what it shares in common with and reveals about the nature
of other hegemonic conflicts. It is a war like all others that poses themes of universal and enduring
importance.
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
The war that Thucydides recounts certainly merits his judgment that, in scope and importance,
it was “much greater than the wars which preceded it.”31 This is due to its length and extent, but
also because of the cultural stakes. Thucydides begins his narrative with an account of the evolution
of Hellenic civilization itself (know to modern students as the Archaeology), which demonstrates the
development from the 7th to 5th centuries of a classic Greek civilization around the political unit of the
city-state (polis). City states were engaged in constant feuding over agricultural land at the margin of
their territories, waging a “Greek way of war” with armed citizens’ militias deployed as heavy infantry
(hoplites) fighting in close formation (the phalanx) in a strategic context heavily constrained by myth
and ritual.32 This relatively harmonious system, whose value system Homer depicted in his epics, was
soon to be swept away—first by external shocks and then by war waged between its leading polities.
The Greek world drew together to repel the Persians in the Persian Wars (490-479) as recounted in
the Histories of Herodotus, culminating with the famous battles of Marathon (490), Salamis (480), and
Plataea (479).33 What followed might be compared, with due allowance for changed circumstances, to
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the emergence of the Cold War after 1945, when disparate allies forced together to resist a common
threat fell out when the threat was removed.34 Athens and Sparta, the leading Greek powers, allies
in the struggle against the Persians but possessed of radically different institutions and aspirations,
soon were engaged in a struggle for dominion. Thucydides devotes a large section of his text (the
Pentecontaetia or “50 years”) to describe the rise of a revisionist Athens bent upon replacing Sparta as
the leading power in Hellas in the decades following the Persian War.
Thucydides’ analysis of the causes of war has a strong cultural dimension. The author repeatedly
refers to the differences in style, attitude, and values that divide the major belligerents. Sparta represents
a distinctive variant of the oligarchic tyranny, with an agricultural economy based on the labor of a
massive population of enslaved helots, with defense provided by professional warriors or Spartiates
organized in elite infantry units famed for their courage and discipline. Sparta’s force as a land power
is justly famed—no other power in the Greek world is presumed to be capable of standing before it.
Sparta also heads a loose alliance based on bilateral agreements with like-minded allies known as
the Peloponnesian League. As an agrarian based oligarchy committed to traditional values and an
unchallengeable land power with a status-quo geopolitical orientation, Sparta may be said to represent
a conservative force in Greek life. By way of contrast, Thucydides portrays Athens as dynamic and
innovative. Though. like all Greek city-states. its economy rests on slave labor, it is ground-breaking
in developing democratic institutions and offers a considerable degree of empowerment to its free
citizens. Its international position rests on sea power, commerce, and an empire of subject states (citystates in the Aegean, Thrace, and Asia Minor) that originally ally with Athens to resist the Persians and
are organized under Athenian leadership in the Delian League in 478. Athens is culturally innovative,
economically dynamic, and strategically expansive. After the construction of the long walls linking
Athens to Piraeus in 450, it is also virtually invulnerable. Periclean Athens is bent on extending its
power, and brash and assertive in its dealings with others.
When the city-state of Megara withdrew from the Spartan alliance and joined with Athens in 460,
a First Peloponnesian War that pitted Athens and Sparta against one another as primary belligerents
ensued. The war ended in 446 with a compromise known as the Thirty Years Peace, including a pledge to
submit future differences to binding arbitration. Between 433 and 431, however, a series of events on the
periphery of the Greek world drove the two antagonists to war once again. Thucydides’ Peloponnesian
War was waged from 431-404, over a span of 27 years. For purposes of simplification (the distinction is
not made by Thucydides), historians generally divide the war into three phases: the Archidamian War
from 431-421, named for the Spartan King Archidamus who ironically opposed a resort to arms and
sought to contain hostilities once in progress; the Peace of Nicias from 421-412, named for the Athenian
general Nicias who negotiated the truce in 421 and went on to meet a tragic fate as commander of the
doomed Athenian expeditionary force on Sicily; and the Ionian War from 412-404 beginning with an
Athenian revival but concluding with her final defeat.
The Archidamian War unfolded as a stalemate between Spartan land power and Athenian sea
power. Each side was capable of hurting its opponent, but not overthrowing it. A turning point came
when Athens established a base on the Peloponnesus at the isolated outpost of Pylos, capturing several
hundred elite Spartiate warriors and threatening to inspire a helot revolt. The Peace of Nicias was the
result, but it did not strike deep roots. By this point, the war had taken on a momentum of its own, with
allies and local commanders refusing to respect ceasefires, and a war party on each side committed
to pursue the conflict jusqu’au bout. Thucydides goes to some length to argue that the Peace of Nicias,
which he calls a “treacherous armistice,” does not divide the Peloponnesian War into two distinct
parts, but rather represents an integral part of an extended conflict with a consistent strategic logic.35
In 416, with rivalry between the two parties unabated, Athens, led by the flamboyant, ambitious,
and unprincipled young Alcibiades, launched a great armada with the intention of shifting the balance
of power decisively by conquering the island of Sicily.36 The destruction of its expeditionary force at
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Syracuse weakened Athens substantially, but not decisively. An oligarchy overthrew the Athenian
democracy in 411, but democratic forces quickly regained political control of the city. Athens eventually
recouped its strength and launched a military comeback, carrying the war into the Aegean and the
Hellespont. The Ionian War essentially was a naval contest waged in these regions, with the Athenian
fleet successful at the outset but unable to force the issue to decisive conclusion. In the end, it was
the intervention in the Spartan cause of the former common enemy, Persia, that turned the tide. In
405 at the battle of Aegospotami, the Spartan admiral Lysander caught the Athenian fleet drawn up
on shore and destroyed it. In 404, with its real center of gravity eliminated, Athens surrendered. The
Spartan army occupied the Acropolis, tore down the long walls, and imposed an oligarchic tyranny
under a kind of junta known to history as the Thirty Tyrants. As a competitive polity in the eastern
Mediterranean, Athens’ authority eventually would be restored, but its Golden Age, inspired by the
ideals of Pericles, would not return. Thucydides’ account of the war ends at the year 411, but it is clear
throughout the narrative that he is aware of its eventual outcome, and that this awareness importantly
shapes the way in which he structures his text and develops its themes.
THUCYDIDES AND GRAND STRATEGY
Even in brief outline, the Peloponnesian War presents the observer with an extraordinarily wide
variety of strategic gambits, military adventures, and political ploys. Thucydides’ history includes
detailed descriptions of major fleet actions, pitched battles, sieges, unconventional operations, plague,
revolution, atrocity and massacre, political confrontations, instances of decisive leadership, and, in fact,
virtually every kind of circumstance that shapes the outcome of major wars. The story is engrossing,
but, as already argued, it is not unique. What is it that makes Thucydides’ account the “classical and
canonical work of Western culture” that it is universally considered to be?37
Part of the answer lies in the controlled emotion with which Thucydides infuses an account of a
war that he firmly believes to be an unprecedented tragedy. Part lies in the author’s methodological
contributions. Thucydides sets out to chronicle a war, not to craft a general theory of warfare. But he
clearly states the conviction that because human nature remains essentially the same, by examining
the past, we can identify recurrent patterns in social and political intercourse, learn from them, and
on that basis develop strategies for more effective action in the future. The author’s magisterial
detachment, refusal to accept conventional explanations at face value, and unapologetic rationalism
are nothing short of remarkable. Moses Finley calls Thucydides “the most careful and, in the best sense,
the most skeptical historian the ancient world ever produced.”38 In this regard, his work provides a
solid foundation for modern historiography and the discipline of political science. Most importantly,
perhaps, The Peloponnesian War is timeless because it develops an appreciation of warfare in a larger
strategic context and poses classic problems in strategic analysis in a particularly lucid way. We can
illustrate the way in which this occurs with three examples: Thucydides’ reflections on the causes of
war, the strategic level of warfare, and ethical and moral concerns.
The Origins of War.
Identifying the causes and nature of war is a basic challenge that arguably has become more difficult
in an era when declarations of war have become things of the past, when the state of war has lost much
of its formal legal status, and when the United States finds itself engaged in an open-ended “war on
terrorism and radical extremism” that may last for generations. Thucydides’ account of the origins of
the Peloponnesian War offers an interesting case study for working through these problems.
Thucydides devotes a great amount of attention to discussing the causes of the Peloponnesian
War and makes a fundamental distinction, which he is sometimes said to have invented, between
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the immediate or short-term sources of the conflict and underlying or structural causes.39 Simon
Hornblower describes this aspect of his work as “a conscious, secular theory of causation in terms of
deep and superficial political causes.”40 Perhaps the most famous sentence in Thucydides’ history is the
comment that however one might adjudicate immediate causes, ultimately “the growth of the power of
Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.”41 The pessimistic fatalism
that seems to be reflected here, the view of political life as an endless striving for power and dominion,
has found great resonance in the realist camp of international relations theory. Hans Morgenthau quotes
Thucydides to the effect that: “Of the gods we know, and of men we believe, that it is a necessary law of
their nature that they rule whenever they can.”42 Athens’ ambition, opines Raymond Aron, condemns
it to brutality: “The servitudes of power are inescapable.”43
In fact, Thucydides does not make any effort to develop a systematic theory of causation. He describes
the origins of the Peloponnesian War in considerable detail, but leaves the reader to draw conclusions
concerning the relative weight of the various factors on which he touches. Thucydides mentions Sparta’s
fear of growing Athenian power on several occasions.44 Clearly, the security dilemma occasioned by
the rise of a great power challenger, competitive bipolarity, and an impending power transition are
powerful structural factors that contribute to systemic instability and increase the likelihood of war.45
Much the larger part of Thucydides’ description, however, is devoted to immediate causes. One set
of variables that he discusses concern economic motivation. The Spartans emphasized the Megarian
Decrees that imposed a commercial embargo on Athens’ rival, Megara, as a primary cause of war. In
response, Pericles enjoined Athens to enforce the decrees rigorously. The origin of the war in an obscure
dispute over a small settlement on the margin of the Greek world is not unrelated to the fact that the
settlement in question is poised strategically along the trade route leading to Italy. Thucydides does
not offer a reductionist explanation that locates the roots of war in an Athenian imperialism driven by
the merchants of the Piraeus, but he is not insensitive to the weight of economic factors.46
Thucydides also probes the diplomatic interaction leading up to the war. Neither of the belligerents
necessarily seeks to provoke war, but all become caught up in a maze of misperceptions, ambiguous
communication, erroneous calculations, and policies of bluff and bluster. As in the July Crisis of 1914,
there is a sense in which the Peloponnesian War becomes a “war by accident” as a result of the failure of
diplomacy. Domestic politics and policy processes, including the critical role of charismatic leadership,
also have their place. The Spartans decision for war results from the crude va-t’en-guerre rhetoric of the
ephor, Stenelaides, who declaims that he does “not pretend to understand” the long speeches of the
Athenians, but nonetheless urges a “vote for war, as honor demands.”47 Pericles’ personal authority
and powers of persuasion are critical factors that turn Athens away from a policy of compromise that
it otherwise might have preferred.
Thucydides’ account does not resolve the issue of the relative importance of structural and
immediate causes, nor does it seek to do so. What the text demonstrates is multiple causality.48 Structural
explanations alone do not suffice—the choice for war is an ambiguous action that is conditioned by
numerous variables, “a confluence of causes at multiple levels of analysis.”49 While the calculus of power
may be a necessary context for a decision for war, it must be filtered through a screen of perception
and misperception, threshed out in the domestic policy process, refined by diplomatic interaction,
and implemented in practice. Nothing is fixed and inalterable. Wars are seldom clear cut, war aims
and strategic calculations are subject to change, and the precise combination of factors that may have
motivated a choice for war at one point in time will alter as the dynamic of conflict unfolds.
The Strategic Level of Warfare.
Thucydides’ depiction of warfare is nearly unparalleled in its intensity and power. There is no more
sophisticated rendering of the complementary roles of land and sea power, the burden of command,
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the consequences of defeat, the impact of political faction on strategic choice, or the role of chance
and circumstance in effecting strategic outcomes. Despite the best efforts of responsible leaders,
momentous events continue to turn on the unpredictable and unexpected—an eclipse of the moon
and bolt of thunder, cloud cover during a night attack, unidentified terrain features, or the personal
foibles of leaders under stress. The Peloponnesian War is one of the greatest books ever written about
the theme of war itself. But Thucydides does not just depict the face of battle. He places warfare in a
grand strategic context where a multiplicity of factors must be explored to account for the difference
between victory and defeat. Thucydides’ appreciation for the strategic level of warfare is one of the
most important, and neglected, dimensions of his work.
Thucydides depicts grand strategy as comprehensive. In great wars, everything matters and nothing
is superfluous. In The Peloponnesian War, this includes such things as the domestic political environment
(Sparta is chronically concerned with the possibility of a helot revolt, there is a constant struggle between
oligarchic and democratic factions within individual city-states with serious strategic implications);
economic necessity (control of commercial routes, access to strategic raw materials); pride and reputation
(alliance defection becomes unacceptable because the hegemonic power will lose face); military
innovation (the enhanced role of light infantry including archers, slingers, and Thracian peltasts as the
war proceeds, the new Corinthian ramming tactics that wreck havoc with the Athenian fleet in the
Great Harbor of Syracuse); geostrategy (control of maritime choke points and lines of communication);
alliance stability (much of Spartan strategy consists of attacking the integrity of the Athenian alliance
system); and decisive battle (the encounters at Delium, Mantinea, or Syracuse where strategic outcomes
hinge on a single day’s fighting). Thucydides makes no attempt to identify a unique hub of power
and movement capable of serving as a Clausewitzian Center of Gravity (even if his narrative provides
plenty of material for making such an assessment retrospectively). What he depicts is an extraordinarily
complex strategic environment where victory can be a consequence of many things, some of which are
virtually impossible to predict.
In addition to being comprehensive, Thucydides’ strategic environment is dynamic. At the outset
of the Peloponnesian War, the two major belligerents clearly have outlined strategies for waging and
winning the war. Sparta’s intention is to invade Attica and force the Athenians to confront their army
in order to prevent the ravaging of their lands and homes. Presumably the Spartans will defeat the
Athenians in a major battle between opposing hoplite armies, leaving Sparta in a position to dictate the
terms of peace. Athens, led by Pericles, intends to withdraw its population from exposed rural regions
and concentrate it inside the city walls, refuse battle, subsist by importing vital commodities via sea,
avoid adventures, and use naval power to raid and harass the Peloponnesus. Eventually, the Athenians
presume, Spartan resolve will flag, and Athens will be in a position to impose an advantageous peace.50
Each set of assumptions proves misguided, and what follows is an extraordinary set of strategic
innovations.
Athenian resolve is weakened by the great plague that strikes the overcrowded city in the second
year of the war—a completely unforeseen event with great strategic consequences.51 The most prominent
victim of the plague is Pericles himself. After his passing, Athens, led by the demagogue Cleon, becomes
more aggressive, establishing the base at Pylos and using it as a means for placing pressure on its
enemy. Sparta, inspired by the generalship of Brasidas, counters by attacking the Athenian alliance in
Boeotia and Chalcidice. Both sides make partial gains but come no closer to ultimate victory. The Peace
of Nicias represents an attempt to impose a strategic pause, but it does not address the underlying
sources of hostility and fails to break the momentum of confrontation. Enduring resentment allows
the talented adventurer, Alcibiades, to up the ante by creating an alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and
Elis to challenge Spartan control of the Peloponnesus. He succeeds in provoking a decisive battle at
Mantinea in 418, in which the Spartans are compelled “to stake their all upon the issue of a single day,”
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but in the end, it is Sparta that prevails.52 Alcibiades’ next gambit is the Sicilian Expedition, a strategic
disaster but not yet a decisive defeat. Athens recovers from the setback, and it is only when Sparta
enters into a closer association with the Great King of Persia, builds a battle fleet, and finds a ruthless
commander in the person of Lysander that it is able to win decisively at Aegospotami in 405.
This brief overview calls attention to a great diversity of strategic initiatives. Thucydides’ history
demonstrates that in protracted conflicts strategy must be flexible and adaptive. Security, of course, is
grounded in a capacity for self-defense. The author has composed the history of a war, and his image
of strategy is tied firmly to “the part which is played by force, or the threat of force, in the international
system.”53 Strategy, the domain of force, is not a synonym for policy. But the clear implication of
Thucydides’ study is that, on the level of grand strategy, all instruments of national power must be
leveraged in conjunction with military means in pursuit of national goals. Events and local circumstances
as they unfold and develop will determine what “mix” of factors will be most relevant at any given
point in the conflict.
Ethical and Moral Context.
Thucydides’ History is notable for its lack of illusion. War, he remarks, is a “rough master that
brings most men’s characters to a level with their fortunes.”54 The strategic environment that he depicts
is filled with instrumental logic, cynicism, abuse of power, and brutal massacre. 55 It is a Hobbesian
universe where the struggle of all against all is often the essence of strategic interaction and the limits of
morality are defined by Staatsraison. Hugo Grotius used the remark of Thucydides’ Athenian emissary
Euphemius to the effect that “for a king or a free city, nothing is wrong that is to their advantage” as a
foil for his effort to assert a law of nations.56 Finley argued that “nothing so marks Thucydides’ work
as the sense of living in a world where moral sensitiveness and inherited tradition were . . . a luxury,
and the very survival of states hung on the skillful use of power and power alone.”57 The discourse of
power that drives interstate relations leads inexorably toward the harsh doctrine of might makes right,
as imparted by the Athenians to the Melians: “You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes,
is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer
what they must.”58
In a recent attempt to update, realist theory John Mearsheimer describes the above passage as
“Thucydides’ famous dictum,” but it is no such thing. 59 The Melian Dialogue, in which Athens lays
down the law to the representatives of the would-be neutral power of Melos, is perhaps not quite so
clear in its implications as might appear at first glance. The Athenian representatives speak the words
during their negotiations with the Melians; they do not necessarily express the opinions of the author.
The views of the Athenians are far from being self-evident, and, in fact, they belie the larger spirit of
Thucydides’ work as a whole. In The Peloponnesian War, breaches of the moral order are punished,
and pride comes before the fall. Sparta comes to believe that its early military misfortunes are the
consequence of its unethical breaching of the Thirty Years Peace. Pericles’ glowing funeral oration is
followed immediately by the terrifying description of the great plague. The doctrine of naked power
defended at Melos is the prelude to Athens’ descent into the heart of darkness in Sicily. The blustering
and violent Cleon comes to no good end. The unbridled ambition of Alcibiades leads him, and the
policy he represents, to ruin.
These contrapositions are not accidental. Thucydides is not a moralist—he rejects the gods, strives
for neutrality in his explanation, and does not preach. Nonetheless, his work forcefully poses the
moral and ethical dilemmas of protracted strategic rivalry. Alternatives to the realist interpretation
of Thucydides emphasize the compassion and austere humanity with which he contemplates the
disasters of his time.60 The Melian Dialogue, often read out of context as a set piece and touted as
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a foundation for political realism, also can be viewed as a depiction of the moral decline of Athens
that leads inexorably to her defeat.61 Viewed through this lens, the Athenian discourse at Melos is not
prudent but pathological, and the crass exercise of overwhelming force that it embraces is intended to
provoke revulsion rather than encourage emulation. The dialogue is, in fact, unique in Thucydides’
text. Among the 40 discourses cited verbatim, it is the only one constructed as a real dialogue—a
conversation between two parties with a theatrical structure and dramatic denouement. This gives it
a unique intensity and centrality in the text that is clearly intended. In the dialogue, it is the Athenians
who are dogmatic and inflexible, and the Melians who argue instrumentally. The Melians see the big
picture, calculate the odds of defiance on a cost-risk basis (even if their calculations are faulty), and
attempt to point out that by striking at the vulnerable without constraint, Athens will place its long
term interests at stake. And the Melians are right. Athens’ harsh conduct reflects an overweening pride
that eventually leads to disaster. Its policies and attitude offend allies, alienate neutrals, create new
enemies, and encourage rivals to redouble resistance.
In The Peloponnesian War, power without principle does not prevail. Thucydides does not portray
interest and justice as antithetic, rather they are “inextricably connected and mutually constitutive.”62
Thucydides does not shy from the carnage of war, but he also does not glory in it as some “blood
and guts” realists suggest.63 His gripping narration places the reader on the ground alongside leaders,
soldiers, and citizens caught up in the midst of calculated violence and coping as best they can, but
he laments the “general deterioration of character throughout the Greek world” that protracted war
promotes.64 War is indeed a violent teacher, and as such, in the words of Leo Strauss, “it teaches man
not only to act violently but also about violence and therefore about the truth.”65 The Peloponnesian War
is, in large part, a cautionary tale about the use and abuse of power with the implicit moral warning “to
use it wisely or lose it woefully.”66 For much of the war and despite many setbacks, Athens sustains its
great power status, but in the end, it abandons the high ground of legitimate authority and is lost. In
a harsh world, administering force effectively demands rigorous professionalism, including a strong
sense of purpose and adherence to an elevated moral code.67 Successful strategy, one may conclude,
must be developed within a sound and stable ethical context.
CONCLUSION
The real subject of Thucydides’ history is the decline and fall of a political civilization under the
strains of hegemonic warfare. Thucydides built the narrative on careful observation and detailed
accounting, but the story line inexorably directs the reader’s attention to the big picture, the grand
strategic environment within which the decisions are made that lead to victory and defeat. What are the
dynamics that cause great power war? Can they be contained, and, if so, how? What kinds of policies
are most conducive to the pursuit of victory? How can the various instruments of national power be
combined in a coherent grand strategy? How should strategy be sustained or adapted in the course of
protracted armed conflicts? What are the attributes of effective strategic leadership? How can power
be linked to purpose, and justice to interest, in a balanced national strategy that sustains legitimate
authority? These are the kind of questions that emerge from a careful reading of The Peloponnesian War.
Thucydides does not reach the end of this history, and his text does not include a formal summary or
conclusion, but he clearly intended it as a guide to statecraft and a plea for caution and moderation that
is as relevant in our time as on the day it was written.
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PART III
ELEMENTS OF POWER

CHAPTER 14
DIPLOMACY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER
Reed J. Fendrick
A diplomat is an honest man sent abroad to lie for his country.”
								

Apocryphal

The patriotic art of lying for one’s country.”
								

Ambrose Bierce1

The media and intellectual elites, the State Department (as an institution), and the Foreign Service (as a culture)
clearly favor the process, politeness, and accommodation position.
								

Newt Gingrich2

Ordinary Americans often have been uncomfortable about the art and practice of diplomacy.
Frequently, they associate diplomacy and American diplomats either with elitist, pseudo-aristocratic
bowing and scraping before supercilious foreigners whose aim is to impinge on our sovereignty and
partake of our largesse; or as naïve country bumpkins whose gullibility allows them to forsake key
American goals and objectives; or as ruthless, cynical practitioners of Bismarckian realpolitiek whose
aims and practices fall far short of our Founders’ noble aspirations; or as liberal, one-worldists whose
collective ideology is far from the American mainstream and who seek to undermine the political aims
of elected Administrations. These stereotypes go back to our country’s origins and have been reinforced
by such traumatic events as Wilson’s perceived failure at Versailles, the Yalta Conference near the end
of World War II, Henry Kissinger’s role as architect of the opening to China, and the failure to obtain a
United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution endorsing the use of force in Iraq.
Is any of this true? True or not, does it matter? What is diplomacy supposed to do? Does the United
States wield diplomacy effectively? Can democracy and diplomacy function harmoniously? How does
diplomacy fit in with the protection and furtherance of national security?
First, diplomacy is one instrument among many that a government utilizes in its pursuit of the
national interest. Among others are military power, actual or potential; economic power; intelligencegathering and operations; cultural and information or “soft power”; relative degrees of national unity;
and probably others. Diplomacy never functions in isolation from the other instruments of power but
at times may be emphasized as the situation warrants. In its simplest, most original form, diplomacy
is the official means by which one state formally relates to other states. Although ambassadors have
existed since antiquity representing one sovereign to another, the earliest diplomats often functioned
more as de facto hostages to ensure peace or compliance with some agreement than in the modern
understanding of an ambassador’s role. Since nation-states were more or less legitimized by the Treaty
of Westphalia in 1648, a whole series of codes and protocols have been established to create a framework
for the practice of diplomacy. These include such seeming anomalies (and irritants to common citizens)
as diplomatic immunity; creation of embassies; establishing and breaking diplomatic relations; sending
and receiving diplomatic notes, demarches, nonpapers and other forms of communication; holding
international conferences and many other means of interstate communication and relations.
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Diplomats are agents of the state. In theory, they act on instruction. Until the advent of modern
communications, their instructions necessarily had to be general, and they required a nearly innate
understanding of the national interest of the country they represented. Both because of the nondemocratic
nature of nearly all states before the American and French Revolutions, and due to the need for
confidentiality to protect state secrets and national security, diplomatic exchanges and even treaties
or agreements often were undertaken in secret or with quiet discretion. When Woodrow Wilson’s
Fourteen Points called for “open covenants openly arrived at” (a reference to Allied agreements for
post-World War I division of spoils from the Central Powers that appeared to make a mockery of
claims the War was meant to make the “world safe for democracy”), he was publicly challenging the
entire edifice of traditional diplomacy that, however, had begun to be modified with the rise of the mass
media and popular participation in the 19th century. Increasingly, mounting scrutiny from democratic
media and academics and ever-increasing intrusive clandestine intelligence-gathering make formal
secret agreements less and less palatable.
One prism through which to view diplomacy is to think of it as an element on the spectrum of national
security devices. In the “normal” course of events, most nations most of the time, while competing for
influence, markets, relative perceived power and other markers of strength, relate to one another the
way competitors do in seeking market-share—not as gangs fighting over turf. In other words, the
assumption is that peaceful approaches, use of agreements and treaties, and normal intercourse will
prevail. In this scenario, diplomacy provides the lubricant for acceptable relations, seeks to remove
irritants, and strives for mutual understanding. However, even in the relations between traditionally
peaceful entities, in the semi-Hobbesian universe of contemporary international relations, diplomacy
holds in its quiver, the potential threat of force. In the cases where rivalry becomes equated with threats
to vital national interests (a determination that is difficult to objectively define but that governments
make drawing on their specific cultural, historical, and political traditions and bringing to bear
whatever institutions or individuals wield predominant influence on this subject), diplomacy becomes
an adjunct to overt or masked displays or use of armed force. In this situation, diplomacy becomes
the main instrument to build coalitions, influence publics and elites in other countries of the justice of
the cause, and works closely with the military establishment to make available critical spaces in nonnational territory for the possible deployment of armed force (i.e., aircraft overflight rights, port visits,
shipment of men and materiel). Finally, if armed conflict does erupt, diplomacy continues during that
period (albeit with a lower emphasis) focusing on post-war planning, cost and burden-sharing, and
international organization endorsement (or at least noncondemnation) of the military actions.
Diplomacy fundamentally consists of a constant assessment of other countries’ power potential,
perceived vital interests, relationship with other states, in an attempt to maximize one’s own country’s
freedom of action with the ultimate purpose of assuring the achievement of the nation’s vital interests,
the core of which is survival. Diplomacy traditionally and currently utilizes a variety of practices or
maneuvers to obtain the protection or furtherance of the national goals or interests. Essentially all these
practices are elements of diplomatic strategy that seek advantage for the state short of war (although
war always remains the ultimate recourse). From the realist perspective, all strategies, while perhaps
amoral in themselves, have as the ultimate goal the moral aim of the survival of the state and its core
values. Thus, leaders must take account of the particular circumstance of the place in the international
order of their state to determine what would be an effective strategy and tactics or maneuvers to enable
its success. Thus, from the British and French perspective in 1938, the decision to appease Germany
over the Sudetenland may have been a misperception of the relative power of each state but was not,
a priori, an invalid tactic. The constant politically-charged accusation of “Munich” or “Yalta” in quite
different circumstances is meaningless. Sometimes appeasement is good or unavoidable. In the case of
Nazi Germany, in hindsight, it was a bad tactic because Hitler could not be appeased, and the Allies
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simply postponed the inevitable clash to a moment when they yielded military advantage to Hitler.
Détente (especially the series of arms control and human rights agreements), as practiced by Nixon and
Kissinger, was an effort to reach accommodation with the Soviet Union at a time when it appeared a
balance of power in nuclear weapons had been struck, and neither side could expect to gain a decisive
advantage. The effort by President George H. W. Bush to create a coalition in the First Gulf War was not
so much to increase U.S. military advantage over Iraq as it was to demonstrate—especially in the Arab
and Islamic worlds—the broad support to repel Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. In the recent Gulf War, the
relative absence of a significant coalition was largely a function of the administration’s desire to not be
constrained in tactics, operations (targeting), and strategy in the way it believed North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) operations in Kosovo had been hampered.
Diplomatic Instruments.
The main instrument of diplomacy is negotiation, whether in a formal or informal setting. In a
sense, all diplomacy is a constant adjustment of relations among states pursued simultaneously
through multiple, overlapping dialogues: bilateral, multilateral (e.g., UN); special conferences and
other venues. The goal is usually, but not always, to reach an agreement that could range from those
containing significant enforcement mechanisms for implementation (e.g., the Non-Proliferation
Treaty) to hortatory proclamations such as the Kellogg-Briand pact that purported to outlaw war. One
of the special advantages diplomats as a profession may have is that they should possess significant
knowledge of the personalities and national cultural styles of their interlocutors. Since much diplomatic
maneuvering by states consist of bluffs and feints as well as subtle signals either of accommodation or
willingness to risk war, a capable diplomacy can discern and characterize the meaning of a given action.
Misinterpretation, ignorance, lack of knowledge, or arrogance can lead to unforeseeable consequences
(e.g., ignoring India’s warning during the Korean War that China would intervene if U.S. forces
approached the Yalu River).
Diplomatic relations among countries long have followed a common set of practices. The necessity
to maintain contact as a means to facilitate dialogue between states leads to diplomatic recognition
that can be of the state, but not the government (e.g. North Korea by the United States); or of the
government as well. Normally, such recognition is not a moral stamp of approval but a reflection that a
regime controls the preponderance of national territory, and that it is in the interest of the other country
to have formal channels of communication. Breaking relations can be a prelude to war; more often, it
is a mark of extreme disapproval. But if the regime survives, nonrecognition can be a cause of great
inconvenience, since maintaining a dialogue usually involves talking either through third parties or in
multilateral institutions. There also are anomalous situations such as is currently the case with Cuba
where the United States maintains a large Interests Section under the technical protection of the Swiss
embassy in order to pursue business with the Castro regime without compromising its disapproval.
Sometimes a decision is made to withdraw the ambassador, temporarily or for longer periods, to
deliver a significant rebuke for some policy or action of the host government. The downside to such
an action is that dialogue between the states may become more rigid and are certainly conducted at a
lower level of authority. In normal practice, the ambassador heads an embassy that is usually divided
into numerous sections each specializing in a particular subject area. The number of persons granted
diplomatic status, which under the Vienna Convention imparts immunity to certain host government
laws, is negotiated between the two states.
An American embassy normally is organized in the following manner: at the apex is the Ambassador,
appointed by the President as his personal representative and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. He may be
a career Foreign Service Officer from the Department of State or he may be chosen from other agencies
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or the private sector. His/her alter ego is the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) who serves under the
Ambassador to assure the timely, efficient, and correct carrying out of instructions and to assure good
management practices in the embassy (i.e., avoidance of waste, fraud, and mismanagement). There
are usually several functional State Department Sections (i.e., Political, Economic, Consular, and
Administrative) that handle the reporting, management, and protection of U.S. citizens and issuance of
visas to foreign nationals. Many embassies also maintain a Defense Attaché Office with representatives
from one or more of the armed services; a Defense Cooperation Office that manages foreign military sales
and transfers; often a Foreign Commercial Service that promotes U.S. exports; a Foreign Agricultural
Service that does the same for agricultural commodities; a Legal Attaché (normally Federal Bureau
of Investigation) that liaises with host country police authorities; Drug Enforcement Agency that
does the same on narcotics issues; and a representative from Customs, possibly the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Depending on the country, many other Federal agencies may be represented.
Similarly, the receiving country may have similar sections in its embassy in Washington.
How, in the real contemporary world, does modern American diplomacy work? With or without the
publication of the National Security Strategy, which is an explicit annual overview of an administration’s
top priorities, often together with a general roadmap on how to achieve the objectives, the Department
of State, usually in conjunction and coordination with the other foreign affairs agencies under the
auspices of the National Security Council, will send telegraphic (or sometimes e-mail or telephone)
instructions to an embassy in a given country or international organization. It might be a request for
information on a matter that has risen to the attention of at least the Country Director in a regional or
functional bureau of the Department of State (perhaps due to media attention, pressure from a lobbyist,
or a request from a member of Congress). Or the department could instruct the Ambassador to raise
with the host country a matter of concern such as the arrest of an American citizen, a report of human
rights abuse by a military unit, allegations of unfair commercial practice harmful to an American firm,
sale of military weapons, a request for port visit of a U.S. warship, surveillance of a suspected terrorist
or many other possible items. In what becomes a continuous conversation, the appropriate section in
the embassy (Political, Economic, Consular, Defense Attaché, Commercial Service, or others) would
be tasked to take the necessary action. Sometimes the embassy itself reports on a matter and offers a
recommendation. In rare cases where immediate action is vital, the embassy might report what it did
and implicitly request endorsement of the action. Often, in parallel fashion, especially on important
issues, the Department would convoke the Ambassador or an appropriate official from the relevant
embassy in Washington or its Mission to the UN to make similar points. Because embassies and foreign
ministries are organized on highly hierarchical principles, it often is possible to adjust the tone and
content of the message to a particular rank, thus making clear the relative importance of the message.
Depending on response, the message’s content, deliverer, and recipient can be ratcheted up or down
accordingly.
Diplomatic Roles.
What are the principal roles of a diplomat? First, he is an agent of his government ordered to carry out
instructions from authorized superiors. In the American case, there is often a vigorous internal debate
throughout the foreign affairs agencies of the government on a given policy, as well as on the tactics
of its proposed execution, a dialogue in which both Department of State and embassies continuously
engage. However, once a decision is made, the action is carried out. Whatever an individual diplomat’s
private feelings on a given issue may be, he is duty-bound to carry out the instructions. If his conscience
does not so allow, he may request a transfer to another assignment or region or offer to resign. In effect,
the diplomat in this role functions as a lawyer with the U.S. Government as his client. Just as a lawyer’s
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ethical responsibility is to make the most vigorous possible advocacy for his client regardless of his
personal opinions of the client’s innocence, so is a diplomat in public or in conversation with foreign
interlocutors expected to make the best possible presentation on behalf of his government.
The diplomat is also an information-gatherer and analyst. Although not expected to compete in
real-time with the media organizations such as CNN or the New York Times on basic facts, due to his
presumed experience and familiarity with a country, its culture, institutions, and key personalities,
the diplomat should be able to bring added value by analyzing and putting in context what to harried
Washington senior leaders can seem like isolated, meaningless events. So, for the diplomat to be wellinformed, he ideally should speak, read, and understand the local language, extract from the mass
media key nuggets of important information, develop a string of well-informed contacts covering a
wide spectrum, and attend major events such as political party congresses. As a message-drafter, the
diplomatic drafter needs to be succinct, clear, pungent enough to both hold busy readers’ attention and
to answer the “so-what” question. The analysis needs to be substantiated by fact and interpretation,
each clearly labeled as such. While never writing with the intent to provoke, when necessary, the
drafter may have to call attention respectfully but clearly to actual or potential situations that may be
unpleasant or resented by policymakers. At the same time, national leaders must be careful not to shoot
the messenger, even if they disagree with the analysis or recommendations. Sometimes this requires
courage from the drafter and restraint from the recipient. It is always the policymakers’ prerogative to
choose other courses. But retaliation against unwanted advice or analysis can lead to self-censorship
and ultimate harm to the national interest through failure to realistically assess events.
In Washington, the middle-level diplomat is not as concerned with interpreting events in a foreign
country as he is with assisting in defining his agency’s position on a given issue (usually a whole host
of them), while interacting with other elements of the foreign affairs agencies in order to glean their
positions to better support their own agency’s position.
A diplomat is also a negotiator. Depending on the issue, a diplomat may have more or less freedom
to adjust from basic instructions, tactics, and goals. In order for a negotiation to succeed, which may
not always be desirable or the preferred outcome, the astute diplomat will have a good general
understanding of his counterpart’s baseline requirement, some sense of the national cultural manner
of negotiating, and a willingness to bargain—but not to bargain away essential or vital objectives. This
propensity for negotiation, also an inherent part of a lawyer’s toolkit, is what sometimes infuriates
ideological or idealistic individuals, since they believe it immoral to negotiate with either blatantly evil
states or leaders or they believe it puts the United States in a position of appearing to make compromises
on what can be construed as vital interests. Unless there is no longer a need to negotiate at all because
of acknowledged overwhelming power of one country or because diplomacy has yielded to open war,
such compromises are an inherent property of having to deal with a Hobbesian world of sovereign
states. Even criminal prosecutors make plea bargains with criminals to achieve a balance of justice,
resource use, and likelihood of conviction on the most serious charges.
In a slightly different key, a diplomat facilitates and maintains dialogue with his counterparts,
hopefully with a view to arriving at complementary assessments of threats, benefits, and actions to
take to maximize their respective national interests. If the dialogue goes far enough, it can lead to
commitments usually expressed in the form of treaties or agreements. They can range from reciprocal
reduction of tariffs to willingness to go to war on behalf of another country.
Diplomats also act as spokesman and sounding board for the country. A good diplomat will be
effective in public and private gatherings at furthering his country’s interests and refuting criticism
of it by couching his advocacy in a manner best suited to the culture where he is stationed. Because
of the ubiquity of media outlets, a good diplomat learns how to access the host country media, key
decisionmakers, and most relevant institutions (parliament, military, chambers of commerce, labor
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union federations etc.), and gets his point across over the blare of “white noise” emanating in the
modern media.
At the more senior level, diplomats serve as counselors to national leaders, few of whom are regional
or global experts. While diplomats rarely have the final say in the most solemn decision a nation can
make—the decision to go to war—they can serve to make clear the potential costs as well as benefits of
such acts and the likely prospects of coalitions in favor (or opposed) to their country. While certainly
not pacifists, diplomats are inclined temperamentally and professionally to seek nonviolent solutions
partly because that is what they do, and partly because they frequently can foresee second and third
order consequences that can lead to a worse situation than the status quo ante bellum. It is at this juncture
that politicians and the media sometimes confuse reporting and analysis that may be at odd with
national leadership goals with disloyalty. It is not a desire for the status quo, let alone a preference for
dealing with dictators, that may drive diplomats as some have charged. Rather it is a realization that in
the absence of comprehensive universally-acknowledged supremacy, negotiation with other regimes,
no matter how unpalatable, may be necessary. The obvious classic quote is that of Winston Churchill
who, despite being before and after World War II an adamant anti-Communist, said upon Hitler’s
attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, “If Hitler invaded hell, I would make at least a favorable reference
to the devil in the House of Commons.”3
Conclusion.
To sum up, diplomacy is a mechanism—one among many—used in furtherance of the national
interest and in protection of the national security. While styles of diplomacy may differ by national
cultures, personal idiosyncrasies, and historical memories, they all have a common purpose. As long as
there are states and they hold differing assessments of their national interests, there will be diplomacy.
While technology is making certain traditional means of conducting diplomacy obsolete, the core
functions of diplomacy will remain. In the past, the airplane and telegraph made clipper ships and
quill pen instructions redundant. New information technology already is making reporting far more
focused on analysis than simple newsgathering that is done better by CNN, and e-mail and cell-phones
are replacing cabled instructions. Such advances occasionally produce serious suggestions to eliminate
some or many embassies, but only because of a perceived more efficient manner of performing their
functions. Diplomacy is still a vital element of national power.
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CHAPTER 15
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN DIPLOMACY:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT TO 1914
Louis J. Nigro, Jr.

Diplomacy, broadly defined as the peaceful dialogue and interaction between political units, is as old
as civilization itself. The first known peace treaty was signed about 2300 BC between a king of Ebla, in
what is today Syria, and the king of Assyria. The Amarna tablets record the diplomatic correspondence
between Egypt and Syrian rulers more than 1,400 years ago, while Genesis 14 talks of Abram’s “treaty
of alliance” with Amorite kings. From the 8th to the 3rd century BC, China was divided among several
“warring states” that conducted diplomacy, as well as made war on each other in order to survive and
succeed, as Sun Tzu’s writings indicate. Other early civilizations offer similar examples of diplomatic
activity.
This chapter, concerning the development of modern diplomacy from its origins in 15th century
Europe until the 20th century, seeks to accomplish five things. First, the chapter describes the origins of
the modern state in Renaissance Italy and shows how that new type of political organization developed
a new kind of diplomacy that met its needs. Second, it examines the role of Florentine political thinker
Niccolò Machiavelli in providing a theoretical basis for the new state and for the new diplomacy used to
accomplish its goals. The chapter stresses that Machiavelli gave directions to rulers of the new states—
whether monarchies, principalities, or republics—on how to be successful in an international system
characterized by constant interaction among geographically sovereign units for power, influence, and
security. Third, it describes the parallel development of the modern sovereign or Westphalian state
and the modern diplomacy that serves it. Fourth, it looks at the application of modern diplomacy to
the classic European age of grand strategy and the balance of power from 1648 to World War I. Finally,
the chapter serves as background and introduction to other chapteers in this volume that deal with
the characteristics of the state, the nature of the international system, and the role of diplomacy as an
element of national power in the contemporary world.
FROM MEDIEVAL TO MODERN
Europe created modern diplomacy because Europe created the modern, geographically sovereign
state—the so-called Westphalian state after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The new form of
international actor that has characterized the modern international system required a new kind of
diplomacy, matched to its needs and consonant with its nature.
The modern, geographically sovereign state (or nation-state) began to emerge in Europe during
the 16th century as the old structures of European international order began to break down. The
international order that Europe had inherited from the Middle Ages was composed of structures of
power that were different from the nation-states that compose our contemporary international system.
There were structures that existed above and beyond today’s nation-state, structures that we can call
supra-statal, and structures existing below and within today’s nation-state that we can call infra-statal.
The chief supra-statal institutions were the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, both rooted
in the spiritual domain and both reflecting the glory of the ancient Roman Empire. Both Popes and
emperors claimed to be the heirs of Rome. Popes and emperors claimed wide and broad powers over
other rulers and over the subjects of other rulers that gave them legal, religious, financial, and other
authorities. The primary infra-statal institutions were a bewildering (to us, not to contemporaries)
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assortment of thousands of autonomous jurisdictions, starting from “national” kingdoms like England,
France, and Aragon, and continuing down a long hierarchical chain of political organizations through
principalities, duchies, free counties, bishoprics, free cities, commercial alliances (like the Hanseatic
League), baronies, petty lordships of all types and sizes, to corporate bodies like guilds, military orders,
and religious orders. All of them exercised what we would call political power in various ways. The
jurisdictions, rights, powers, and responsibilities of both the supra-statal and the infra-statal institutions
often conflicted and overlapped.
Together these supra-national and infra-national institutions made up what contemporaries called
Christendom. Christendom’s institutions drew their strength and legitimacy from feudal traditional
practices that mixed public office and public functions with private property and hereditary rights;
from religious and spiritual sanctions; and from social and cultural habits a thousand years in the
making. Political order in Christendom was characterized by interlocking networks of rights and
responsibilities fragmented into many small, autonomous parts. The focus of political authority was
personal, feudal, and local. The idea that political rule was strictly linked to control of territory rather
than to other sources of authority largely was absent, so that rulers were not geographically sovereign
in the sense of exerting supreme and monopolistic authority over and within a given territory and
population. Christendom as a political system appears to us to have been ambiguous, complicated,
messy, and illogical, but it worked as long as people believed in it.
The medieval order of Christendom started to break down under pressure from rising political
units that drew their strength and legitimacy from new territorial and demographic realities; that were
sanctioned more by the possession and use of practical power than by religion and tradition; and
that were evolving behind borders that were more definite and more restrictive than the old porous,
overlapping medieval political units. The growth of vernacular languages and the concomitant
beginnings of national consciousness aided the process of the development of the new political units,
which eventually would become the legally equal, sovereign states. This would intensify into the
process of state formation at the expense of both the old supra-national institutions and the old infranational institutions.
THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE ORIGINS OF MODERN DIPLOMACY: 1450-1500
Italy was the birthplace of the Renaissance and also of the first prototypes of the modern,
geographically sovereign state. The reason for this was Renaissance Italy’s vanguard status in most areas
of European endeavor—art, literature, science, jurisprudence, philosophy, economics, and finance—
but also in political development. Jacob Burckhardt’s classic 1860 interpretive essay, The Civilization of
the Renaissance in Italy, had as its central theme the problem of politics and of political anthropology.
Burckhardt believed that it was the unique political environment of Renaissance Italy that led to the
development of the Renaissance mind with its more liberated ideas, ideals, morals and attitudes. The
two overarching organizing institutions of the pre-Renaissance West, of what people thought of, not
as Europe, but as Christendom—the universal Papacy and the universalistic Holy Roman Empire—
effectively had been absent from Italy and had therefore exerted little or no influence in Italian political
life for over a century and a half. That absence, Burckhardt wrote, “left Italy in a political condition
which differed essentially from that of other countries of the West” and explained why “in them, we
detect for the first time the modern political spirit of Europe.”1
The Italian Microcosm.
Because the foundations of the medieval international order crumbled in Italy around 1300, the
Italians began to create a new political institution to fill the void left by that collapse. This new institution
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was called in Italian the stato, transforming a word that, until then, had been used to describe the legal
classes into which people fell within a political unit. Now stato—and all its cognates, such as state in
English, état in French, estado in Spanish, Staat in German, and so on—would become the term used to
describe the basic political unit of the new international order. The Italian microcosm was an anarchic
political space. The new states that the Italians evolved to fill that space were the prototypes of the
future Westphalian state. They were, in contemporary eyes, illegitimate, existing outside the medieval
and feudal hierarchies of political authority. They had to create their own legitimacy by defending their
existence. They were, therefore, warlike and aggressive. They were geographically discrete—separate
and distinct from other states or any other authorities and were nearly “sovereign” in the modern sense
of the term, jealously guarding a monopoly of political authority within their borders and recognizing
no other authority higher than themselves.
The power vacuum created by the absence of higher authority in Renaissance Italy resulted in the
growth of several Italian city-states into territorial states that absorbed smaller and weaker neighbors.
This Darwinian process of political consolidation by conquest eventually resulted in the creation of a
miniature state system in Italy, an enclosed political space with five “great” powers contending among
themselves for hegemony and influence over smaller, weaker city-states. By 1450, the five principal
territorial states of Florence, Venice, Milan, Naples, and the Papal State (based on Rome) dominated
the Italian peninsula. As they maneuvered against one another for power and advantage, making and
breaking alliances among themselves, the Italian peninsula came to constitute an enclosed system of
interacting states—a state system—that was a microcosm of the European state system to follow. In
1454, a series of wars to resist Milanese hegemonic aggression resulted in the general Peace of Lodi.
In 1455, most of the five powers and other smaller ones signed a mutual security agreement, the Italic
League, which guaranteed the existence of signatory states and called for common action against
outsiders. These arrangements led to nearly 50 years of peace on the peninsula. Managing the peace
was largely the work of Lorenzo “the Magnificent,” the Medici ruler of Florence who believed that
maintaining a balance among the five powers was better policy than trying to eliminate enemies. This
was the first conscious balance of power policy in a post-medieval state system.
The State as a Work of Art.
The 15th century Italian states were prototypes of the modern state in the sense that they interacted
as equals with the other states of their microcosmic systems and in the way they interacted with the
other powers and lesser political units of Italy. The new territorial states existed because of the absence
in Italy of the great, overarching, hierarchy-anchoring, legitimacy-conferring institutions of Papacy
and Empire. As such, the new, legitimacy-challenged Italian states had to struggle to survive, and they
knew it. The Italian state was “a new fact appearing in history—the state as the outcome of reflection
and calculation, the state as a work of art,” according to Burckardt.2 The Italian states, lacking the luxury
of traditional legitimacy, were on their own. To survive, they adopted an approach to statecraft that
responded more to necessity than to the traditional aproach that enjoined Christian moral standards
on rulers and the diplomats that served them. They acted, if not in an immoral way, then at least in an
amoral way, according to the medieval canons of princely comportment. The end—the survival of the
state—justified the means—whatever efforts the state was capable of—regardless of the established
standards of international conduct. This is the argument that makes raison d’état (reason of state) the
ultimate justification for action by states vis-à-vis other states.
As the Italian states became more self-conscious of their circumstances, they began to recognize that
the medieval way of diplomacy was no longer adequate to their needs. Medieval diplomacy was based
on the occasional dispatch and receipt of very prestigious but often untrained individuals as envoys
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on specific, short-term missions. Occasionally, diplomats were as much hostages as negotiators. The
diplomat usually viewed himself as serving as an emissary for the higher needs of Christendom, not
the political ruler who sent or received him. But the new Italian territorial states needed diplomatic
institutions and mechanisms more effective, more durable, and more permanent than the old medieval
ones. They needed both continuous dialogue with their neighbors and continuous intelligence
regarding their neighbors’ designs. The Renaissance ruler needed a mechanism to gather and report
intelligence and to sustain diplomatic dialogue. They therefore invented the key institution of modern
diplomacy—the resident ambassador endowed with diplomatic immunity—to conduct the relations
between the five states of the system continuously and seamlessly. During the second half of the 15th
century, all five of the major Italian states and many smaller ones established permanent accredited
diplomatic missions headed by ambassadors in each of the five major capitals.3
In summary, the Italian Renaissance produced the basic elements of the future European state system.
It created the geographically sovereign international actor called the state. It posited an anarchical
international environment in which states struggled ceaselessly for power and rulers deployed
statecraft, diplomacy, and military force according to calculations, not of right or wrong, but of political
expediency. It developed the notion of raison d’état; that what was good for the state was the right thing
to do, because in politics the end justified the means. It created the mechanism for continuous, sustained
diplomacy to manage the state’s engagement with the world. Finally, Renaissance Italy developed the
idea of the balance of power as a goal of the state system.
At the end of the 15th century, the days of the Italian microcosm of an enclosed and protected
peninsular state system were numbered. The world beyond the Alps, with political units much more
militarily powerful than the Italian states, began to influence Italian affairs. In 1494, the French invaded
successfully, drawing other non-Italian powers, especially Spain and the revived Holy Roman Empire,
into a struggle for control of the peninsula that made Italy a battle field for 60 years. The Italian
microcosm was destroyed, but not before its transalpine destroyers adopted the diplomatic methods
and diplomatic institutions that the Italian states had developed and deployed to meet the needs of
their prototypical modern state system. The Italian Renaissance way of diplomacy became the basis of
the European way of diplomacy for the future.4
MACHIAVELLI AND THE THEORY OF MODERN DIPLOMACY
Concepts like the amorality of politics, the ends justify the means, and raison d’état are usually
labeled “Machiavellian,” referring to the ideas of the Florentine statesman, diplomat, and political
thinker Niccolò Machiavelli (1465-1527). His works have come to epitomize the difference between the
premodern, medieval international system, and the modern, geographically sovereign one that first
appeared in the Italian state system of the 15th century.
Machiavelli received a typical Italian Renaissance education based on the ancient Greek and Roman
classics. That was the essence of the Renaissance, which means rebirth—the Italians and others believed
that they were presiding over a rebirth of learning, art, and philosophy based on the recovery of ancient
examples of those pursuits. The Renaissance was obsessed with ancient Greek and Roman culture
as the Reformation would later be obsessed with ancient Jewish and Christian culture. Renaissance
humanism was a preference for those areas of ancient Greek and Roman culture that were oriented
toward empowering human beings in this world rather than preparing them for another, better world.
The Renaissance humanist curriculum stressed rhetoric, history, and ethics, because these were tools
men could use to pursue secular, and especially political, economic, and social objectives.
Machiavelli put those tools to work as a bureaucrat in the government of the Florentine Republic.
From 1498 to 1512, he worked in the equivalents of its war and foreign ministries and went on many
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diplomatic missions to the other courts of Italy and those of France and the Empire. He was a participant
in the political and diplomatic life of Italy in the last years of the existence of the Italian microcosm
as well as the first years of the spread of the new state structure and the new diplomacy to the rest
of Europe. In 1512, the republic he served underwent a revolution and the autocratic Medici family
returned to power. Machiavelli was forced into exile in a hamlet near Florence. There he wrote his
principal works, especially The Prince, The Discourses, and The Art of War, all classics of political realism.
The Prince gives advice to monarchical regimes, especially to princes newly raised to power, on how to
retain and extend their power and influence. The Discourses does much the same thing for republican
regimes. The Art of War analyzes the military element of national power in terms of its relationship to
the political and social bases of the state.
Machiavelli’s contribution to political thought was instantly, inevitably, and lastingly controversial.
Most of his readership was confined to The Prince, a short, enigmatic, epigrammatic, and elusive work
that lent itself to misinterpretation. (Machiavelli’s other more straightforward works, including The
Art of War and The Discourses, were read less often.) In The Prince, Machiavelli gave practical advice to
an Italian prince trying to create a new state. His advice was blunt: In order to be successful, the new
prince had to use every tool available to him, including violence, deceit, treachery, and dissimulation.
The desired end was to increase his own and his state’s power. The means were politically expedient
actions, without reference to justice or traditional morality. The standard of a ruler’s conduct was raison
d’état, not Christian ethics.
Contemporaries and later writers interpreted The Prince as the bible of the doctrine of political
expediency that justified immoral conduct if it produced the desired result, that elevated power over
principle, and that denied that Christian morality applied to politics. He was accused of justifying any
means to accomplish political goals, especially the retention of and extension of state power. He was
denounced for advising rulers to use cunning, duplicity, and bad faith to enhance their own power
and undermine their enemies. Criticism of Machiavelli’s ideas developed into a genre of writing on
political theory, as thinker after thinker wrote an “anti-Machiavelli” attack on his doctrines. Shakespeare
called him “the murderous Machiavel.” The Catholic Church condemned all Machiavelli’s writings
and placed them on its Index of Prohibited Books. Later, Machiavelli was praised for the very same
doctrines, now seen as Realpolitik—the “politics of reality“ or “power politics”—based on practical and
material factors rather than theoretical or ethical objectives. Proponents hailed The Prince as an attempt
to “liberate” politics from morality and ethical concerns and to see politics “as it really is.” Louis XIV
called The Prince his “favorite nightcap”; Napoleon annotated his copy of it heavily; Benito Mussolini
extolled it as a “handbook for statesmen”; and Adolf Hitler said he kept a copy of it by his bedside.5
Machiavelli’s Message.
Machiavelli’s ideas went much further and deeper than such readers of The Prince realized. In fact,
when one takes into account his ideas as expressed in his more substantial political works, Machiavelli
emerges as the first and still the preeminent theorist of the new geographically sovereign state. He
was also the first theorist of the new diplomacy that the new states required in order to survive and
prosper. Machiavelli’s political theory is a reflection of the rise of the state system in Italy and the new
diplomacy that kept them running. As such, they are both descriptive and prescriptive. Machiavelli’s
political theory constitutes the “user’s manual” for rulers and servants of the new state—statesmen,
diplomats, and military leaders alike—in the new international environment. They instruct those who
ruled the new state and directed its engagement with the world how to succeed at statecraft under the
new conditions.
Machiavelli’s world-view is a primer for the realist theory of international affairs. In all his major
works, Machiavelli assumed a Westphalian international order long before the Peace of Westphalia gave
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its name to such an order—one composed of geographically sovereign states with durable boundaries,
equal in legal standing and legitimacy, in which the ruler monopolized the lawful use of force. He
assumed an anarchic international order, with no higher court of justice or authority than the state itself
in defending and advancing its interests. He assumed that recourse to war will be frequent and that the
new state must be organized for war to be successful. And he assumed that the state’s engagement with
the world would be constant; the state must also be organized for continuous, professional diplomacy,
in order to be successful. If we read Machiavelli broadly—not just The Prince, but The Discourses and The
Art of War as well—with these assumptions in mind, we take away a coherent theoretical structure that
reflects the Italian microcosm’s political realities that already were on their way to becoming the future
international political realities of Europe as a whole.
Machiavelli’s lessons for statecraft, war, and diplomacy generally were valid for monarchies and
republics. Rulers were responsible for the good of their state, for its survival and stability, in a word,
for its security. Rulers were judged by their success in defending and advancing the interests of the
state, not by any other standards, moral or political. The more legitimate the government, that is, the
more recognized its use of state power by constitutions, laws, tradition, custom, and religious sanction,
the stronger it would be, and the less the ruler would need recourse to extreme measures. The less
legitimate the government, the more likely its ruler would need to use extreme measures to enforce
the government’s rule. Republics and monarchies could possess strong legitimacy. But republics
were, by virtue of their representative nature, stronger and more stable than monarchies. Republics
owed their strength and stability to their ability to mobilize the loyalty and power of the people better
than monarchies, because the will of the people lent powerful reinforcement and legitimacy to any
state that represented their interests rather than those of the monarch. Well-constituted republics
were internally stable and externally strong because they were better able to promote and exploit the
economic prosperity, military potential, and patriotism of their people. But the rulers of a republic
had the same responsibility for the security of the state as monarchs, and they were judged by the
same standard—reason of state. Machiavelli advocated a return to ancient Roman republican values,
especially replacement of decadent Christian religious values with a Roman-style “civic religion” that
worshiped service to the state as the highest value, in order to reform the Italian states of his day and
prepare them for success in the anarchic international order in which he lived.
One of Machiavelli’s key legacies was the concept that the state’s primary role was external, to deal
with other states through diplomacy and war—the primacy of external policy. Another was that all
states, including republics, needed a strong executive power in their constitutions to facilitate action
against external threats. The state that Machiavelli designed in his major works would be able to fulfill
its mission of active and successful participation in an anarchic international system. That state could
contend with other sovereign states for power, influence, and security and would justify its actions by
their success according to the measure of reason of state.6
THE SPREAD OF MODERN DIPLOMACY TO EUROPE: 1500-1650
French King Louis XI led his army into Italy, took, and occupied cities from the border to Naples,
and then successfully retreated despite suffering tactical defeat by Italian forces. This revealed the stark
power differential between the small Italian states and their European counterparts, especially the
strong monarchies of France and Spain. Italy became a battleground for foreign powers for the next 60
years. The invasions of Italy helped spread the Renaissance to all of Europe, including the new Italian
political institutions. The idea of the new state with its exclusive territorial basis and its concentration
of power in the ruler’s hands was attractive to Western European rulers. And the European rulers
had one thing that the Italian Renaissance new states lacked—legitimacy. Their rule, whether over
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kingdoms, principalities, duchies or other jurisdictions, was sanctioned and supported by the soft
power of legitimacy based on religion, tradition, or custom. When these rulers adopted the ways of the
Italians in concentrating power within defined territorial limits, they became more and more powerful
at the expense of the old medieval system. Diffused authority and fragmented rights and responsibilities
among nobility and church, cities and social orders, and all the other atomized institutions that claimed a
share of political power on traditional and feudal grounds could not withstand the new state system.
The northern rulers also adopted the diplomacy that the Italians had developed to serve their new
states. More and more, diplomacy was restricted to political units that had pretensions to sovereignty—
a monopoly of legitimate force within the borders of the territory they controlled. The Italian system
of permanent, resident ambassadors, duly accredited and endowed with diplomatic immunity rapidly
became the standard for Europe. The resident ambassadorial system gave rulers ways to influence other
states by representing policies and views to other rulers, by providing timely and accurate political
intelligence back to the capital, and by concerting actions with allied and friendly governments; it soon
became the norm throughout Europe.
The Reformation.
The invasions of Italy and the spread of the Renaissance Italian state system to the rest of Europe in
the early 16th century coincided with the beginnings of the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation
had great influence on the development of the modern state system and modern diplomacy because it
discredited the two great supra-statal political institutions of Christendom, the Papacy and the Empire.
The Reformation radically reduced those institutions’ ability to influence the international system, and
at the same time greatly strengthened the power of the rulers of the new states. The Reformation
strengthened the hand of Protestant rulers by transferring to them the effective leadership of the reformed
churches. The Reformation therefore intersected with the rise of territorial states in ways that powerfully
accelerated the process of state formation that the Renaissance had begun. The Reformation harnessed
the immense power of religion to the raison d’être of the state and added religious differences to the
already long menu of reasons for states to conflict with other states. In the short run, the expansion and
development of diplomacy suffered as states of different religions downgraded or interrupted normal
diplomatic relations for a time. In the long run, however, the development of diplomacy resumed its
previous trajectory, keeping pace with the development of state power and self-awareness, as well as
with the extension of a state system that required continuous and consequential diplomatic activity in
order to function effectively.
The Reformation led to a long series of religious struggles, first in Germany and Central Europe,
and later in France, the Low Countries, and elsewhere. It led, too, to the Catholic Counter-Reformation,
which reorganized the Church in Catholic lands as the Reformation reorganized the churches in
Protestant lands. In both Catholic and Protestant Europe, however, the religious breakdown of the unity
of Christendom resulted in a tremendous source of political influence for the new states—religious
uniformity under the control of the state and its ruler became the norm. Everywhere, the sanction of
guardian of the faith was added to the secular ruler’s authority, vastly increasing the concentration
of his power. This was recognized in international law and practice by the Peace of Augsburg of
1555 between the Catholic Emperor Charles V and the rebellious Protestant states of his Empire. The
question of which religion people would be allowed to practice—in this case, either Catholicism or
Lutheranism—was to be decided by the local ruler. This arrangement was expressed as the principle
of cujus regio, ejus religio—the ruler’s religion is the religion of the ruler’s people. At the state level, no
toleration of religious minorities was foreseen. At the macro level, the result was greater toleration for
religious diversity in the international system of sovereign states.
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Balance-of-Power Diplomacy and the Wars of Religion.
As the modern state system developed, its characteristic dynamics developed as well. In an anarchic
system, hegemonic threats appeared as one state grew stronger than others. The system began to
respond to hegemonic threats through the mechanism of the balance of power, in which coalitions
developed to resist, restrain, and reduce the would-be hegemon’s power and influence to manageable
proportions. This happened even during the wars of religion. The attempts of Habsburg Emperor (and
King of Spain) Charles V to restore and extend the power of the Holy Roman Empire from the 1530s
until his abdication in 1556 led to the formation of coalitions against him on both religious and purely
political grounds (although the distinction was losing its edge). This was the last serious attempt by
a Holy Roman Emperor to achieve European hegemony and Christian unity, another indication that
the modern state was succeeding in crowding out premodern political forms. The development of the
major European states into absolute monarchies was another. The balance of power mechanism was
extended beyond Europe when France signed a treaty with the Turkish Sultan in 1536 to bring the
Ottoman Empire into play diplomatically in its resistance to Charles’s hegemonic effort.
Habsburg dynasts made two more attempts to assert hegemony over Europe using religion as a
justification. Charles V’s son, King Philip II (1556-98) of Spain, tried to leverage the power of his realm
and its wealthy overseas empire to achieve European hegemony, but met the opposition of coalitions
that linked his Dutch and Belgian Protestant subjects with England and France. Between 1618 and
1648, the Habsburg rulers of Spain and the Empire again grasped for hegemony, trying to exploit the
Counter-Reformation’s partial successes to once again impose a Habsburg-controlled order on Europe.
The Thirty Years War that prevented that from happening was the result of the resistance of a wide
coalition of German Protestant states backed by Catholic France and Lutheran Sweden. The leading
anti-hegemonic statesman of the first half of the 17th century was France’s Cardinal Richelieu, who
knitted together the anti-Habsburg coalition that won the Thirty Years War by blocking the Spanish
and Austrian branches of that family’s bid for mastery of the continent.
THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHIES AND BALANCE-OF-POWER DIPLOMACY: 1650-1815.
The Westphalia settlement of 1648 ended the period of religious wars and ushered in one in which
the Great Powers engaged in episodic struggles to extend their power and influence in order to achieve
hegemony for themselves, or in order to prevent the achievement of hegemony by others. The settlement
itself generally is considered to have established definitively the sovereign state as the basic international
actor and to have christened the European state system as one composed of distinct and juridically equal,
sovereign states. These Westphalian sovereign states monopolized the legitimate use of force within
well-defined borders and struggled for power in an anarchical international environment. The reality
was not quite so advanced, but the idea of the modern Westphalian state gradually would become
accepted as the norm. A constant search for equilibrium governed the system through diplomacy that
sought to restore the balance of power among competing states. The universalist idea was no longer
seriously considered outside the Papal Apartments in the Vatican.
Adam Watson describes how the period from Westphalia to Vienna contributed to the development
of modern diplomacy. First, there was the propagation of the concept of the professional career diplomat,
who cultivated specific skills that ensured effective performance of his duties. Second, there arose the
idea that these professional diplomats belonged to informal but useful groups of accredited diplomats
at various courts of Europe who shared a common outlook and common goals. These included a
common need to protect their status and privileges; mutual advantage in exchanging information and
evaluations, especially among representatives of allied and friendly states; and reciprocal advantage in
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maintaining good working relations, even as their governments quarreled. The diplomatic corps had
taken shape and would become permanent, although its members came and went. Third, diplomatic
congresses began to play an increasingly important role in ending and regulating conflict, and began
to be seen not as isolated events, but as “climaxes in dialogue.”7
Diplomacy was becoming continuous and general, as war was becoming occasional and limited to
certain principals, while some neutrals normally stood aside. Negotiation increasingly was regarded
as valuable in and of itself, as Cardinal Richelieu stated in his Political Testament. Richelieu also sought
to remain in constant diplomatic contact with the enemies of France, including during war, in order to
be better placed to influence their policies, even as their respective armies fought. Fourth, diplomacy
increasingly was conceived of as the management mechanism for the balance of power, which ensured
the continued existence of all international actors by adjusting and readjusting the alignment of states to
compensate for changes in the level of power of individual states. Diplomacy was needed to negotiate
these adjustments. Finally, institutions to manage the conduct of diplomacy in capitals coalesced into
regular ministries of foreign affairs, as a “logical complement of resident envoys.”8
The balance of power could ensure the survival of most states, but it could not preserve the peace
entirely. First France under Louis XIV (1640-1715) threatened to become the European hegemon,
especially by unifying France and Spain into one grand dynastic empire that would include Spain’s farflung international holdings. This brought coalitions led by the Netherlands, the Holy Roman Empire,
and Britain into play in order to deny French ambitions. Such coalitions fought the French and their
allies four times between 1667 and 1713, exhausting France and Spain. The last of these wars, the War
of the Spanish Succession or Queen Anne’s War in America (1702-13), was very nearly a world war,
because it involved operations and alliances with local rulers on several continents.
Through the rest of the 18th century, French attempts to reassert itself and English efforts to prevent
France from dominating Europe, while extending its own colonial and commercial empire, were played
out in a series of wars based on shifting alliances—the War of the Polish Succession (1733-38); the War
of the Austrian Succession or King George’s War in America (1740-48); the Seven Years War (175663), called the French and Indian War in America (1754-63); and the War of the American Revolution
(1775-83). The war in America became a Great Power struggle as skillful diplomacy and astute use of
intelligence by the colonists intersected with French desire for revenge on Britain. That produced an
American-Franco-Spanish alliance that fought the British militarily and a pro-American, Russian-led
League of Armed Neutrality served to isolate Britain diplomatically and economically.
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic period brought a renewed French drive for continental
hegemony as well as British resolve to prevent it, involving coalitions on both sides. Napoleon, in fact,
realized albeit briefly (1807-11) the general European hegemony about which Charles V and Louis XIV
had dreamed. In Europe in 1811, only Britain was outside the French orbit. The French Empire was
surrounded by satellite states and allies of dubious loyalty but unwilling to oppose Napoleon’s dictates
openly. Napoleon’s political overreach in Spain and military defeat in Russia in 1812 revived British
efforts to create an anti-French coalition. British diplomacy was ultimately successful in exploiting
the state system’s inherent unwillingness to tolerate an aggressive hegemon by constructing and
maintaining a Grand Coalition of all the other Great Powers to defeat Napoleon and finally to impose
regime change on the French.
BALANCE-OF-POWER DIPLOMACY AND EUROPEAN EQUILIBRIUM: 1815-1914
The post-Napoleonic settlement began an unprecedented period of comity in the European state
system. After the Congress of Vienna that codified the post-Napoleonic settlement, no general wars
lasting more than a few months or involving all of the Great Powers were fought for nearly a century.
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The statesmen and diplomats gathered at Vienna were intent on restoring the 18th century balance
of power in the European state system as the best way of ensuring peace. The territorial changes they
made and the institutional initiatives they took were successful in providing the basis for a durable
peace among the Great Powers for nearly 100 years. No shock to the international system as great as
that produced by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Hegemony has yet been followed by such
a sustained period of peace.
Sir Harold Nicolson described the chief characteristics of the diplomacy of the period from Vienna
to World War I, when grand strategy was implemented on the basis of the balance of power, first in
Europe and then in the rest of the world, as the European powers spread their influence internationally.
First, diplomacy was Eurocentric. Europe was regarded as the most important area of the world and
the other continents of secondary importance. Second, diplomacy was Great-Power-centric. The
smaller and weaker powers were drawn into the orbits of one of the Great Powers in order to play
their supporting roles in the unending maneuver to maintain, restore, or overthrow the existing
balance of power. Third, the Great Powers possessed a “common responsibility for the conduct of
the Small Powers and the preservation of peace between them.” This implied a right of intervention
by the Great Powers in crises and conflicts involving the smaller and weaker powers. Fourth, there
was the establishment in every European country of a “professional diplomatic service on a more
or less identical model.” These professional diplomats developed a kind of corporate identity based
on a common belief, notwithstanding the policies of their various governments, “that the purpose of
diplomacy was the preservation of peace.” Finally, diplomacy was conducted on “the rule that sound
negotiation must be continuous and confidential.”9
From 1815 to 1848, Britain followed its successful wartime diplomatic leadership with an ambitious
attempt at peacetime coalition diplomacy. The British aimed to create a system of collective security
based on dynastic legitimacy and participation in periodic international congresses to regulate the
balance of power diplomatically. British foreign secretary Lord Castlereagh was the architect and
inspiration both of the anti-Napoleonic coalitions and of the post-war settlement. Charles de Talleyrand,
who served in leading political and diplomatic roles for every French government from the Old Regime
before 1789 to Napoleon’s Empire, deserted Napoleon to lead the French diplomatic effort to preserve
key territorial gains since 1789 and win a seat at the table of European congress-diplomacy after 1815,
thereby rescuing and restoring France’s Great Power status. In 1818, the victorious powers—Britain,
Austria, Russia, and Prussia—welcomed the same France they had defeated into a quintuple alliance
that would exert a kind of collective supervision over the European state system. Five-power congresses
authorized French intervention in Spain and Austrian interventions in Italy to put down revolutions
there in the 1820s. The collective security arrangements of the Congress System did not last long, but
the idea of a less institutionalized but still effective Concert of Europe, with the Great Powers acting
as a kind of continental directorate, ensured general peace among themselves while permitting minor
adjustments to the prevailing order for 30 years. Austrian Prince Clemens von Metternich, called “the
coachman of Europe,” guided the concert-system on the continent through the second quarter of the
century, successfully pursuing peace and stability through the Concert of Europe and the conservative
Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia to defend dynastic legitimacy against the threat from
the most dangerous non-state actors, the nascent national movements. Even so, the system peacefully
absorbed the effects of revolutions in France, Belgium, and Poland in 1830.
During the period 1848-71, the wave of nationalistic political and social revolutions that swept over
Europe in 1848-49 strongly challenged the system, and the gradual breakup of the Ottoman Empire
in Europe, which led to the Crimean War of 1856, further taxed it. The processes of Italian and then
German national unification were severe tests for the state system and deeply affected the balance of
power, but even these events involved short, limited wars that were not allowed to become general
European conflicts. The forces of nationalism were managed without recourse to general war. Italy was
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united under the Kingdom of Piedmont-Savoy through the diplomatic virtuosity of Prime Minister
Camillo di Cavour, who joined the Franco-British alliance against Russia in the Crimean War (185456). This gained him the British diplomatic support and the French military assistance he needed to
defeat the Austrians (1859) who ruled northern Italy and to begin the unification process completed
by his successors in 1870. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck united Germany by isolating France
diplomatically while constructing an anti-French coalition among the smaller German states to defeat
France in 1870 and proclaim the creation of the German Empire in 1871 with the Prussian king as
Kaiser. Lord Palmerston put British naval and financial might to work to influence the balance of
power on the continent to London’s advantage. The American Civil War did not tempt the European
powers, especially Britain and France, to serious intervention, either militarily or diplomatically. U.S.
diplomacy, aimed at keeping the Europeans out of the issue, bested Confederate diplomacy, which
sought European intervention and eventual recognition of the Confederacy as a legitimate, sovereign
state. Even under the difficult conditions created by a rising tide of nationalism and political and social
revolutionary sentiments the European powers managed to regulate their state system without recourse
to general war or war between certain powers for more than a few months.
During the years 1871-1914, European diplomacy was concentrated on the peaceful management of
two intense contests among the European powers, the competition for the remnants of the dissolving
Ottoman Empire, especially in Europe, and the competition for colonial expansion in Africa and
Asia. Bismarck’s political foresight and diplomatic skill were demonstrated in both spheres, first as
he assembled the Powers in Berlin in 1878 to craft a general settlement to the Russo-Turkish War of
1877-78 that involved multiple changes of boundaries and prevented war from spreading. He called
them together again in 1885 to submit a number of African colonial disputes to general arbitration and
international decision. The United States under Theodore Roosevelt played a leading diplomatic role
in ending the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 through mediation at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
The 19th century produced advances in diplomatic institutions in response to developments in
military affairs, economic expansion, nationalist ambitions, and the rise of public opinion. From the
1830s, military attachés were added to embassy staffs, reflecting the growing complexity of the military
element of national power. Soon after, commercial attachés made a similar appearance in the diplomatic
world, reflecting the growing importance of the economic element of national power. Governments
also began to engage in cultural diplomacy by supporting missionaries they saw as spreading their
languages and cultures as well as the faith, and by promoting cultural associations like the French
Alliance Française and the Italian Società Dante Alighieri to encourage familiarity with and respect
for their respective languages and cultures. Finally, governments started to exploit the possibilities
of influencing foreign public opinion, usually by trying to influence the popular press to report and
comment favorably on their policies and actions.10
The ability of the European powers to continue to manage their diplomatic relations without
recourse to general war ended in the cataclysm of 1914-18. Historians would later see World War I, and
especially the inability of the powers to reach a durable settlement after it in Paris in 1919, as the end of
the European state system and the beginning of the global state system of the 20th and 21st centuries.
Diplomacy would, nevertheless, continue as a crucial element of power.11
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CHAPTER 16
INFORMATION:
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT
Frank L. Jones
Information and the various technologies that disseminate it to people throughout the world are
critical to modern life, even though some people take it for granted while others resist its impact with
Hutterite vigor. The very nature of our personal lives, including the means of social interaction as well
as the conduct of commerce and government, has been changed dramatically by the use of computers
and telecommunications equipment. The technological revolution that we have witnessed since the
1970s forced us to coin the term “Information Age” to provide the context for the influence that the
computer and the silicon chip have had on our daily activities. The means by which we communicate
today are decidedly different from the methods used even a decade ago, and the technological advances
that are likely to be developed in the next several decades cannot be readily understood or appreciated
except by a few visionaries. Nonetheless, we now readily grasp that the methods used to communicate
are in constant transformation.
The repercussions of this spectacular and perhaps radical change in technology are numerous.
Nonetheless, for the national security professional, it has strategic implications. States now must not
only deal with other states, but with a variety of subnational and nonstate actors. Diplomacy in a wired
world is far different in its conduct than it was even a few decades ago. This is because of the capacity
of the global media to transmit information and images throughout the world with astonishing speed
but also because the nature of communication today is transnational, domestic audiences cannot be
isolated from foreign ones. We live in an increasingly connected world. The other two elements of
power, military and economic, have been changed substantially by the wired world as well.
U.S. military doctrine addresses the concept of “information dominance,” which is defined as “the
degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities
to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of
war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary.”1 Military theorists argue that information
dominance is essential to military operational success and relies on a sophisticated understanding
of what information is required, as well as a capacity to manage the use and dissemination of that
knowledge to the right place, at the right time, and for the desired purpose.2
Economists talk about information production and use as a modern measurable inventory of assets,
a medium of exchange, and the target for growth.3 In other words, knowledge and information are
understood as commodities that can be moved thousands of miles in fractions of seconds. Yet, despite
this recognition of information as an integral facet of contemporary society and its inclusion as an
element of national power by many scholars and strategic thinkers, this element’s unique role often is
misunderstood.
Since the 1990s, many political scientists and international relations scholars have identified and
advocated information as a fourth element of power. Bartlett, Holman, and Somes have argued that the
dynamic security environment that we confront today and in the future will alter the relative utility of
the other three elements—economic, diplomatic, and military. They suggest that strategists increasingly
must consider additional forms of influence, including the growing use of information media to shape
the battle space.
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Defining Information as an Instrument of Power.
Nonetheless, a common understanding of information as an instrument of power is necessary
before proceeding. Information as an element of power has taken on a new meaning in the past
decade with the introduction of such concepts as information operations (IO) and information warfare.
Unfortunately, both of these terms have disputed and convoluted meanings that encompass numerous
aspects of warfare ranging from computer network attack to psychological operations. Consequently,
our understanding of information as an element of power often is confused or so ambiguous as to be
meaningless to the strategist. We need a more refined definition.
In his seminal article, “Soft Power,” Joseph Nye argues that the notion of power is changing in world
politics. He contends that displays of power do not reside in resources but in the ability to change the
behavior of states, to control the political environment. Military power and economic power have their
limitations because of unintended consequences and the costs associated with using these instruments,
as well as the diffusion of certain equalizers such as technology. Power is being transferred from the
“capital rich” to the “information-rich,” and that power in world politics has now another dimension,
what Nye calls “co-optive power” or “soft power” whereby “one country gets other countries to do
what it wants” rather than using force to order other countries to act in a certain manner. He continues
by stating that soft power is designed to shape beliefs and preferences of other countries based on the
attractiveness of culture and ideology. To succeed in this endeavor, a state must have the ability to
communicate its messages to other countries.4
Information, as an element of soft power, is a strategic instrument within the context of grand
strategy. As an instrument, it relies on the “understanding and use of graphic, intellectual, or sensory
imagery, drawing on historical, cultural, linguistic, religious, ethical, and other issues of substance
and belief which affect people as individuals or groups within the strategic environment.”5 Thus,
information as an element of power should be understood as a psychological dimension of warfare,
not to be confused with psychological operations, which is a component of the information element of
power. Therefore, for the U.S. Government, the informational element of power is its ability to employ
its information capabilities to influence the attitudes and behaviors of foreign elites and publics.
Unfortunately, the informational element often is viewed as a component of the diplomatic or political
elements of power, but to view information solely as a subordinate tool is myopic since information is
an instrument in its own right. The increasing reach of regional and global communication systems has
made it an autonomous tool of statecraft.
It is important to differentiate information as an element of power from the diplomatic and military
elements. Regarding the former, the diplomatic element tends to focus primarily on state-to-state
communication through the auspices of foreign ministries and other governmental institutions.
The military use of information largely has been placed under the umbrella term, “information
operations.” As mentioned earlier, the functions that constitute IO have been a subject of debate for
several years. The definition in Army Field Manual 3-0, June 2001, will suffice for our purposes: “Actions
taken to affect adversaries’ and influence others’ decisionmaking process, information, and information
systems while protecting one’s own. . . .”6 Consequently, this definition could include such practices
as computer network operations (attack and defense), deception, and psychological operations. For
most people, however, information operations are synonymous with computers. This meaning is
inconsistent with the objective of influencing foreign audiences. It confuses the technology that is used
with the intention. Instead, there must be some basic principles to define information as an element of
power. William Kiehl, a U.S. public diplomacy expert, offers a useful term—influence and perception
management. Influence and perception management may be defined as “the use of the tools of influence
and perception management in peace or in war to influence positively the perceptions, attitudes and
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actions of publics to advance the interests of a nation.”7 Kiehl makes no distinction between foreign and
domestic audiences. Such a distinction must be noted because of U.S. law. The Smith-Mundt Act, which
was enacted in 1948, prohibits the domestic dissemination of any “information about the United States,
its people, and its policies” prepared for foreign dissemination.8 In essence, Congress was concerned
about U.S. Government agencies propagandizing the American public. Therefore, in the U.S. context,
the emphasis is on influencing foreign publics, although many practitioners argue that this distinction is
no longer realistic, given the transnational nature of information dissemination by the global media.9
Regardless, Kiehl’s term is more apt as it speaks to the outcomes that a strategist wants to effect in
utilizing information as an instrument of power, that is, influencing the behaviors and actions of allies,
friends, neutrals, and enemies in order to attain national security objectives, while at the same time
recognizing that to influence publics one must make use of various tools. The U.S. Government uses
four tools for influence and perception management: public diplomacy, public affairs, international
broadcasting, and psychological operations.
The Four Components of the Informational Element.
The ability to influence the attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences historically has been a
government’s ability to further its national strategic goals through an integrated, synchronized
interagency process using the aforementioned tools as its channels.
Public diplomacy is one of the earliest tools that the founders of this nation used in attempting to
influence foreign publics. One can argue that the Declaration of Independence is not only a statement
of the aspirations of some American colonists to break from England and create a new philosophy of
democratic governance, but it is also a well-crafted propaganda document directed at the English and
European publics to justify their actions against the monarch and Parliament.
There is no generally accepted definition of public diplomacy. In fact, its meanings have changed
over the years and with various presidential administrations. Nonetheless, it generally is understood
to be the careful engagement primarily of targeted sectors of foreign publics (individuals and groups)
in order to promote U.S. national interests through understanding, information and influence.
Public diplomacy activities, consisting of two elements, are carried out by the Department of
State. The first are information activities which include publications and electronic media, overseas
information resource centers, speakers, and specialists who meet with foreign publics and governments
in various venues, and various video and teleconference programs. The other aspect of public
diplomacy is educational and cultural exchanges such as academic exchanges, the Fulbright program,
and international visitors programs, to name a few.
Public affairs is the second component. It is the provision of information to the public, press, and
other institutions regarding the goals, policies, and activities of the U.S. Government. It seeks to foster
an understanding of these goals through a dialogue with individual citizens, groups, and institutions,
as well as the domestic and international media. Nonetheless, the focus of public affairs is to inform the
U.S. domestic audience.
The primary departmental offices concerned with public affairs as it related to the conduct of
national security policy are the Department of State’s office of the Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.
The third component, international broadcasting, is conducted under the auspices of the Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG), which became the independent, autonomous entity responsible for all U.S.
Government and government sponsored, nonmilitary, international broadcasting in October 1999.
This was the result of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (Public Law 105-277), the
single most important legislation affecting U.S. international broadcasting since the early 1950s.

211

The Board consists of nine members, eight private citizens and the Secretary of State (the director
of the U.S. Information Agency represented the U.S. Government on the board until that agency
was abolished in 1999). Congress intended the composition of the BBG to protect the integrity of the
journalists working in international broadcasting and to maintain their ability to operate under the
Voice of America Charter.
The Voice of America (VOA) Charter, drafted in 1960 and later signed into law in July 1976 by
President Gerald Ford, provides the principles that guide U.S. Governmental international broadcasting.
The Charter indicates that the long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating
directly to the peoples of the world and by gaining the attention and respect of these listeners. Therefore,
three principles pertain to achieve this end:
•

VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective,
and comprehensive.

•

VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced
and comprehensive projection of significant American thought.

•

VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will present responsible discussions
and opinion on these policies.

The U.S. Government’s international broadcasting programs are transmitted directly to a mass
audience rather than through an embassy. These programs are disseminated on a daily basis by the
individual BBG international broadcasters: the VOA, Radio Sawa, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio and TV Marti, and WORLDNET Television,
with the assistance of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), which provides administrative and
other support for the broadcasters.
The final component of the informational element of power is international military information
(IMI), better known as overt psychological operations. Psychological operations are defined as operations
to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior that are favorable to U.S. foreign policy or military
objectives in selected foreign audiences through planned operations to convey selected information in
order to influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately behavior, and to accomplish
this end through truthful means.10 Historically, psychological operations have been conducted at the
operational and tactical level by designated psychological operations units and less at the strategic
level, since the modes of information dissemination at that level belong to the Department of State and
the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
Experts typically view IMI as having two facets. The first is information communicated to foreign
audiences through the execution of the regional combatant commander’s Theater Security Cooperation
Plan, using such measures as forward deployments, military-to-military contacts, unit visits, exercises,
and conferences. IMI also includes overt peacetime psychological operations programs (OP-3),
which was established in the early 1980s. OP-3 are annual programs that regional commanders have
coordinated with the chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions to support and provide for the conduct of overt
psychological operations in support of U.S. regional objectives.
Using the Power of Information—The U.S. Historical Experience.
As indicated earlier, influence and perception management has been understood as an important
aspect of American foreign policy since the founders declared their independence from Great Britain.
However, it was not an institutionalized or a highly developed tool until the American experience
in World War I, with the creation of the Committee on Public Information in 1917. It was at this
time that the U.S. Government first comprehended and valued the importance of communicating
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with foreign publics and opinion makers to promote its foreign policy goals, dismiss rumors, and
counteract disinformation and propaganda. Over the succeeding decades, it has created a number
of organizations, usually of limited duration, and utilized a variety of media to communicate with
foreign audiences. Media have ranged from the technologically simple such as printed materials, to
the more sophisticated such as radio broadcasts, film, television, Internet websites, and direct satellite
broadcasting. The purpose for establishing these organizations and using these media is to inform and
influence foreign audiences, whether friendly or not, to understand and accept and support, or at least
tolerate, U.S. activities and policies. Yet, the U.S. Government’s overall investment in these media has
been minimal, and its attention to the importance of this instrument has been sporadic at best.
Nonetheless, beginning with the Cold War, some Presidents have understood the value of an
information campaign directed at foreign audiences. For example, in 1951, President Harry S Truman
created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) to provide for more effective planning, coordination,
and conduct of psychological operations within the structure of approved reporting directly to the
National Security Council.11
This belief in the use of information as an instrument of power was not necessarily shared by the
administrations that followed. In some instances, the use of this instrument became too narrowly focused
because a national-level strategic vision was lacking or was beleaguered by bureaucratic resistance
and poor operational coordination among the responsible agencies. Scholars and practitioners have
maintained that these problems manifested themselves during the Vietnam War and festered through
the 1970s and into the 1980s as a foreign policy consensus in the United States unraveled. It can be
argued as well that within the Department of Defense (DoD), starting in the late 1950s, psychological
operations, then called psychological warfare, became an element of the Army’s special warfare mission
and therefore lost its strategic focus, becoming instead a device for use in counterinsurgency. Regardless
of these reasons, what does seem clear is that the post-Vietnam war era signaled the beginning of a long
period of decline and ultimately degeneration, until President Ronald Reagan’s election.12
President Reagan, the “Great Communicator,” appreciated and used information as a fundamental
part of his administration’s national security strategy to destroy the Soviet Union. National Security
Decision Directives 45, 77, and 130, signed in 1982, 1983 and 1984, respectively, emphasized the
importance of public diplomacy, particularly, international radio broadcasting and psychological
operations. Public diplomacy programs were acknowledged as a strategic means of implementing U.S.
national security policy and not merely supplementary to diplomacy.13 Carl Builder concluded in his
book, The Icarus Syndrome, that the barriers of the Cold War were “breached not by military forces,
diplomacy, alliances or economic power, but by information spewing out of television sets, telephones,
audio and video tapes, computers, and facsimile machines, into the minds of the individuals.”14
President Bill Clinton recognized the importance of strategic information dissemination and signed
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, International Public Information, in 1999. The objective of
this directive was to use international public information activities to improve the ability of the U.S.
Government to prevent and mitigate crises and to promote understanding and support for U.S. foreign
policy initiatives around the globe. PDD-68, however, was not directed against a particular adversary in
order to defeat that opponent. Instead, it was developed in response to primarily the horrors of Rwanda
and the use of “Hate Radio” by Hutu extremists to incite violence against Tutsis and moderate Hutus,
but also because of the U.S. peacekeeping experience in Haiti and Bosnia. Although the directive had
its flaws, the absence of senior official support for timely implementation of its provisions, insufficient
staff, and no funding specifically targeted for its purposes ensured that it remained a half-measure.
Yet, like its predecessor directives, with a change in administration, what little progress had been made
in underscoring the importance of influence and perception management was lost since there was no
organizational structure in place to ensure continuity.
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Diplomats, members of Congress, and others recognized this situation in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001. Shortly after those tragic events, members of Congress, practitioners, and scholars
wrote opinion pieces decrying the U.S. Government’s inability to communicate its message to foreign
audiences. Congressional committees held hearings dedicated to understanding the U.S. Government’s
public diplomacy role in the war on terrorism. The Department of State enlisted the Advertising
Council to assist in the creation of public service announcements to be used overseas. This measure
only highlighted that the U.S. Government had no strategic information policy or plan that had been
forged in the interagency process and that would synchronize the efforts of the Departments of State
and Defense, as well as other agencies that can contribute to this effort. Instead, the administration was
reacting to events as many of its predecessors had done, and when it did act, it did not always tailor
its message to foreign audiences accurately. Eventually, the George Bush administration recognized
that it needed to implement several actions in the “War on Terrorism,” to include reestablishing media
and information capabilities that had been eliminated because of limited resources and implementing a
formal interagency coordination process at the senior level.15 President Bush also established by executive
order an Office of Global Communications in the White House to advise the President and other U.S.
Government leaders on how to achieve the most effective means for the United States Government,
to ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent
misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform
international audiences.16
It is too early to determine if such measures will be long lasting. Historically, the U.S. Government’s
awareness of information as a critical element of power has been uneven, always receiving more
attention during crises. Nonetheless, the events of September 11, as well as the “War on Terrorism,”
have sensitized strategic leaders to the importance of not only having a more effective apparatus for
disseminating the U.S. Government’s message, but the creation of specialized programs primarily
aimed at communicating with the Arab and the wider Muslim community. Yet, even these efforts
are not panaceas, as there are limitations due to the complexities involved to how successful the U.S.
Government can be in influencing foreign audiences.
Controlling the Information Environment.
Control of the information environment at the strategic level always has been a critical requirement
for U.S. political leaders. Every act of government has a psychological effect on the nation’s foreign
relations whether it is a trade delegation visit, a diplomatic summit, or a military training exercise
conducted with allies and friends. Numerous administrations have attempted to consolidate strategic
information capabilities and develop an information strategy, but the task is difficult for a number of
reasons ranging from the mundane—such as competing bureaucratic demands and interests and the
availability of resources—to the more complicated elements of time, image, and ideas. These three
elements, according to Professor Barry Fulton, underscore that a government’s ability to influence the
attitudes and behaviors of foreign audiences is difficult and limited.
There is a decided belief that if an information campaign is well-designed and directed toward the
correct audience, it will change attitudes and behavior. As Fulton points out, time past often is forgotten,
that is, any message will be filtered through culture, history, and experience, and these variables have
a tendency to distort the message. Further, he argues that governments tend to concern themselves
with today’s message or with short-term goals, while changing attitudes and behaviors takes years to
accomplish. Thus few government leaders are in office long enough to sustain a information campaign
over an extended period, and few want to dedicate resources to address problems that may be decades
away.17
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The second element is image, that is, we act on the pictures that we perceive and retain, not on
the complex reality of which these pictures are a part. In other words, how people perceive images
is individualistic, and it is difficult to predict how broadcasted images will be received, what reality
they may represent.18 As Carnes Lord has pointed out, success in psychological warfare is more than
the conflict of ideas, ideologies, and opinions. It is also about cultural and political symbols, about
perceptions and emotions. The informational content of television pictures is low or nonexistent,
and they are often “torn out of any intelligible context” so as to arouse emotions that hinder rational
discussion.19
Lastly, ideas are more than the messages. Ideas are best nurtured in dialogue—listening is as
important as speaking. Fulton refers to the work of two RAND Corporation researchers, John Arquilla
and David Ronfeldt, who suggest that there are three realms of information. The first is cyberspace—
the global network of electronic connectivity, primarily the internet plus electronic information held
by corporations and governments. The second is the infosphere, which consists of cyberspace and
broadcast, print, and other media, as well as command, control, and communication systems of the
military. The third is noosphere, the realm of knowledge and wisdom. If one focuses on cyberspace and
the infosphere, then the tendency is to concentrate our attention on the media and the message. Fulton
argues that the contemporary strategist must go beyond these two dimensions and become comfortable
in the more abstract noosphere where he must learn to think in terms of ideas and values.20
Conclusion.
Clearly, the times warrant a greater recognition of the distinctiveness and importance of information
as an element of national power, given the technological advances in communications that have occurred
over the past 3 decades. These advances have furnished new tools of communication, influenced not
only the structures and processes of public and private sector organizations, but also given rise to a
multitude of nonstate actors that now wield power in international affairs, and transformed political
and economic relationships domestically and globally. In short, information is now understood to be an
essential instrument of power and influence that, when used strategically, can be effective in achieving
national interests.
Senior leaders and strategists who do not comprehend that information is a strategic element
surrender the advantage to those who do. As General Wesley Clark underscores in his book, Waging
Modern War, the efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S. Government to
tell their story during Kosovo and to counter the Serb media campaign were inadequate. He declares
that the importance of attending to media coverage was not lost on the military and political leaders
in the West.21 The validity of his pronouncement is subject to debate. His experience is not. Strategic
leaders must understand the value that the components of the informational element of power can
bring to the strategic art. Using information effectively is more than networks and hardware. Instead,
the synchronized and timely dissemination of a relevant message consistent with the audience’s values
is critical to achieving national security objectives.
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CHAPTER 17
MILITARY POWER AND THE USE OF FORCE1
John F. Troxell
Force without wisdom falls of its own weight.
				

				

Horace

International politics is a struggle for power. Power, in the international arena, is used to protect a
nation’s interests by influencing potential competitors or partners. The most important instrument of
power available to a nation-state is military power. “In international politics in particular,” according
to Hans Morgenthau, “armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor
making for the political power of a nation.”2 The other elements of power certainly are important and
can contribute to the furtherance of national interests; however, as long as states continue to exist in
a condition of anarchy, military power will continue to play a crucial role in international politics. As
Kenneth Waltz aptly put it, “In politics force is said to be the ultima ratio. In international politics force
serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one.”3
The current world situation once again focuses the international community’s attention on the role
of military power, due in part to the absolute and relative dominance of the world’s sole superpower,
the United States. According to recent figures, U.S. defense expenditures account for 39 percent of
the world’s total spending on defense. The United States spends more than eight times the combined
defense budgets of China and Russia, and more than 25 times the combined defense spending of the
remaining six “rogue nations” (Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea). These comparisons
do not reflect the defense contributions of the closest U.S. allies, nor do they include the impact of the
Pentagon’s fiscal 2005 budget request of $400 billion, a cumulative increase of 24 percent over the past
3 years.4 The resultant gap in military capabilities is huge, and may even be greater than that reflected
in a comparison of defense budgets due to the technological lead and the high quality professional
armed forces of the United States. Recent conventional operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq
only confirm this dominance.
As important as military power is to the functioning of the international system, it is a very expensive
and dangerous tool of statecraft—one, as Robert Art recently pointed out, that should not be exercised
without a great deal of wisdom:
Using military power correctly does not ensure that a state will protect all of its interests, but using it incorrectly
would put a great burden on these other instruments and could make it impossible for a state to achieve its goals.
Decisions about whether and how to use military power may therefore be the most fateful a state makes.5

Art’s caution is clearly evident in the emerging security environment of the 21st century. Despite
undisputed U.S. military supremacy, the United States and its allies sense a greater vulnerability to
their basic freedoms and way of life than at any time since the height of the nuclear standoff with the
Soviet Union. Military supremacy has yet to find an answer to the combined threats of proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and international terrorism. Failed states and rogue states
continue to present security concerns and the resultant demand for military forces to contain conflicts
and rebuild nations. The United States faces two strategic challenges—one of ends and the other of
means. The most prominent declinist of the last decade, Paul Kennedy, argued that great powers
succumb to “imperial overstretch” because their global interests and obligations outpace their ability
to defend them all simultaneously. James Fallows recently echoed this concern, claiming that “America
is over-extended” because the United States has so many troops tied down in so many places that we
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can no longer respond to emerging crises. Beyond the concern with over-ambitious ends, Fallows also
claims that the United States is in danger of actually breaking the military instrument of power through
overuse and thus returning to the days of the post-Vietnam “Hollow Army.”6
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of military power in the international arena in an
effort to address challenges, highlighted above, associated with its use. There are two major parts to
this discussion. The first concerns the political purposes of military power, and the second concerns the
actual use of military force. The use of force discussion will include a brief consideration of employment
options (the Range of Military Operations), a presentation of various guidelines for the use of force,
and a look at the issue of legitimacy.
POLITICAL PURPOSES OF MILITARY POWER
Despite all of the changes that have occurred in world politics since the end of the Cold War, there
is, in many respects, an underlying continuity with earlier eras. The recent conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and mass-casualty terrorism are evidence that the use of military power as an
instrument of political purpose remains as relevant today as in the past. Clausewitz’ famous dictum
continues to ring true, “that war [the application of military power] should never be thought of as
something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy,” and that “war is simply a continuation
of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.” While still serving as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell analyzed the military successes that the United States had
experienced through most of the 1990s. The principal reason for these achievements, he concluded, “is
that in every instance, we have matched the use of military force to our political objectives.”7
From a modern day American perspective, the U.S. Constitution establishes the political context in
which military power is applied and the framework for civilian authority over the Armed Forces. The
capstone publication for the U.S. Armed Forces, Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces
of the United States, which addresses the employment of the U.S. military as an instrument of national
power, is very explicit on this point: “Under the Constitution’s framework, American military power
operates for and under conditions determined by the people through their elected representatives. This
political context establishes the objectives and the limits of legitimate military action in peace, crisis,
and conflict in the United States and abroad.”8
Military power can be matched to several different categories of broadly defined political objectives.
The traditional categories that were developed and articulated during the Cold War, in the context of
the U.S./Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) nuclear rivalry, included deterrence, compellence,
and defense.9 Since the threat of large-scale nuclear war between competing nation-states largely has
receded, it seems more appropriate to focus on the political purposes behind the use of conventional
forces. In this context the categories can be modified, as shown in Figure 1.
Defeat.
Military power can be used in its purest sense to physically defeat an adversary. Joint Pub 1 clearly
articulates this objective as the fundamental purpose of military power—to fight and win the nation’s
wars. Although recognizing other, potential noncombat objectives, JP 1 argues that “success in combat
in defense of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, societal values, and national interests is the
essential goal and measure of the profession of arms in American society.”11 Thomas Schelling, in the
classic Arms and Influence, used the phrase brute force and referred to a country’s ability, assuming it
had enough military power, to forcibly seize, disarm, or disable, or repel, deny, and defend against an
opponent.12 Schelling’s discussion clearly recognizes both offensive and defensive uses of force. Robert
Art, on the other hand, focuses on the defensive use of force as the deployment of military power either
to ward off an attack or to minimize damage if actually attacked. Despite this focus, Art also argues that
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Security Policy:
Political Objective

Defeat: eliminate
an adversary’s
ability to choose
courses of action.

Coerce: cause
an adversary
to change his
potential or actual
course of action.

Deter: avert deleterious
actions on the part of
an adversary

Other:
• Reassure
• Dissuade

Compel: make an
adversary take
beneficial actions.

Figure 1. Components of Security Policy.10
a state can use its forces to strike first if it believes that an attack is imminent or inevitable. This leads
to the distinction between a preemptive attack, in response to an imminent threat, and a preventive
attack, in response to an inevitable attack. A preventive attack can be undertaken if a state believes
that others will attack it when the balance of forces shift in their favor, or perhaps after key military
capabilities are developed. In the case of either preemptive or preventive actions, Art concludes that “it
is better to strike first than to be struck first,” and supports the maxim that “the best defense is a good
offense.” The defeat aspect of military force seeks to eliminate the adversary’s ability or opportunity to
do anything other than what is demanded of it.13
Coercion.
Because of the high cost and uncertainty associated with combat operations, a nation’s primary
strategic objective is usually an attempt to cause an adversary to accede to one’s demands short of
war or actual combat operations. As such, most states attempt to achieve their goals through coercion.
Successful coercion is not warfighting, but is the use of threatened force, including the limited use of
actual force to back up that threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would.
Coercion relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary’s decisionmaking.14
As opposed to brute force, coercion is the “threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can
make someone yield or comply.”15 From this perspective, it is withheld violence that can influence an
adversary’s choice. It is this perception of withheld consequences that causes a nation to acquiesce to a
coercer’s demands. Those consequences can take the broad form of anticipated punishment in response
to an action, or anticipated denial or failure of an opponent’s chosen course of action. Punitive coercion
seeks to influence an opponent through fear, and coercion by denial through hopelessness. Finally,
just as it is important to recognize the dynamic nature of the strategy formulation process, strategists
also should view coercion as a dynamic, two (or more) player contest. Each side acts, not only based
on anticipation of the other side’s moves, but also based on other changes in the security environment.
The adversary can react to alter the perceived costs and benefits and certainly has a vote in assessing
the credibility of the coercer’s threat.16 Coercion has two subcategories: deterrence and compellence.
Deterrence. Deterrence, in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific
action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks. Deterrence can be
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based on punishment, which involves a threat to destroy what the adversary values, or on denial, which
requires convincing an opponent that he will not achieve his goals on the battlefield. In either case, the
adversary is assumed to be willing and able to engage in well-informed cost-benefit calculations and
respond rationally on the basis of those calculations. An irrational (or ill-informed) opponent that will
accept destruction or disproportionate loss may not be deterrable.17 Deterrence theory became almost
synonymous with strategy during the Cold War as both superpowers sought to ensure their survival
through mutual threats of massive nuclear retaliation.18 Nevertheless, there are certain important
distinctions concerning the term: 19
• General (strategic) or immediate (tactical) deterrence (the former refers to a diffuse deterrent
effect deriving from one’s capabilities and reputation; the later to efforts to discourage specific
behavior in times of crises). An example of tactical deterrence was the evidently successful
threat conveyed to Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War to dissuade Iraq from using WMD
against coalition forces. An unsuccessful example was the U.S.-United Arab Emirates (UAE)
tanker exercise that failed to dissuade Iraq from invading Kuwait.
• Extended and central deterrence (the former alludes to endeavors to extend deterrent coverage
over friends and allies; the latter to the deterrence of attack upon one’s homeland). Examples
continue to abound concerning extended deterrence—one particularly difficult issue concerns
the U.S. security guarantees extended to Taiwan.
There are two challenges to the future deterrent posture of U.S. forces. The first is the on-going
issue of trying to evaluate the effectiveness of a deterrent policy. The willingness of a legislative body
to allocate resources to various elements of military power normally is contingent on recognition of
beneficial results. Henry Kissinger aptly describes the problem:
Since deterrence can only be tested negatively, by events that do not take place, and since it is never possible to
demonstrate why something has not occurred, it became especially difficult to assess whether existing policy
was the best possible policy or a just barely effective one. Perhaps deterrence was unnecessary because it was
impossible to prove whether the adversary ever intended to attack in the first place.20

The second challenge deals with the changing nature of the threat. During the Cold War, deterrence
was based on a known enemy operating from a known location and under the assumed direction
of a rational leader. The emergence of rogue states and transnational terrorist networks that could
gain access to WMD has created what Colin Gray defines as the current crisis of deterrence. These
new actors do not necessarily share the long-standing and highly developed theory of deterrence that
emerged from the Cold War, and the cost-benefit calculus that underpins deterrence may be clouded
by cultural differences and varying attitudes towards risk. In fact, as Gray observes, “. . . some of
the more implacable of our contemporary adversaries appear to be undeterrable. Not only are their
motivations apparently unreachable by the standard kind of menaces, but they lack fixed physical
assets for us to threaten.”21 The current U.S. National Security Strategy is in full accord with these views:
“Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are
wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death
and whose most potent protection is statelessness.” 22
Compellence. Compellence is the use of military power to change an adversary’s behavior. It attempts
to reverse an action that already has occurred or to otherwise overturn the status quo. Examples
include evicting an aggressor from territory it has just conquered or convincing a proliferating state to
abandon its nuclear weapons program. According to Thomas Schelling, who initially coined the term,
“Compellence . . . usually involves initiating action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the
opponent responds.”23 Physical force often is employed to harm another state until the later abides by
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the coercer’s demands. It is important to recognize the difference between compellence and deterrence.
The distinction, according to Robert Art, “is one between the active and passive use of force. The
success of a deterrent threat is measured by its not having been used. The success of a compellent
action is measured by how closely and quickly the adversary conforms to one’s stipulated wishes.”24
Compellence may be easier to demonstrate than deterrence because of the observable change in
behavior, but it tends to be harder to achieve. It usually is easier to make a potential aggressor decide
not to attack in the first place than to cause the same aggressor to call off the attack once it is underway.
A state that is deterred from taking a particular action can always claim that it never intended to act in
such a way, and thus publicly ignore the deterrent threat. However, if a state succumbs to compellent
actions, it is much harder to change behavior without an associated loss of prestige and possible national
humiliation. Consequently, compellent threats should be accompanied by a complementary set of
concessions or face-saving measures to make it politically acceptable for a state to comply. Success also
can be driven by the perceived or actual imbalance of interests at stake. As the American experience in
Vietnam demonstrated, compellence tends to fail when the issue is of vital importance to the adversary
but possibly only represents an important or peripheral interest to the coercing state.25
In the post-Cold War era, three broad conditions have emerged that facilitate the effective use of
military threats. These relationships are expressed in Figure 2. Together, the credibility of the threat
and the degree of difficulty of the demands shape the targeted leader’s evaluation of the likely cost of
complying or of not complying with U.S. demands. If the threat is perceived to be wholly incredible, the
anticipated cost of noncompliance will be low. The balance between the cost of compliance and the cost
of defiance represents the potency of the threat. In the post-Cold War period, despite overwhelming
U.S. military supremacy, it has been extremely difficult for the United States to achieve its objectives
without actually conducting sustained military operations. A principal reason for this difficulty is the
existence of a generation of political leaders throughout the world whose basic perception of U.S.
military power and political will is one of weakness. They enter any situation with a fundamental belief
that the United States can be defeated or driven away.26
Context:
• Historical precedent
• Public support
• International support
• President’s reputation

Degree of Difficulty of
the Demand:
• Content of the demand
• Positive incentives
• Degree of visibility

Character of the Threat:
• Urgency
• Tangible actions
• Communication of will

CREDIBILITY

Costs of Defiance

Costs of Compliance
Potency of
Threat

Figure 2. Evaluations of Compellent Threats.27
Echoing Colin Gray’s crisis of deterrence, perhaps there is a similar crisis of compellence. According
to Blechman and Wittes:
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American presidents have been reluctant to step as close to the plate as had been required to achieve U.S. objectives
in many post-cold war conflicts. They have made threats only reluctantly and usually have not made as clear or
potent a threat as was called for by the situation. They have understood the need to act in the situation but have
been unwilling or perceived themselves as being unable to lead the American people into the potential sacrifice
necessary to secure the proper goal. As a result, they have attempted to satisfice, taking some action but not the
most effective possible action to challenge the foreign leader threatening U.S. interests. They have sought to curtail
the extent and potential cost of the confrontation by avoiding the most serious type of threat and therefore the
most costly type of war if the threat were challenged.28

This conclusion was written prior to the tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the subsequent
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Time will tell if Americans will sustain their support for two very
challenging and increasingly costly nation-building projects.
Reassurance.
Finally, there are two other political objectives listed on Figure 1. The first of these is reassurance,
a term that began as a key element of U.S. nuclear strategy. In particular, reassurance was associated
closely with the notion of extended deterrence in that its objective was to extend security guarantees
to friends and allies. As a consequence, reassurance played a crucial role in the Cold War if for no
other reason that the concept helped to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states like
Germany and Japan. In a similar manner, the current U.S. defense policy includes, as its first objective,
the goal of assuring friends and allies. This assurance is gained through the forward presence of U.S.
forces and ensures allies and friends that the United States will honor its security commitments and
continue to be a reliable security partner. In addition to the stationing of large numbers of U.S. military
personnel overseas, the political objective of reassurance/assurance is achieved through numerous
security cooperation activities and agreements. Security cooperation serves U.S. national interests by
advancing U.S. values and beliefs, promoting regional stability, and improving cooperation among
allies, partners, and friends.29 From this perspective, security is this country’s most influential publicsector export. “We are the only nation on earth,” one analyst observes, “capable of exporting security
in a sustained fashion, and we have a very good track record of doing it.”30 A primary consequence
of a more secure environment is the promotion of global economic growth. With this focus on both
security and economic interests, the ultimate purpose of U.S. military engagement, according to some
analysts, is to maintain international order, thereby allowing the American people to continue to reap
the benefits of globalization.31
Dissuasion.
The final political objective is dissuasion, sometimes presented as the ultimate purpose of both
defense and deterrence, that is, persuading others not to take actions harmful to oneself. The notion
here, however, is more in keeping with that of the National Security Strategy, which describes building
military forces strong enough U.S. military forces “to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling the power of the United States.”32 The Quadriennial
Defense Review (QDR) elaborates on this objective: “Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore
dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions. The United States can exert such
influence through the conduct of research and development, test, and demonstration programs. It can
do so by maintaining or enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability.”33 The goal clearly is
to maintain, if not grow, the tremendous capability gap that U.S. military forces enjoy over virtually all
other militaries. The origin of this objective dates back to the formerly discredited draft 1992 Defense
Planning Guidance. When initially leaked to the press, this document included a call to preserve
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American global military supremacy, to discourage others from challenging our leadership, and to
maintain a military dominance capable of “deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a
larger regional of global role.”34 More recently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has been equally
explicit: “Just as the existence of the U.S. Navy dissuades others from investing in competing navies—
because it would cost them a fortune and would not provide them a margin of military advantage—we
must develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing.”35
The concept, however, need not be so rough-edged, dissuasion also can apply to countries that
are not full-fledged adversaries, but those with which the United States has a mixed relationship—
mutual suspicions and common incentives to avoid violence. The term goes to the heart of the new
geo-strategic era. “In short, dissuasion aims at urging potential geopolitical rivals not to become real
rivals by making clear that any sustained malevolent conduct will be checkmated by the United States.
It involves military pressure applied with a velvet glove, not crude threats of war and destruction.”36
The key relationship for U.S. dissuasion is that with China in terms of preventing the People’s republic
from developing assertive, and menacing geo-political policies. Colin Gray is much more sanguine
about this policy’s prospects, noting “we should expect state-centric enemies to attempt to organize
to resist the American hegemony, and in particular to work hard in search of strategic means and
methods that might negate much of our dissuasive strength.”37
In all this, it is important to recognize that military power alone is not sufficient to conduct a successful
foreign policy. Military power must be integrated properly with the other elements of statecraft—
political, economic, diplomatic, and information. Even for the greatest of nations, as Joseph Nye argues,
military power is always in short supply and consequently must be rationed among competing goals:
“The paradox of American power is that world politics is changing in a way that makes it impossible for
the strongest world power since Rome to achieve some of its most crucial international goals alone.”38
RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
The broad political purposes for the use of military power clearly encompass many different
employment options for military force, which have been grouped under employment categories in
what the Joint Staff calls the “Range of Military Operations (ROMO)” (Figure 3). These distinctions are
designed to assist strategists in understanding the characteristics of each one.39
War refers to large-scale, sustained combat operations necessary to achieve national objectives or
protect national interests. These operations could include preventive attacks or preemptive operations.
Preemptive actions are associated with imminent threats, and the identification of these threats places
a premium on intelligence and warnng.
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Figure 3. Range of Military Operations.
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On the other hand, force is only used as a combat mode in one of two broad categories concerned
with military operations other than war (MOOTW), that of deterring war and resolving conflict. These
operations include punitive attacks or raids and strikes, in which military force is designed to inflict
pain and cost, normally in retaliation for some behavior, but not necessarily designed to reverse the
adversaries actions. Punitive attacks also require evidence of who was responsible for the offending
action. Interdiction involves the discrete use of direct force to prevent the transshipment of goods or
resources. These operations can be associated with sanctions enforcement.
Under this same category are peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations. Peace enforcement
operations are also referred to as Chapter VII operations under the United Nations (UN) Charter, which
addresses enforcement actions “with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.” A closely related category is peacemaking, which assumes that one of the protagonists
opposes the status quo. These operations take place in a nonconsensual environment. Peacekeeping is
often referred to as a Chapter VI operation under the UN Charter, which addresses “pacific settlement
of disputes.” Peacekeepers are impartial and relatively passive, called upon to monitor or verify troop
withdrawals, separation of forces, or provide security during elections. These operations take place in
a consensual environment.
Promoting peace and support to civil authorities, which do not involve the use or threat of force,
represent the other end of the MOOTW spectrum. Nevertheless, nation assistance or nation building
is still an extremely intrusive form of intervention designed to bring about political leadership and/or
institutions different from those that presently exist. Disaster relief or humanitarian assistance involves
the deployment of forces to save lives without necessarily altering the political context. These generally
occur in a consensual environment, although occasionally military forces will take part in an imposed
humanitarian intervention which may be carried out in a hostile environment.
In any event, all of these different classifications of military operations can be viewed as fulfilling
one of the three principal political purposes: deterrent, compellent, or defensive. For example, the
political goal of humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations is to save lives; this is defense
of parties under attack. The political goal of nation-assistance is to construct a viable government; this
can be viewed as compelling armed groups or other elements of the society to obey the new central
government. The political goal of any collective security arrangement is to prevent aggression; which
is deterrence.40
There is one important type of military operation that is not explicitly cited in the “Range of
Military Operations” chart—covert action. These actions are a specialty of the U.S. Special Operations
Forces (SOF) community, which is currently enjoying an unprecedented prominence within the U.S.
military. Covert action is defined by U.S. law as activity meant “to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not
be apparent or acknowledged.”41 According to the Special Operations Command posture statement,
“SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct covert, clandestine, or discreet
counterterrorism missions in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.”42 The current
definition of covert operations was adopted as part of the effort to fill gaps in oversight that led to
the Iran-Contra scandal. According to the law, covert actions must first be authorized by a written
presidential finding, and the House and Senate intelligence committees must be notified before the
operation has begun.43
In the past, SOF missions were viewed as “traditional military activities” in support of on-going or
anticipated military campaigns and thus were not subject to the covert action oversights just mentioned.
However, in the on-going and broadly defined campaign against global terrorism—a campaign in
which the Special Operations Command directly plans and executes its own missions—there is some
concern that this type of use of force will be removed completely from congressional oversight. On the
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one hand, the U.S. Government should be able to use every tool available in the fight against terrorism.
However, such broad-brush authority, combined with an increasing propensity to use SOF in covert
operations in support of an aggressive preemption strategy, may lead to abuse and risks to U.S. foreign
policy.44
One final point concerning the current nature of military operations is the increasingly cluttered
battlefield from the standpoint of other coalition partners, interagency elements, and even
nongovernmental organizations. The Joint Staff describes the nature of these operations as unified
action. The concept of unified action highlights the synergistic application of all of the instruments
of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as
military forces.45
GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF FORCE
War cannot be divorced from political life; whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that
connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.
Clausewitz
If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you cannot succeed, do not use troops.
Sun Tzu
Madeleine Albright asked me in frustration, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always
talking about if we can’t use it?” I thought I would have an aneurysm.
Colin Powell
Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? Here I am. Send me.
Isaiah46

These quotations emphasize the importance of linking political objectives to the use of military
force. One of the best ways to ensure this is to use military force only in support of the national interest
and when success is assured. The difficulty with such a straight forward prescription is reconciling
the various degrees of interests, to include valid concerns about furthering important national and
international values. In addition, the resort to war or conflict always unleashes the forces of chance and
friction, creating in one analyst’s description, “a fearful lottery.”47 Creating the conditions for success,
let alone guaranteeing success is much easier said than done. Decisions concerning the use of force
are the most important that any nation can make. Given that the post-Cold War experience supports
the necessity of resorting to force and the threats of force, but also emphasizes the risks of doing so,
national security decisionmakers are left with a critical issue in the theory and practice of foreign
policy: under what conditions and how can military force and threats of force be used effectively to
accomplish different types of policy objectives. In the final analysis, political leaders should come up
with convincing answers to these questions before sending soldiers in harm’s way.48
Debates in the United States about appropriate guidelines for the use of force normally revolve
around the Weinberger Doctrine—which is viewed habitually as an outgrowth of the lessons from
the Vietnam War.49 However, the origins of the current debate actually go back to the Korean War.
Two schools of strategic thought developed from an assessment of that limited and inconclusive war.
The first was the never-again, or all-or-nothing school, which advocated that either the United States
should do everything necessary to win a decisive military victory, or it should not intervene at all.50
At the other extreme was the limited-war school. Proponents of this view held that the United States
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could expect to become involved in regional conflicts demanding intervention in support of less than
vital interests. Colin Powell, although normally associated with the all-or-nothing school, has argued
that all wars are limited; either by territory on which they are fought, the means used, or the objectives
for which they are fought.51
Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger articulated his six criteria for the use of force in response
to two major issues—the lessons of the Vietnam War and an on-going policy debate in the Reagan
administration about the appropriate response to terrorism. Both issues are clearly relevant as the
debate on the use of force enters the 21st century. Lessons from Vietnam included the recognition that
military victory does not always result in political victory, and that sustaining public and political
support throughout a prolonged war can be difficult. Both of these issues continue to resonate in the
debate about U.S. operations in Iraq. Senator Edward Kennedy, for instance, recently charged that
“Iraq has developed into a quagmire,” and has become George Bush’s Vietnam.52
Concerning terrorism, when the Weinberger doctrine was unveiled in 1984, the national security
elites were in a heated debate about this issue, particularly as it related to the failure of U.S. policy in
Lebanon. Weinberger was reluctant to commit troops to such an indeterminate and chaotic situation.
Secretary of State George Shultz, on the other hand, argued that the Weinberger doctrine counseled
inaction bordering on paralysis, and that “diplomacy could work these problems most effectively when
force—of the threat of force—was a credible part of the equation.” The Wall Street Journal referred to
“Mr. Shultz’s sensible anti-terrorist policy of ‘active-prevention, preemption and retaliation.’”53 Shultz
was on the losing end of this debate in the 1980s, but 20 years later, his approach seems to have carried
the day, at least in the Bush administration. Figure 4 shows the Weinberger doctrine and several more
recent versions of guidelines for the use f force. 54

Guidelines for the Use of Force
Weinberger Doctrine
(November 28, 1984)

Powell

(Fall, 1992)
• No fixed set of rules
• Relevant questions
• Evaluate the
circumstances

1. Vital interests
at stake

W
H
E
N

3. Clearly defined
political and military
objectives

Unambiguous
military objective

5. Public support
Last resort

2. Commitment to
victory
(sufficient force)

4. Continuous
reassessment

(April 1995 / NSS ‘99)
• Political: interests
• Military: success
• Ethical
1. Vital interests
- overwhelming force
- unilateral (if necessary)

2. Important interests

6. Last resort

H
O
W

Perry (Clinton NSS)

- ability to succeed
- cost/risk assessment
- last resort
- limited options

3. Humanitarian interests
- catastrophic
- urgent need
- unique resources
- minimal risk
- end state

• Clear mission
• Public support
Will the force
be successful?
• Costs & risks
• Decisive means
(overwhelming force)

• Multilateral
• Opportunity cost on
the force (OPTEMPO)
• Exit strategy

End state consequences
(exit strategy)

Two questions:
1. When to use force?
2. How to use force?

Joint Pub 1

(Nov 2000)
• Adhere to societal
values
• No unbending rules

Rumsfeld
(Nov 2002)

Questions for the use:

1. Necessary?
• Advances national
- national interest
interest
(all three categories)
2. Doable?
- clear goals
• Clear mission
- military capabilities
- clear Cmd structure
• International
support

• Public support

3. Is it worth it?
- public support
- worldwide
consequences

Guidelines for how:
• Decisive means
• Action – offensive
• End state and
• Don’t restrict options
exit strategy
- no arbitrary deadlines
- Termination
• Use all elements of
conditions
power
- Path to success
- military last choice
- Milestones
• Brutally honest
- Alternatives if
- don’t promise what
military unsuccessful
can’t be delivered
• NGOs and IGO’s ready

Figure 4. Guidelines for the Use of Force.
When to use force is the first critical question. The linkage of such use in support of vital national
interests harkens back to the Napoleonic notion of fighting wars for grand purposes. Samuel Huntington
defined national interest as a public good of concern to all or most Americans, and a vital national
interest as one that Americans are willing to expend blood and treasure to defend. The 2000 National
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Security Strategy defined vital interests as those directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of
the nation. There are two problems with this very straightforward proposition. The first is the difficulty
in determining what those vital interests are. The domestic consensus that supported U.S. foreign policy
during the Cold War has been shattered, resulting in a lack of agreement on the nature and importance
of U.S. national interests.55 The recent focus on commercial and ethnic interests exacerbates the lack of
widespread agreement on national interests. “The institutions and capabilities created to serve a grand
national purpose in the Cold War, “according to Huntington, “are now being suborned and redirected
to serve narrow subnational, transnational, and even nonnational purpose.”56 Conversely, the attacks
of 9/11 have undoubtedly contributed to a recognition of grand purposes and vital national interests,
at least as associated with the war on terrorism.
The second concern is that states often use force in support of secondary and even tertiary interests.
They do this either to protect vital interests, or to support important national values. Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry supported the selective use of force and thus distinguished between three categories
of interests—vital, important, and humanitarian. He argued that different uses of limited force, and
not necessarily applied in an overwhelming manner, were appropriate to protect these interests in the
pursuit of limited objectives.57 Perry’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John Shalikashvili, also
desired more flexibility in the use of force. He reportedly claimed that he did not have the right to put a
sign on his door saying, “I’m sorry—we only do the big ones.” The United States clearly has continued
to use force in support of nonvital interests or important national values. And wars waged in the name
of values invariably turn out to be more controversial than wars waged for interests.58
Weinberger borrows heavily from Clausewitz for his third, and relatively uncontroversial criteria,
the importance of having clearly established objectives. According to Clausewitz, “No one starts a war .
. . without first being clear in his own mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends
to conduct it.”59 This criteria is common across all of the sets of guidelines. Recognizing the need for
clear objectives, however, does not necessarily remove all debate on the issue. The objectives chosen,
just as the articulation of the national interests at stake, may not reflect broad agreement.
There are two other points worth considering on this criterion. First, once a war begins, chance,
friction, and uncertainty take effect and original political objectives and force requirements, as Michael
Handel has observed, can change.
Weinberger’s assumptions are more correct for military interventions/operations that can be carried out swiftly
and decisively, … than they are for prolonged interventions and wars. The problem, of course, is that it is often
very difficult to tell in advance which interventions will be short and decisive, and which will be costly and
long.60

The second point is that it is always difficult to determine in advance if a certain compellent or deterrent
action will have the desired effect, or result in an unanticipated counterreaction by an adversary. As
Richard Haass so aptly puts it, “It is as simple—and as basic—as the difference between winning a
battle and winning a war. It only takes one party to initiate hostilities, but it takes everyone involved to
bring hostilities to an end.”61
The next two criteria, public support and last resort, also are common across all of the sets of
guidelines. The need to maintain public and political support is common sense but not completely
without debate, and certainly not without potentially great difficulty in execution. In the original
argument over the Weinberger doctrine, Secretary Shultz took issue with the need for public support
prior to initiating action. In his view, the duties of leadership could require action before mobilization
of public support.
My view is that democratically elected and accountable individuals have been placed in positions where they can
and must make decisions to defend our national security. The risk and burden of leadership is that those decisions
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will receive, or not receive, the support of the people on their merits. The democratic process will deal with leaders
who fail to measure up to the standards imposed by the American people . . .62

There is a great deal of historical validity to the “rally-around-the-flag” and “support-the-troops”
effect. That approach can be effective particularly for short and decisive campaigns. In prolonged wars,
however, the difficulty does not lie so much in obtaining initial public and political support as it does in
sustaining it for the duration.63 Leaders must lead and mobilize public support. That can be done most
easily by appeals to moral values or national interests. In any event,
the inertia of the governed can not be disentangled from the indifference of the government. American leaders
have both a circular and a deliberate relationship to public opinion. It is circular because their constituencies are
rarely, if ever, aroused by foreign crises, even genocidal ones, in the absence of political leadership, and yet, at the
same time, U.S. officials continually cite the absence of public support as grounds for inaction.64

Last resort is an important component of the just war theory of jus ad bellum, or just resort in going to
war. Americans traditionally have been very reluctant to resort to force unless they have been attacked
directly. There is always a strong desire to give diplomacy a chance, or obtain sufficient results through
the application of economic sanctions or other pressures. Time also is needed to mobilize domestic
and international support. However, it may not always be wise to delay military action. Once again,
George Shultz challenged this point, “The idea that force should be used ‘only as a last resort’ means
that, by the time of use, force is the only resort and likely a much more costly one than if used earlier.”65
General Wesley Clark, in his examination of the Kosovo campaign, concluded that the key lesson must
be that “nations and alliances should move early to deal with crises while they are still ambiguous
and can be dealt with more easily, for delay raises both the costs and the risks. Early action is the
objective to which statesmen and military leaders should aspire.” All of this has direct relevance for
the threat of catastrophic terrorism. Countering undeterrable terrorist organizations armed with WMD
places the other instruments of statecraft at a huge disadvantage. “To consider force as a last resort is
appropriate when trying to settle inter-state conflict,” according to Ivo Daalder, “but when it comes to
. . . preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or defeating terrorism, waiting too
long to employ force can both enhance the cost and reduce the effectiveness of its use.”66
The last two items on Weinberger’s list concern how force should be used. The first of these addresses
the importance of committing sufficient forces to accomplish the objectives. The goal is to avoid a long,
drawn-out gradual employment of force that may not accomplish the objectives in a swift and decisive
manner. This is the essence of the Vietnam syndrome. The U.S. military wants to avoid a half-hearted
approach that results in higher casualties, a prolonged war, and a decision to quit before the mission
is accomplished. One significant deterrent to U.S. action in Bosnia was the estimated steep cost of
intervening in terms of troops required. For instance, the Joint Staff estimated in 1992 that it would take
50,000 U.S. ground troops to secure the Sarajevo airport for humanitarian relief operations. The airlift
eventually was conducted under the watchful care of only 1,000 Canadian and French forces.67
On the other hand, it normally is better to go into a hostile environment with too much rather than
too little force. General Powell used the phrase decisive force and indicated that decisive means and
results always are preferred, and that if force is used, “we should not be equivocal: we should win and
win decisively.”68 Decisive means eventually evolved into overwhelming force, and related concepts,
such as shock and awe. Joint Pub 1 notes that “when combat is possible, the force employed must
be both overwhelming and decisive.”69 The controversy about U.S. endstrength in Iraq, in both the
initial combat phase and the subsequent stabilization and reconstruction phase, will contribute only to
renewed military reluctance to undertake operations with less than overwhelming or decisive force.
General Wesley Clark has argued in this regard that Operation IRAQI FREEDOM took “unnecessary
risk because it skimped on the forces made available to the commanders,” during the combat phase, and
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he claimed the existence of excessive risk during the post-combat phase. “The result was a U.S. force
at the operation’s end that was incapable of providing security, stopping the looting and sabotage, or
establishing a credible presence throughout the country.”70 The all-or-nothing versus limited objective
(limited war) debate continues.
Michael Handel refers to the final item, the need for continuous reassessment, as the escape clause.
Circumstances may change, or the enemy may respond in an unexpected manner, all necessitating a
reassessment of objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and forces (means). That criteria also implies that if
the costs become too high or if the objectives do not justify a greater commitment of resources, it may
be prudent to terminate the conflict.71
Figure 4 clearly shows that several of the Weinberger guidelines have evolved and been modified
over the years. One of the most important and far-reaching evolutions is the expansion of applicable
interests categories and the recognition that limited options for the use of force may be appropriate
in the pursuit of less than vital interests. Another is the inclusion of the concern about multilateral
or international support. That guideline was added in the Clinton administration’s national security
strategies and reflected a growing interest in ensuring multilateral responses to security issues.
Multilateralism obviously included deliberations and support from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), but also recognized an enhanced role for the UN. America’s alliances were one
of the keystones of Clinton’s selective engagement strategy, and the administration saw the UN as an
important actor in the new world order. Having partners when it comes to using force also contributes
to gaining and sustaining public support. As Charles Krauthammer argued at the close of the Gulf
War, “Americans insist on the multilateral pretense. A large segment of American opinion doubts
the legitimacy of unilateral American action, but accepts action taken under the rubric of the ‘world
community.’” He went on to say that the ultimate problem with “multilateralism is that, if you take it
seriously, you gratuitously forfeit American freedom of action.”72
Finally, in terms of the evolution of the Weinberger guidelines, there is the inclusion of end state
and exit strategy concerns. The desire to establish an exit strategy is principally associated with
interventions that do not involve vital interests. If vital interests are at stake, national security experts
generally assume that politicians will apply overwhelming force, unilaterally if necessary, until the
conflict is resolved. For interventions in support of important or humanitarian issues, there is much
more of a premium placed on quickly reaching an agreed upon end-state, getting U.S. forces out, and
reconstituting them for the next “big one.” As indicated on Figure 4, the Joint Staff has expanded
this criteria to include specific termination conditions, paths to success, and milestones along those
paths. Rumsfeld’s guidelines, however, seem to challenge this point by specifically cautioning against
arbitrary deadlines. He is supported in this view by Richard Haass, who argues that it is important to
“avoid a specific end point or certain date for ending the commitment regardless of local developments.
Artificial boundaries on a U.S. intervention run the risk of emboldening adversaries, who need only to
wait until the deadline has passed, and unnerving allies.”73 End states can also be very ambiguous and
constrained, since they rarely include unconditional surrender, regime change or destruction of the
warmaking capability of the other side.74
Michael Handel’s analysis of the Weinberger doctrine concluded that it represented a utilitarian,
realistic yardstick not much concerned with moral and ethical questions, although it does, in fact,
provide useful insights for moral and ethical decisions about the use of force.75 The proliferation of
intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War world, and the growing threat posed by nonstate actors, will
continue to place pressure on decisionmakers to decide when and how to use force. Figure 5 represents
a score card of sorts to portray a subjective assessment of the application of the Weinberger doctrine to
recent U.S. military operations.
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Weinberger Doctrine from Vietnam to Iraq
Criterion
1. Vital
interests at
stake

Vietnam

Grenada

Lebanon

Panama

Persian
Gulf War

Somalia

Haiti
(1994)

Bosnia

Kosovo

Iraq
(2003)

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

YES – for
regime
change
NO –
nation bldg

NO

NO

YES – for
regime
change
? – nation
bldg

NO

?

2. Commitment
to victory

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

3. Clearly
defined pol/mil
objectives

NO

YES

NO

YES

YES

4. Continuous
reassessment

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

5. Public
support
(mobilized by
the gov’t)

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

YES
(at first)

YES

YES
(?)

YES

YES

6. Last resort

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

YES/
NO

FAILURE

SUCCESS

FAILURE

SUCCESS

SUCCESS

FAILURE

FAILURE

?

?

?

Success or
Failure

YES –

YES
then

NO

short term

?- long

YES

term

Figure 5. Weinberger Doctrine from Vietnam to Iraq.76
LEGITIMACY
One of the main tenets of the Weinberger doctrine was the need to garner public and congressional
support—“some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their
elected representatives in Congress.”77 Public support represents the will of the people, and as
Harry Summers concluded, the failure to invoke that national will was one of the principal strategic
failures of the Vietnam War, producing a strategic vulnerability that the North Vietnamese were able
to exploit.78 Public support and national will are both a reflection of the legitimacy with which the
use of force is viewed. Legitimacy is fostered and sustained through many channels, including the
steadfast application of Weinberger doctrine-like guidelines, congressional resolutions and legislation,
presidential leadership, and actions of the international community. Legitimacy thus is grounded in
both domestic processes and international or multilateral organizations and processes.
The President and the Congress.
Constitutional provisions represent the foundation of legitimacy in the United States. Under the
Constitution, the president and Congress share the war powers. The president is commander in chief
(Article II, Section 2), but Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed
forces (Article I, Section 8). Congress, however, has declared war only on five occasions, the last being
World War II. Despite having considerable constitutional authority over decisions about the use of
force, Congress largely has deferred to the president as commander-in-chief, in general recognition
that this role makes him responsible for leading the armed forces and gives him the power to repel
attacks against the United States. Consequently, the executive branch has executed most military
interventions.79
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In an effort to regain some control over decisions on the use of force, and as a backlash to the
Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) over President Richard Nixon’s
veto in 1973. The purpose of the War Powers Resolution was to ensure that Congress and the president
share in making decisions about the use of force. Compliance becomes an issue when the president
introduces forces abroad in situations that might be construed as hostilities or imminent hostilities.
The law included a broad set of triggers for executive consultations and explanations of the rationale
for, and the scope and duration of, military operations. If Congress does not grant authorization in a
certain period, the law does not permit the action to continue. Presidents have never acknowledged
the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution; however, they have made modest efforts to comply
with its reporting requirements, submitting 104 reports to Congress concerning troop deployments
abroad.80 Some deployments were not reported because of the brevity of the operation or the perceived
lack of hostilities or imminent hostilities. Most of the reports submitted to Congress are done “consistent
with the War Powers Resolution,” and not in “compliance” with the WPR.
Despite this record on reporting, a longer-term issue concerns the degree to which Congress actually
is participating in the decisions to employ force. The WPR requires the president to consult with Congress
prior to introducing U.S. forces into hostilities and to continue consultations as long as the armed forces
remain. The conclusion of one congressional research study is that there has been very little executive
consultation with Congress, “when consultation is defined to mean seeking advice prior to a decision
to introduce troops.”81 It is certainly in the country’s best interest to garner congressional support, and
thus the two branches of government need to work out useful political processes that debate, inform,
and support the country’s engagement in conflict. From this perspective, a major purpose behind the
WPR was not necessarily to constrain the president, but to force the Congress to meet its obligations
to share in decisions on the use of force, “compelling members to face within a predictable period and
under specified procedures the fundamental question regarding military action by the United States:
Does the Congress endorse or oppose the commitment of American blood and treasure to a particular
mission?”82 The question is appropriate for Congress. As confirmed by Secretary Weinberger, U.S.
military personnel want to know that it has the backing of the public—a commitment affirmed through
a constitutional political process.83
The WPR played an important role in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. In response to the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, President George Bush notified Congress that he had deployed forces to the region.
Although he had not consulted with Congress before acting, both houses later adopted resolutions
supporting the deployment. Throughout the fall of 1990 there was intense debate within Congress
concerning the use of force. Urged by congressional leaders, President Bush later asked for a resolution
supporting the use of all necessary means to implement the UN decrees on Iraq. On January 12, 1991,
both houses, by narrow margins, approved a joint resolution authorizing the use of force pursuant to
UN resolution 678, which had been passed on November 29, 1990.84
In the crisis in Bosnia, on the other hand, the United States participated without congressional
authorization in humanitarian airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring and sanctions, and aerial
enforcement of no-fly zones and safe havens. In late 1995, after President Clinton committed over
20,000 combat troops as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, Congress considered several
bills and resolutions authorizing this deployment, but failed to reach a consensus. In 1999, President
Clinton ordered U.S. military forces to participate in the NATO-led military operation in Kosovo,
without specific authorization from the Congress, a state of affairs that one analyst has termed “virtual
consent”—in which the public is consulted but the formal institutions of democracy are bypassed:
The decay of institutional checks and balances on the warmaking power of the executive has received almost no
attention in the debate over the Kosovo conflict. This suggests that citizens no longer even care whether their elected
politicians exercise their constitutional responsibilities. We have allowed ourselves to accept virtual consent in the
most important political matter of all: war and peace.85
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The catastrophic events of 9/11 initially created a united sense of purpose between the executive
and Congress. Only 3 days after the terrorist attacks, Congress passed a Joint Resolution, authorizing
the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.” Three weeks
later, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” President Bush reported to Congress the use of
force against Afghanistan.86 In a similar manner, Congress passed the Joint Resolution, “Authorization
for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq,” in October 2002. This resolution authorized the President to
use the armed forces of the United States “as he determines to be necessary and appropriate,” to defend
the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant UN Security Council
Resolutions regarding Iraq. The President, in turn, dutifully reported to the Congress on March 21,
2003, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” and pursuant to his authority as Commander-inChief, that he had “directed U.S. Armed Forces operating with other coalition forces, to commence
operations on March 19, 2003, against Iraq.”87
The political storm gathering around the 9/11 Commission and the on-going struggle in Iraq will
constitute a severe test of the nation’s willingness to support a prolonged and deadly conflict. The
legitimacy of these actions will be dependent largely on the President’s ability to mobilize public opinion
and the willingness of Congress to continue to provide support. According to Alton Frye, “unless there
is continuing consultation in good faith between Congress and the Executive, the unity that marks the
beginning of the campaign against terrorism could degenerate into the profound disunity that scarred
American politics 30 years ago.”88 But the harsh reality is that Congress rallies around victory and piles
on in defeat. Success matters more than procedure in the politics of making war.89
The United Nations.
The founding of the UN substantially narrowed the legitimacy of the use of force by individual
nation-states. The UN Charter indicates in its Preamble that the it is established “to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war,” and its substantive provisions obligate the member states to
“settle their international disputes by peaceful means” (Article 2(3)) and to “refrain . . . from the threat
of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .” (Article 2(4)). In
place of the traditional right of states to resort to force, the charter creates a system of collective security
in which the Security Council is authorized to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace” and
to “decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain international peace and security” (Article 39).90
The UN security apparatus, created in 1945, was a hybrid, combining a universal quality with a
great power concert. The system did not work well during the Cold War because the UN was kept
on the sidelines by U.S.-Soviet bipolar rivalry. With few exceptions, UN involvement in use of force
decisions began in the 1990s. The evolving nature of global threats, however, has caused a reexamination
of the collective security apparatus. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan helped set the stage for this
process: “The United Nations Charter declares that ‘armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest.’ But what is the common interest? Who shall define it? Who shall defend it? Under whose
authority?”91
Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of self-defense: “Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.” Some authorities interpret Article 51 to permit anticipatory
self-defense in response to an imminent attack. Such an interpretation allows action, either unilaterally
or collectively in self-defense, or preemptively based on an interpretation of imminent threat. The
threat of catastrophic terrorism argues for a requirement to establish intelligible and transparent
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criteria of imminent threat that could provide for legitimate unilateral, coalition of the willing, or,
hopefully, UN Security Council action.92 Even Kofi Annan has suggested that UN members should
consider developing “criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types
of threats—for instance, terrorists groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.”93 Article 106 of
the charter can be interpreted to allow coalitions of states to take action to maintain international peace
and security pending UN Security Council action. This article originally was added to accommodate
regional alliances such as the RIO Pact and NATO. By modifying certain aspects of the charter, to include
article 106, a better understanding may be developed for the legitimate requirements for multilateral
response to threats outside the confines of the Security Council.
Based on the use of force in the last decade, some analysts have argued that the UN Security
Council must be reformed: enlarged to become more representative, and restructured to replace the
veto system. One rationale for the elimination of the veto power of the permanent five is based on the
need for legitimacy:
All modern military operations need international legitimacy if they are going to succeed. Consequently, the great
powers, especially America, face a difficult choice: they can either maintain the veto, and embark on unsanctioned
military adventures with their partners only to see these fail because of lack of international approval; or they can
surrender veto power in return for the increased likelihood of securing majority approval for the use of military
power.94

As this argument relates to the debate in the UN about Iraq, France, or any other country on the Security
Council, should be in a position to adopt and support a particular view, but it should not be in a position
to block pursuit of a vital interest and put at risk the entire UN enterprise. “What do you do if, at the
end of the day, the Security Council refuses to back you?” asks Charles Krauthammer, “Do you allow
yourself to be dictated to on issues of vital national—and international—security?”95 Thomas Friedman
answered the question, “The French and others know that . . . their refusal to present Saddam with a
threat only guarantees U.S. unilateralism and undermines the very UN structure that is the best vehicle
for their managing of U.S. power.”96
This debate also touches on the concept of multilateralism. Americans define multilateralism as
a policy that actively seeks to gain the support of allies. As such, Security Council authorization is a
means to an end—gaining more allies—not an end in itself. The Europeans, on the other hand, view
multilateralism much more narrowly as a legitimate sanction from a duly constituted international
body—the Security Council. Despite the fact that the United States enjoyed the support of dozens of
nations for the war in Iraq, and is supported by 33 troop-contributing coalition partners as I write,
many critics continue to charge that the United States is acting unilaterally. The current debate “over
multilateralism and legitimacy is thus not only about the principles of law, or even about the supreme
authority of the UN; it is also about the transatlantic struggle for influence. It is Europe’s response to
the unipolar predicament.”97 In any event, it is clear that any new arrangements to exercise collective
security need to be developed and given legitimacy by the international community.
CONCLUSION
War between nation-states endures because human interests, values, and commitments often
are irreconcilable. In addition, because of the existence of a much more insidious kind of violence—
catastrophic terrorism—military power remains the ultimate defender of common human values and
the ultimate arbiter of human disagreements:
The efficacy of force endures. For in anarchy, force and politics are connected. By itself, military power guarantees
neither survival nor prosperity. But it is almost always the essential ingredient for both. Because resort to force
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is the ultimate card of all states, the seriousness of a state’s intentions is conveyed fundamentally by its having a
credible military posture. Without it, a state’s diplomacy generally lacks effectiveness.98

Strategists must be able to answer the classic charge from Clausewitz, “No one starts a war . . . without
first being clear in his own mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct
it.” The political objectives for the use of force must be reassessed continually in light of the changing
nature of warfare and the proliferation of nontraditional threats. Likewise, remembering the caution
raised by President George H.W. Bush that there can be no single or simple set of fixed rules for the
use of force, the prudent strategist needs to keep in mind relevant questions and issues he should
evaluate in each particular circumstance that might require military force. Finally, democracies have the
unique challenge of dealing with the elusive and malleable concept of legitimacy. “Discovering where
legitimacy lies,” according to Robert Kagan, “at any given moment in history is an art, not a science
reducible to the reading of international legal documents.”99 Still there are immutable principles such
as that of Horace who cautioned that “force without wisdom falls of its own weight.” Today, more than
ever, the key question concerning the use of force is not whether it is lawful, but whether it is wise.100
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CHAPTER 18
ECONOMICS:
AMERICAN ELEMENT OF POWER OR SOURCE OF VULNERABILITY?
Clayton K. S. Chun
The early Romans worshipped Janus, one of their many panoply of gods. Janus, the god of beginnings,
was frequently depicted as two-faced; one face looked at new beginnings, while the other looked to the
past. In many respects, the economic element of national power is like Janus. Economics has two faces:
one as a dominant element of power, and the other as a source of potential vulnerability for the nation.
Economic activity is a potent source of power that includes the ability to create wealth, produce goods
and services, influence, and weaken or coerce possible foes. It is also a potential vulnerability that must
be protected. The United States is blessed with a rare combination of labor, physical and human capital,
entrepreneurial spirit, legal system, raw materials, and geography that have allowed it to become the
leading global economic power. Conversely, economics also may be a source of vulnerability or weakness
for a nation. The nation can exist without international trade; however, the standard of living of its
citizens and its wealth certainly would suffer. This nation’s economy is linked inexpiably to countries,
large and small, throughout the world. Globalization has become an integral part of the American
economic system. We purchase many finished goods, components, and raw materials from around the
world. Similarly, we rely on financial investment from foreign nations, businesses, and individuals to
help pay for a host of government and commercial ventures. Real and perceived disturbances in the
global economy certainly can affect actions that reach this country’s shores.
For many people, economics is a complex subject. The topic can entail highly mathematical
models or arcane issues that, on the surface, do not seem to have much relevance to national security.
However, the world does revolve around economics. Without firing a shot, nations could face panic
and disruption throughout their societies. Whether the problem is a stock market crash, currency
devaluation, natural disaster, oil crisis, or depression, economic concerns can paralyze a country.
Economics is simply the study of the use of constrained resources. One of national leadership’s main
concerns is the acquisition of additional resources or the maximization of their use. In this respect,
the United States tries to expand its ability to make goods and services using constrained resources or
to extend its access around the world to get more. These objectives naturally come into conflict from
a host of domestic and international sources. On the domestic side, members of Congress and the
President might disagree about how much we will spend on military, income redistribution, social,
or healthcare programs. More interesting issues arise on the international scene. Potential rivals that
that may refuse access to strategic materials threaten a nation’s ability to get resources necessary for its
economic security. Control of products, raw materials, financial assets, and other economic resources
can provide unfettered influence from one state to another. Outsourcing of jobs and services to foreign
countries affects directly domestic jobs and generates fears of fundamental changes to the economy.
Loss of whole segments of the economy may put the state’s security at risk.
This chapter explores economics as an element of national power. The most potent and flexible U.S.
ability to influence events worldwide may not be military, but economic. Increasingly in the future,
national leadership may find exercising military power difficult to accomplish or inappropriate for
the circumstances. A basic understanding of the scope of the nation’s economic power will help the
reader think about how the country can use it along with other elements of power-political, military,
and informational. The author addresses what makes an economy strong and how the nation can use
its economic power to achieve its national interests. Although the chapter focuses on the United States,
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much, if not all, of this discussion is applicable to other countries. This examination can help the reader
evaluate the economic capabilities and limitations of nation-states.
What Makes an Economy Strong?
The United States is fortunate that it has, at present, the preeminent economy in the world. The
nation’s businesses and her people can draw on a host of resources that they can convert to capabilities
expressed in an effective military or other element of power. What does a nation require to do so? One
certainly can use the United States as an example to analyze. No matter what the size or strength of
national economies, they have certain common characteristics that allow them to flex their economic
power. No matter what problems a nation has, most have some ability to use their resources to conduct
economic activities.
Every nation in the world has some type of national resource that it can parlay into economic power.
For some, it might involve a natural resource like oil or some other type of raw material. However,
not all countrys have the luxury of self-sustaining supplies of raw materials. Instead, a nation might
have the benefit of other types of national resources that can compensate for the lack of basic raw
materials. Three types of resources might allow a nation’s industry to provide value-added activities
that transform raw minerals or components into a product or service that allows that state to extract
economic gain that is the wherewithal of national security. Human, capital, and technological resources
are some of the most visible means that states can use to strengthen their economies and where they
might be vulnerable.
Human resources involve the skill and abilities of labor and management. A highly educated and
motivated labor force can increase the capabilities of an economy through improved productivity or
by increased flexibility to change scope or direction of activities. Additionally, management teams
that provide leadership, innovation, and risk acceptance can introduce new or better products when
coupled with a skilled labor force. Nations such as Singapore have compensated with human resources
for the lack of geography and raw materials to become a regional economic power in Southeast
Asia. Singapore’s economy depends on its biggest resource, people, to provide value to the nation’s
production of finished goods from consumer to high-tech products, like electronics, that depends on
skilled labor. Similarly, a focus on advanced education has allowed India and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) to expand their economies from ones that merely produced goods to ones that design and
conduct research on them.
Increasingly, capital resources have become very important assets that allow a nation to control
the investment or production of goods and services. Capital can take the form of physical plant or
financial assets. Physical plants, the traditional image of industrial might, allows a nation to transform
raw materials into goods. Financial resources allow the construction of new or modifications of existing
physical plants in the country. More frequently, countries rely on financial resources to acquire means
of production by building or purchasing productive capacity or other activities outside their borders.
Such investment in the form of foreign-owned businesses often is welcomed by countries with other
resources but little capital or technical knowledge. Financial capital also provides great influence. The
threat or actual withdrawal of investment funds can slow research, development, and construction.
Panic in domestic financial markets or the devaluation of currencies can trigger internal problems that
may spread to regional catastrophe or even become worldwide panic. The United States has relied
increasingly on foreign capital sources to finance mounting public and private debt. Foreign firms,
individuals, and governments have footed the bill for our international trade deficits to balance our
growing appetite for imports.
Nations also can replace or substitute products through technological advances. A nation’s ability
to provide resources to research, develop, and further educate their people can lead to new applications
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of science and knowledge to solve problems—in other words, technology. Technological advances can
replace existing weapon and support systems to enhance or expand warfighting capability. Acquiring
technology through a nation’s human resources or with capital resources can allow the nation to make
great leaps in economic progress. The PRC attracted billions of dollars in foreign direct investment
through favorable business terms, e.g., cheap labor or taxes, and aggressively seeking critical knowledge
through activities like sending graduate students to nations that possess desired technology. These
efforts have paid handsome dividends to Beijing due to a combination of low cost labor, available
technology, financial investment, educated professionals, and failure of competitors to keep up with
the Chinese economy. Information technology and software innovation, once the monopoly of the
American economy has migrated to countries like China, India, or Taiwan. Global competition has
forced a reconstruction of economies worldwide. Forced to seek lower costs, many industries in the
United States have moved operations and production offshore; research, design, and technological
development soon followed. Questions about the benefit of low cost products compared to a loss of
employment are contentious issues involving the value of globalization.
A country’s government has a significant impact on the performance on an economy. Government
policies to improve business and labor activities can motivate market activities that may lead to
innovation or increased competition. These actions can allow the nation’s population to develop the
state’s economic power. Similarly, the government can fund activities to improve common public
infrastructure like roads, utilities, and other services that provide a foundation for economic growth.
Governments also can send messages to their people on how they will treat business activities. Will
the government operate inefficient, publicly-owned enterprises that compete unfairly with private
business? Does the government punish businesses with onerous taxes or uncompetitive labor laws?
These and other activities can challenge the economic future of a nation. Indeed, government plays
a large role in the domestic economy, but it also affects international events. National governments
might agree to international standards of the World Trade Organization; support regional alliances; or
encourage the free flow of goods, services, and capital that may affect economic relations with other
states.
The structure of market systems also plays a key role in an economy. Free markets allow an almost
unfettered exchange of goods and services to flow within and across borders. Reliance on the “rule of
law” to settle differences and a minimum of government interference supports creative and growing
markets. Along with free exchanges of products and services, many markets also encourage information
exchange that allows ideas and principles to circulate among a nation’s population and its trading
partners. Opportunities to create wealth and improve one’s living standard also can force changes in
government.
Not all nations possess all of the aforementioned resources and policies. They use a combination of
available resources to convert what assets they have or can acquire into a capability. Even though the
United States dominates all other individual nations economically, it is not self-sufficient today in terms
of raw materials, goods, services, and, increasingly, financial capital. The nation must import many
components to sustain its economy. Although the United States sold over $807 billion of exported goods
to foreign countries in 2004, it purchased $1,473 billion of imports in the same period.1 The trend of
increasing reliance on finished goods and raw materials like oil from abroad has continued for decades.
This situation has economic and political ramifications that range from foreign control of sectors of the
economy to debt concerns. As countries like China and India develop their economies and reap gains
from trade, demand by their consumers for the same goods and raw materials will rise. Changes in
standard of living and overall economic strength will occur here and abroad. The subsequent trading
relationships between nations will force greater reliance on and interest in events around the world
that can create pressures on other resources and the economy itself.
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Nations that historically have had little impact because of past trade relations or possession of raw
materials of limited value are now capable of influencing American foreign policy actions. These nations
have either a direct linkage to or indirectly affect America’s economy. For example, the United States
has attempted to seek oil sources from other than Persian Gulf nations. Some of the largest sources of
available non-Middle East oil imports are from Venezuela and Nigeria. This reliance on Venezuelan
and Nigerian oil gives those nations greater influence on U.S. foreign policy, or at least a stronger
bargaining position with Washington. Failure to consider them or problems within their regions can
produce hefty economic penalties to the nation and the global economy. Although the amounts of oil
imported from Venezuela and Nigeria is smaller than imports from Saudi Arabia and some other oil
producers, upward spikes in oil prices can slow down the American economy by directly “taxing”
consumers and production due to higher prices at the gas pump and for many products. However,
the effect does not stop there. Higher world oil prices also threaten the economic health of many small
nations. This, in turn, affects their ability to produce exported goods and services and can seriously
reduce their ability to buy imported American goods. Economic hardship can create disruption that
leads to political instability and conflict.
Economics as an Element of Power.
National power is a very topical issue today. Countries that desire to achieve certain goals or
objectives can do so in many ways in this complex world. Although most people equate national power
with military power, many situations in international politics are inappropriate for the sole use of
military means. Often, a combination of other elements, with or without the military, might accomplish
the objective faster and with better results. Perhaps one way to think about national power is as the
capacity to create capabilities that a nation can exploit to undertake actions to achieve its national
interests. In this light, a strong economy provides the means to allow national leaders the ways to
attain desired ends. The economy does this through a number of measures by providing the goods and
services necessary to carry out selected actions.
A nation could produce goods and services itself either through domestic production, or acquiring
them from international sources. The United States has been able to mobilize its economy to fight wars
and to provide resources to her allies. Certainly, the United States was able to aid in the defeat the Axis
powers in World War II significantly through its role as the “arsenal of democracy.” American-made
trucks, aircraft, tanks, small arms, clothing, and food helped arm and feed the Allied armed forces and
liberated peoples around the world. American business and labor leaders were able to transition the
economy from a depression-era subsistence production level to a fully mobilized economy that made
military and, albeit limited, civilian goods and services available. Times have changed. Today, with the
globalization of the economy, the United States and other nations must go progressively beyond their
shores to get products, raw materials, and services. Trade access and the financial wherewithal allows
the country to get those goods and services that are not available or are more costly in the United
States. Even though some goods and services may be available domestically, concerns about quality,
cost, and other issues have forced peacetime consumers and businesses to purchase the items from
foreign sources. Unfortunately, many of these commercial products are vital for national security. Many
military-specific products like aircraft, satellite communications, information technology, and other
items are made overseas. Manufacturing capability has declined rapidly in the United States. In 1995
the United States possessed 17.2 million manufacturing jobs; by November 2005, it had declined to 14.3
million positions.2 Some of the declines are due to increased productivity from improved automation
or technology. Given the growing U.S. population, this statistic represents a disturbing trend as whole
industries move offshore in search of lower cost production sites. Although consumers benefit from
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lower prices, future ability to design, build, and maintain like type products may disappear. Reliance
on foreign technology and products is possible, assuming access is guaranteed. What if Washington
cannot acquire these systems due to a lack of available products or the refusal of a foreign government
or firm to sell them?
National leadership can take several economic approaches to addressing potential security concerns.
In most cases, governments concentrate on three primary approaches for security policy. A government
can use an instrument or combination of instruments of power to persuade, coerce, or defeat an
adversary.3 These techniques work well with economics, as well as other elements of power. A nation
could try to persuade or use influence to change what a power might believe or value. For example,
the United States could offer to reduce tariffs on imported goods to motivate the nation to agree to a
proposal. Similarly, a country might want to change certain of its adversary’s behaviors. A state could
then use coercion to force modifications of selected behaviors. Washington could ban import or increase
tariffs on a country’s goods until the objectionable behavior changed. Finally, the nation’s government
might try to eliminate another power’s ability to take certain actions or capabilities through defeating
them in some endeavor. The nation could out produce or try to purchase outright the capacity of a rival
to produce goods or services. Economics can be used in all three cases independently or along with
political, military, and informational elements of power.
A government can persuade or influence another state that perhaps what they value or believe
fundamentally is flawed.4 The United States could educate a trading partner on the benefits or costs of
taking a particular position. For example, the United States might preach that better economic gains
or prosperity result from allowing more open trade than from maintaining closed markets or limiting
the production of products or raw materials. One might provide examples of nations that experienced
increased standards of living after privatization of state owned enterprises or elimination of high import
tariffs.
Economic success and prosperity are seen easily. Improved standards of living manifested in material
and financial wealth, mortality rates, education, and other measurable means are very powerful as
evidence of economic growth. In our hemisphere, many nations in Central and South America have
seen the success, in many areas, of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and now the
new Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Not only have they improved industry and
increased jobs across borders, but they also have helped improve intergovernmental relations in many
respects. Central American nations also might see political benefits through improved cooperation
between themselves by using a similar agreement as a device for better relations.5 Mexico and Canada
have seen increased investment in their countries by U.S. businesses that directly have advanced their
countries economically. Other nations easily could see the potential benefits from economic integration.
Still, this status comes at a cost, with employment changes spread among industries that move across
borders.
Economic foreign aid or assistance is a classic persuasive tool. Economic aid is a well-understood
“carrot” and very useful as a reward for good behavior or decisions that favor the granting country.
Thus, the United States granted both Egypt and Israel large annual allocations of economic and military
aid to help persuade the nations to accept the Camp David peace accords. Because only intent separates
this technique from our next category, foreign aid also can be a coercive tool.
Coercion takes on a more ominous image than persuasion. Instead of trying to voluntarily change
behavior from within, coercion attempts to force changes in measured behavior. A nation can take two
routes to coerce another: deter or compel.6 The difference is that, in one case you are trying to prevent
an opponent from doing something, while in the other you are trying to cause him to do something
he might not otherwise do. Deterrence involves getting an opponent to realize that, if it takes a certain
action, then any result from that action will become more costly to it than any potential gains. For
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example, a nation might use the threat of force to dissuade another from taking a contemplated action.
Nations also could deter other nations by getting them to join an alliance or agreement to force them
to accept certain standards of behavior and reject others. Similarly, a nation could compel other states
to take certain actions. Nations can use threats or more positive means to force adversaries to take a
particular avenue to solve a problem.
A government can use economic means to deter or compel another to take certain actions or behavior.
The United States could use her economy to deny a potential adversary essential goods or services to
deter an action or to coerce an action. The nation simply can refuse to sell certain items to that country;
outbid rivals for the sale of the items so that the targeted country cannot purchase the items; deny them
the ability to sell good and services that would reduce their ability to buy certain resources; or get other
countries to act against the state in question. A strong economy has a great say among producers and
consumers around the world. In some respects, even if the nation is concerned about buying a product
from another country, the United States could moderate the seller’s behavior. Suppose the seller of a
raw material decides to export that product to an American adversary. We could use our purchasing
power to buy or use the threat to buy the entire surplus; pressure the seller not to allow the sale of the
product to the adversary by threatening to buy the product from someone else; or withhold sales of a
product to the selling nation. Certainly, the options are numerous, given the strength of the economy
compared to a weak economy that leaves a country vulnerable.
A nation also can use its economy to try to defeat another power. The nation can use its economic
power in attempts to destroy a targeted country’s capability to take certain actions or ability to project
her power. Although physical defeat of the enemy more often is associated with military operations,
economic means also are viable to support the elimination of a nation’s ability to take certain actions.
These economic measures could allow only one course of action open to the adversary, one chosen by
the power that destroyed the economy.
Perhaps a nation could target a particular segment of an opponent’s economy for destruction
that would render it vulnerable to other actions. Let us suppose that a nation relies primarily on
manufacturing for domestic and international sales. Further, this manufacturing capability is tied to
steel production. A nation or combination of nations can try to limit a raw materials used in its steel
production; outproduce the target and sell the steel at a lower price; convince others to boycott the
adversary’s products; or find some other way to choke off vital manufacturing capability to destroy
the capacity to make steel permanently. As mentioned earlier, this nation lent vital economic aid to
allied countries during World War II. Some might argue that it was American economic power that
out produced the Axis powers’ economies to defeat them. The United States, as the world’s largest and
most diverse economy has many options it can use to influence, coerce, or defeat a foe with economic
means.
Indeed, economic power has become a very powerful tool to enhance the abilities of a nation and
limit those of an adversary. However, as nations become more intertwined through globalization, they
become more vulnerable to disruptions in their economies, manmade or natural, due to reliance on
foreign sources of raw materials, components, finished products, or key services. This is especially
true for complex, highly integrated economies like the United States. For example, U.S. dependence on
energy sources indicates a strong need for imported oil. In 1973, the average production from U.S. oil
fields was 9,208 thousand barrels per day. The country imported 3,244 thousand barrels daily. By 2004,
the average American production amount fell to 5,419 thousand barrels. Imports had jumped to 10,088
thousand barrels.7
Consequently, the nation has become more sensitive to external events that might affect the future
supply of oil. Any reduction in oil production, regardless of its intended destination, affects the
nation’s economy in several ways. First, if there is a reduction in oil production, prices rise worldwide
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since buyers bid up prices to meet their demand. This disrupts resource flows and production. Energy
substitutes, such as natural gas, also see a rise in demand and price. Second, poorer nations that cannot
afford high priced oil might face internal political strife as their standard of living declines. These
concerns can create conditions for mass disruptions in poor nations. Third, uncertainty and turmoil
about the future threatens long-term investment and consumer confidence due to fears that the nation’s
economy might slow. This will affect the nation’s ability to produce goods and services in the coming
years. Fourth, declining oil stocks can affect key trading partners’ and allies’ economies that also rely
on access to oil. If those nations do not have viable economies, they might not produce the goods we
need nor are they capable of buying our exports.
An oil crisis or shortage of some other product like an imported computer microchips, whether
caused by a manmade or natural disaster, can create a series of political and economic conditions
that can affect the health of a nation severely. A reduction in oil supplies creates all types of possible
government responses, and may become a cause to use other elements of power to assure that oil flows
freely in the world market. One could use, for example, the political element to encourage other states
to increase production. Conversely, we could use informational means to persuade oil consumers not
to panic and cause additional disruptions in the market. Finally, the country could use military means
to create a secure supply line from oil producers to consumers.
Conclusion.
Economic interdependence on one hand has allowed competitive forces to lower prices and increase
availability of many goods and services. Economic security, improving domestic employment and
wealth, have been increased with international trade. Free trade has helped sharpen the government’s
ability to achieve national objectives. The promise of access to American and other tariff free markets
can help motivate other countries to cooperate with the United States. Increased access to markets
also has allowed American business to sell products from computers to agricultural items that result
in jobs. However, with the enhanced economic relationships have come critics who charge that more
international integration has led to the loss of vital industries that have left the country to seek lower
cost production elsewhere. This aspect of free trade has eliminated U.S. jobs, created a hemorrhage of
technology, strengthened potential regional rivals, and left the nation more vulnerable to economic
disruption. Manmade or natural disruptions in supply of imported assets may slow the ability to sustain
combat operations or alter a decisionmaker’s options to involve the country in operations for fear of
adverse economic consequences. One of the challenges facing the nation’s leaders will continue to be
how to use economics to strengthen America’s security while balancing the risk of future involvement
in economic relationships that may constrain, rather than enhance, U.S. national security.
Economic power has helped shape American foreign policy for decades and will do so far into
the future. This element of power is very flexible. If used wisely in conjunction with the political,
military, and informational elements, it is hard to beat. Whether a nation has a large or small military,
its leadership must understand economics. Economics is a great tool to create conditions for further
action or to force a nation to change behavior. As the world further embraces globalization, economics
as an element of power will only gain greater influence in the United States and around the world.
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CHAPTER 19
PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STATECRAFT:
RETHINKING ENGAGEMENT1
Douglas A. Borer
February 2003 marked the 12th anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait by the United States and its
global allies, and their near-total victory over the military forces of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
in Operation DESERT STORM. However, much to the surprise of members of the first George Bush
administration, academic scholars, military analysts, media pundits, foreign policy experts, and the
average layman, Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq and continued to defy the international
community successfully. Regardless of the military success of the U.S. war with Iraq prosecuted by the
second Bush administration in 2003, Saddam’s longevity, in itself, should serve as a significant warning
to policymakers that something may be amiss in the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy.
In this chapter, the author reexamines the fundamental intellectual and strategic assumptions of what
is known as “engagement,” the foreign policy doctrine that guided U.S. behavior toward Iraq in the
decade preceding Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. Despite the wholesale failure of U.S. strategy toward
Iraq before 1990, the fundamental assumptions that guided U.S. engagement policies have remained
largely unexamined. This failure to acknowledge historic mistakes raises the disturbing possibility
that similar failures of engagement may occur in Washington’s strategic relationships with other
problematic international actors and rogue states.
Engagement in Practice: U.S. Relations with Iraq, 1982-90.
Engagement serves as a core policy doctrine of U.S. national security strategy in the 21st century.2
In practice, implementing engagement relies heavily on the manipulation on the economic elements
of national power, primarily in the areas of trade and finance, to influence the behavior of other states.
Engagement uses economic interdependence, or mutual dependence, to create ties that, in theory,
should bind states together. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggest that economic interdependence
should be understood in terms of the power to influence, or the effects on each state of their trade
linkages. Indeed, as many scholars have indicated, states have long recognized the truth that power
generally flows from asymmetrical (or imbalanced) interdependence.3 In keeping with this tradition,
Keohane and Nye stress that when planning an effective diplomatic strategy, “It is asymmetries in
dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one
another. Less dependent actors often can use the interdependent relationship as a source of power in
bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues.”4 At its core, economic statecraft is founded
on the principle of asymmetrical power.
In 1979 political turmoil in the Middle East forever changed the regional strategic landscape. In
January of that year, a groundswell of Islamist protesters drove the Shah of Iran from the Persian throne;
in December the Soviet Union launched its ruinous war in Afghanistan; and in September 1980, Iraq
invaded Iran. Thus, the Middle East stage radically was changed as the Reagan administration entered
the White House. In the minds of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy team, U.S. national interests in the oilrich Persian Gulf now faced two significant new threats: communist expansionism by direct military
means from the Soviet Union and the spread of anti-U.S. Islamic fundamentalism from Iran. With these
two factors in mind, Iraq’s sponsorship of international terrorism was seen as a lesser of evils, and
therefore Baghdad was perceived as a potential partner that could serve U.S. strategic interests in the
region.
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In terms of strategic formulation, the ends (or goals) were clear: block both Soviet expansion and the
further expansion of radical Islam into the Gulf region. The way in which these goals could be achieved
was identified as the transformation of Iraq into a pro-U.S. country vis-à-vis a policy of engagement. The
means to be deployed would be a combination of three elements of national power: 1) limited military
support; 2) increased diplomatic and political intercourse; and 3) heavy economic incentives; with the
latter being the key element. What was the risk assessment of such a strategy? There was little chance
that U.S.-Iraq relations could be made any worse than they were at the time, thus, it seemed that almost
any strategy that could increase U.S. influence in with Baghdad was worth a try. If the strategy worked,
the United States would achieve its regional political goals and possibly even score a broader battle in
the Cold War by weaning a Soviet client state away from Moscow. The only possible negative outcome
was a domestic political backlash by those who would accuse the administration of negotiating with
a terrorist-sponsoring state. However, there were no well-organized anti-Saddam groups of Iraqis in
the United Stattes that could pressure Congress (unlike the powerful Cuban-American community) to
block White House overtures. Due to the huge leverage Washington held over Tel Aviv by its yearly
military and financial aid packages, any potential pressure that the Israeli lobby might decide to mount
was considered manageable. Finally, it must be remembered that these events transpired during one
of its most strained periods of the Cold War. Virtually all opposition to a change in policy toward
Iraq could be bent upon the traditional wheel of geopolitical Cold War national security interests. In
short, the risk assessment suggested a high potential gain, with a minimal potential loss; as a result,
engagement was given the green light.
In March 1982, the U.S. Government officially began engaging Saddam Hussein by removing
Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The official reason was to recognize Iraq’s improved
record,5 a claim that a Defense Department official later rebutted, stating: “No one had any doubts
about [the Iraqis’] continued involvement in terrorism. . . . The real reason was to help them succeed
in the war against Iran.”6 Thus Iraq, no longer on the list of terrorist states subject to highly binding
export restrictions on weapon purchases and technology exports, became eligible for U.S. Government
financed credits designed to promote the export of U.S. goods. It was presumed that after Iraq began to
benefit from and become reliant on U.S. economic linkages, the United States would be able to induce
Iraq to behave more in accordance with international norms. Engagement of Saddam’s regime was
anchored on the assumption that trade interdependence would be asymmetrical in favor of the United
States, and that, in turn, the United States would be able to shape Iraq’s behavior, using trade as a tool
of influence. In November 1984, after Reagan’s reelection, Washington resumed full diplomatic ties
with Baghdad.
The contextual setting of the time strongly suggested that such a strategy had an excellent chance of
success. As a result of war-related disruptions in shipping through the Persian Gulf, Iraq’s oil revenues
had shrunk from $22 billion in 1980 to approximately $9.5 billion in 1982. Iraq was dependent on imports
for 75 percent of its food supply, and it was deep in debt.7 Thus, it comes as no surprise that three of the
main areas of trade that Reagan administration officials focused on for engagement with Iraq were in
the realms of oil, agriculture, and finance. By 1984 the U.S. Agriculture Department’s Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) had extended $513 million in credits for Iraq to purchase U.S. farm products. In 1985
the U.S. Export-Import Bank extended more than $684 million in short- and long-term credits to Iraq
for the construction of a strategic oil pipeline through Jordan that would have the capacity for a million
barrels per day. In terms of military assistance, the United States still officially maintained a stance of
neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. However, the United States sold to Iraq a wide variety of “dual-use”
items. For instance, Iraq purchased more than 100 helicopters from manufacturers in the United States,
which in export documents were designated for civilian and recreational purposes. Upon arrival in
Iraq, they immediately were diverted to the front with Iran, with no ensuing protest from Washington.
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The Reagan administration also gave the “nod and wink” to the illegal transfer of U.S. weapons from
third countries, including sales of theator of war (TOW) anti-tank missiles, helicopters, small arms,
mortars, and munitions from Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. However, of greater military
value was the intelligence data supplied to Iraq from U.S. satellite photography. In 1984 President
Ronald Reagan signed a national security directive authorizing intelligence-sharing with Iraq, a move
analysts would later describe as having saved the Iraqis from being overrun in several key battles.8
U.S. engagement incentives continued to grow throughout the remainder of Reagan’s term in office.
Under the first Bush administration, however, the use of the economic tools of statecraft moved to a
higher level. His transition team argued, “Trade is the best key to political influence.”9 By 1989, Iraq
had become the single biggest market for U.S. rice exporters, with sales running to $180 million. Sales
of wheat, flour, livestock feed, cotton, and other commodities amounted to more than $345 million
in additional income for U.S. farmers and agribusinesses. In 1990 the U.S. Department of Agriculture
proposed allocating $1 billion in new credits to Iraq, bringing the total to more than $2 billion.10 These
selected examples only begin to portray the variety of ways in which the United States attempted to
engage Iraq with economic incentives.
Considering what we now know about Iraq in the years that have passed since the Gulf War, it
is only pointed rhetoric to ask if the policy was a success. However, even before the Gulf War, it
was apparent to many observers that engagement of Iraq was not working. Despite Saddam’s official
opening of Kurdistan to foreign reporters, atrocities against the Kurds continued unabated in 1989
and 1990. Amnesty International documented the kidnapping and torture of more than 300 Kurdish
children as human hostages in an attempt to intimidate Kurdish separatists in the north of Iraq,11
and the U.S. Government’s own human rights report clearly stated that even perceived political and
military opposition to the Iraqi government was dealt routinely with through the torture and execution
of suspected Kurds.12 Some of the most disturbing warning signs of Saddam’s continued predatory
profile come from the review of Iraq’s supposedly clandestine program to develop weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). As early as March 1985, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle urged that the
United States impose a “non-nuclear assurance” clause as a written condition for exporting advanced
computers. Perle, who was known as one of the administration’s most hard-line hawks in his antiSoviet views, was not convinced that economic statecraft (in the form of technology transfers) should
be used in the attempt to wean Iraq away from Moscow. However, those who were certain that such
transfers were necessary to convince the Iraqis of Washington’s friendship overruled Perle and others
in the administration. 13
From 1985 to 1990, U.S. controls on exports of specialized, high-technology dual-use products were
weakened steadily despite repeated protests from high-ranking officials in the Energy and Defense
Departments.14 However, in retrospect, it is clear that until the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the U.S. foreign
policy agencies that had embraced the economic tools of statecraft (primarily State and Commerce)
were able to override continually those agencies focused on national security (Defense and the CIA).
Correspondingly, the Iraqi record on terrorism remained largely unchanged. In 1982 Iraq was tied to
the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to London, the hit man being a colonel in the Iraqi
intelligence services. After expelling the well-known Palestinian terrorist, Abu Nidal, under pressure
from the U.S. Congress, Saddam proceeded to patch up relations with Yasir Arafat, who thanked the
Iraqi leader for his “donations” of weapons to reequip the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
after it had been driven out of Beirut by Israeli forces. In October 1985 the Iraqi government assisted the
escape of the terrorists responsible for the murder of wheelchair-bound U.S. citizen, Leon Klinghoffer,
on the cruise ship, Achille Lauro, and Baghdad refused to revoke the diplomatic passport held by Abu
Abbas, the lead terrorist in the high-profile attack. In 1985 two Iraqi-based terrorists were captured in
Rome in transit to planned attacks on American targets. Despite official public denials from the U.S.
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Executive Branch, it was acknowledged in a then-classified Reagan administration document that Iraq
continued to support terrorism.15
Probably the most damning evidence of engagement’s ineffectiveness in altering Iraq’s behavior
comes from a review of that country’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and Iraqi
civilians. In 1983, the first of four reports of the use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces was
received in Washington, and in 1984 a report issued by the United Nations (UN) provided the first
public documentation of Iraq’s violation of international law on the use of such weapons.16 The Reagan
administration responded to these chemical weapon attacks by filing paper protests with the Iraqi
government, sponsoring a resolution in the UN General Assembly, and tightening some export controls
on chemical supplies and technology.17 At the same time, however, the United States continued to
provide Iraq with intelligence data on Iranian troop movements and formations, ignoring the fact
that such data was being used to optimize the deployment and use of chemical attacks against the
Iranians.
It is obvious that from a moral, ethical, or legal perspective, the U.S. position in these policies is
an impoverished one. However, in the amoral, realpolitik world of international diplomacy, where
strategic concerns often take precedence over moral and ethical principles, one might choose to argue
that the U.S. position was not necessarily an illogical one. But does such an amoral realist’s analysis
actually hold true under closer scrutiny in terms of its strategic logic? The key question is this: When
George Bush took over from Ronald Reagan, what had happened to the original strategic rationale for
engaging Iraq?
In 1988, immediately after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, using U.S.-built helicopters, Saddam
unleashed brutal gas attacks on the Kurds. Approximately 30 villages were gassed with chemical agents
that included mustard gas and nerve toxins. Normally, the United States would lead the outraged
international response to any such act. (One can only imagine the response at the time if the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua had gassed the U.S.-supported Contras.) In fact, the Reagan administration
did sponsor a resolution in the UN condemning the use of chemical weapons, and it tightened some
export controls; however, the great majority of all dual-use export licenses were approved by the
Reagan administration.18 While the record clearly shows that the United States refused to pursue
a highly confrontational approach (in the form of economic sanctions), there is little evidence that
Washington made any serious attempt to alter Saddam’s behavior by using any form of leverage that
the burgeoning asymmetrical economic ties had created during 6 years of engagement.
This inaction on the part of the United States is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, economic
sanctions had been imposed on Libya simply based on intelligence data showing that the country was
developing a chemical weapons program. In contrast, Iraq had not only developed the most extensive
chemical weapons program in the Third World, but it actually had used the weapons repeatedly. Yet
no sanctions were forthcoming. As noted at the time by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter,
Saddam’s actions constituted a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights,” which, according to existing law, required sanctions.19 Second, and perhaps more to the
point, the geopolitical strategic situation in the region, which drove the original overture to Iraq, had
changed by the summer of 1988. The Cold War was at its lowest ebb in years as Gorbachev’s perestroika
and glasnost revolution accelerated. This revolution in Soviet behavior was validated that year by the
announcement that Soviet troops would begin withdrawing from Afghanistan. In August 1988, Iraq’s
war with Iran came to an end, with stalemate along the original border being the end result. Thus, both
core strategic U.S. goals had been fulfilled: fundamentalism had been blocked geostrategically from
spreading from Iran into the oil-rich Gulf states, and the Soviet military threat was in rapid retreat
from the region. If the “ends” or goals of U.S. strategy had been accomplish, why, then, did the Bush
administration continue the policy of engagement, vis-à-vis positive incentives, rather than turning to
more coercive threats by threatening to cut off Iraq’s sole remaining lifelife?
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In terms of the logic of engagement, the potential for U.S. leverage over Iraq was quite salient at
the time. In 1988 Iraq was mired in debt and in desperate need of foreign capital for reconstruction
after 8 years of destructive war with Iran. If the rationale of asymmetrical interdependence that lay at
the foundation of U.S. engagement policies was correct, Iraq should have been malleable under any
new economic stresses imposed by the United States. Indeed, the war with Iran had cost the country
nearly half a trillion dollars in direct and indirect costs.20 Iraq was behind in its loan payments, with
an overall foreign debt of more than $80 billion. Its major economic lifeblood, oil, was a commodity in
high supply and lower demand on world markets. In 1980, before the war, Iraq had made $22 billion a
year in oil revenues; in 1988 the figure was $11 billion, before adjusting for inflation.21
The question is, when Saddam used poison gas to lay waste to Kurdish Iraqi citizens, why did the
United States put so little pressure on Iraq to change its behavior? This lack of action seems inexplicable
when the original policy of building economic ties to gain political leverage over Iraq seemed so
ripe for success. If the tools of economic statecraft had been deployed with the goal of making Iraq
open to U.S. influence, then those tools could be given meaning and substance only if the United
States was willing to put coercive pressure on Iraq when behavioral reciprocity failed to emerge. In
retrospect, the preponderance of evidence, even at the time made it quite clear that Iraqi behavior had
not fundamentally changed. Yet, despite Iraq’s ongoing pariah-like behavior, the United States was
unwilling to invoke the power of the trade linkages it had intentionally created. Why?
Bridging the Gap in Theory and Practice: Inverse Engagement.
The policy of engagement refers to the use of noncoercive means, or positive incentives, by one state
to alter the elements of another state’s behavior. As such, some scholars have categorized engagement
as a form of appeasement.22 However, I concur with the view articulated by Randall Schweller that
while engagement can be classified in generic terms as a form of appeasement, an important qualitative
difference exists between the two: “Engagement is more than appeasement,” he says:
It encompasses any attempt to socialize the dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order. In practice
engagement may be distinguished from other policies not so much by its goals but by its means: it relies on
the promise of rewards rather than the threat of punishment to influence the target’s behavior. . . . The policy
succeeds if such concessions convert the revolutionary state into a status quo power with a stake in the stability
of the system. . . . Engagement is most likely to succeed when the established powers are strong enough to mix
concessions with credible threats, to use sticks as well as carrots. . . . Otherwise, concessions will signal weakness
that emboldens the aggressor to demand more.23

Schweller’s account provides the basic parameters of how engagement should work in theory, but
what can theory tell us about how engagement works in practice? When the “carrots” fail to produce
change, can theory help to explain why an established power fails to use the “sticks” mentioned by
Schweller? In this case, how can theory help us explain the first Bush administration’s ongoing practice
of granting noncoercive, positive trade incentives to Iraq in the face of overwhelming evidence before
its invasion of Kuwait, showing that Iraq had not changed its preengagement behavioral profile and
was continuing to act as a rogue state? In other words, why did the United States not use its significant
power over Iraq?
To bridge this gap between theory and practice, I turn again to Keohane and Nye’s classic work,
Power and Interdependence:
Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and
at an acceptable cost to the actor). . . . When we say that asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power,
we are thinking of power as control over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes. A less dependent actor in a
relationship often has a significant political resource, because changes in the relationship (which the actor may be
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able to initiate or threaten) will be less costly to that actor than to its partners. This advantage does not guarantee,
however, that the political resources provided by favorable asymmetries in interdependence will lead to similar
patterns of control over outcomes.24

Clearly, our study of U.S.-Iraq relations is illustrative of a case when a less dependent actor (the
United States) is not guaranteed control over outcomes. Why? In order to understand the dynamics of
power in an interdependent relationship, Keohane and Nye distinguish two useful concepts: sensitivity
and vulnerability. Sensitivity interdependence, “involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy
framework—how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are
the costly effects? It is measured not merely by the volume of flows across borders, but also by the costly
effects of changes in transactions on societies or governments.” The authors characterize vulnerability
interdependence as the cost to, and the capabilities of, a state to offset or change any unwanted impacts
caused by the actions of its foreign partner.25 For instance, two countries may be equally sensitive to
change in an economic variable, but one might less vulnerable than the other because it has a wider
variety of alternatives available to it. To illustrate both concepts, Keohane and Nye use the following
pertinent example:
In petroleum, for instance, what matters is not only the proportion of one’s needs that is imported, but the
alternatives to imported energy and the costs of pursuing those alternatives. Two countries, each importing 35
percent of their petroleum needs, may seem equally sensitive to price rises; but if one could shift to domestic
sources at moderate cost [e.g., the United States], and the other had no alternative [e.g., Japan], the second state
would be more vulnerable than the first. The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative
availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.26

How does this distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability help us understand the relationship
between interdependence and power? According, again, to Keohane and Nye:
Clearly, it indicates that sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in
providing power resources to actors. If one actor can reduce its costs by altering its policy, either domestically or
internationally, the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to power resources.27

As shown during the oil shocks of the 1970s and again most recently in 2000, the U.S. policymaking sphere
is highly sensitive to changes in the world price of oil.28 Because of its own domestic oil production, the
United States is less vulnerable than a country like Japan in terms of absolute dependence on foreign
sources, but price sensitivity for such products as gasoline and heating oil is similar in the United States
and Japan, a sensitivity that invokes policy changes by decisionmakers in the White House. Thus, if
Iraq somehow had the power to dictate world oil prices, then the United States would be both sensitive
to price increases for petroleum products 29 and vulnerable because of a lack of alternative suppliers,
although less vulnerable than countries that rely more heavily than the United States on imported oil.
On the flip side, because of its heavy reliance on exported oil as its primary source of state revenue,
Iraq’s policymaking sphere also was highly attuned to changes in the world crude oil price. If too many
producers were pumping too much oil, the global price would drop, and Iraq would suffer.
In terms of vulnerability, by 1990 Iraq’s exposure to variations in the global oil market clearly was
much higher than that of the United States. The oil shocks of the 1970s driven by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) were followed by efforts by numerous suppliers to increase
global production, which resulted in overproduction by the late 1980s. OPEC unity progressively
deteriorated as its members blatantly violated production quotas, resulting in an oil glut and low prices
that lasted until the beginning of the Gulf War (and resumed thereafter to continue through the 1990s).
As a result, by 1990, U.S. vulnerability to any single oil supplier had greatly lessened. With the supply
outpacing demand, the United States could acquire oil from a broader assortment of sources than had
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been contributing to the world market a decade earlier (for example, new sources included the United
Kingdom’s North Sea operations and new domestic production in Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico),
and existing suppliers had all increased production. As an importer, the United States remained
vulnerable to the overall supply of oil, but only if major exporters cooperated in cutting production
and raising prices. Lacking such cooperation by OPEC and other major exporters, in 1990 the United
States was not vulnerable to the actions of any single source-point supplier like Iraq.30 However, Iraq,
which added to the global oversupply problem by pumping as much oil as possible to finance its war
debt, could not easily find an alternative customer to replace the level of consumption represented
by the United States.31 Within the U.S.-Iraq trading relationship, the United States might have had
incurred some minimal short-term financial costs for replacing its Iraqi oil with oil from other suppliers.
But, in comparative economic terms, the costs borne by Iraq would have been significantly higher if
Washington had decided to play its economic cards—that is, its asymmetric power within the bilateral
interdependency. All other things being equal, in terms of bilateral economic pain and influence, Iraq
should have had a lower threshold than the United States, because in 1990, Iraq’s weakened economy
was much more vulnerable than the U.S. economy to existing conditions in the global oil market.
A similar situation existed in the two other pillars of the bilateral economic relationship, the
intertwined areas of agriculture and finance. In an economy that relied on imports to supply 65 to 70
percent of its agricultural commodities, food and the financial ability to pay for it were two critical
economic sectors with a high degree of vulnerability for Iraq. By the late 1980s, Iraq had become
increasingly dependent on U.S. Government-backed loans that were used to buy agricultural goods
produced in the United States. According to data from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, by 1988 Iraq had
serious credit problems. Primarily because of Iraq’s payment arrears, which totaled over $100 million
to Italy, $90 million to France, $65 million to the United Kingdom, $36 million to West Germany, and
additional large amounts to Japan, the governments of the industrialized countries were unwilling
to extend further loans to Baghdad.32 Likewise, Iraq had mostly exhausted the huge lines of credit
and outright grants of cash that had been extended by its oil-rich, but by then cash-strapped, Arab
neighbors. These Arab countries held approximately half of Iraq’s $80 billion in foreign debt. Thus,
as noted earlier, the $1 billion in agricultural credits approved in 1990 under the CCC program was
exceedingly important to Iraq because it had few options.33 Thus, having no alternative funding sources
if U.S. credits dried up, Iraq was exceedingly vulnerable to any U.S. fiscal actions. In short, in terms of
U.S.-Iraq interdependence, Iraq was dependent asymmetrically on the United States for its economic
well-being and was of negligible importance to the overall economic well-being of the United States.
If Iraq was highly vulnerable to U.S. power over the core economic areas of oil, food, and finance
yet Saddam remained a bad actor, why did the United States not act to assert its economic leverage
despite the change in the strategic picture after 1988? Ignorance of Saddam’s ongoing behavior by
decisionmakers in Washington certainly was not the case. As hinted at previously, the Reagan/Bush
policies of uninterrupted economic engagement with Saddam did not proceed without serious internal
dissent within the U.S. Government. Inside the Administration, the strongest opposition came from
the Department of Defense (DoD), which (as noted in the earlier Richard Perle example) had argued
for years against the shipment of dual-use technologies that could be used in the development of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Dissenting voices also were heard from those within the
State Department responsible for monitoring human rights violations. Additional internal resistance
was put forward at the sub-Cabinet level and by analysts in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve. On the whole, however, within
the upper echelons of the executive branch, any direct challenges to the overall engagement mandate
eventually were overridden by Cabinet-level secretaries wielding their most effective lever: the national
security directives signed by both Presidents Reagan and Bush.34
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A more serious challenge to U.S. policies of engagement with Iraq came from Congress. Under
the framework of the Constitution, the executive branch holds the greatest sway in overall matters
of foreign policy. Because of its control over the nation’s taxation and spending authority, however,
Congress can influence any U.S. foreign policy that utilizes financial instruments. Although Congress
did not act to condemn Iraq for the gassing of Iranian soldiers on four verified occasions in the mid1980s,35 Saddam’s gassing of Kurdish civilians in 1988 from American-made helicopters did foment a
significant congressional reaction, primarily from the Senate.
In early September, the Senate unanimously passed the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988. In its
original form, the legislation called for the following changes in U.S. policy toward Iraq:
•

An embargo on all dual-use technology exports,

•

The elimination of all CCC and Export-Import Bank credits,

•

An embargo on all U.S. imports of Iraqi oil,

•

A requirement that all loans to Iraq under consideration in international financial institutions (the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.) be opposed by the United States.36

Liberal and conservative senators alike lent their outspoken support to this assertive legislation.
Liberal Democrat Claiborne Pell declared, “Iraq’s conduct is a crime against humanity. . . . It must
be met with the strongest possible response.” His conservative Republican counterpart, Senator Jesse
Helms, concurred, stating that the Senate legislation “will help demonstrate to the Iraqi regime just
how serious our country views its campaign against the Kurds. In addition, it will help assure that
United States tax dollars do not subsidize the Iraqis.”37 As members of the Senate saw it, the time had
come for exercising whatever leverage the United States held in its relationship with Iraq. However,
despite the unanimous support of the Senate, over the course of the next few months, the sanctions
bill systematically was watered down, and it eventually died under the heavy influence of both the
Administration and opponents within the House of Representatives.
The power to influence is a two-way relationship. The key question in this case is “who is influencing
whom?” On the surface, the answer appears simple. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States
had become Iraq’s most important international trading partner. Thus the American plan hatched
by the Reagan White House for building economic ties had, in fact, worked. However, as noted by
Keohane and Nye, “sensitivity interdependence can be social or political, as well as economic.”38 While
the United States consciously pursued its own diplomatic strategy to engage Baghdad with economic
tools of statecraft, Iraq simultaneously was organizing its own political muscle in Washington on the
basis of a strategy of inverse engagement that targeted the power of interest-group politics within the
U.S. political system.
To achieve its own national interest goals, Iraq pressured American businesses and organizations
with vested interests in trade to lobby key members of the House. For instance, at the urging of Iraq, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly encouraged Representative Dante Fascell (Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee) to step away from an emotional response to the Iraqi poison gas attacks
and to think in terms of the economic cost to Americans if sanctions were imposed.39 Other pro-Iraq
business groups also put pressure on members of the House. One important lobbying group, created in
1985 at the urging of the Iraqi government, was the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum. Since this group was one
of Iraq’s major tools of influence inside the U.S. business community, it subsequently held significant
influence inside the American government. At the forum’s founding, Iraq’s Ambassador to the United
States, Nizar Hamdoon, publicly urged corporate executives to join the group, promising that its
members would receive preferential treatment in any competitive ventures involving Iraqi government
contracts. In addition to a wide assortment of medium-sized and small American businesses, the U.S.Iraq Business Forum included Fortune 500 companies (AT&T, Bechtel, Caterpillar, and General Motors),

256

major defense contractors (Bell Helicopter-Textron, Boeing, Lockheed, and United Technologies), and
some of the world’s largest U.S.-based oil companies (Amoco, Exxon, Mobil, Occidental, and Texaco).40
In aggregate, the membership of the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum represented a significant cross-section
of the commanding heights of corporate America.
Implemented through the manipulation of powerful American domestic special interests, Iraq’s
strategy of inverse engagement is perhaps best illustrated in its oil pricing policies. In its effort to
engage Iraq, the United States had gone from importing no Iraqi oil before lifting sanctions in 1982,
to importing 126 million barrels in 1988. However, what is most interesting in this exchange is that
despite historically low global oil prices, American oil companies received a $1 per barrel discount
on purchases of Iraqi oil, a benefit not shared by non-U.S. companies. Thus, by 1988 Iraq’s inverse
engagement policy resulted in discount pricing that increased normal American oil company profits
on 126 million barrels of oil per year.41 These companies could have purchased non-Iraqi oil from
alternative suppliers; however, they would do so without the $126 million financial “carrot” offered by
Saddam’s inverse engagement strategy. Thus, despite its severe financial crisis, the Iraqi government
was willing to purchase what it perceived as an extra $126 million worth of power and influence with
American oil company executives, who in turn would be asked to use their substantial clout inside the
Washington beltway.
Was inverse engagement a good policy choice by Iraq? When sanctions for gassing the Kurds were
being debated within the U.S. Government, Iraq threatened to turn to other countries in the world
market, warning that it would stop payment on over $1 billion in outstanding debt if the United States
imposed sanctions. Leading members of the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum and other special interests in
Washington then pressured members of the House to kill the sanctions bill. As New York Times reporter
Elaine Sciolino reported,
The special interests got into the act,” [Senator] Pell said in a speech on October 21, 1988. “Agriculture interests
objected to the suspension of taxpayer subsidies for agricultural exports to Iraq; the oil industry protested the oil
boycott—although alternative supplies are readily available. Even a chemical company called to inquire how its
products might be impacted.42

To borrow Harold Lasswell’s statement, the Iraqis clearly understood the intricacies of “who
gets what, when, and how”43 in American politics. In order to achieve its foreign policy goals, Iraq
demanded that its major trade partners in the private sector pressure key members of Congress, as well
as the White House, to block any proposals for economic sanctions or to act in other ways that harmed
Iraq. In terms of economic statecraft, Iraq’s inverse engagement was a brilliant tactical approach that
used Washington’s own erroneously perceived strengths to Iraq’s advantage. By specifically targeting
congressional political sensitivity to any matters related to trade, domestic employment, and the
profit margins of politically active groups, the Iraqis were able to effectively neutralize America’s
power to exploit the asymmetric economic interdependence that had been created through the policy
of engagement. Indeed, as noted above, “Trade is the best key to political influence”; in this case,
however, the sentence should read: “Trade is the best key to political influence in the United States, not
necessarily in other countries.”
Conclusion.
It would be a bold and erroneous assertion to claim that a single variable—domestic special
interests—fully explains the complexities of U.S. foreign policy in the case of Iraq in the 1980s. However,
it does seem clear that the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability lend credence to the relative weight
of this analytical approach, although not precisely in the manner that Keohane and Nye prescribed. In
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retrospect, it is clear that America’s engagement policies, both past and present, are built on the basic
theoretical assumption that economic sensitivity and vulnerability in the target state will ensue from
any asymmetrical trade linkages that favor the United States. This assumption may be theoretically
true in purely economic terms, but it is less relevant (if not erroneous) in terms of practical statecraft,
the arena where economics and politics are inextricably linked. In the real-world politics of U.S.-Iraq
relations, the political spheres in the United States were highly sensitive to Iraq’s counterstrategy of
inverse engagement, despite the asymmetrical nature of interdependent U.S.-Iraq economic ties. Here,
too, it is clear that international relations theory needs some rethinking. First, it is clear that the more
dependent actor (Iraq) held more power to influence policy than the less dependent actor (the United
States). Second, Keohane and Nye’s assertion that “sensitivity interdependence will be less important
than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors”44 is challenged by the
evidence on the ground in this particular case. American sensitivity to Iraqi-inspired economic threats
was greater than Iraq’s vulnerability to overall U.S. economic power. As British military historian
Charles Callwell wrote early in the 20th century, “Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when
practice points the other way.”45
Therein lies a key conceptual problem of engagement. In thinking about how engagement would
work in Iraq, U.S. policymakers failed to comprehend fully the internal dynamics of both sides of
the system, both in terms of the Iraqi regime and in terms of the U.S. regime. As a result, perhaps
the most important lesson of this study is the failure of U.S. foreign policy practitioners to grasp the
domestic consequences of their actions at home. In other words, when engaging a foreign power,
during the critical risk assessment phase, the question should be asked: What impact will policy
changes have inside the United States? Iraq did, of course, respond to U.S. engagement initiatives, but
not in the way policymakers in the United States hoped it would. Instead of responding as predicted
in Washington, the Iraqis designed their own inverse engagement policies to obtain some measure
of control over American policy. In the United States, politicians rule on the democratic principle of
popular sovereignty; in day-to-day practice, however, American policymaking in both domestic and
foreign affairs is influenced heavily by interest-group politics that have little to do with voting by the
masses.46 Domestic special interest groups in the form of oil companies, agribusinesses, labor unions,
and industrial conglomerates existed long before the United States embarked on its new policies with
Iraq in 1982. However, before the Reagan administration decided to engage Iraq, no significant pro-Iraq
special interests existed in the United States because there were no vested interests in Iraq. Professional
umbrella political organizations such as the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum emerged only after engagement
of Iraq began in the early 1980s. To use a battlefield metaphor, Iraq’s inverse engagement policy was a
well-executed flanking maneuver that took advantage of the shifting diplomatic terrain created by the
United States.
In thinking broadly about trade politics in general, this domestic-level oversight may not be a critical
consideration in relations between democracies, but when an autocracy is involved, all bets are off.
Indeed, as this case study suggests, when an economically powerful yet politically sensitive democracy
(the United States) is pitted against an economically vulnerable yet politically resilient autocracy (Iraq),
the autocracy may achieve undue levels of influence if it is clever enough to follow the Iraqi model and
employ an inverse engagement strategy. Thus, if one wished to identify an Achilles’ heel of engagement,
the answer is not found beyond America’s borders but within the nation’s constitutional structures and
governing order. In rethinking engagement, a keener understanding of, and greater respect for, any
given opponent’s ends, ways, and means for influencing the U.S. process must be considered seriously
by American decisionmakers.
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PART IV
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING

CHAPTER 20
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS
Gabriel Marcella1
Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength
comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy
marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the
mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power
abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are
the paladins of statecraft.2
Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.

The United States is a fully equipped, globally deployed, interagency superpower. It is the
indispensable anchor of international order and the increasingly globalized economic system. Nothing
quite like it has ever existed. Indeed, such great powers as Rome, Byzantium, China, Spain, England,
and France achieved extraordinary sophistication, enormous institutional and cultural influence, and
longevity, but they never achieved the full articulation of America‘s global reach.
Today the United States forward deploys some 250 diplomatic missions in the form of embassies,
consulates, and memberships in specialized organizations. It possesses a unified military command
system that covers all regions of the world, the homeland, and even outer space. It is the leader of
an interlocking set of alliances and agreements that promotes peace, open trade, the principles of
democracy, human rights, and protection of the environment. American capital, technology, and
culture influence the globe. American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional. All the
instruments of national power are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the
instruments into coherent effectiveness, remains. Presidents and their national security staffs strive to
achieve coherence, with varying levels of success through use of the “interagency process.”
The interagency decisionmaking process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity.
Given ever expanding responsibilities and the competition for resources, it is imperative that national
security professionals master it in order to work effectively within it. The complex challenges to national
security in the 21st century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within
the government. It also is imperative that changes be made to make the system and the process more
effective.
The United States first faced the challenge of strategic integration in an embryonic interagency
process during World War II. Mobilizing the nation, the government, and the armed forces for war and
winning the peace highlighted the importance of resources and budgets, of integrating diplomacy with
military power, gathering and analyzing enormous quantities of intelligence, conducting joint and
combined military operations, and managing coalition strategies and balancing competing regional
priorities, for example, the European versus the Pacific theater in national strategy. From the war and
the onset of the Cold War emerged a number of institutional and policy innovations. Among them
were the structure of the modern Department of State, Department of Defense (DoD) (from the old War
and Navy Departments), a centralized intelligence system, the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of
Europe, the unified military command system, the Air Force, the predecessor of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (Point Four), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other
alliances, military assistance pacts, military advisory groups, and the U.S. Information Agency.
There is probably no period in American history like the late 1940s and early 1950s that demonstrates
the kind of national and institutional learning that John P. Lovell calls “purposeful adaptation.”
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He defines it as “the need to develop and pursue foreign policy goals that are sensitive to national
needs and aspirations and to the realities of a changing world environment.”3 The evolution of the
interagency process parallels America’s purposeful adaptation to changing global realities of the last
5 decades. But it is not an orderly evolution because of serious structural and cultural impediments,
such as discontinuities from one administration to another and poor institutional memory.4 Prominent
historical markers along the path of learning and adaptation included such documents as National
Security Council (NSC) 68, the intellectual framework for the containment strategy against the Soviet
Union. Though not a policy document, the Weinberger Doctrine articulated criteria for the use of
military power that dramatically influenced the shape of American strategy in the 1980s and 1990s.
There are countless examples of how American statesmen codify in writing the patterns of “purposeful
adaptation.” The tragic events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), had such an impact on American national
security that the George W. Bush administration created a Department for Homeland Security. It also
published a series of strategy documents on counterterrorism, homeland security, military strategy, and
infrastructure security. Bush‘s National Security Strategy (NSS) dramatically redefined the philosophical
underpinnings of the U.S. role in the world. Because the attacks of 9/11 represented an assault on
international order and exposed the vulnerabilities of the United States to asymmetric warfare by nonstate actors, the NSS of September 17, 2002, spoke of the need to redefine the Westphalian concept of
sovereignty for the purpose of reestablishing order and security in the international system.5
When the United States reluctantly inherited global responsibilities in 1945, American statesmen
faced three challenges: forging a system of collective security, promoting decolonization, and building a
stable international financial order. These and four decades of intense threat from the other superpower
had a decisive impact on shaping the interagency process. With the end of bipolar ideological and
geopolitical conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda was captured by free trade, democratization,
subnational ethnic and religious conflict, failing states, humanitarian contingencies, ecological
deterioration, terrorism, international organized crime, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of the
technology of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The dawn of the 21st century calls for a relook at
the adequacy of the interagency system not only because of the changing agenda, but also because of
the nature and extent of the global responsibilities the United States has taken on.
The National Security Council: The Permanent Tension between Coordination vs. Policymaking.
To bring strategic coherence, consensus, and decisiveness to the burgeoning global responsibilities
of the emerging superpower, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council:
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments
and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
. . . other functions the President may direct for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and
functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the nation’s security . . .
. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States . . .
. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned
with the national security .

The statutory members are the President, the Vice-President, and the Secretaries of State and
Defense. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
are advisors. Other advisors, including additional cabinet members such as the Secretary of the
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Treasury, may be invited. The President chairs the meeting; but the Council need not convene formally
to function. Formal NSC meetings are rare. Indeed, by late 1999 the Clinton NSC had met only once:
March 2, 1993. There are alternatives to formal meetings, such as the ABC luncheons of Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Sandy Berger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, or the Deputies breakfasts and lunches. The President himself
may at any time meet informally with members of his cabinet. In recent years, televideo conferencing
facilitates such senior level consultations.
The “NSC system” of policy coordination and integration across the departments and agencies
operates 24 hours a day. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs directs the staff.
The emergence of the modern “operational presidency,”6 brought to the NSC greater authority over
the development and implementation of policy, thus creating a new power center that competes for
jurisdiction with the Departments of State and Defense.
The NSC staff, known as the Executive Secretariat, has varied in size and function. In 1999 the staff
comprised about 208 professionals covering regional and functional responsibilities (101 were policy
personnel and 107 administrative and support personnel). Under the George W. Bush administration,
the NSC staff was cut to nearly half. Staffers are detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intelligence
community, the civil service, the military services (12 military officers were in policy positions in
September 1999), academia, and the private sector. The staffing procedures are personalized to the
president’s style and comfort level. The structure of the staff, its internal and external functioning,
and the degree of control of policy by the president varies. Carter and Clinton were very centralized,
Reagan and George Bush, Senior, less so. As examples, the first two Presidential Decision Directives of
the Clinton administration, dated January 20, 1993, set forth
the structure and function of the NSC staff and groups that reported to it (see Figure 1). The day-today policy coordination and integration was done by the NSC Staff, divided into the functional and
geographic directorates depicted in Figure 2.

National Security Council System
National Security
Council Staff

National Security
Council
Principals
Committee
Deputies
Committee
Interagency
Working Groups

Direction & Supervision
Coordination

Figure 1. National Security System Under Clinton.
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National Security Council Staff
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Executive Secretary

Deputy Executive Secretary and Senior
Director for Administration

Deputy Executive Secretary

Situation Room/Systems &
Technical Planning Director

Record & Access Management
Senior Director

Functional Directorates

Geographic Directorates

Intelligence Programs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Speechwriting
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Central & Eastern Europe
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

African Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Multilateral Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Public Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
Deputy Press Secretary
and Senior Director

European Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Russian/Ukranian/Eurasian Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Transitional Threats
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

NATO Summit Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Near East and South Asian Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Asian Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Legal Advisor
Special Assistant to the President
and Legal Advisor

Legislative Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Inter-American Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Nonproliferation & Export Controls
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

International Economic Affairs
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director

Defense Policy & Arms Control
Special Assistant to the President
and Counselor

International Health and
Environmental Affairs Directors

Figure 2. Clinton’s National Security Council Staff.
The Principals Committee members were the cabinet level representatives who comprised the senior
forum for national security issues. The Deputies Committee included deputy secretary level officials
who monitored the work of the interagency process, did crisis management, and when necessary,
pushed unresolved issues to the principals for resolution. Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) were
the heart and soul of the process. They were ad hoc, standing, regional, or functional. They functioned
at a number of levels, met regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, framed policy responses, and
built consensus across the government for unified action. The fluid nature of the process meant that
IWGs did not always have to come to decisions. The system preferred that issues be decided at the
lowest level possible. If issues were not resolved there, they were elevated to the next level and when
appropriate, to the Deputies Committee. Who chaired the different IWGS and committees varied
between the NSC director and senior State Department officials.
Dramatic changes came with the election of George W. Bush. Comfortable with a corporate style
executive leadership and surrounding himself with very experienced national security statesmen like
Secretary of State Colin Powell (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, and White House Fellow), Vice-President Richard Cheney (former
Congressman, Secretary of Defense, and White House Chief of Staff), and Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld (former Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to NATO, and Congressman), President George
W. Bush centralized policy authority by establishing new structures and procedures.7 (See Figure 3.)
The process began with new nomenclature for presidential directives. National Security Presidential
Directive 1 (NSPD1), dated February 13, 2001, established six regional Policy Coordination Committees
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(PCCs) and 11 (later 16) PCCs to handle functional responsibilities.8 In 2005, they consisted of:
Regional PCCs:
		 Europe
		 Western Hemisphere
		 East Asia
		 South Asia
		 Near East and North Africa
		 Africa
Functional PCCs (with department responsible in parentheses)
		 Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (NSC)
		 International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (State)
		 Global Environment (NSC and National Economic Council)
		 International Finance (Treasury)
		 Transnational Economic Issues (NEC)
		 Counterterrorism and National Preparedness (NSC)
		 Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (Defense)
		 Arms Control (NSC)
		 Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)
		 Records Access and Information Security (NSC)
		 International Organized Crime (NSC)
		 Contingency Planning (NSC)
		 Space (NSC)
		 HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases (state and Health and Human Services)
Interagency Process
National Security
Council (NSC)

Principals
Committee (PC)

Policy Coordination
Committee (PCC)

POLICIES

Deputy
Committee (DC)

NSC

State

OSD

JCS

DCI USUN Treas

Figure 3. Bush Administration Interagency Process.
The plethora of existing IWGs was abolished by NSPD1. The activities of IWGS were transferred to
the new PCCs. The PCCs were the most important structural changes made by the Bush administration.
According to NSPD1, they were the “Day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security
policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC
system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the president.” The centralization of authority
over national security matters reached levels not seen for many years. However, it remained to be seen
whether the system would work effectively. In Spring 2003, a senior national security careerist who
was involved intimately with policymaking referred to interagency relations as “the worst in 20 years.”
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An experienced foreign policy hand commented: “The interagency system is broken” and averred that
instead of centralization of authority, there is fragmentation.9 Explanations for this state of affairs varied.
They included the intrusion of group think dynamics among senior neoconservative decisionmakers,
the role of strong personalities, the bypassing of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Condolezza Rice, as well as the deliberate isolation of the Department of State.10
Another important interagency reorganization made by the Bush administration was the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and a unified military command, the Northern Command.
The creation of DHS involved the transfer of responsibilities, people, and resources from existing
agencies and departments to a new entity. DHS has over 170,000 employees and an anticipated budget
of 40 billion dollars. It constitutes the largest reorganization of the U.S. Government since the creation
of the Defense Department. DHS combined 22 agencies “specializing in various disciplines” such as
law enforcement, border security, immigration, biological research, computer security, transportation
security, disaster mitigation, and port security.11 Though it is a national security department, it will
not be involved in power projection, a crucial difference with the Defense Department. Yet, it will
use many skills and resources that reside across the agencies: military, diplomatic, law enforcement,
intelligence, and logistics. Homeland security also involves the concept of federalism, whereby some
87,000 state and local jurisdictions share power with federal institutions. The challenge of integrating
federalism injects into national security planning will be immense.
Policy often is made in different and subtle ways. Anthony Lake, writing in Somoza Falling: The
Nicaraguan Dilemma, A Portrait of Washington At Work, discusses how the answer to an important letter
can help set policy. Hence the importance of interagency coordination and the importance of being the
one (bureau, office, agency) that drafts it: “. . . policy flows as much from work on specific items—like
the letter from Perez [to Carter]—as it does from the large, formal interagency ‘policy reviews’ that
result in presidential pronouncements.”12 Each action is precedent for future actions. Speeches, press
conferences, VIP visits, and presidential travels are important. Lake elaborates “Policy is made on the
fly; it emerges from the pattern of specific decisions. Its wisdom is decided by whether you have some
vision of what you want, a conceptual thread as you go along.”13
The NSC staff does the daily and long-term coordination and integration of foreign policy and
national security matters across the vast government. Specifically, it:
•

Provides information and policy advice to the President,

•

Manages the policy coordination process,

•

Monitors implementation of presidential policy decisions,

•

Manages crises,

•

Articulates the President‘s policies,

•

Undertakes long term strategic planning,

•

Conducts liaison with Congress and foreign governments,

•

Coordinates summit meetings and national security related trips.

There is a natural tension between the policy coordination function of the NSC and policymaking.
Jimmy Carter‘s Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Robert Pastor, argues that:
. . . tension between NSC and State derives in part from the former’s control of the agenda and the latter’s control
of implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxious about the NSC usurping policy, and the NSC
tends to be concerned that State either might not implement the President‘s decisions or might do so in a way that
would make decisions State disapproved of appear ineffective and wrong.14

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body but it oscillates between the poles, taking policy control
over some issues while allowing the State or Defense to be the lead agency on most national security
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and foreign policy issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99, the NSC staff may
take over policy control from State. Similarly, policy towards Cuba and Haiti in 1993-95 was handled
directly out of the White House because of the deeply-rooted domestic dimension of those issues. In
virtually all cases, however, major policy must be cleared through the NSC staff and the National
Security Advisor. This process of clearing makes the NSC staff a key element in the policymaking
process. In general, the clearance process involves a review by the appropriate NSC staff director to
assure that the new policy initiative is consistent with the president’s overall policy in that functional
or regional area, that it has been coordinated with all appropriate departments and agencies, and that
all obvious political risks associated with the new initiative have been identified and assessed. This
process makes all the relevant departments stakeholders in the final policy statement. The Oliver North
Iran-Contra caper created an autonomous operational entity in the NSC staff. But that was an aberration
that does not invalidate the general rule. The salient point is that proximity to the president gives the
NSC staff significant policy clout in the interagency process. Such clout must be used sparingly lest it
cause resentment and resistance or overlook the policy wisdom and skills available elsewhere in the
executive departments.
Toward a Theory of the Interagency Process: How Does the President Mobilize the Government?
The interagency is not a place. It is a process involving human beings and complex organizations
with different cultures, different outlooks on what is good for the national interest and the best policy
to pursue—all driven by the compulsion to defend and expand turf. The process is political (therefore
conflictual) because at stake is power, personal, institutional, or party. The “power game” involves the
push and pull of negotiation, the guarding of policy prerogatives, the hammering out of compromises,
and the normal human and institutional propensity to resist change.15 Regardless of the style of the
president and the structures developed for the management of national security policy, the interagency
process performs the same basic functions: identifies policy issues and questions, formulates options,
raises issues to the appropriate level for decisions, makes decisions where appropriate, and oversees
the implementation of decisions throughout the executive departments.
It is helpful to view policy at five interrelated levels: conceptualization, articulation, budgeting,
implementation, and post-implementation analysis and feedback. Conceptualization involves the
intellectual task of policy development, such as a presidential directive. Articulation is the public
declaration of policy that the president or subordinates make. It is critical in a democracy in order to
engage public support. Budgeting involves testimony and the give and take before Congress and its
various committees to justify policy goals and to request funding. Implementation is the programmed
application of resources in the field in order to achieve the policy objectives. Post-implementation
analysis and feedback is a continuous effort to assess the effectiveness of policy and to make appropriate
adjustments. It is conducted by all the agencies in the field. The General Accounting Office of the
Congress makes extensive evaluations of the effectiveness of policy implementation. Congressional
hearings and visits in the field by congressional delegations and staffers also make evaluations that
help refine policy.
The ideal system would have perfect goal setting, complete and accurate intelligence, comprehensive
analysis and selection of the best options, clear articulation of policy and its rationale, effective execution,
thorough and continuous assessment of the effects, and perfect learning from experience and the ability
to recall relevant experience and information (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Ideal Foreign Policy Process.16
Such perfection is impossible. The reality is shown in Figure 5.
TASK

CONSTRAINTS

Goal Setting

National interests are subject to competing claims; goals established
through political struggle

Intelligence

Always incomplete, susceptible to overload, delays and distortions
caused by biases and ambiguity in interpretation

Option Formulation

Limited search for options, comparisons made in general terms
according to predispositions rather than cost-benefit analysis

Plans, Programs, and Decisions

Choices made in accordance with prevailing mind sets, influenced
by groupthink and political compromise

Declaratory Policy

Multiple voices, contradictions and confusion, self-serving concern
for personal image and feeding the appetite of the media

Execution

Breakdowns in communication, fuzzy lines of authority,
organizational parochialism, bureaucratic politics, delays

Monitoring and Appraisal

Gaps, vague standards, rigidities in adaptation, feedback failures

Memory Storage and Recall

Spotty and unreliable, selective learning and application of lessons

Figure 5. Policy in Practice.17
Effective policy requires control, resources, and a system of accountability. The most compelling
challenge for the executive is to retain policy control. Since presidents do not have the time or expertise
to oversee policymaking in detail (though Jimmy Carter tried), they delegate responsibility. But
“nobody is in charge” is an often-heard refrain of the interagency process. By delegating responsibility,
control becomes more diffused and the policy effort diluted. Moreover, the quest for resources brings
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in another stakeholder. Congress has the constitutional responsibility to scrutinize policy initiatives
and vote monies for foreign affairs and national defense. By then, a literal Pandora’s box of players
and expectations is opened. The numerous congressional committees and their staffs have enormous
impact on national security and foreign policy.
The president begins to mobilize his government immediately upon election. A transition team
works closely with the outgoing administration for the purpose of continuity. He begins nominating
his cabinet, which must then be confirmed by the Senate. Some 6,000 presidential level appointees will
fill the subcabinet positions, staff the White House and the NSC, take up ambassadorships (serving
ambassadors traditionally submit their resignation when the occupant of the White House changes),
as well as second, third, and fourth level positions in the executive departments. The purpose of these
nominations is to gain control and establish accountability to the president and his agenda. In his first
administration, President William Clinton faced serious difficulties because he never finished staffing
his government.
Thus there is a high turnover and the injection of new talent, at times inexperienced and equipped
with new predispositions about national security, at the top echelons of American government
every time the part that controls the White House changes. Continuity of government resides in the
nonpartisan professionals (neutral competence) of the federal civil service, the diplomatic service, the
military, and the intelligence community. The transition to a new administration is a period of great
anticipation about the direction of policy. Consequently, the entire interagency produces transition
papers to assist and inform the newcomers, and also to protect the institutional interests of the various
departments from unfriendly encroachment.
The first months of a new administration are a period of learning. Newly appointed people must
familiarize themselves with the structure and process of policymaking. This necessity invariably leads
to a trial-and-error atmosphere. In anticipation of the passing of the mantle, think tanks and the foreign
policy and defense communities prepare for the transition by writing papers recommending the
rationale for policy. These will inform the new administration about the central commitments of U.S.
policy and provide opportunities for departments and agencies to define institutional turf and stake a
claim to resources. The administration itself also will mandate policy reviews that eventually produce
new guidance for policy.
Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrines is another way for the president to mobilize
the government. The State of the Union message is one of the preeminent sources of presidential
activism that engages the interagency. The congressionally-mandated NSS document, which bears the
president‘s signature and is supposed to be produced annually, is eagerly awaited, though not with
equal intensity across departments, as an indicator of an administration‘s direction in national security
and foreign policy.
The NSS is awaited eagerly for another reason; it is the best example of “purposeful adaptation” by
the American government to changing global realities and responsibilities. It expresses strategic vision,
what the United States stands for in the world, its priorities, and a sensing of how the instruments of
national power, the diplomatic, economic, and military will be arrayed. Since it is truly an interagency
product, the NSS also serves to discipline the interagency system to understand the president’s agenda
and priorities and to develop a common language that gives coherence to policy. It also is more than
a strategic document. It is political because it is designed to enhance presidential authority in order
to mobilize the nation. Finally, the NSS tends to document rather than drive policy initiatives. This is
especially true in election years.
The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threat. The Bush administration expanded it by including
more regional strategies, economic policy, arms control, and transnational issues and the environment.
The Clinton document of 1994 proposed “engagement and enlargement,” promoting democracy,
economic prosperity, and security through strength. The 1995 version added criteria on when and how
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military forces would be used. By 1997, the integrating concepts of “shape,” “prepare,” and “respond”
for the national military strategy came into prominence. To the core objectives of enhancing security
and promoting prosperity and democracy were added fighting terrorism, international crime and drug
trafficking, along with managing the international financial crisis. Homeland defense against the threat
of mass casualty attacks and regional strategies completed the agenda.
Another instrument is the presidential national security directives process. Administrations have
titled these documents differently, and they have produced them in greater or lesser quantity. The
two Clinton administrations produced at least 73 Presidential Decision Directives and the George
W. Bush administration issued 44 National Security Presidential Directives by December 2005. Other
administrations’ totals and titles are as follows: George H. W. Bush, 79 National Security Decision
Directives; Reagan, 325 National Security Decision Memoranda; Carter, 63 Presidential Directives; NixonFord, 348 National Security Decision Memoranda; and Kennedy-Johnson, 372 National Security Action
Memoranda. Each administration will try to put its own stamp on national security and foreign policy,
though there is great continuity with previous administrations. Whereas Reagan emphasized restoring
the preeminence of American military power and rolling back the “evil empire,” Clinton focused on
strengthening the American economy, open trade, democratization, conflict resolution, humanitarian
assistance, fighting drug trafficking and consumption, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation. 9/11
imposed a national defense priority on the George W. Bush administration. In response, the Bush
administration—in addition to the NSPDs mentioned above—created a new category of Homeland
Security Presidential Directives (HSPD). Some policy documents serve jointly as NSPDs and HSPDs.
For example, NSPD 43 on Domestic Nuclear Detection also is HSPD 14.18
Presidential national security directives are macro level documents, often classified, that take much
deliberate planning to develop. They result from intensive interaction among the agencies. The process
begins with a presidential directive to review policy that tasks the relevant agencies to develop a new
policy based on broad guidance. For example, Clinton’s PDD 14 for counternarcotics emphasized greater
balance between supply and demand strategies. Because of the many constraints placed on the use of
economic and military assistance to fight the “war on drugs” and to help Colombia, PDD 14 evolved
into the Colombia-specific PDD 73. This, in turn was superseded in the Bush administration by NSPD
18, which, thanks to 9/11 and the terrorism in Colombia, went further and provided support for both
counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities in Colombia. The evolution of these policy documents
over nearly 10 years nurtured the growth of significant institutional memory in the interagency with
respect to the Colombian conflict.
The learning went both ways because Colombian officials had to adapt to the Washington policy
process. Because of the global reach of American power and influence, such adaptation is becoming
more common. Clinton’s celebrated PDD 25 set down an elaborate set of guidelines for U.S. involvement
in peace operations. It became so effective as a planning device that the United Nations (UN) adopted
it in modified form for planning its own peace operations, an excellent example of the international
transfer of American purposeful adaptation. Other nations also used the terminology and organizing
principles for their strategic and operational planning in multilateral peacekeeping.
Another instructive example is the Latin American policy PDD 21. Effective on December 27, 1993,
it emphasized democracy promotion and free trade. It was addressed to more than 20 departments and
agencies: Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney
General, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
U.S. Trade Representative, Representative of the United States to the UN, Chief of Staff to the President,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chair of the
Council of Economic Advisors, Assistant to the President for National Economic Policy, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Director of the
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Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and
Director of the U.S. Information Agency.
The point of listing departments and agencies is to identify the interagency stakeholders in regional
policy, though the size of the stake will vary greatly among them according to the particular issue.
The stakeholders are related by functional interdependence; they have different resources, personnel,
and expertise that must be integrated for policy to be effective. It is an iron rule of the interagency that
no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone. For example, the DoD
needs the diplomatic process that the Department of State masters in order to deploy forces abroad,
build coalitions, negotiate solutions to conflict, conduct noncombatant evacuations (NEO) of American
citizens caught in difficult circumstances abroad, and administer security assistance. The Department
of State, in turn, depends on the logistical capabilities of the DoD to deploy personnel and materials
abroad during crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, support military-to-military contacts, and give
substance to alliances and defense relationships. The Office of National Drug Control Policy, a new
cabinet level position, must rely on a range of agencies to reduce the supply abroad and consumption
of drugs at home. Finally, all require intelligence input to make sound decisions.
These patterns of functional interdependence, whereby departments stayed within their jurisdictions,
began to fray in the George W. Bush administration. Press reports in the spring of 2003 focused on the
Bush “policy team at war with itself.”19 Accordingly, there was a “tectonic shift” of decisionmaking
power from the Department of State to Defense because of the strong personalities and neo-conservative
ideology of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and subordinates, principally Deputy Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz. Such a shift is unnatural and will likely correct itself in the future. But the prospect of the
DoD dominating foreign policy raised concerns about the effectiveness of policy and the standing of
the United States in the world. The inattention to functional interdependence was a contributing factor
to the ineffectiveness of postwar reconstruction planning for Iraq in 2003.20 In October 2003, President
Bush attempted to improve the Iraq reconstruction effort by placing his National Security Advisor,
Condoleezza Rice, in charge. The correction allegedly upset Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.
Earlier in the year, the president had given authority (via NSPD 24) over the Iraq reconstruction to the
Defense Department.21
The problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq led to an upsurge of recommendations
on how to improve the system for the future. For example, the House of Representatives and the
Senate proposed the “Winning the Peace Act of 2003,” which would create within the Department of
State a permanent office to provide support to the new position of Coordinator of Reconstruction and
Stabilization. A comprehensive study published in November 2003 by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart
Johnson of the National Defense University advocated major focus on transforming military institutions
to perform “stabilization and reconstruction” operations. It also recommended harnessing interagency
capabilities via the creation of a rapidly deployable National Interagency Contingency Coordinating
Group to meet the need of a national level group to plan and coordinate post-conflict operations.22 At
this juncture it is important to note that in July 2004 the Office of Coordinator of Reconstruction and
Stabilization took form in the Department of State under the leadership of Ambassador Carlos Pascual.
Yet, one year later the office was still understaffed and under budget, an example of an unfunded
mandate. The Congress, which legislated the office and is a stakeholder in national security, by July
2005 had not provided sufficient funding for the Office to do its job properly.23 By December 2005,
as detailed later in this paper, a new National Security Presidential Directive (44) would give the
Department of State the responsibility to manage interagency efforts to conduct reconstruction and
stabilization.
Ideally, in response to the promulgation of a presidential directive, all agencies will energize their
staffs and develop the elements that shape the policy programs. But this takes time and seldom creates
optimum results, in part because of competing priorities on policymakers, limited time, constrained
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resources, and congressional input. For example, the Haiti crisis of 1992-94 and congressional
passage of the North America Free Trade Act (NAFTA) consumed most of the energy of the Clinton
administration’s NSC staff and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State during
1993-94 to the detriment of other Latin American policy. The Central American crisis of the 1980s also
crowded out the broader agenda for Latin American policy.
In theory, once the policy elements are put together, they are costed out and submitted to Congress
for approval and funding, without which policy is merely words of hopeful expectation. The reality,
however, is that a presidential directive is not a permanent guide to the actions of agencies. Rarely is
it fully implemented. The culture of the various executive departments will modify how directives
are interpreted. For example, for the military oriented Defense Department, a directive is an order to
be carried out. For State, a directive may be interpreted as the general direction a policy should take.
Presidential policy can be overtaken by new priorities, new administrations, and by the departure of
senior officials who had the stakes, the personal relationships, know how, and institutional memory
to make it work. A senior NSC staffer, Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Policy
and Arms Control, remarked in 1999 that one could not be sure about whether a directive from a
previous administration was still in force because the government does not maintain a consolidated
list of these documents for security reasons. Moreover, directives and other presidential documents are
removed to presidential libraries and the National Archives when administrations change. A senior
Defense Department official stated that directives rarely are referred to after they are final, are usually
overtaken by events soon after publication, and rarely are updated. In this respect, the interagency
evaluation of PDD 56’s effectiveness, published in May 1997, is instructive: “PDD 56 no longer has
senior level ownership. The Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the NSC officials
who initiated the document have moved on to new positions.”24 The loss of institutional memory is not
necessarily fatal. The permanent government retains much of the wisdom for the continuity of policy.
That wisdom is always available to an administration. It must learn how to tap it.
PDD 56: Ephemeral or Purposeful Adaptation?
It is useful to examine PDD 56 as an example of an interagency product and as a tool intended
to influence the very process itself. Directives normally deal with the external world of foreign
policy and national security. PDD 56 was radically different, for it went beyond that and attempted
to generate a cultural revolution in the way the U.S. Government prepares and organizes to deal
with these issues. PDD 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency
Operations, was perhaps the mother of all modern Directives. It is a superb example of codifying
lessons of “purposeful adaptation” after fitful efforts by American civilian and military officials in the
aftermath of problematic interventions in Panama (1989-90), Somalia (1992-94), and Haiti (1994-95).25
The intent was to institutionalize interagency coordination mechanisms and planning tools to achieve
U.S. Government unity of effort in complex contingency operations and in post-conflict reconstruction.
It tried to institutionalize five mechanisms and planning tools:
• An Executive Committee chaired by the Deputies Committee (Assistant Secretaries),
• An integrated, interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan,
• Interagency Rehearsal,
• Interagency After-Action Review,
• Training.
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The philosophy behind the document was that interagency planning could make or break an
operation. Moreover, early involvement in planning could accelerate contributions from civilian
agencies that often are excluded from or culturally are averse to strategic and operational planning.
An excellent Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations issued in
August 1998 contains in easy digestible form much wisdom about how to do it right. PDD 56 was
applied extensively and adapted to new contingencies, such as Eastern Slavonia (1995-98), Bosnia from
1995, Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict since 1998, and the Kosovo
contingency of 1998-99. The March 1999 review commented: “PDD 56 is intended to be applied as an
integrated package of complementary mechanisms and tools . . . since its issuance in 1997, PDD 56 has
not been applied as intended. Three major issues must be addressed to improve the utility of PDD 56.”
It recommended:
• Greater authority and leadership to promote PDD 56,
• More flexible and less detailed political-military planning,
• Dedicated training resources and greater outreach.
Reflected in the three recommendations were the recurring problems of the interagency: the need
for decisive authority (“nobody’s in charge”), contrasting approaches, and institutional cultures
(particularly diplomatic versus military) with respect to planning, and the lack of incentives across the
government to create professionals expert in interagency work. PDD 56 was a noble effort to promote
greater effectiveness. It may bear fruit if its philosophy of integrated planning and outreach to the
interagency takes root. In late 1999, the PDD 56 planning requirement was embedded as an annex
to contingency plans. Bush’s February 2001 NSPD1 tried to provide some life support to PDD56 by
stating: “The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 . . . will be performed by
the appropriate . . . PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination
for ongoing operations.” The failures in post-conflict planning and reconstruction for Iraq in 2003
underlined the importance of taking PDD-56 seriously. Fortunately, as mentioned above, there are
enough people in government who retain the expertise and who can be tapped as necessary. Much
of the wisdom contained in PDD56 and its Handbook is invaluable in the business of post-conflict
reconstruction and stabilization.
As the result of the purposeful adaptation engendered by the mistakes made in the reconstruction
and stabilization of Iraq, the Bush administration promulgated National Security Presidential Directive
44, on December 7, 2005: “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and
Stabilization.” It speaks eloquently of the need for a coordinated U.S. Government effort for harmonizing
interagency responses across the spectrum of conflict: complex contingencies, peacekeeping, failed and
failing states, political transitions, and other military interventions. NSPD 44 states:
The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all
U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure
harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support
relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being
addressed.26

The document closes with the statement: “This directive supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/
NSC 56, May 20, 1997, ‘Managing Complex Contingency Operations.’” It may supersede, but it cannot
erase from collective and personal memory banks the excellent and very useful ideas contained in PDD
56. Such a concept would threaten the notion of purposeful adaptation. A companion to NSPD 44 is the
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DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)
Operations,” promulgated in late 2005.
The Operational Level of the Interagency Process:
Ambassador, Country Team and Combatant Commanders.
To this point, we have discussed the national strategic level of the interagency process, that is, what
occurs in Washington. Actually, the interagency process spans three levels: the national strategic, the
operational, and the tactical. In the field, policy is implemented by ambassadors and their country teams,
often working with the regional combatant commanders (COCOMs) if the issue is principally security
or political-military in nature. Ambassadors and combatant commanders are not only implementers,
they frequently shape policy via their reporting to Washington through a continuous flow of cables,
after action reports, proposals for new policy initiatives, as well as direct consultations in Washington
with senior officials and members of Congress. They also comment on how to shape policy initiatives
that originate from Washington.
There is a permanent conversation between the embassy and the respective regional bureau in
Washington, which includes a broad distribution of the cable traffic to such agencies as the White House,
the Defense Department, the regional combatant command, Department of Treasury, Commerce, the
Joint Staff, the intelligence community, as well as other organizations such as the Coast Guard, when
there is a “need to know.” The “need to know” almost always includes other embassies in the region or
major embassies in other regions, and even at times, for example, the American Embassy to the Vatican.
The ambassador and combatant commander often conduct one-on-one meetings over the multiplicity
of security issues.
The embassy country team at the embassy is a miniature replica of the Washington interagency
system. In the country team, the rubber proverbially meets the road of interagency implementation.
Ambassadors and COCOMs rely on each other to promote policies that will enhance American interests
in a country and region. COCOMs have large staffs and awesome resources compared to the small staffs
and resources of ambassadors. Moreover their functions are different. The ambassador cultivates ties and
is a conduit for bilateral communications through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or she promotes
understanding of U.S. foreign policy, promotes American culture and business, and is responsible
for American citizens in that country. The ambassador is the personal emissary of the President, who
signs the ambassador’s formal letter of instruction. The letter charges the ambassador “to exercise full
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in (name
of country), except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander . . .” There is
enough ambiguity in the mandate to require both ambassador and COCOM to use common sense and,
in a nonbureaucratic way, work out issues of command and control over U.S. military personnel in the
country. In effect, control is shared, the ambassador having policy control and the COCOM control
over day-to-day military operations. Thus it is prudent that both work closely together to ensure that
military operations meet the objectives of U.S. policy.
This is particularly the case in military operations other than war. Before and during noncombatant
evacuations, peace operations, exercises, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, such cooperation
will be imperative because of the different mixes of diplomacy, force, and preparation required. A
successful U.S. policy effort requires a carefully calibrated combination of diplomatic and military
pressure, with economic inducements added. The security assistance officer at the embassy (often
the commander of the military advisory group) can facilitate communication and bridge the policy
and operational distance between the ambassador and the COCOM. So can State’s Political Advisor
to the COCOM, a senior ranking foreign service officer whose function is to provide the diplomatic
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and foreign policy perspective on military operations.27 The personal and professional relationship
between the Foreign Policy Advisor (formerly called the Political Advisor) and the COCOM is the key
to success.
The COCOM represents the coercive capacity of American power through a chain of command that
goes to the president. He and his sizable staff oversee the operational tempo, deployments, readiness,
exercises, and training of divisions, brigades, fleets, and air wings–resources, language, and culture that
are the opposite of the art of diplomacy. Since all military activities have diplomatic impact, it is prudent
that both work harmoniously to achieve common purpose. Ambassador and Commander interests
intersect at the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG, also called Military Advisory Group
(MAG), Military Liaison Office (MLO), and Office of Defense Coordination) level. The commander
of the MAAG, which is an important arm of the country team since it provides training and military
equipment to the host country, works for both the ambassador and the COCOM.
In the spectrum from peace to crisis to war, the ambassador will tend to dominate decisions at the
lower end of the spectrum. As the environment transitions to war, the Commander assumes greater
authority and influence. Haiti 1994 is an excellent example of how the handoff from ambassador to
COCOM takes place. The American ambassador in Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge of
U.S. policy until General Hugh Shelton and the U.S. military forces arrived in September of that year.
Once the military phase was completed, policy control reverted to Swing, thus restoring the normal
pattern of military subordination to civilian authority. In the gray area of military operations other
than war or in what is called an “immature” military theater, such as Latin America, disputes can arise
between ambassadors and COCOMs about jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in the country. The
most illustrative was in 1994 between Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command General
Barry McCaffrey and U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Charles R. Bowers and U.S. Ambassador to Colombia
Morris D. Busby. The dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington by the Secretaries of State and
Defense.28 Elevating a dispute to such a level is something the system would rather not do. The fact is
that ambassador and COCOM must work closely together to coordinate U.S. military activities. Another
distinction is that COCOMs have a regional perspective, strategies, and programs, while ambassadors
are focused on advancing the interests of the United States in one country.
An important step forward in synchronizing interagency activities at the theater level has been the
creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups. These are literally interagency cells located at the
combatant commands and staffed by personnel from across the government. Although in their infancy
and not endowed with policymaking authority, these groups offer the foundation greater strategic and
operational integration in the future.
The Continuing Challenges in the Interagency Process.
The tensions generated by cultural differences and jealousy over turf always will be part of the
interagency process. The diplomatic and the military cultures dominate the national security system,
although there are other cultures, and even subcultures, within the dominant cultures. The former uses
words to solve problems, while the latter uses precise doses of force. Cultural differences are large,
but communicating across them is possible.29 Figure 6 compares the cultures of military officers and
diplomats.
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Military Officers

Foreign Service Officers

Mission: prepare for and fight war

Mission: conduct diplomacy

Training a major activity, important for units and
individuals

Training not a significant activity. Not important for either units or
individuals

Extensive training for episodic, undesired events, to think
the unthinkable

Little formal training, learning by experience in doing desired
activities (negotiating, reporting)

Uncomfortable with ambiguity

Can deal with ambiguity

Plans and planning—both general and detailed—are
important core activities

Plan in general terms to achieve objectives but value flexibility and
innovation

Doctrine: important

Doctrine: not important

Focused on military element of foreign policy

Focused on all aspects of foreign policy

Focused on discrete events and activities with plans,
objectives, courses of action, endstates

Focused on ongoing processes without expectation of an “endstate”

Infrequent real-world contact with opponents or partners
n active warfighting

Day-to-day real-world contact with partners and opponents in active
diplomacy

Officer corps commands significant numbers of NCOs
and enlisted personnel

Officers supervise only other officers in core (political and economic)
activities

NCOs and enlisted personnel perform many core functions
(warfighting)

Only officers engage in core activity (diplomacy)

Leadership: career professional military officers (with
officers (with the military services and in operations)

Leadership: a mix of politicians, academics, policy wonks, and career
Foreign Service professionals at headquarters and in field

All aspects of peace operations, including civilian/
diplomatic, becoming more important

All aspects of peace operations, including military, becoming more
important

Writing and written word less important, physical actions
more important

Writing and written word very important. Used extensively in conduct
of diplomacy

Teamwork and management skills are rewarded,
interpersonal skills important internally

Individual achievement and innovative ideas rewarded, interpersonal
skills important externally

Understand “humma-humma” and “deconflict”

Understand “demarche” and “nonpaper”

Accustomed to large resources, manpower, equipment,
and money

Focus meager resources on essential needs

Figure 6. Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers.30
The principal problem of interagency decisionmaking is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge.
As long as personalities are involved who work well together and have leadership support in the NSC,
interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence is not predictable. The world situation does not
wait for the proper alignment of the planets in Washington. There is too much diffusion of policy
control. It is time to implement an NSC-centric national security system, with appropriate adjustments
that align budget authority with policy responsibility. It would consolidate in the NSC the functions
now performed by the Policy Planning Staff at State and the strategic planning done at Defense. Such
reorganization recognizes the reality that the White House is where an integrated approach to national
security planning must take place.
Asymmetries in resources are another impediment. The Department of State, which has the
responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Its diplomats may have the best words
in town in terms of speaking and writing skills and superb knowledge of foreign countries and foreign
affairs, but it is a very small organization that has been getting smaller budget allocations from Congress.
The corps of foreign service officers equates in number to about an Army brigade. The Department of
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State’s technology is primitive, and officer professional development of the kind that the military does
is not promoted. Moreover, unlike the military, State lacks a strong domestic constituency of support.
The military has more money to conduct diplomacy than does State. Secretary of State Colin Powell
began to improve the Department’s budget. But the inability to hire personnel because of previous
budgetary constraints effected hundreds of positions in the middle ranks of the diplomatic service. It
will take decades of adequate funding to grow the foreign service officers to fill authorizations at the
appropriate grade.
The resource barons, those with people, money, technical expertise, and equipment reside in DoD
and the military services. Consequently, the military, especially the Army, is constantly being asked
to provide resources out of hide for nation-building purposes, for example, in Haiti and Panama. It
is tempting to reach out to it because it is the only institution with an expeditionary capability, and
fungible resources and expertise. It can get there quickly, show the flag, bring significant resources to
bear, stabilize a situation, and create an environment secure enough for other agencies to operate. On
a much smaller scale, the Agency for International Development is a baron because it has money and
technical expertise to promote development and institution building. Other baronies exist, such as
intelligence, Department of Justice, Commerce, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies of the U.S. Government do not promote
professionalization and rewards in interagency jobs. What is needed is a systematic effort to develop civilian
and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy coordination, integration, and operations.
Some of this takes place. Military officers are assigned to various departments. For example, until 2002,
35 officers from all military services worked in the regional and functional bureaus of the Department
of State. Senior diplomats (some of ambassadorial rank) also are allocated to military and civilian
agencies such as Foreign Policy Advisors at the regional unified commands, the Special Operations
Command, to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, various key positions in the Pentagon, and the
war colleges. These programs must be expanded. Unfortunately, the opposite was occurring in 2003. In
order to convert military personnel slots to warfighting positions, the DoD recalled most of its officers
from the civilian agencies, to include the State Department, which, in turn, reduced to 30 the number
of diplomats posted to military organizations. An important element for interagency integration and
harmony was weakened.
Moreover, there ought to be incentives for national security professionalism, as there are for joint
duty in the military. For civilian agencies, something akin to the Goldwater-Nichols Act is needed to
encourage interagency service, to include the Department of State. Promotions should be based not
only on performance at Foggy Bottom and in Embassies abroad, but on mandatory interagency tours
as well. Similarly professional development incentives should apply to civil servants that work in the
national security arena.31
Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would require significant changes in personnel systems
and career tracking. The Report of the National Defense Panel of 1997, Transforming Defense: National
Security in the Twenty-first Century, recommended creating “an interagency cadre of professionals,
including civilian and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national
security structures.”32 This would build on the jointness envisioned by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Act. The Report also recommended a national security curriculum for a mix of civilian, military, and
foreign students. The Defense Leadership and Management Program of the DoD, a Master’s level
initiative in national security studies for civilian personnel, is an important step in this direction. The
Department of State, under Colin Powell’s guidance, began to invest in educating its personnel in
strategic planning. Accordingly, the Department published The Department of State and Agency for
International Development Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009. The document sets forth directions
and priorities and supports policy positions enunciated in the President’s National Security Strategy.
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This is potentially an intellectual breakthrough for strategic integration. Also, more State Department
personnel were allowed to participate in War College courses, thereby adding to the opportunities
for mutual learning and strategic integration in the professional development of civilian and military
leaders. In early 2005, there was serious discussion among senior Pentagon officials about creating a
national security career path. At State, diplomats were now required to have interagency tours for
advancement.
Implications for the Military Professional.
There are critical implications for the military warrior. The nature of future warfare is likely to be
more military operations other than war, requiring more mobile, flexible light forces. Future war also
will require a more intellectual military officer, one who understands the imperative of working with
the panoply of civilian agencies, nongovernment organizations, the national and international media,
and foreign armed forces. It is a commonplace of strategy that American forces rarely will fight alone
again; they will do so in coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian trinity of the people, the armed
forces, and the government now encompasses the global community. The implications are clear; the
military officer will have to develop greater diplomatic and negotiating skills, greater understanding
of international affairs, capability in foreign languages, and more than a passing acquaintance with
economics.
Moreover, the warrior likely will work with civilian counterparts across a spectrum of activities short
of war. These include strategic planning and budgeting, humanitarian assistance, peace operations,
counter narcotics, counterterrorism, security assistance, environmental security, human rights,
democratization, civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence, war planning and termination
strategy, command and control of forces, continuity of government, post-conflict reconstruction,
technology transfer, crisis management, overseas basing, alliances, noncombatant evacuations, and
homeland defense.
Therefore, the future officer also will need greater appreciation of the institutional diversity and
complexity of government, because of the need to advise a diverse audience of civilians on the utility of
military power in complex contingencies that are neither peace nor war as Americans are accustomed
to think of them. He or she will have to work in tandem with civilian agencies and non-government
organizations unaccustomed to command systems and deliberate planning, and that often do not
understand the limits of military power.33 Lastly, instruction on the interagency system and process
should be mandatory for civilians and military alike. Such education must have a sound theoretical
foundation in national security decisionmaking, strategic planning, and organizational behavior,
expanded by sophisticated case studies of relevant historical experiences. Because the United States
will be heavily engaged in the spectrum of activities entitled humanitarian intervention, stabilization
and reconstruction, and the transformation of societies, the curriculum of senior service colleges must
emphasize the strategic integration of the instruments of national power to a much greater degree than
they have in the past.
What attributes should the military officer bring? Above all, holistic thinking—the ability to think
in terms of all the instruments of national power and respect for the functions and cultures of diverse
departments and agencies. Communication skills are paramount. The effective interagency player
writes and speaks well. He or she will be bilingual, able to function in military as well as civilian
English. Bureaucratic jargon is the enemy of interagency communication. The military briefing, though
an excellent vehicle for quickly transmitting a lot of information in formatted style, is not acceptable.
One must be less conscious of rank because ranks will vary among the representative around a table.
Someone of lower rank may be in charge of a meeting. A sense of humor, patience, endurance, and
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tolerance for ambiguity and indecisiveness will help. The ability to “stay in your box” and articulate the
perspective of your department will be respected, though the temptation to poach on other domains will
be there. The ability to anticipate issues, to consider the second and third order effects from the national
level down to the country team and theater levels, will be invaluable. Finally, the interagency requires
diplomatic and negotiating skills, the ability to network, and mastery of the nuances of bureaucratic
politics and language.34
The most evolved democracy in the world has the most cumbersome national security decisionmaking
process. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers imposed for democratic accountability. But some
of the inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture, with its multiplicity of players, plentiful but
diffused resources and the penchant to throw resources at the problem, and the propensity to segment
peace and diplomacy from war and military power. (See Figurre 7.) Frederick the Great cautioned:
“Diplomacy without arms is music without instruments.” So did John F. Kennedy: “Diplomacy and
defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail.”35 Major structural changes must
be made in the interagency system in order to harness human talent and resources intelligently.
Democracy is defined as a process of mutual learning and adaptation. Accordingly all institutions
of government learn, adapt, and make appropriate changes. This is even more imperative for the
national security agencies and personnel, where the stakes are high. The distempers in the interagency
process evidenced in 2001-04 created new opportunities for learning and for adaptation. Fortunately,
in time American democracy will make those adaptations. The question will be at what price and how
quickly.
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White House
National Security Council
Office of the Special Trade Representative
Office of National Drug Control Policy
National Economic Council

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Department of State
U.S. Foreign Service
Agency for International Development
Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Department of Labor
Dep Under Sec for International Affairs

Department of Homeland Security
Coast Guard
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Border Patrol
Secret Service

Department of Health & Human Services
Social Security Administration
Public Health Service
Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
Customs Service

Department of Defense
Office of Secretary of Defense
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines

Department of the Interior
Asst Sec for Territorial & International Affairs

Department of Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Department of Agriculture
Foreign Agricultural Service

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Independent Agencies
Central Intelligence Agency
Environmental Protection Agency
Export Import Bank
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade Commission
National Aeronautics & Space Administration
National Science Foundation
National Transportation Safety Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Peace Corps
U.S. Postal Service

Department of Energy
Asst Secy for Defense Programs

Department of Education

Office of National Drug Control Policy

Department of Commerce
Foreign Commercial Service
Travel and Tourism Administration
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Agency
National Marine Fisheries Service
International Trade Administration
International Trade Commission
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Marshals Service
Foreign Claims Settlement Administration
U.S. National Central Bureau, International
Criminal Police Organization

Congress
General Accounting Office
Assorted committees

Figure 7. U.S. Departments and Agencies Involved in Foreign Affairs.
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CHAPTER 21
NATIONAL SECURITY POWERS:
ARE THE CHECKS IN BALANCE?
Marybeth P. Ulrich
On the distinction between policy success in domestic and foreign policy, President John F. Kennedy
once noted, “The big difference is that between a bill being defeated and the country [being] wiped
out.”1 Much is at stake in the formulation and implementation of national security policy. Not only is the
achievement of national interests on the line, the preservation of the framers’ constitutional allocation
of power designed to keep liberty and security in balance also is at stake. As the United States proceeds
further in its “Long War”2 focused on fighting terrorism, its political elite is struggling to define the
degree of collaboration that must remain between the different branches of government. Does a state
of national emergency or war justify the suspension of deliberation and consultation inherent in the
American political system’s design? Does Congress retain meaningful powers to resist presidential
assertions of power? What role will the courts play in limiting or facilitating presidential overreach and
congressional reassertion of its powers? These are key questions of concern to all who participate in
and seek to understand the U.S. national security policymaking process. This chapter will review the
constitutional foundations of the American political system, explore the adaptation and evolution of
this original distribution of power, and assess the impact of the current state of “checks and balances”
on prospects for strategic success and the preservation of American democracy.
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
A unique aspect of the American political system is its design feature creating two co-equal principals
among the President and Congress. The framers of the Constitution envisioned a national security
process that would be dependent on a system of shared and separate powers across the democratic
institutions that they created. Embedded in these constitutional foundations are the formal sources
of power of the Presidency and Congress, the two key democratic institutions that work together to
formulate and carry out national security policy.
Some scholars argue that the Framers’ intent to give the Congress a leading role in government is
evident in that Article I of the Constitution grants many explicit powers to the Congress in comparison
to the ambiguity and vagueness of the President’s powers outlined in Article II. Indeed, a survey of the
historical record reveals that,over time,presidents have successfully exploited the ambiguity of their
formal powers to increase the power of the Presidency vis-à-vis the Congress. A brief review of the
constitutional basis of each institution’s powers will be useful to strategists seeking to understand the
evolution of these powers in the life of the American republic.
The Framers envisioned the Congress as the main preserve of governmental powers. The powers
enumerated in Article I, Section 8,touch on the entire scope of governmental authority. Chief among
these is the power to tax and spend. This power of the purse, checked by the President’s veto power,
is the defining characteristic of the Framers’ intent to create an energetic central government with
a vigorous legislature.3 The Framers concluded the powers enumerated in Article 8 with the elastic
clause, the power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers.”4 The shared vision of their republic was that of a “deliberative legislature,
composed carefully to reflect both popular will and elite limits on that will.”5
The first sentence of Article II clearly designates the President as the Chief Administrator of the
government, but the Constitution offers few specifics about how this executive responsibility should be
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carried out. The President’s role as Chief Executive stems from language in Section 2 that requires the
heads of each executive department to report to the President. In the Washington administration, the
federal government consisted of only three cabinet departments (State, Treasury, and War) and a few
hundred people.6 Of course, the vast bureaucracy of the United States has grown exponentially since
then and is now comprised of 15 executive departments and 136 federal agencies and commissions,7
backed by a work force of 1.7 million federal civil service employees.8 As the federal government has
grown, the power of the President also has expanded as the statutory and constitutional responsibility
for the policies, programs, and expenditure of funds is asserted across the executive branch.
Authority to administer the federal bureaucracy, however, does not necessarily translate into its
control. All presidents are faced with the challenge of making the bureaucracy responsive to their
leadership. Two key tools to shape the executive branch’s outputs into a more coherent administration
vision are the use of the appointment authority and the White House Staff. Article II, Section 2 gives
the President the power to appoint the department and agency heads within the federal government.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower created the schedule C personnel classification for appointed
policymaking positions throughout the executive branch. This represented a shift from party-based
patronage that rewarded the party faithful with everything from predominantly uncontroversial
government jobs in the field to key policy posts in Washington.9 Schedule C personnel play critical
behind-the-scenes roles, such as setting the schedules and agendas of cabinet members, guiding
political strategy, and giving legal opinions and policy advice. These appointees are lower in rank than
noncareer Senior Executive Service (SES) officials, who fall just below presidential appointees and who
must be confirmed by the Senate. At latest count, SES and Schedule C employees numbered 1,935 in the
George W. Bush administration. In all, President George W. Bush has 3,000 political appointees serving
in his administration. Although political appointees account for less than 2/10ths of 1 percent of the
total civil service, their presence results in significant influence throughout the policymaking process.10
In the modern presidency, presidents have offered these positions to ideologically compatible people
who will work to ensure that their department or agency’s policies are in sync with the President’s
vision.
The Senate’s confirmation role is its check on the President’s appointment power. While the vast
majority of the President’s nominations are confirmed, the potential to subject nominees to intense
congressional scrutiny and ultimately to reject candidates gives the Senate great influence in the
appointment process and, tangentially, in the overall policy process. While the executive sits at the
top of the federal bureaucracy, the design of the various departments and agencies is specified in
congressional statutes that detail their structure and duties. Though not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution, Congress’ capacity for oversight can be a tremendous check on the executive when it
is employed. Oversight hearings require officials to appear and testify under oath and report what
the administration is doing. Oversight programs demanding reports on executive department or
agency activity also can have some bite.11 Congress has the responsibility to keep a careful eye on the
administration of its laws to ensure that they are properly interpreted and executed.12
Another management tool of relatively recent creation is the Executive Office of the President (EOP),
better known as the White House Staff. President Franklin Roosevelt established this “mini-bureaucracy
within the bureaucracy” with Congress’ consent in 1939 as an attempt to centralize control over the
executive branch and to provide unity and direction to the federal government.13 The EOP includes
both the professional staff working in such places as the National Security Council and the Council of
Economic Advisers, as well as the president’s most trusted advisers in the White House Office.14 The
two tools are closely related as presidential appointments increasingly have become subject to intense
vetting in the EOP.
In national security affairs and the conduct of foreign policy that might result in the use of armed
force, the President draws on the authority vested in him as Commander-in-Chief. However, the Framers
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also were in agreement that significant war-related powers also must reside in the Congress. Indeed,
as Figure 1 indicates, Article I, Section 8 lays out extensive and explicit war-related powers granted
to the Congress. The Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights both reflect the Framers’ distrust
of standing armies unaccountable to a legislature. Their design of American democratic institutions
separating the power to declare war from the power to command or direct military forces in wartime
was meant to ensure that the President was unable to make war alone. It is important to note that rather
than giving the President the power to declare war with the “advice and consent of the Senate” as they
had done with the treaty power, the Framers deliberately elected to give Congress the sole authority
to declare war.15 The historical record shows that, in practice, Congress has not been the initiator of
all significant military actions, and that there has been a struggle for power between the two branches
over war powers.
This brief survey of constitutional powers relevant to the conduct of national security policymaking
highlights the Framers’ intent for policymaking and implementation to be a shared process across the
legislative and executive branches. The Framers’ design of shared and separate powers resulted in a
policymaking framework that requires both cooperation and coordination to achieve anything of real
significance in national security affairs.
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES
The Framers’ final product reflected an understanding that the institutions they created had distinct
and complementary institutional competencies. While Congress was granted important powers ensuring
it a significant role in the conduct of national security policy, its institutional design also meant that it
almost never would move quickly on such matters. The requirement for legislation to clear both the
House and the Senate after potentially lengthy deliberations in each body subject to the influences of
public opinion and the media, favored the role of Congress as the branch of government that considered
diverse viewpoints, deliberated between them, and remained accountable to the public.
The Executive branch, on the other hand, was designed to move with speed and dispatch, with an
appropriate amount of secrecy in order to conduct day-to-day foreign and security policy in peacetime,
and to act decisively in crisis situations. Congress’ design, meanwhile, affords it significant oversight
checks, as well as policy influence in the power of the purse. The Framers’ deliberate consideration of
institutional competencies when deciding which powers should be shared, which should be held alone,
and in which branch the power should be put is evident in the Framers’ debate on the distribution of
war powers at the constitutional convention. Early deliberations argued that Congress should be given
the power to “make war.” However, it eventually was agreed that this should be changed to “declare
war” to clarify and ensure that the actual conduct of war remained an executive function and that the
institutional competencies of the Presidency were maximized during wartime.
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND PERSUASION
Formal powers contribute to and limit the influence wielded by the President and Congress in
any specific policymaking scenario. Informal powers of each branch, on the other hand, if astutely
employed, can enhance significantly the influence of either institution. The struggle for influence is
characterized neither by all-out competition nor by perfect consensus. Congress can be both a potential
adversary and key partner in the formulation and conduct of national security policy. Conversely,
the President and his team cannot sustain any national security policy course without the support of
Congress and the American people. Dominating the political agenda requires that the President build
popular support, work effectively with Congress, control the vast federal bureaucracy, and know when
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Formal Powers of the President Relative to
National Security Policymaking As Stated
in the Constitution

Formal Powers of the Congress Relavant to
National Security Policymaking As Stated
in the Constitution

“The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America.”16
Article II. Section 1.

“The Congress shall have Power to . . . make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, all other Powers vested by this
Constitution . . .” Article I, Section 8.

”. . . he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed . . . ” Article II,
Section 3.
“Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented
to the President . . . If he approve he shall sign
it, but if not he shall return it . . . If after such
reconsideration two thirds of that House shall
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent . . . to the
other House . . . and if approved by two thirds
of that House, it shall become Law.”
Article I, Section 7.
“The President shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the
United States.” Article II, Section 2.
”. . . he may require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices . . .” Article II, Section 2.
“He shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and
all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established
by Law.” Article II, Section 2.

“The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the debts . . .” Article I, Section 8.
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.” Article I, Section 9.
“The Congress shall have Power to . . . provide
for the common defense and general Welfare of the
United States, . . . declare War, . . . to raise and
support Armies . . ., To provide and maintain a
Navy; To make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States . . .”
Article 1, Section 8.
“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”
Article II, Section 2.

Figure 1. Key National Security Powers as Enumerated in the Constitution.
and where to invest political capital. Presidential leadership and the administration’s articulation of a
vision underpinning its foreign policy, in general, and its national security policy in particular are keys
to success as well.
The President and Congress are at once so independent and so intertwined that neither can be said to govern save
as both do. And even when they come together they face other claimants to a share in governing: the courts, the
states, the press, the private interests, all protected by our Constitution, and the foreign governments that help to
shape our policy.17
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Although the President is the single actor in the American political system granted the greatest range
of formal powers, the ability to make his will prevail among the competing wills of actors also vested
with significant powers depends on skillful presidential leadership. President Harry Truman once
remarked that presidential power really just boils down to the power to persuade.18 The renowned
presidential scholar, Richard Neustadt, in his classic text, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents,
equates presidential power with influence and seeks to explain its sources and the contexts where
presidential power is more or less dominant.
Scholars differentiate between situations where the President essentially can command and those in
which he must rely on his powers of persuasion. If the issue involves presidential authority that is not
shared with a competing entity, then the desired result may be achieved without resistance. Examples
include the relief of a military commander, the use of an executive order to advance unpopular policy,
and the deployment of military forces to protect American interests.
President Truman’s relief of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 is probably the most well-known
dismissal of a military commander in the modern presidency. Truman was careful to consult the Joint
Chiefs in the matter and implemented the order in a successive delegation of authority from him through
the appropriate military authorities. Truman and the Chiefs viewed MacArthur’s public interventions
in the face of strict orders not to publicly comment on administration policy as the open defiance of
the Commander-in-Chief and consequently justified his dismissal as essential to maintaining civilian
control of the military. There was no question in the MacArthur affair, with regard to the assertion of
formal constitutional powers, that the President had the authority to dismiss a commander in the field.
However, congressional critics of Truman’s Korean Policy and MacArthur’s Republican supporters
used the opportunity to conduct a full-fledged congressional investigation of the government’s foreign
and military policies against a domestic backdrop that featured a grand tickertape parade honoring the
relieved general, MacArthur’s address to a Joint Session of Congress, and an adoring public passionately
opposed to the ouster of an American icon.19 Truman’s actions consequently were offset by the exertion
of informal powers inherent in the Congress, the press, and the people whose inputs account for and
shape the ultimate political impact of the President’s actions.
The issuance of an executive order is another strategic tool that presidents can use to achieve
desired policy outcomes and to assert presidential authority. Eisenhower’s use of federal troops to
enforce the orders of a Federal Court to desegregate Little Rock schools in 1957 illustrates a President’s
prerogative to assert his constitutional power over the state militias, a power that is not shared with
another constitutional entity. The President’s decision to federalize the Arkansas National Guard
troops originally called into action by Governor Orval Faubus to halt the integration of Central High
School was clear, unambiguous, and highly public. The President’s assertion of power featured a
“sense of legitimate obligation, legitimately imposed”20 As in the MacArthur case, to not have exerted
the authority would have resulted in its erosion and the prevalence of less legitimate sources of power
in the American political system.
Executive orders mainly have been used in three areas: to combat various forms of discrimination
against citizens, to increase White House control over the Executive branch, and to maintain secrets.21
When Congress perceives that executive orders are taken to bypass Congress on controversial issues,
they may elicit great political controversy and be a source of conflict between the two branches. This
is why the congressional reaction to President George W. Bush’s series of executive orders authorizing
the National Security Agency (NSA) to eavesdrop on the conversations of Americans without warrants
as required in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has been uncharacteristically strong.
Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle saw the action as a challenge to the Congress’ power
vis-à-vis the executive.
Even the prospect of an executive order being issued can erupt in major political controversy as was
the case with President Bill Clinton’s proposal to lift the ban on gays serving in the military. There was
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no question that the President had the legitimate authority to issue such an order as President Truman
had done to integrate the armed forces in 1948, but the political backlash was so strong in 1993 that
President Clinton abandoned the idea in order to salvage his domestic agenda before Congress.22
While the President’s formal powers are significant, presidential leadership more often is dependent
on the President’s power to persuade others that what he wants of them also is compatible with
the pursuit of their own interests. The successful launching of the Marshall Plan is an example of a
President with minimal political capital achieving a critical foreign policy goal through the effective
use of the informal powers of his office. Truman faced the uphill battle of convincing a Republican and
traditionally isolationist Congress and a Treasury department focused on controlling spending, that
massive European aid deserved their support. The domestic political context in 1947 was characterized
further by animosity over Truman’s veto of the Republican leadership’s key legislative initiatives and
the assumption that Truman would be easily defeated in the upcoming 1948 presidential election.
He had a key advocate in the figure of General George C. Marshall pushing for the plan that bore
his name from State and the support of the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Arthur Vandenberg. All the resources of the administration were unleashed to back the
plan, and special care was taken to meet the terms Vandenberg insisted on to maintain his support,
which included frequent personal meetings with the President and Marshall and extensive liaisons
between Congress and the agencies involved with implementing the plan. Truman even deferred
to Vandenberg’s choice of a Republican to head the new agency created to administer the program.
These “bargains” subsequently resulted in key players lending their prestige and influence to make the
proposed European Recovery Program a reality.23
The few cases discussed here highlight the linkages between presidential power and effective
presidential leadership. The American political system’s institutional design, with its unique blend
of shared and separate powers, means that key actors often have divided loyalties, a result of serving
multiple masters in government. Even players within the Executive branch also are responsible to
Congress and have allegiance as well to their staffs and departments to represent their bureaucratic
interests. Fulfilling the President’s policies, in addition, necessarily involves interagency cooperation
and overcoming the disparate bureaucratic interests of each. Presidential power is as much a function
of personal politics as it is of formal authority or position.24
CONGRESS: DOES AN EFFECTIVE CHECK REMAIN ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER?
Most texts examining the extent of the presidential-congressional partnership in national security
policymaking cite constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin’s musing that the Constitution “is an invitation
to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.”25 What does the historical record
suggest about the President’s capacity to dominate national security policy? Is the American political
tradition that Congress defers to the Executive in foreign and security policy, weighing in with
countervailing powers only by exception? Can Congress regain its lost clout and limit presidential
overreaching?
An objective assessment of the congressional-executive struggle over the control of national
security policies will reveal several findings. First, American history is replete with examples of
serious congressional quarrels with the President over the conduct of foreign policy. Second, periods of
deference to the executive have been limited, and even then included at least tacit approval of the basic
parameters of U.S. foreign policy. Third, as a result of congressional reforms in the 1970s, Congress
gained an increased capacity to challenge presidential policies with the creation of the Congressional
Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the expansion of personal and committee
staffs. These tools boosted Congress’ analytical ability and contributed to more enhanced oversight
of foreign policy and a greater trend toward legislating specific aspects of foreign policy.26 Finally, the
292

congressional-executive relationship on use of force issues seeks a comfortable equilibrium. Periods
of congressional acquiescence often are interrupted by perceived executive overreach that leads to the
reassertion of congressional authority. Such was the context for the passage of the War Powers Act in
1973.
However, the net result of this struggle over time has been what one report called “the executive’s
slow-motion coup” made possible by Congress, itself, which has been complicit in its own diminution
of power instead of guarding its institutional prerogatives.27 Even though Congress periodically
fought back with such measures as the War Powers Act and the enactment of FISA in 1978, enforcing
the oversight provisions mandated in these initiatives has been uneven, amounting in the overall
concession of power to the executive. Some question whether it is even possible in the current political
environment of polarized politics favoring partisan loyalties over institutional obligations to correct
the imbalance between congressional and executive power.
ENTER THE JUDICIARY: WILL IT ACT TO RESTORE THE BALANCE?
Beginning with George Washington, presidents have drawn on the institutional competencies of
the executive and formal powers to play an active and assertive role in foreign affairs and national
security issues. President Thomas Jefferson essentially conducted the Louisiana Purchase on his own;
Abraham Lincoln, citing war powers, governed without Congress and suspended the courts; while
Franklin Roosevelt oversaw the establishment of a plethora of federal agencies empowered to make
policy in their realms in order to lift the country out of the Depression. In debate in President George
W. Bush’s second term over the limits of presidential power, the 1952 decision of Justice Robert H.
Jackson has been cited. Justice Jackson rejected President Harry Truman’s claim that, as Commanderin-Chief, he had the inherent power to seize the nation’s steel mills. This decision has been cited as
precedent for future Supreme Court deliberations of the issue. Justice Jackson’s framework for judging
the constitutionality of assertions of executive power is outlined below and was at the center of the
recent confirmation hearings of the newly seated Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito.28 Many believe
that many aspects of the question of presidential overreach will come before the Supreme Court, giving
the Court a unique opportunity to reshape the balance between the executive and Congress.
Three Political Contexts.
Justice Jackson laid out three possible political contexts characterizing congressional-presidential
relations in the national security arena. First, presidential power is maximized when the President acts
pursuant to the express or implied authorization of Congress in a given area. In such periods of concordance,
presidential leadership virtually is unchallenged. Such cooperation may be attributed to agreement
over the major policy decisions in play. Presidential power also has been at its height during times
of national crisis and war. Lincoln largely got his way in the conduct of the Civil War. In the 20th
century, Woodrow Wilson, until 1919, and Franklin Roosevelt after 1941, enjoyed an advantage over
the control of foreign policy. The postwar era through the mid-1960s was another period of presidential
dominance rooted in broad agreement over policy. Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy,
and Lyndon Johnson all governed during major wars or at the height of the Cold War, and each had
relative control over national security and foreign policy.29 President George W. Bush contends that the
2001 congressional resolution authorizing the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force” to
respond to the September 11, 2001, attacks and to prevent such attacks in the future served as implied
authorization for detention and surveillance programs incident to the use of force in wartime. This
controversy remains unresolved at this writing; however, it is clear that a sharp difference of opinion
exists between the Administration and Congress over the matter.
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Each period of perceived presidential overreach was followed by a backlash or resurgence of
congressional power. Following the Civil War, powerful Congresses dominated the Presidency in the
late 19th century, and Congress handed Wilson the devastating political and personal defeat of rejecting
the Treaty of Versailles with a reassertion of congressional power that resulted in the domination of
foreign policy until World War II.30 The War Powers Act of 1973 was the culmination of Congress’
break with the President over the conduct of the Vietnam War and its reemergence in national security
affairs.
Second, presidential independence is possible if Congress is indifferent or acquiesces in a particular policy
area. In this political context Congress falls short of playing the role of constructive partner to critique,
build support for, and improve on the President’s foreign and security policy. Many factors contribute
to such a scenario. There is a tendency in Congress to view foreign and security policy through domestic
political lenses or from the perspective of special interests, which may both be barriers to judging
foreign policy initiatives on the basis of the national interest. Presidential independence may also be
possible simply because Congress is not paying attention to the administration’s policies. Domestic
issues often dominate the congressional agenda in peacetime. Furthermore, Congress may neglect
its responsibilities in foreign affairs by devoting too little time to rigorous programmatic oversight.31
In both the concordant and acquiescent political contexts, the President’s leadership is not essential.
However, in the third context to be considered, presidential leadership is critical.
Presidential power in security and foreign policy is at its lowest ebb when the administration’s desired action
is incompatible with the expressed or implied will of the Congress. An analysis of congressional-presidential
relations in the Vietnam War illustrates a dramatic conversion of Congress’ perception of its role in
checking presidential war making powers. Its 1964 passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution essentially
ceded to President Johnson the “blank check” he sought to deal with the crisis in Southeast Asia.
The near unanimous backing in Congress (there were only two dissenting votes in the Senate) gave
the President authority to take all “necessary measures” to repel any armed attack against the forces
of the United States and “to prevent further aggression.” President Johnson’s interpretation of his
Commander-in-Chief powers, which President Richard Nixon took to even greater heights as his
successor, was an open-ended doctrine permitting the President to order armed forces into combat
whenever the President determined that the security of the United States was threatened.32
As the administrations’ prosecution of the war continued, Congress retreated from its role of
presidential cheerleader and gradually began to reassert its authority. Congressmen increasingly traveled
to Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s to take stock of the war, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
televised hearings in 1966, and by the early 1970s, Congress changed its rules for considering defense
appropriations bills so that individual amendments attempting to limit or influence the policy could be
considered without rejecting the entire defense appropriations package.33 Continuation of presidential
dominance in the face of a growing majority’s disagreement with the Vietnam policy in particular, and
even broader consensus that the Nixon administration had overreached with the assertion that the
executive had unlimited discretionary authority as Commander-in-Chief to send American troops into
action around the world, led to the passage of the War Powers Act.
The act established procedures in three main areas: presidential consultation with Congress,
presidential reports to Congress, and congressional termination of military action. Congress’ intent
was to assert its authority via procedural constraints limiting the ability of the President to commit
U.S. forces abroad. The act calls for the President to consult with Congress “in every possible instance”
before introducing U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities, declares that the President must
report to Congress within 48 hours when such forces are introduced, and mandates that the use of
forces be terminated within 60 to 90 days, unless Congress authorizes that they remain.34
The continuous shifting between the political contexts discussed above is indicative in the ambiguous
role the War Powers Act has had since its passage. President Nixon rejected it out of hand with his veto
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of the measure in 1973. Congress shot back with its overwhelming override,35 asserting its intent to
expand its influence in national security policymaking with measures beyond the blunt instrument of
withholding funds.
In practice, Congress has not asserted consistently the authority granted in the act. Presidents,
meanwhile, have been careful not to acknowledge the law’s constitutionality, while avoiding direct
confrontations with Congress over its provisions. In fact, Congress has managed to get the President
to honor the War Powers Act only once, in an obscure 1975 Marine action to recapture a tanker off the
coast of Cambodia.36 Depending on lawmakers’ overall view of the President’s proposed intervention,
they may sit on the sidelines or strive to be consulted. Presidents continue to insist on flexibility and may
seek Congress’s explicit authorization for an impending action, but without admitting that such action
is being taking in order to comply with the Act. There is, however, an acceptance, if grudgingly, that the
War Powers Act stands as a reminder of the ultimate need to get at least congressional acquiescence,
and, ideally, congressional approval for the commitment of troops.37 Since the introduction of the War
Powers Act into congressional-presidential relations all three political contexts, enthusiastic concord,
indifferent acquiescence, and expressed disagreement with the President’s foreign and security policy
continue to occur.
President Bush’s domestic surveillance program has raised the ire of the usually acquiescent
Republican Congress because it sidesteps the oversight provisions outlined in FISA. As of this writing,
Republican Chair of the Senate Judiciary committee Senator Arlen Specter is conducting hearings with
the purpose of disputing the administration’s claim that its broad powers to fight terrorism override
specific legislation prohibiting warrantless eavesdropping. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales testified
before the Judiciary Committee in February 2006 that the administration reasonably interpreted the
2001 authorization of force resolution as the legal justification for its actions. However, when two laws
seem to come in conflict, the law which is more specific tends to prevail unless a law meant to override
an earlier one specifically includes language to the contrary.38 The FISA debate is unique because it
brings together elements of wartime presidential powers within the context of actions contrary to “the
express will of Congress.” Indeed Senator Lindsey Graham warned Attorney General Gonzales that
the administration’s expansive interpretation of the 2001 resolution may make it “harder for the next
president to get a force resolution if we take this too far.”39 Thus far, the Bush administration has not
indicated any interest in going back to the Congress to change the statutory language in order to have
Congress play a role in the program’s oversight. Congressional angst notwithstanding, the current
balance of power between the Executive and Congress is likely to stand unless the courts intervene
in the unlikely event that one of the subjects of the domestic surveillance program successfully brings
suit.
KEYS TO EFFECTIVE PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
The Executive branch’s institutional competencies make the President the most important actor
in foreign and security policy. The President, alone, has command of the bully pulpit to give him an
unrivaled voice in policy debates. The President also is the actor in the American political system
best positioned to consider the national interest. Since World War II, control over foreign and security
policy increasingly has been centralized in the executive. The government’s expertise for formulating
and implementing foreign and security policy is largely resident in the Department of State and the
Department of Defense, with the National Security Council also assuming an increasing amount of
authority and influence—all three components of the Executive branch. Yet effective leadership is not a
given. Perhaps the broadest and most common sense recommendation comes from presidential scholar
Paul Quirk, who contributes the concept of “strategic competence.” Quirk argues that presidents must
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have a well-designed strategy for achieving the competencies they need to effectively lead. In this view,
the key competencies to be mastered are policy substance, policy process, and policy promotion. An
adequate level of policy expertise will result from years of attentive engagement in the major national
issues. The development of direct in-depth personal competence in policy areas is necessarily selective,
but a base knowledge of the key issues is essential to the president’s recognition of the elements of
responsible debate and to responsible decision-making.40 Anything less than this, Quirk argues is
minimalist and may impede intelligent decisionmaking,
A minimalist president…will not fully appreciate his own limitations. By consistently neglecting the complexities
of careful policy arguments, one never comes to understand the importance of thorough analysis. In politics and
government, at least, people generally do not place a high value on discourse that is much more sophisticated than
their own habitual mode of thought.41

To lead effectively, presidents also must be competent in the processes of policymaking. The President
sits atop a system of complex organizational and group decisionmaking processes and must ensure that
the administration has put in place reliable decisionmaking processes. The major threats to effective
national security policymaking processes are intelligence failures, groupthink and other malfunctions of
the advisory process,42 and failing to coordinate within the interagency process effectively and beyond
the executive branch as appropriate.43 Finally, building coalitions with congressional leaders and key
interest groups, and using the bully pulpit to take the case to the public, are essential ingredients for
effective policy promotion once policy decisions have been made.
Lee Hamilton offers his advice for effective presidential leadership in foreign and national security
policy from his perspective as the former chairman and long time ranking Democrat on the House
Committee on International Relations. Presidents must make foreign policy a priority and set forth a
day-to-day course that is driven by an overall strategic vision. Hamilton argues that the foreign and
security policy arena is uniquely dependent on the President’s attention and leadership. Too often
an issue receives intense attention and scrutiny for a short time, but then the administration fails to
remain sufficiently focused or to expend the requisite resources to achieve success. The President also
is uniquely positioned to forge the personal relations with foreign heads of state that are critical to
alliance building and to articulate U.S. policies and the associated national interests with clarity to the
American people.44
In a system of shared and separate powers in national security policymaking, successful policy rarely
will be the result of strong-arming the Congress or the American people through the overplaying of
formal powers. The Supreme Court is extremely reluctant to check the President’s power while a war
is in progress. Presidential leadership in national security policymaking effectively blends presidential
authority with a consideration of the institutional competencies that the rival branch brings to the
development and execution of strategy.
As the most accessible and representative branch of government, Congress can help mediate between
the American people and the foreign policy elite. Through the hearings process, Congress also can
help to educate the public on complex foreign and security policies. Testifying before the appropriate
committees also forces the administration’s top officials to articulate and defend their policies. However,
some observers are concerned that this check on executive power is being weakened by an administration
reluctant to make senior officials available for sworn congressional testimony or to provide documents
to relevant committees, citing the confidentiality of Executive branch communications.45
Debates over particularly contentious and weighty matters of national security policy, such as
whether or not to authorize the use of force against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, can engage the public and strengthen the policy process through the inclusion of such measured
deliberations. Passing legislation in support of the administration’s policies also can help to strengthen
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the President’s hand before international bodies, adversaries, and allies. In the case of the Gulf War,
congressional leaders insisted on being consulted and on debating the issue before authorizing the
use of military force. President George H. W. Bush, however, feared that weak support or a split vote
would be worse than no vote at all and might actually weaken his hand in the face of Iraqi aggression.
President Bush maintained throughout the period of congressional consultation that, regardless of the
outcome in Congress, he still had the constitutional right to commit U.S. forces to battle. In the end,
the Congress passed the resolution with a clear victory in the House, 250-183, and a squeaker in the
Senate, 52-47.46 Effective presidential leadership in foreign and security policy recognizes Congress’
constitutional role in the process and seeks ways to ensure that sustained consultation is a characteristic
of the executive strategy for interacting with Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL-PRESIDENTIAL COLLABORATION IN THE WAR IN IRAQ
The open-ended resolution Congress passed in October 2002 granted the President broad authority
to use any means he determined necessary and appropriate—including military force—to respond to
any security threat posed by Iraq.47 Critics contended that, in contrast to the 1991 appeal of President
Bush’s father to authorize force on the eve of conflict when key conditions related to its prosecution
were well known, “The president is asking Congress to delegate its constitutional power to declare
war before he has decided we need to go to war, but he has not adequately explained what this war
will look like.”48 Others argued President Bush’s request was constitutionally inappropriate because
it was seeking a conditional grant of power, leaving in the President’s hands the decision to change
the nation into a state of war. These critics contend that a nonbinding resolution declaring support
for the President’s efforts to make Iraq comply with United Nations (UN) resolutions followed by the
authorization to use force if peaceful means fail may have been more appropriate. Such a two-step
approach would have left Congress in the loop up until the point when the President was ready to
begin military action.49
Although some Republicans had concerns about endorsing the new doctrine of preemption, they
deferred to the President. With the mid-term elections only weeks away, many Democrats felt pressure
to “get this question of Iraq behind us” so they could return to other issues that they thought would be
successful for them in the elections. At the height of the House debate, less that 40 members could be
found on the floor. On the Senate side, no more than 10 senators could be found. The resolution passed
296 to 133 in the House and in the Senate 77 to 23.50
Observers noted that the debate over the Iraq war was a pale shadow of the Senate’s more vigorous
role in the past. Congressional scholar Norman Ornstein commented on the Senate’s role in foreign
policy, “the Senate is struggling to find an appropriate role to play. I think you’d be hard-pressed
to suggest the Senate is a great debating body—on anything.”51 The concordant-acquiescent political
context that has characterized congressional-presidential relations since the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks may have contributed to executive overreach in ways that could weaken the overall prospects
for the sustainment and ultimate success of the President’s strategy in Iraq.
The political environment in the run-up to the War in Iraq was conducive to the executive “going
it alone” vis-à-vis Congress. Although the Congress put up little resistance over the open-ended
resolution to use force in Iraq, this support occurred within a climate of some angst on the Hill over the
administration’s attitude toward the role of Congress in defense policy. Congressmen of both parties
complained that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld “tells lawmakers little and demands immense
discretion.”52 Complaints also were numerous and continue today, accusing the Administration of
thwarting Congress’s investigative authority. Some lawmakers were frustrated that their attempts to
get more information about the administration’s impending war plans and strategy came up empty.
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Administration officials were unable to answer with any specificity questions related to the cost of the
war or of the reconstruction effort to follow before lawmakers cast their votes.
Some members of Congress demanded to hear the administration’s plans for the postwar occupation,
but were denied such consultations based on the argument that it would not be proper to plan for the
aftermath of a conflict that the President had not yet decided to fight. The “ends” that the President
advanced shifted among competing candidates, eventually settling on the need to disarm Saddam
Hussein and dismantle the imminent threat that his weapons posed.
Scholars pointed out that the doctrine of preemptive military strikes added a “new wrinkle to the
Imperial Presidency,” because the trigger for the use of force is classified intelligence.53 Richard Durbin,
a member of the Senate intelligence committee, complained that an insufficient body of the intelligence
available to the committee was declassified in the run-up to the vote on Iraq, hindering the ability of
his colleagues to make an informed vote.
The choice to maximize the powers of the presidency, while marginalizing the participation of the
Congress, may have put the strategy at risk. Congress shares responsibility for the policy due to its
decision to support the open-ended resolution. However, the emphasis on regime change through
invasion without laying out all aspects of a comprehensive strategy complete with clear strategic ends,
a thorough explanation of the ways or courses of action the administration would pursue to achieve
the ends, and a good faith estimate of the means or cost to the American people in terms of lives and
treasure made it more likely that the administration would be on the defensive when the strategy ran
into difficulty.
Indeed, in September 2003, when the Bush administration finally delivered the first major bill for
the war to Congress in the form of a request for $87 billion dollars to fund Iraqi reconstruction and the
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the remainder of the fiscal year, Congress pushed back
mightily. Pent up frustration over the lack of collaboration with the legislative branch was evident.
Senator Diane Feinstein remarked, “We want to be good Americans. We want a bipartisan foreign
policy. We know the time is tough. We want to be with you. But there’s a feeling that you know it all.
The administration knows it all. And nobody else knows anything. And, therefore, we’re here just to
say, ‘Yes, sir. How high do we jump?’ And at some point we refuse to jump.”54 More direct was Senator
Robert Byrd’s comment to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, “Congress is not an ATM. We
have to be able to explain this huge, enormous bill to the American people.”55
The administration sustained another wave of attacks in January 2004 when its Chief Weapons
Inspector in Iraq, David Kay, concluded that there were no large stocks of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in Iraq before the war. “Based on what I’ve seen is that we are very unlike to find stockpiles,
large stockpiles of weapons. I don’t think they exist.” “It turns out we were all wrong.”56 Democrats
charged this was further proof the war was based on false premises. Lawmakers on both sides of the
aisle took issue with the certainty of the language that administration officials used with regard to the
prewar intelligence, and some questioned whether administration officials misled them.
Members of Congress complained that Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet gave his
personal assurance in closed-door hearings that WMD stocks would be found in Iraq. “He was telling
the senior people in the administration…that the weapons absolutely were there, that they were certain
the stuff was there.”57 Ohio Senator Mike DeWine, a Republican on the Intelligence Committee, told
the Columbus Dispatch that he was not sure he would vote to authorize war with Iraq if he had to do it
all over again.58 Meanwhile, on the campaign trail, Democratic presidential candidates took aim at the
administration. “We were misled not only in the intelligence but misled in the way that the president
took us to war,” the Democratic front-runner, Senator John F. Kerry (MA), said when asked about
Kay’s conclusions.”59
The administration’s critics fault the lack of consensus building and deride its unwillingness to
collaborate with either international allies or its domestic partners in the national security policymaking
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process. As the popularity of the Iraq War has waned in the face of its $233 billion price tag by early 2006
and deaths of American servicemen creep upward of 2,200, the Bush administration stands undeterred
in its approach to Executive power. The sweeping assertion of the powers of the presidency is grounded
in a belief that the full power of the Executive must be restored in order to prevail in the War on
Terrorism.60 Leaving the Congress and the Courts in its wake, however, is at least politically flawed and
may provoke a reaction from these bodies that ultimately cuts back on presidential powers.
Supporters of the administration, on the other hand, laud the resurgence of presidential power
and maintain that the administration’s approach is merely a corrective action necessary to reverse the
erosion of presidential prerogatives in recent decades. According to this view, the administration’s
approach is to be admired as a model in presidential leadership,
To achieve all this, Bush staged one of the most impressive exercises of presidential power in modern times. He
used all the tools at hand: the bully pulpit, TV, personal persuasion in the Oval Office, and the skillful deployment
of top officials in his administration. And, not to be underestimated, there was sheer presidential bullheadedness.
When a president takes a firm and defensible position and doesn’t flinch, he normally prevails . . . One telling
result of Bush’s full-throttle use of his presidency was a far greater percentage of Democratic support for his
congressional war resolution than the elder President Bush won in 1991 after Iraq had invaded Kuwait.61

Is President Bush’ leadership vis-à-vis Iraq firm, resolute leadership appropriate to the national
security challenges inherent in fighting the security threats facing the United States in the 21st century
or imperial presidential overreach that, if continued, ultimately will lead to a failed strategy for fighting
the War on Terrorism? The historical record indicates that policy is strengthened when each branch
understands its proper role, powers, and limitations in foreign policy. An analysis of the case of the war
in Iraq suggests that both branches have fallen short of this ideal.
CONCLUSION
The American republic’s very essence lies in its allocation of power across the political system. The
Founders envisioned a struggle for power between actors enabled with competing powers to keep each
other in check. That such struggles continue is a testament to the continued viability of the founding
blueprint. In the current political environment, the backdrop of national security seems to present
an obstacle to the balanced interplay of the President, Congress, and the Courts. But the Founders’
institutional design was undertaken with a realistic expectation that national security matters could be
at the heart of power plays among the government elite placed in each of three empowered branches.
Liberty could not be forfeited, the Founders’ assumed, unless key actors chose not to employ their
countervailing power to preserve it. Security, meanwhile, would depend on the adoption of an effective
strategy for victory. The “Long War” may only be beginning. Balancing the quest for security with the
preservation of liberty requires a collaborative employment of the national security powers that the
President, Congress, and the Courts share.
Effective conduct of national security policy depends on understanding one’s power, its limits, and
the recognition that other actors’ actions also shape the policy battlefield. Successful national security
policy exploits the institutional competencies that the Framers’ designed into the American political
system. Coordinated efforts that link the President’s national security policy initiatives with Congress’
unique capacity to vet the policy, educate the public, and ultimately lend its support are more likely to
lead to successful strategy. Such policy also must withstand the scrutiny of the Courts empowered to
rein in the President or Congress when either entity oversteps its allocation of power. Successful policy
implementation, furthermore, is reliant on competent executive decisionmaking, efficient bureaucratic
processes and the keen oversight of lawmakers, the media, and the American people.
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CHAPTER 22
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES:
1990 TO 2005
Richard M. Meinhart
The four Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1990—Generals Colin Powell (1989-93), John
Shalikashvili (1993-97), Henry Shelton (1997-2001) and Richard Myers (2001-05)—used an unclassified
national military strategy to provide advice on the military’s strategic direction to the President and
Secretary of Defense, and communicated that direction to Congress and the American people. The
Chairman’s responsibilities as the nation’s senior military advisor to provide this strategic advice,
along with many other tasks, are specified in Title 10 U.S. Code. These increased responsibilities were a
result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), considered to be the most significant piece of defense
legislation since the National Security Defense Act of 1947 that established the Defense Department.1
The GNA was the result of almost 4 years of somewhat contentious dialogue and debate among
Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan administration on how
best to organize the Defense Department to strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice to
civilian leaders, provide for more efficient use of resources, and better execute in the field to respond
to the nation’s security challenges.2
While this author will discuss the strategic environment each Chairman faced in more detail as he
analyzes the four strategies, the first three Chairmen were challenged by an environment that began
with the Gulf War and continued with an increasing number of other regional military operations
across the spectrum of conflict as the decade progressed. They had to meet these challenges while
accommodating slowing declining financial resources and a Cold War equipped force reduced by about
one-third. Since 2000, and particularly after September 11, 2001, the last two Chairmen faced different
security challenges dominated by the focus on terrorism, as most evidenced by the wars in Afghanistan
and in Iraq, while needing to transform by developing future capabilities to achieve the vision of full
spectrum dominance. They had to meet these challenges with greater financial resources and better
technology but with no increase in military manpower.3 The four national military strategies were
the key formal way each Chairman advised the nation’s leaders on how best to meet these challenges,
which are summarized in Figure 1.
1990s

2000s

Regional competition and threats
Gulf War
Greater number military operations
Declining financial and personnel resources
Need to integrate technology
Robust overseas bases and deployed force
Well maintained Cold War equipment

Global War on Terror
Iraq and Afghanistan
Continued global engagements
Increasing financial resources
Need to transform to capabilities
Less global infrastructure and forces
Updated but worn equipment

Figure 1. Chairmen’s Strategic Environment.
This chapter will focus on the Chairmen’s leadership challenges since 1990, and how they developed
and used four different national military strategies in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2004 to respond to those
challenges. The chapter describes in broad terms the strategic environment facing each Chairman, as it
formed the basis for his subsequent strategy. Then each of the strategies’ key components, which were
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organized around an ends, ways and means construct, will be examined. The assertion is that formal
direction provided by these strategies was an important aspect of each Chairman’s leadership legacy.
Since each military strategy was part of and perhaps the key integrating component of an overall
strategic planning system, the chapter begins by examining this planning system’s integrating nature
and other key characteristics.
Strategic Planning System.
The Chairman’s strategic planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people and
organizations above him (President and Secretary of Defense) and the people and organizations with
which he directly coordinates (Services and Combatant Commanders). The Chairman has no control
over any significant defense resources (Secretary of Defense and Services control resources) or direct
control of operational military forces (Combatant Commanders control operational forces); however,
orders to those forces flow through the Chairman. The Chairman formally influences his civilian leaders
and those with whom he coordinates through this strategic planning system. In addition to influencing
leaders, this system provides specific direction for the many staffs that support these leaders. As such,
the Chairman’s Joint Strategic Planning System formally evolved four times during this 16-year period
in 1990, 1993, 1997, and 1999. It is the Chairman’s key system that integrates the nation’s strategy,
plans, and resources that consist by 2005 of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, and reserve forces
and defense outlays of $465B.4
1989 Status: Prior to 1990 there were 10 rather large and primarily classified strategic planning
products that were described as voluminous, somewhat stove-piped, and highly bureaucratic, but this
was indicative of strategic planning products produced in the late 1980s.5 The Senate Armed Services
Committee called this style of strategic planning ineffective, and the former Chief of Naval Operations,
in remarking on a strategic planning document, stated it was “. . . almost as valueless to read as it was
fatiguing to write. . . . a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave
was minimal.”6 Chairman Powell recognized these deficiencies and streamlined the system when he
published Memorandum of Policy No. 7 on January 30, 1990.7
1990 Change: The 1990 change added a front-end leader’s guidance while eliminating or combining
many other documents as ten products were reduced to four. The front-end guidance was through a
formal joint strategy review for “. . . gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration
of strategy, operational planning, and program assessments,” that culminated with publishing
Chairman’s Guidance.8 This concise document (6 to 10 pages) was structured to provide the principal,
initial direction to develop the planning system’s next three documents: the National Military Strategy
Document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Chairman’s Program Assessment. The classified
National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) was to be produced under a rigid 2-year cycle with several
parts, one of which was a National Military Strategy. In addition, there were seven functional annexes
added to this document, such as intelligence and research and development that in total comprised
hundreds of more pages. For example, one annex alone had 11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs. The
part of the NSMD called the National Military Strategy (also classified) would be sent to the Secretary of
Defense for review and forwarded to the President for approval before returning to influence defense
resource guidance.
1993 Change: Chairman Powell again revised this planning system in March 1993 by publishing
the first change to his earlier Memorandum of Policy No. 7.9 This change essentially codified what
was executed in previous years rather that designing a new system. This revised system included
the following guidance: place more focus on long-range planning by requiring formal environmental
scanning to determine what challenges the strategy needed to consider; issue the National Military
Strategy as an unclassified document designed to communicate with the American people rather than
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providing internal military direction; establish a Joint Planning Document to sharpen the Chairman’s
advice to the Secretary of Defense on how to resource the strategy; and keep the JSCP, which directs
plans to implement that strategy in the field, the same.
1997 Change: Chairman Shalikashvili made the next revision to the strategic planning system in
September 1997 when he published Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01.10 This instruction
again reflected changes he instituted in prior years rather that formally changing the system before
execution. He kept the national military strategy as an unclassified document produced in a flexible
manner that looked out about 5 years, but he added the 1996 Joint Vision 2010 to provide longer range
direction not covered by his strategy. He also added the Chairman’s Program Recommendation to provide
leader-focused resource advice to implement both the strategy and vision. Again, the JSCP was left
unchanged.
1999 Change: Chairman Shelton made the final formal change to the strategic planning system in
September 1999.11 He did not change any major processes or products. Instead, he placed more focus
on Theater Engagement Plans to integrate the strategy’s shape component and on implementing the
1996 Joint Vision to better support the strategy’s prepare component. This vision process involved
identifying specific 21st century security challenges and the desired operational capabilities to meet
those challenges, all of which provided joint direction to conduct operational experiments and influence
resource decisions. Overall, this process change resulted in improvements to better execute the national
military strategy.
2005 Status: While Chairman Myers made no official changes by 2005 to the 1999 operating instruction
that describes the strategic planning system, the formal system has not been completely followed
since the early 2000s. In execution, General Myers published three new strategy-related planning
documents, kept four existing planning products to include the unclassified national military strategy,
and cancelled the separate vision and staff-resource advice products. The three new strategy-related
products he added were: a classified 2002 and later 2005 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on
Terrorism to provide more guidance to the military’s effort to execute the national strategies associated
with terrorism; a classified Chairman’s Risk Assessment that identified to Congress the strategic and
military risk to execute the national military strategy; and Joint Operations Concepts in 2003 (revised to
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations in 2005) that identified future concepts and capabilities associated
with implementing the vision of full spectrum dominance now embedded in the 2004 National Military
Strategy. These strategic planning system changes, along with what they direct or inform and the dates
of the most recent products by June 2005, are depicted in Figure 2.12
All of these Chairmen’s changes incrementally resulted in the strategic planning system evolving
from being rigid and Cold War focused at the decade’s start to being more flexible, vision oriented,
and resource focused at the decade’s end. After 2000, the strategic planning system was more focused
on the War on Terrorism and identifying joint force capabilities. Throughout this 16-year period with
its changing national security challenges, the unclassified National Military Strategy remained the
planning system’s keystone document.
1989 National Military Strategy Document.
At the beginning of 1990, the formal manner by which the Chairman advised the President and
the Secretary of Defense on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces was via a classified and rather
voluminous National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) and a shorter classified National Military
Strategy that was part of this document. Admiral Crowe published these in 1989 to provide guidance
for the resource time frame of FY 92 to FY97. The process to produce this strategy also was formally
linked to the Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Hence, this was the strategy and
processes that General Powell inherited.
305

Figure 2. Strategy—Foundation for all Major Processes.
The classified 1989 National Military Strategy Document included chapters dedicated to subjects such
as national military objectives, national military strategy, appraisal of U.S. defense policy, intelligence
appraisal, fiscally constrained force levels, net assessment options and risk evaluation.13 In addition to
this basic document, there were seven separate classified annexes on functional subjects that supported
the strategy such as research and development and intelligence. The 1989 strategy focused on the Cold
War and the Soviet Union. This strategy, which was underpinned with a robust nuclear deterrent,
included a forward defense with many forces deployed forward, particularly in Europe and Korea,
that were then backed up by rapid reinforcement to dispersed bases in many nations.
1992 National Military Strategy.
The demise of the Soviet Union, a broad retreat from ideological support of communism, and an
inclusive international coalition that reversed Iraqi aggression in Kuwait characterized the strategic
environment that influenced the 1992 strategy.14 On the positive side, democracy was growing in many
parts of the world. On the negative side, regional conflicts, animosities, and weapons proliferation
that the bipolar world and Cold War had previously constrained now had the potential to intensify. In
essence this was the “new world order,” a concept articulated by President Bush in his September 11,
1990, speech to a joint session of Congress and repeated many times later.15
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The 1992 strategy, which was unclassified and only 27 pages long, was a complete change from
the previous one in clarity, conciseness, and strategic direction. While this strategy was published
in January 1992, its roots can be traced to the President’s National Security Strategy, the Secretary of
Defense’s policies in his Defense Planning Guidance and Annual Report to the President and the Congress, and
General Powell’s development of the Base Force. This strategy represented a “. . . shift from containing
the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy that
is regionally oriented and capable of responding to the challenges of this decade.”16 In essence, this
was the most fundamental change in the U.S. military strategy since the global containment strategy
and Cold War that began in the 1950s. The military’s primary objective now was to be deterring and
fighting regional wars rather than containing a superpower rival.
This strategy was based on the United States providing leadership to promote global peace and
security. It was built on the following four foundations: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, which
consisted of a credible nuclear deterrent composed of offensive and defensive capabilities; Forward
Presence, which consisted of forces continually stationed or deployed worldwide; Crisis Response,
which was the ability to respond quickly to more than one regional crisis; and Reconstitution, which
involved the ability to mobilize personnel, equipment, and the industrial base to rebuild military
strength. The strategy also specified eight strategic principles that reinforced those four foundations—
readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power
projection, technological superiority, and decisive force. In conclusion, the strategy described how to
employ forces and listed the broad military force structure, called the “Base Force,” to implement the
strategy.
This Base Force, which was determined earlier, was composed broadly of strategic nuclear forces,
Army divisions, Navy ships, Marine expeditionary forces, and Air Force fighter wing equivalents.
When compared to the 1991 force structure, the Base Force was significantly smaller by the following
representative systems or organizations: 460 missiles and 16 nuclear submarines from the strategic
forces; 4 active and 2 Army Guard Divisions; 80 naval ships and 3 Carrier Battle Groups; and 7 Active
and 1 Reserve Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents.17 The strategy clearly conveyed to the American
people—one of the main target audiences, if not the most important audience—why they needed a
military and in what size. The American people and Congress were clamoring for a peace dividend
as the end of the Cold War sank in and the euphoria of the 1991 Operation DESERT STORM victory
ended.
This strategy’s coordination was different than the bureaucratic coordination of other strategic
planning documents on the Joint Staff, which illustrated the flexibility in strategic planning General
Powell achieved. The strategy, which had undergone a few variations and was interrupted by
operational necessity (Gulf War and Soviet internal turmoil) from its conceptual beginnings in 1990
to the end of 1991, was finally published in January 1992. It did not go through the disciplined 2-year
cycle with its associated annexes and formal assessments. Joint Staff Officer Harry Rothman, who was
part of the process, gave credit to General Powell’s personal relationships and strategic vision of the
world that broke down the impediments resident in formal planning processes. He stated that “. . .
people and not the process were more important in the forging of the new strategy.”18 General Powell
spent considerable energy convincing other senior leaders and converting them to his broad views
rather than conducting the detailed coordination at junior or mid levels that usually influenced the
document’s content.
One other significant aspect about this strategy was the Foreword to the document, which illustrated
General Powell’s leadership style of both boldness and humility. The Foreword boldly stated that the
strategy was his advice, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commanders
of unified and specified commands, and that he presented it to fulfill his responsibility under the GNA
to provide such advice. Humbly and emphasizing civilian control of the military, the Foreword also
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stated that, in determining this strategy, he listened to his civilian leadership, as the strategy clearly
implemented the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s policies. Clearly, as the first Chairman totally
under the GNA, General Powell created a leadership legacy in style and substance, as it was the first
unclassified strategy signed by a Chairman. Lorna Jaffe, in her detailed examination of the Base Force’s
development (a key part of the strategy), concluded that Powell fully used the enhanced authority of
the GNA and stated:
While he hoped to win the Services to his point of view, he did not aim for either bureaucratic consensus through
staff work or corporate consensus through JCS meetings. He never asked the Service Chiefs to vote on either the
Base Force or recommending to the Secretary and the President adoption of a new strategy [NMS]. Rather, he
thought it was more important to win the Secretary’s approval.19

1995 National Military Strategy.
The strategic environment at this time was centered on an unsettled world that exhibited both
opportunities and threats.20 This world was characterized by regional instability as evidenced by
conflict in the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda; concern about the possible proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) to hostile regional groups or terrorists from the Soviet Union’s breakup;
transnational dangers associated with fleeing refugees, diseases, and crime syndicates; and dangers to
nations undergoing transition to democratic reform, particularly those in the former Soviet Union. The
strategy developed to respond to these challenges was one of two produced by General Shalikashvili.
They looked very similar to General Powell’s in style, but in direction were very different in a few key
areas.
The 1995 strategy took guidance from the President’s National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement and defined the military’s two simple main objectives—promote stability and thwart
aggression. While the thwart aggression was embedded in the 1992 strategy, the promote stability
objective was different fundamentally than the 1992 strategy. The 1995 strategy described a more
active use of the military globally to promote stability rather than to react to instances of instability. To
achieve these two objectives, the 1995 strategy defined three components: (1) peacetime engagement,
which was the broad range of non-combat activities to promote democracy, relieve suffering and
enhance overall regional stability; (2) deterrence and conflict prevention, which ranged from conflict’s
high end represented by nuclear deterrence to conflict’s low end represented by peace enforcement to
restore stability, security, and international law; and (3) fight and win, which the strategy described
as the military’s foremost responsibility and defined as the ability to fight and win two major regional
contingencies. In essence, the military was expected to become more engaged in conflict prevention
to include missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation assistance; missions not
mentioned in the 1992 strategy.
This strategy also identified the military forces necessary to execute the strategy, but earlier work
by the Secretary of Defense’s Bottom-Up Review actually had determined the force structure outside
the formal strategy development process. While the military missions were growing in noncombat
areas, the force structure was decreasing from the 1992 Base Force. For example, active Army divisions
declined by two, the Air Force lost six fighter wings, and Navy combatant ships went from 450 to 346.21
In addition, reconstitution, defined in the 1992 strategy as forming, training, and fielding new fighting
units along with activating the industrial base, dropped out of the 1995 strategy altogether. Hence,
maintaining readiness became ever more important as the force became smaller and was used more
frequently. This readiness focus was emphasized greatly by Chairman Shalikashvili, as he used words
related to readiness in his annual Posture Statements to Congress with significantly greater frequency
than Chairman Powell.22
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This strategy’s development was different significantly than the 1992 strategy, as it followed the
more flexible processes and overall structure outlined in the 1993 Memorandum of Policy. The strategy
included information summarized from another strategic planning product, the Joint Strategy Review,
and reflected the conceptual outline as defined in the memorandum.23 This illustrated that process, as
well as people, drove this strategy’s development. This also reflected General Shalikashvili’s leadership
style, which could be characterized as using interpersonal skills to develop and value consensus and
using strategic planning processes to achieve and implement that consensus.24 In addition, since this
strategy was similar in style to the previous one, an existing strategic planning process could more
easily produce an evolutionary vice revolutionary product.
1997 National Military Strategy.
Opportunities and threats again characterized the strategic environment in 1997.25 The opportunities
were the lower threshold of global war and potentially a more peaceful world. The four principal
threats this strategy identified were: (1) regional dangers as primarily represented by Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea; (2) asymmetric challenges as represented by state or nonstate actors to include terrorists
that might possess WMD; (3) transnational dangers such as extremism, ethnic or religious disputes,
crime, and refugee flows; and (4) wild cards that could arise from unexpected world or technology
events as yet undefined or by a synergistic combination of the other three threats.
To respond to these challenges, the strategy centered on concepts described by the words shape,
respond, and prepare. These words and concepts were articulated more broadly for all elements of a
nation’s power in the President’s May 1997 National Security Strategy and also used in the Secretary of
Defense’s May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. In integrating advice from the President and Secretary
of Defense, these words took the following meaning in the military strategy: “U.S. Armed Forces
advance national security by applying military power to Shape the international environment and
Respond to the full spectrum of crisis, while we Prepare Now for an uncertain future.”26
The 1997 NMS built on the work of the previous strategy, but was different in four main areas. First,
it more specifically identified the asymmetric and wild card threats, which, in hindsight, conceptually
reflect the characteristics of the al Qaeda organization and the subsequent September 11, 2001 (9/11)
attacks 4 years later. Second, it strongly made the case for why the military needed to be involved with
shaping the international environment. While doing so, it clearly emphasized the warfighting aspect
when it stated: “Our Armed Forces’ foremost task is to fight and win our Nation’s wars.”27 Third,
it identified the force structure to execute the strategy in greater detail than previously, which may
have been a way for the Chairman to more aggressively identify force structure issues. For example,
the strategy identified the required numbers of: Army Corps, cavalry regiments and National Guard
enhanced brigades; naval attack submarines and amphibious groups; and defense department civilians,
Coast Guard personnel and special operations forces. Fourth, in preparing for the future, the strategy
established the foundation for the current joint force and defense transformation when it identified
the characteristics for a multi-mission, joint, and interoperable force. This was clearly the greatest joint
focus of any strategy to date.
This strategy also was developed within the strategic planning process. It relied on two other 1996
strategic planning documents. The Joint Strategy Review influenced the strategy’s strategic environment
assessment, and the section that covered preparing for the future leveraged the concepts identified in
the 1996 Joint Vision 2010. Since the strategy came out in September, a short time after the President’s
May National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s first Quadrennial Defense Review, it
emphasized the interconnectivity and strong collaboration that existed among the military and civilian
leadership in the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. While
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General Shalikashvili signed this strategy in his last month as Chairman, it was coordinated fully with
General Shelton, the incoming Chairman.
2004 National Military Strategy.
Prior to the publication of the National Military Strategy in 2004, the nation experienced a dramatic
change in the strategic environment that started with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and included with
the strategic response of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan) in October 2001 and
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Iraq) in March 2003. In essence, the military was engaged fully in the
War on Terrorism. A defense strategy being written in concert with this military strategy placed the
persistent and emerging security challenges the United States faced into four categories of traditional,
irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.28 A traditional challenge was associated with states employing
well-formed militaries and systems that typified the massive state-on-state warfare characteristic of
World Wars I and II. Irregular challenges reflected unconventional methods used by both state and
nonstate entities against a stronger state, or somewhat akin to what occurred in the Vietnam War.
Catastrophic challenges focused on terrorist or rogue use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like
effects, which reflected concerns identified in the 1997 strategy. The last category, disruptive, described
competitors making a breakthrough by technological means to overcome the U.S. advantage in a
particular operational domain. This last category reflected aspects of the 21st century environment that
previous strategies had not considered.
This military strategy amplified these four defense challenges when it specified three aspects of the
environment that had unique military implications. These three aspects were under the headings of
a wider range of adversaries; a more complex and distributed battlespace; and technology diffusion
and access. The wider range of adversaries ran the gamut from established or rogue states to nonstate
organizations, such as crime syndicates or terrorists networks, and finally to individuals. The complex
battlespace included the entire globe, whether in urban or desolated areas; defined physical space or
cyber space; or in foreign states or the U.S. homeland. Emphasis on the U.S. homeland was unique
to this strategy. The third aspect reflected the global availability and easy access to civilian dual-use
technologies that determined adversaries can adapt for military use. The last aspect was, again, very
different than seen in previous strategies.
To meet these challenges, the military strategy again built directly on four defense objectives, as it
defined three supporting military objectives. These three military objectives were organized around
three words: protect, prevent, and prevail. They were defined as “protect the United States against external
attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries.”29
To achieve these objectives, the 2004 NMS made no reference to specific force structure as had
previous strategies. Instead, the strategy emphasized the desired attributes, functions, and capabilities
for a joint force. However, it also supported what came to be called a 1-4-2-1 force sizing construct
that appeared in the defense strategy. The 1-4-2-1 construct postulated that the U.S. military needed to
accomplish the following: defend the homeland (1), deter forward in and from four regions (4); conduct
two overlapping defeat campaigns (2); and win decisively in one campaign (1). Overall, this force
structure approach provided great flexibility for force structure changes in concert with a capabilityvice threat-based approach and clearly had the greatest joint focus to date.
The process to produce this strategy was very different from the other three strategies in many
ways. A solid draft of the strategy was produced in 2002 to integrate the advice of the post-9/11 2001
Defense Quadrennial Review and the 2002 National Security Strategy. However, there was some question
whether an unclassified National Military Strategy was needed, since a defense strategy was published
as part of the QDR, the Chairman provided military specific advice by the 2002 classified National

310

Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, and he provided unclassified operational military advice
in 2003 through the Joint Operations Concepts. Hence, completing the early draft of the 2004 NMS was
not a priority. However, Congress cleared up any ambiguity that existed when it passed the 2004
National Defense Authorization Act. That Act required the Chairman to produce a detailed report that
is a biennial review of the National Military Strategy in eight specific areas, to include the strategic
and military risks inherent in the strategy.30 This amendment to existing U.S. Code is an example of
Congress performing its oversight role. The initial legislation asked for information without specifying
how it should be provided. Congress was not satisfied with the information it received, so it got much
more specific in terms both of “what” and “how” the Chairman should provide in his report.
The actual writing of the 2004 military strategy followed a very integrated and parallel path as the
Vice Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff stated: “So we’ve worked hand in glove with
the Secretary of Defense’s staff in developing both of these documents.”31 The Defense Staff focused on
writing a national defense strategy, the first time this was done as a separate unclassified document;
and the Joint Staff focused on writing the national military strategy. As such, one sees the military
strategy directly referencing the national defense strategy in many of its sections that reflects this close
collaboration to ensure synchronization and alignment. While the military strategy was completed
in 2004 and copies could be located on the internet, it was released officially at a March 18, 2005,
press conference when the Under Secretary Defense for Policy and Joint Staff Vice Director of Strategy,
Plans and Policy discussed the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy together.32 The
2004 National Military Strategy also has a classified annex that was later sent to Congress that analyzes
strategic and military risk in detail.33
Conclusion.
The National Military Strategy is the keystone document of an overarching strategic planning system
that enabled the Chairman as the nation’s senior military advisor to execute his formal leadership
responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Since 1990, each of the four strategies
examined identified the broad military ends, ways, and means to meet the nation’s security challenges
identified by the President in his National Security Strategy and integrated advice by the Secretary
of Defense from other documents. The unclassified nature of the strategy and its signature by the
Chairman to integrate this civilian advice was a leadership legacy started by Chairman Powell that
continues today. Most importantly, this strategy directly communicates to the American people the
need for a military, what that military will do, and how it will do it to provide for our nation’s security.
It essentially creates a compact between the military and the American people that is so important in
today’s volatile and complex security environment.
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CHAPTER 23
THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE MAKING
OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY1
Anthony R. Williams
The purpose of intelligence analysis is to elevate the quality of discussion in this town.
Sherman Kent

What is the appropriate role of intelligence in the making of national security policy? Most members
of the national security community bring to their roles a preconceived and mostly subconscious view on
this issue, which view seems so obvious to its holders, that they rarely see reason to raise the question.
Even within the U.S. Intelligence Community, where the subject is discussed more frequently, it is
usually approached as part of an academic discussion, and only rarely as part of the planning and
execution of normal support to the national security policy process.2 In effect, all the players in the
process hold opinions on this issue, but those opinions function in the background, much as the
operating software for a personal computer runs invisible to the user unless it malfunctions.
Generally speaking, members of the national security community will fall loosely into one of two
groups as regards to their attitude toward the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process.
These can best be described as the “unconstrained support to policy” view and the “policy neutral”
view. While few will hold either attitude without qualification, it is instructive to imagine these attitudes
as opposite poles on a spectrum, along which national security players will tend to coalesce. This
difference is more than of academic interest, because it dictates how the players use intelligence and the
intelligence apparatus in the development, communication, and execution of national security policy.
And that, in turn, has significant implications for the nature of American democracy.
The 1947 National Security Act can be cited in support of the “unconstrained view,” in that it
specifically charges the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (and by extension the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) as his executive agent) to act as the principle advisor to the President on intelligence
matters relating to the national security.3 And most would agree that the State of the Union Address
is very much a matter of national security. Furthermore, the 1947 Act also charges the DCI with the
responsibility “for providing national intelligence
• to the President;
• to the heads of the departments and agencies of the executive branch;
•

to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders;

•

and where appropriate, to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees
thereof.”4

But because the 1947 National Security Act leaves so many things undefined, it allows for the widest
interpretation and in that context can be cited to buttress any position on this spectrum of attitudes. For
example:
•

What form or forms exactly is the DCI’s advice and “national intelligence” to take? Does it
include only formal reports, either verbally or in writing? Or does it include the review of
Presidential and Secretarial speeches, statements, etc.? Does it include only passive review of
those instruments or active involvement in their creation?
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•

Who is to initiate advice? Is it at the initiative of the DCI, or only at the invitation of the President,
the National Security Advisor or other members of the NSC, executive departments, agencies,
and military commands?

• Is there a difference between advice given by the principle advisor and “national intelligence?”
How one answers these questions determines where one falls with regard to the appropriate role of
intelligence in the policy process.
Although most of these questions never have been formally answered through Executive Order,
legislation, or judicial interpretation, the government has managed to function more or less well over the
past 60 years as if it had answers to them in hand. These questions customarily are resolved on a dynamic
basis through a variety of procedures established and modified by each Presidential administration,
by each Congress, and through the political process. Generally speaking, as each administration
establishes its procedures for dealing with the overall issue of intelligence advice to the policymaking
process, the players accept those procedures without challenge. Even in cases where both sides hold
differing views as to the answer to one or more of the above questions, the players frequently will find
a way to “peacefully coexist” on a given issue.5 Where they do clash, they customarily do so through
the political process, which, regardless of specific outcome, always allows successors the opportunity
to challenge again with potentially different outcomes.
The recent furor surrounding the casus belli for the Iraqi War provides a case in point. Both the
President’s critics and supporters have addressed the veracity of the evidence presented by the President
and Cabinet Secretaries justifying the initiation of hostilities against Saddam’s government in Iraq, and
the appropriateness of the President’s reference in the State of the Union Address to the British report on
Iraqi efforts to obtain uranium from Africa.
In virtually every case, however, both supporters and critics have operated from a preconceived and
unstated view of the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process. For example, the Statement
by the DCI accepting responsibility for the questionable “intelligence” included in President Bush’s
2003 State of the Union speech, and a critical article by a former senior CIA officer titled “Intelligence
Shouldn’t Exist Just To Serve Policy,”6 present starkly contrasting views on the role of intelligence in
policymaking. Yet neither actually addresses that issue directly.
The DCI’s Statement makes clear that he believes the responsibility of the DCI (and the CIA) goes
beyond providing intelligence in a policy neutral format, and includes making sure to the extent
possible that the President does not make a mistake in developing or communicating policy, whether
the President is relying directly or indirectly on intelligence. It should be noted that the current DCI
also apparently accepts that “intelligence” plays an appropriate informational role in all aspects of
policymaking, both public and private.
The McGovern article, by its very title, makes the case that intelligence analysis should be policy
neutral. While the author does not make that statement explicitly and his polemical tone helps to
obscure the bottom line in the piece, the clear implications of the article are that intelligence analysis
should be neutral regarding policy. Note, for example, the parenthetical reference to the way the author
believes intelligence assessments were done in his day, “without fear or favor.”7 It also would appear
that the author shares with DCI Tenet the view that “intelligence” should play an informational role in
policymaking without regard to the public or private nature of that policymaking.
By the terms of the “unconstrained” view, because the CIA and much of the Intelligence Community
had serious reservations regarding the substance of the British reports on Iraq’s nuclear program,
the DCI had a responsibility to make certain that the President was advised by the CIA to remove
the reference to those British reports from the State of the Union Address. And from the nature of the
response to the DCI’s Statement, it is obvious that a wide range of policymakers, legislators, academics,
and journalists agree that the DCI has this responsibility.8
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By extension, the holders of this position also generally hold a wider definition of what constitutes
the national security policy process than is commonly appreciated. Note, for example, that the “policy”
document under discussion was a speech by the President, albeit a very important speech. And in
October 2002, the DCI intervened in another Presidential speech of much less moment than the State of
the Union Address, for which intervention he has been praised, but not criticized, by those policymakers
who have chosen to address this issue in public.9 Apparently those who share DCI Tenet’s view of his
responsibility clearly see any Presidential statement (and by extension that of his closest advisors and
cabinet members) as part of the policy process that the Intelligence Community is obligated to support.
This view at its broadest holds that it is incumbent on the DCI to take strenuous measures to assure the
veracity of all policy statements, both public and private, as they may deal with matters on which the
Intelligence Community has some information.
One can conclude from the DCI’s Statement, and the statements from the White House noting that
the CIA reviewed the President’s address, that the current administration accepts the “unconstrained”
view of intelligence support to policy. Furthermore, based on statements by National Security Advisor
Condoleeza Rice and efforts by members of the NSC and White House staffs to coordinate various
parts of the President’s State of the Union Address, it is clear that this administration views the DCI’s
intelligence advisory role to include active involvement in both the development and communication
of national security policy. Rice stated on July 11, 2003, that the wording used in President Bush’s
speech had been reviewed and changed by the CIA, and that some “specifics about amount and place”
had been changed, and that after the changes, “the CIA cleared the speech in its entirety.” According to
press reporting, detailed discussions were held between a nuclear proliferation expert at the NSC and
a proliferation expert at the CIA over the content of the speech relating to the putative Iraqi nuclear
program.10
If we conclude that the DCI and “intelligence” are to play an active role in developing and
communicating national security policy, at whose initiative are they to play this role? To wit, on July
11, Rice said that “if the CIA, the director of central intelligence (sic), had said, ‘Take this out of the
speech,’ it would have been gone, without question.” And Senator Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence stated “it was incumbent on the director of intelligence to correct the
record and bring it to the immediate attention of the president.” And an unnamed Democratic member
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) was quoted by the Washington Post as saying
that DCI Tenet was asked repeatedly in closed hearings on July 16 why the CIA had “permitted” the
unfounded Iraqi uranium allegation in the address.11 Clearly, there would seem to be wide agreement
that the initiative lies, at least in part, with the DCI, and is not solely dependent on the initiative of the
President or his cabinet members and advisors.
As noted above, the countervailing view of the role of intelligence in the policy process, holds
that to the extent possible, the DCI should ensure that the Intelligence Community strives to provide
intelligence advice to the President and his advisors in a policy neutral format. While very few would
argue that this goal can be attained 100 percent of the time, many see it as a necessary constraining
force. The primary argument for this is that anything less undermines the credibility of the Intelligence
Community, and particularly the Office of the DCI and the CIA. In general, there appears to be an
acceptance of the fact that departmental intelligence agencies12 are intended to support policymakers
within their respective departments or military services, and thus their product, in many cases, will
be “policy supportive.” There is, however, a strong expectation on the part of many in the national
security community that the national agencies should avoid even the appearance of policy bias in their
products.
A good example of a policy neutral approach to intelligence can be found in the famous “missile
gap” case in the run-up to the 1960 Presidential Election. Despite the fact that the Kennedy Campaign
had used much of the material provided to the press by the Gaither Committee to substantiate its
charge that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) held a commanding lead over the United
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States in the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, President Dwight Eisenhower refused to
allow CIA intelligence on the subject to be released. It has been argued that this decision was a factor in
the loss of the election by Richard Nixon, since the available national intelligence made clear that there
was no missile gap, and there was not likely to be one for the foreseeable future. In this case, President
Eisenhower chose not to allow intelligence to become embroiled publicly in the political process. One
can argue the merits of Eisenhower’s decision, but it is taken by many analysts in CIA and the other
national agencies as the proper way to handle national intelligence.
This view has a long tradition within the CIA, and it often has been criticized by members of
the national security community as a bar to effective CIA intelligence support to policymakers. For
example, as part of the continuing educational effort for analysts at CIA, the Sherman Kent School for
Intelligence Analysis at the CIA University has published a series of occasional papers addressing,
among other subjects, the proper relationship between the analyst and the policymaker. The author of
these papers is at some pains to assure analysts that lowering the wall between intelligence analysis
and the policymaking process will not damage intelligence credibility (if proper tradecraft is used) and
will make intelligence more relevant to the policymaker.13
Criticisms of the “policy neutral” view have a long tradition among policymakers. Current Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was selected as a member of the so-called Team B, “which
challenged the expertise, methods, and judgments of Intelligence Community analysts working on
Soviet strategic military objectives (specifically, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) (11-3-8 for
1977). The underlying issue in this case was the perceived failure of the NIE to address directly the
implications for Soviet intentions of the USSR’s ongoing strategic buildup. While serving as the Dean
of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Ambassador Wolfowitz was appointed
to the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Throughout
this period, he continued to argue for a more “policy actionable” approach to national intelligence.
According to press reports, Ambassador Wolfowitz, as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the current
administration, has been associated with a large group of policymakers who have argued strenuously
that the Intelligence Community, and specifically the CIA, has not produced intelligence on current
policy issues that has been helpful in the development, articulation, and execution of policy.14
From the policy neutral perspective, the primary concern, as noted above, is that the close involvement
of intelligence in the making, communication, and execution of specific national security policies will
undermine the credibility of the intelligence itself and the intelligence organizations involved. Often
critics attack the intelligence organization, such as the CIA, as “shilling” for a policymaker if the
intelligence product is seen as too supportive, or is used openly in the political process. In this case, the
intelligence agency itself, or the DCI, becomes sucked up in the maelstrom of political conflict over the
policy under debate. The net effect of this, to quote Senator John Kerry, D-MA, does “. . . nothing to
make this country safer and will simply further erode the confidence of the American public and our
allies around the world.”15
The caution to the intelligence provider, and to the policymaker who uses that intelligence, may well
be Aristotle’s axiom, “moderation in all things.” If the intelligence player or product is too supportive
of policy, or appears to be too supportive, then both will be subject to criticism and a loss of credibility.
If, on the other hand, intelligence is too “neutral” and too high a wall is kept between intelligence
and policy, then the intelligence will be subject to criticism and a loss of relevance. Complicating this
picture for the intelligence player is that critics also will often make the case that they want “objective”
analysis, that can be used by all the participants in the policy debate.16 When that is translated into
reality, however, it most often means that the critic’s side in the debate is not faring as well as the critic
believes it should because the intelligence input favors the other side. Finally, as noted above, even
the legislation creating the current intelligence structure does more to complicate than to answer the
question as to the appropriate role of intelligence in the policy process.
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CHAPTER 24
COGNITIVE FACTORS IN NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING
George E. Teague
Generally, national security professionals probably would agree that decisions concerning our
national security are so important that they ought to be above personal and organizational self-interests
and reflect an objective, unbiased approach to selecting actions that are truly in the best interest of the
nation. However, for a variety of reasons, this often is not the case. A number of decisionmaking models
have been developed and examined to gain insight into the national security decisionmaking process
and to identify those factors that often keep this process from being as objective and unbiased as it
perhaps should be. In their book, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison
and Philip Zelikow provide three such models for examining the U.S. national security decisionmaking
process.1 The first of these, the rational actor model, is essentially the ideal decisionmaking process—an
unbiased, comprehensive examination of the relevant facts and all potential courses of action leading
to an optimal choice designed to maximize value in terms of national interests. Two other models,
organizational behavior and governmental politics, address some of the forces at work within our
national security system—organizational self-interests, bureaucratic resistance, personal agendas of
influential individuals, etc.—that often influence the decisionmaking process and lead to outcomes
that would not have been predicted by the rational actor model. Even these models, however, do
not account fully for why decisionmakers, at times, pursue courses of action that seem to disregard
international and domestic political influences, appear inconsistent with national interests, or otherwise
seem to deviate from the rational approach. Nor do they account for how decisionmakers sometimes
make “good” decisions in the absence of sufficient time or information to adequately develop a rational
approach to the issue.
In order to fully understand national security decisionmaking fully, then, a fourth model is
required—one that takes into account factors that affect individual decisionmaking. Since decisions
ultimately are made in the minds of individual decisionmakers, even when working as members of a
group charged with making a group decision or recommendation (i.e., a jury or committee), it almost
is inevitable that those decisions will be influenced to some extent by such things as personal beliefs,
biases, values, desires, experiences, and memories. Further, anything that might affect an individual’s
ability to function mentally, such as strong emotions, stress, fatigue, and illness, also will likely affect
the decisions he or she makes. Finally, since many (most?) significant national security decisions are
made under conditions of great uncertainty, how individuals compensate cognitively for the absence
of important information will impact necessarily on the information they consider and the decisions
they ultimately reach. It is therefore important that national security professionals understand how
individuals make decisions and appreciate the influence of cognitive factors on the decisionmaking
process.
This chapter will provide only a brief overview of some of the cognitive factors at work in the
national security decisionmaking process. Readers who wish to pursue this topic in greater detail will
find a wealth of available material.
COGNITION AND DECISIONMAKING
As indicated above, many factors may affect the extremely individual and internal process of making
a decision. Some of these represent cognitive processes and tendencies common to most humans, while
others are more idiosyncratic. At times, these factors can enhance the decisionmaking process, but
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often they pose significant pitfalls. Failure to recognize these potential problems can lead to ineffective
or flawed decisions.
Cognition.
The human mind generally prefers and seeks simplicity, consistency, and stability. The mind
dislikes uncertainty and mental discomfort and routinely will attempt to eliminate these aspects from
decisionmaking. These tendencies usually enable humans to sort, process, and make sense of the vast
amount of sensory input efficiently that is received on a daily basis. However, when confronted with the
complexities inherent in most decisionmaking situations, these same tendencies may lead one to ignore
some information, “fill in the blanks” with other information from memory, and rely on unconscious
mental shortcuts or routines known as heuristics (“rules of thumb”).2 For example, although most
people wish to believe that they mentally examine every alternative before choosing the “best” one,
this normally is not so. The human mind tends to “satisfice,” that is, to seize upon the first solution
that appears to solve the problem without looking past that solution to see if a better one can be found.
Decisionmakers consciously must force themselves to identify and evaluate all possible solutions if
the optimal solution, versus one that is only “good enough,” is desired. This is easier said than done,
particularly when the stakes are high and the decision must be made under conditions of limited
time and/or limited availability of relevant information. Such conditions increase the likelihood that
decisionmakers will rely on assumptions and heuristics.
Although heuristics generally serve to facilitate mental functioning, researchers have identified
a number of flaws in the way minds work when making decisions.3 Several of these are addressed
below.
• Anchoring. During decisionmaking, the mind tends to give disproportionate weight to the first
information it receives. This information, such as first impressions or initial estimates, “anchors”
subsequent thoughts and judgements. Since anchors can set the terms on which a decision is
made, negotiators often try to exploit this tendency by submitting initial proposals that anchor
negotiations in their favor (e.g., high-end offers).
• Status Quo. Decisionmakers display a strong bias toward solutions that maintain or perpetuate
the status quo. Breaking from the status quo requires taking increased action and responsibility
and opens the possibility of criticism and regret. For example, the United Nations (UN) continued
to impose economic sanctions against Iraq for years, despite evidence that the sanctions were
being violated and having little effect on Hussein’s regime. The other options, lifting the sanctions
altogether or using force to enforce them, were viewed as too risky for many members of the
Security Council. Despite considerable criticism, President George Bush broke from the status
quo, and it remains to be seen whether or not he or his allies experience serious regret.
• Sunk Cost. Decisionmakers tend to make choices that justify past choices, even when they no
longer seem valid. People generally are unwilling to admit to mistakes, especially when the
cost for doing so is high. Some might argue that President Lyndon Johnson’s unwillingness to
withdraw from, or change his method of prosecuting the Vietnam War was due in large part
to sunk cost—his political commitment and the potential cost for admitting that he was wrong
were too high.
• Confirming Evidence. Decisionmakers seek out information that supports their existing point
of view, while ignoring or dismissing contradictory information. This is compounded by two
other tendencies: to decide subconsciously what we want to do before we figure out why we
want to do it; and, to be more engaged by things we like than by things we dislike. Current
debates over the accuracy and use of various intelligence reports on Iraqi weapons of mass
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destruction (WMD) programs suggest that members of the Bush administration may have been
affected by this bias towards confirming evidence to support a course of action they already had
decided upon. At a more personal level, people often decide that they want a particular type of
car, then seek information that supports their choice, while ignoring or dismissing information
that points out reasons not to buy the car (poor safety record, high insurance costs) or to buy a
different model (higher fuel efficiency, lower cost).
• Framing. The way a problem is framed can influence strongly the decision that is made. Framing
can establish the status quo, introduce an anchor, highlight sunk costs, or lead one towards
confirming evidence. Further, people tend to accept the frame as it is presented to them rather
than restating the problem in their own terms. When framed in terms of potential gains, a
given option is more likely to be chosen than when framed in terms of potential costs or losses.
For example, surveys of public opinion concerning development of a missile defense system
indicate that, when asked if having such a system to protect against missile attacks from rogue
states is a good idea, most people respond favorably. However, when asked a similar question
that highlights the cost in billions of dollars, the response is far less favorable. When debating
whether to spend this much money on research and development of the system, opponents
generally frame the problem in terms of the low likelihood of attack and of other programs
where the money could be better spent, whereas proponents of the system highlight the costs
associated with failure to prevent an attack (how much is your hometown worth?).
• Overconfidence. Although most people are not very good at making estimates or forecasts, we
tend to be overconfident about our accuracy when doing so, which can lead to poor judgement
and bad decisions. This overconfidence can lead decisionmakers to limit the range of possibilities
and miss opportunities or expose themselves or others to too much risk. Many critics of the
postwar operations in Iraq accuse members of the Bush administration of being overconfident
in their estimates of how many troops would be needed and how quickly they would be able to
withdraw.
• Overcautiousness (Prudence). When the stakes are high, we tend to adjust our estimates “just
to be on the safe side.” This tendency sometimes leads to “worst-case analysis,” when efforts
to cover every possible circumstance can add huge costs in terms of time and resources with
minimal, if any, practical benefit. This is particularly evident in the development of weapon
systems; engineers routinely are required to design weapons to operate under the worst possible
circumstances, leading to huge costs increases despite the low likelihood of ever facing those
circumstances.
• Availability. Anything that distorts the ability to recall events in a balanced way will distort
probability assessments. People tend to be overly influenced by dramatic events that leave strong
impressions on their memories. As a result, we tend to exaggerate the probability of events that
get disproportionate media attention or that we personally experience, such as plane crashes or
the loss of a loved one to a particular disease. For example, if asked to estimate the percentage of
sexual assault charges against U.S. servicemen in Okinawa relative to charges against Japanese
men, it is likely that more people would assign a higher probability to U.S. servicemen because
of attention given to recent high-profile incidents.
Memory.
People acquire data through one or more of the five human senses, and the mind must interpret,
evaluate, sort, and store this data, as well as determine what is useful and what is not. Generally
speaking, the mind sorts data into broad categories (schemas) and encodes it for recall.4 Entire sets of
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data then may be retrieved when only limited bits of information are received. For example, if a person
hears a growl coming from behind a fence, that piece of information could lead to the identification of
the source of the growl as a dog. The mental picture associated with “dog” may be a generic one, or, if
the growl is similar to one experienced in the person’s past, the mental picture may be of a specific type
of dog. As more information becomes available, the mental picture becomes more complete. If, a few
seconds after hearing the growl, the observer noted an open gate, heard the sound of a chain breaking,
and the growl were replaced by a fast-approaching, angry barking dog, a very complete mental picture
could be obtained—and several possible courses of action suggested.
This ability to retrieve large amounts of information in response to selected information cues rests in
large part on the use of stereotypes. There has been extensive research on this facet of human thought,
leading to the general conclusions that stereotyping is “widely practiced as a means of simplifying
the world and making perceptual and cognitive processes more efficient” and is “a pervasive human
tendency.” Simply stated, stereotypes are used in most aspects of human thought because they offer an
easy way of organizing, storing, and recalling data. They serve as a tool for simplifying environmental
stimuli.5 Unfortunately, stereotypes often are developed with inaccurate information and/or applied
inappropriately due to insufficient information. Such stereotyping often is the basis of discrimination
and faulty decisionmaking due to misinterpreting or underestimating the intentions and capabilities of
others. Many would argue, for example, that the United States grossly underestimated both the North
Koreans and the North Vietnamese, in part because of a widely-held stereotype of Asians as inferior to
Westerners. Further, the use of some stereotypic identifiers, such as “terrorist,” “fanatic,” “racist,” or
“hero,” often may trigger strong emotional reactions from both the labeled individuals and those who
interact with them.
Perceptions.
Perceptions (how individuals interpret and understand data presented to them) are among the most
important influences in decisionmaking. The decisionmaker’s perceptions of other actors involved in
the decision, the perceived consequences of the decision, and the apparent utility of historical parallels,
can come to dominate the decisionmaking process. In extreme cases, perceptions can be so strong that
the decisionmaker will ignore some facts, twist others, and interpret data as pointing to the presence of
trends that do not exist in reality.6
Once formed, perceptions are difficult to discard.7 A famous example involves an experiment in
which two different groups were shown an identical tape of a college lecture. The first group was told
that the lecturer was warm, humorous, and highly respected. The lecturer was described to the second
group as harsh, cold, and reserved. After watching the identical lecture, the groups were asked for their
impressions. The first group gave the lecturer a very positive endorsement, while the second group
was extremely negative in its response.
Analogies and perceptions are linked closely. As noted behavioral political scientist Robert Jervis
states: “Previous international events present the statesman with a range of imaginable situations and
allow him to detect patterns and causal links that help him understand his world.” It is human nature
to look for patterns in an event, to seek similarities between what is happening now and what has
happened before. Once apparent similarities are discovered, an analogy inevitably will be invoked.
Examples of such analogies include, “Saddam Hussein is just like Hitler,” or “Haiti is another Somalia
waiting to happen.” The analogy may then suggest a course of action, e.g., “Appeasement is out, it
leads to greater conflict,” or “The United States can never allow the United Nations to take operational
command of U.S. forces.” This mental technique can be extremely useful if the analogy is accurate and
its use leads to the quick adoption of a successful course of action. Unfortunately, analogies—especially
those that are invoked with little or no thought—rarely are accurate, and solutions based on false
analogies can be devastating.8
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Values and Beliefs.
Personal values and beliefs tend to be forged over time and may reflect the cumulative values and
beliefs of one’s parents, teachers, community, etc. They are powerful influences on decisionmaking
and are tied directly to how individuals perceive situations, other people, and actions. People will
tend to reject and distrust data or solutions that seem in conflict with their belief and value systems,
while embracing those that do.9 Of course, the danger is that simply because information runs contrary
to a belief, this does not make the information invalid, and vice-versa. For example, in 1941 many
senior leaders in the United States believed the Japanese could not mount a surprise attack upon the
Hawaiian Islands. These leaders knew the Japanese possessed modern aircraft carriers and planes, and
a Pearl Harbor scenario had been wargamed. However, these leaders believed that no one could sail
a fleet in secrecy across the Pacific Ocean. They also believed that when the Japanese did start a war,
they would limit their attacks to the Philippines, Guam, and other targets closer to Japan. These beliefs,
although sincere, did not prevent the air raid on December 7, 1941. The leaders’ beliefs caused them to
discard, ignore, or dismiss multiple indications that the Japanese were quite capable of mounting such
an attack.
A decisionmaker also may tend to believe that his or her personal value and belief systems are
universal when they may not be. This can lead to “mirror imaging,” i.e., a decisionmaker expecting
the “opponent” to react exactly as he/she would, or attributing motives to an opponent’s action
based on why he/she may have done the same thing. Similar to the pitfalls of stereotyping, when
a decisionmaker substitutes his or her own beliefs or values to compensate for a lack or information
about—or understanding of—others involved in a national security issue, the likely result will be a
poor decision.
Finally, decisionmakers may feel compelled to select a particular course of action based upon their
personal beliefs and values regardless of international or domestic political pressures. Sometimes our
leaders simply believe that a particular action is the right or wrong thing to do and they act accordingly.
President Bush, for example, appears to be firmly committed to development of a missile defense
despite widespread international and domestic opposition and doubts about its efficacy.
Emotions, Fatigue, and Stress.
The tendency of the mind to simplify and satisfice tends to be exaggerated when accompanied by
strong emotions, fatigue, or stress. Emotions trigger chemical changes in the body that are generated
in the same areas of the brain that handle reasoning and decisionmaking.10 As a result, strong emotions
may physically interfere with normal cognitive processing of information during the decisionmaking
process, despite one’s attempts to ignore or control them. In addition, emotions such as anger,
embarrassment, and sadness may cause the decisionmaker to ignore the advice of others deliberately
and make decisions for personal reasons rather than out of concern for national interests. However, not
all emotions are bad—for example, the presence of fear may cause the decisionmaker to consider more
carefully the potential consequences of high-risk courses of action in situations where the stakes are
high. The challenge facing a decisionmaker is to recognize emotional influences without being ruled by
them.
The importance of proper physical condition in regards to decisionmaking should be readily
apparent to anyone who has attempted some complex task after a long and tiring day. Fatigue decreases
sensory awareness, limiting the ability to receive sensory data; and it inhibits cortical activity in the
brain, limiting the ability to accurately interpret and then process the information. In other words,
the senses do not collect information as well, and the mind is prone to misperception and inefficient
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processing of the information. People become more likely to misunderstand what they see or hear,
to overlook or ignore important information, and to make faulty decisions as a result. Under these
conditions, even something as simple as filling out a crossword puzzle may prove impossible. However,
given a few hours rest, the same puzzle may be solved in minutes. Sleep deprivation induces extreme
fatigue and exacerbates the cognitive limitations described above. Military leaders routinely deny
themselves adequate rest during high-stress training and combat operations, often leading to impaired
decisionmaking that results in catastrophic operational failure, fratricide and accidental deaths, blind
obedience to irrational or illegal orders, and otherwise preventable noncombatant casualties.11
Stress also is encountered frequently during the decisionmaking process and deserves special
mention. Stress can lead to an increase of satisficing decisions and may strengthen the tendency to
unquestioningly accept as accurate pre‑existing perceptions, values, and beliefs. Stress also can lead to
irritability, anger, and an unwillingness to listen to others. If a team, such as a committee of advisors,
is involved with the decision, a high level of stress rapidly can cause dysfunctional and ineffective
behavior, such as bickering and emotional outbursts. This is especially true if the team is inexperienced
in dealing with stressful situations and becomes even worse if the members of the team are not used to
working with each other.12
Personality and Motivation.
An individual’s personality and personal motivation also will play a role in the decisionmaking
process. Imagine the effect a cynical, autocratic, and arrogant decisionmaker would exert on the
decisionmaking process, compared to that exerted by an outgoing, affable, and optimistic decisionmaker.
The former could stifle opinion easily, instill fear and dislike, and perhaps convince others that
the situation was hopeless. The latter’s personality very likely would encourage subordinates to
offer suggestions, feel comfortable in providing information, and keep belief in success alive. Some
decisionmakers are brusque, while others are personable. No specific personality type is “wrong,” but
each affects decisions. Prudent decisionmakers will understand not only their own personalities, but
also those of their closest advisors.
Motivation is also a factor in decisionmaking. A leader who wants a particular decision outcome will
be less likely to turn over the process to subordinates. There will be less chance of stalling or delaying
tactics. Conversely, a low level of motivation may mean that subordinates obtain an even greater
degree of control over the decision or that the decision is continually put off—sometimes, as in Haiti,
until it becomes a crisis. The perceived consequences of a decision may affect the decisionmaker’s level
of motivation directly and the extent to which he or she works for a particular decision. Concerns over
such issues as popularity polls, reelection, impeachment, or one’s legacy may cause decisionmakers to
take actions that they otherwise might not have or that would not have been predicted by the rational
actor model. Some might argue, for example, that concerns over possible impeachment compelled
former President John Kennedy to take aggressive action in the Cuban missile crisis.
Groupthink.
Groups of people sometimes appear to take on particular identities that arise through the
complicity of the group’s members and then behave in ways that can have a profound impact on
decisionmaking. Behavioral expert Irving L. Janis developed a theory regarding this behavior and
labeled it “Groupthink.” Typically, as the group identity emerges, members begin to modify their own
behaviors in order to conform. Eventually, members may become reluctant to offer any opinions that
may be seen as “anti‑group.” Those that do may find themselves being pressured to return to group
norms and ostracized if they fail to do so.13 When this occurs, recommendations from the group may
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be based more on maintaining group harmony than in truly addressing the problem. Many believe that
President Kennedy’s advisors exhibited signs of groupthink in developing their recommendations that
led to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.
REMOVING BARRIERS TO CLEAR THINKING
Having identified potential problems with cognition and decisionmaking, it is appropriate to
examine potential methods to reduce or eliminate those problems. These methods include:
• Seek Out Contradictory Views. Decisionmakers must guard against hearing only one point
of view. When this occurs, unseen biases can intrude into the decisionmaking process. If one
organization or individual assumes a disproportionate role in advising the decisionmaker,
opposing views might not be heard or considered. Expanding the diversity of views makes the
potential influence of biases less likely.14 The more varied the backgrounds and perspectives of
those offering the leader advice, the less likely an important factor will go unnoticed.
• Use Multiple Advisory Groups. Although assigning two groups to work separately on the same
issue is redundant, this method may ensure that a wider spectrum of alternatives is examined
prior to reaching a decision.15 During the Cold War, the U.S. military carried this process
further than most other organizations. Not only were multiple independent groups assigned to
large problems, but elite groups of specialists also were trained to look at issues from a Soviet
perspective. This technique had the added benefit of reducing the danger of “mirror imaging,”
as long as the “red” players did not actually “think blue.”
• Assign a Devil’s Advocate. This can be a highly effective technique, as was demonstrated during
the Cuban Missile crisis when Bobby Kennedy filled the (unofficial) role of Devil’s Advocate.
Briefly stated, the role of the devil’s advocate is to examine critically other proposals being put
forward. This acts as a hedge against biases and groupthink. However, care must be taken in
selecting the person to fill this role. This individual must be strong enough to take the mental
stress of always being in the opposition and be respected enough by the leader to ensure that
the advocate’s opinion is not simply ignored. The latter happened during the administration of
President Lyndon Johnson. Presidential advisor George Ball filled the devil’s advocate role in
discussions about Vietnam policy, but his opposing positions grew irritating to the President.
Over time the other presidential advisors began to ignore Ball. This was doubly unfortunate
because the group continued to believe that the devil’s advocate was keeping them safe from
groupthink biases.16
• Identify Known/Unclear/Presumed. In their book, Thinking in Time, political science experts
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May offer several methods to avoid the traps inherent in using
history as a tool in decisionmaking. One of these methods consists of formally writing down
what is actually known, unknown, and presumed about the situation and the actors involved in
it. This relatively simple exercise may point out potentially dangerous assumptions and blind
spots. It also can be used to channel intelligence efforts and resources into activities with the
largest potential payoffs.17
• Identify Similarities/Differences. Neustadt and Also may suggest treating analogies with great
care. Recognizing the tremendous allure of an analogy (providing a blueprint for a solution), they
strongly recommend that a list identifying the similarities and differences between the current
and past situation be compiled. When this is done, it is not uncommon to find the similarities
were only superficial or did not even exist at all.18
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• Conduct Placement. Neustadt and May offer a third safeguard known as “placement.”
Placement is a method by which the stereotypical view of an opponent becomes more factual
and sophisticated as important elements of personality and individual history are identified
and placed in historical context. Although not in any way presented as a crystal ball or as a
key to predicting exact behavior, placement does seem to offer a better chance of predicting an
adversary’s moves and understanding how an opponent thinks.
• Avoid Stress and Fatigue. The old folk remedy of sufficient rest being a cure for ailments still
applies. Leaders must watch their staffs for signs of excessive fatigue and should schedule and
manage meetings and work sessions to ensure that each member of the team can contribute
at his/her maximum potential. At the same time, someone must watch the leader. Practicing
decisionmaking, preferably under simulated crisis conditions, is a fairly effective method to
prepare for, and minimize, the potential effects of stress in an actual crisis.19
• Delay the Decision. Although not always possible, there may be real merit in postponing the
execution of a decision until enough time has passed to allow reassessment. This technique
reduces the chance that emotion might play too large a role in the decision.
• Safeguard Against Groupthink. Janis discusses several safeguards in detail in his book,
Groupthink. These include encouraging the discussion of diverse opinions, accepting criticisms
and attempting to shed organizational biases. Janis points to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
creation of the Marshall Plan as two instances where these techniques were extremely successful.
A strong devil’s advocate was involved in decisionmaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and
the authors of the Marshall Plan solicited advice and input from an incredibly diverse group
of experts. Janis also notes that, although the techniques sound easy, they may not be easy to
implement. Senior leaders often are unprepared to hear their own judgments criticized, and
many have difficulty remaining objective and impartial in this process. They generally are used
to being right, they often have more experience than anyone around them, and they may perceive
criticism as a personal attack.
• Establish Reexamination Criteria. Despite the most conscientious intentions to remain
“rational,” perceptions may gain control of the decisionmaker and his/her key advisors. It is
therefore useful, at an early stage of the decisionmaking process, to identify specific criteria that
will trigger a reexamination of some or all presumptions.20 Examples could include the spotting
of a new behavior or technology on the part of the opponent, or the lack of an expected reaction
to certain actions. For example, the Egyptian acquisition of improved air defense systems and
long-range missiles from the Soviet Union should have triggered a reexamination of the Israeli
assumption that the Arab nations would not attack until the Egyptians had rebuilt their air force
to address their air superiority deficiency. Had such criteria been adopted, the 1973 Arab‑Israeli
conflict might have run a very different course.
CONCLUSION
The human dimension in decisionmaking is inescapable. It applies to all decisionmakers, irrespective
of culture, education, or background. Everyone uses stereotypes to aid in memory retrieval, selects
analogies to help in decisionmaking, and is affected, sometimes deeply, by personal beliefs, values, and
emotions. In order to achieve a more complete understanding of the national security decisionmaking
process, it is therefore important to consider the wide range of cognitive factors that may affect the
individual decisionmaker. It is equally important to take steps to safeguard against the potentially
detrimental effects of these cognitive factors when national security decisions are being made. In a
general way, this reading has sought to indicate how this might be accomplished.
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PART V
STRATEGIC ISSUES

CHAPTER 25
AIR POWER THEORY: AN ANALYTICAL NARRATIVE
FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR TO THE PRESENT
Tami Davis Biddle
The role that airplanes should play in war has been, arguably, the most consistently controversial
of all the issues pertaining to modern warfare over the last century.1 This chapter will explore the ideas
and the theories that have served as the foundation for the use of aircraft in war. What was expected
of the airplane as an element of the military instrument of power, and what has it brought to the
conduct of warfare? How do we assess its record over the last 100 years? While my remarks apply in
a general way to most of the industrialized nations that have built air forces, I shall focus principally
on the United States and Britain through the end of World War II, and the United States after World
War II. And while I shall address tactical aviation in a general way, I shall devote most of my attention
to independent air power and the question at the heart of its theory: Is air power an effective coercive
tool, and under what conditions can it be used to extract concessions from an enemy and force him to
comply with the political terms being sought by the use of force?
Air power can be used in support roles for ground and sea warfare, and, indeed, it has proven itself
extremely effective—and essential—in these applications. In addition, it can be used as the primary
arm in warfare, with the other services providing support and follow-on capabilities and resources.
Most of the major theorists of air warfare have been proponents of the latter role for aircraft, advocating
a primary emphasis on aerial bombing as a means of directly influencing an enemy’s ability and will to
fight a war. But if one believes that bombing can bring an enemy to terms, what assumptions does one
make, implicitly, about the enemy? And what assumptions does one make about the ability of aerial
bombing to so disrupt and disorient the enemy’s economy and society that its warmaking capacity (and
will to war) must cease? The century-long experience of air warfare has shown, above all, that one must
know a great deal about an enemy (in terms of politics, economics, culture, and social organization) to
understand where its weak points are and how they may be exploited by bombing. It has revealed, too,
that effective aerial bombing is a difficult, demanding, and technology-dependent enterprise.
A Long History of Speculation.
The dawn of the 20th century was accompanied by great speculation about the prospects for heavierthan-air flight. Such speculation had captured the human imagination for a long time, and late 19th
century advances in science, technology, and engineering had created an environment pregnant with
expectation and anticipation. Those who pondered human flight imagined it in a wide array of roles,
including transportation, travel, and warfighting.
As scientific progress continued, notions of air war were modernized and infused with the hopes,
concerns, and fears of the day. In the Victorian era, a common and recurring theme was that air warfare
would be terrible, thus prompting enemies to mitigate their behavior, or even abolish war altogether—
fostering a better, more peaceful world. In 1862 Victor Hugo speculated that aircraft would bring
about the universal abolition of borders, leading to the end of wars and a great “peaceful revolution.”2
Jules Verne’s widely‑read novel, Clipper of the Clouds (1886), asserted that the future belonged to aerial
warfare machines.3 In 1893 Major J. D. Fullerton of the British Royal Engineers theorized about an aerial
“revolution in the art of war.” A year later inventor Octave Chanute argued that, because no territory
would be immune from the horrors of air war, “the ultimate effect will be to diminish greatly the
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frequency of wars and to substitute more rational methods of settling international misunderstandings.”4
In a 1911 essay for Collier’s magazine, noted military inventor Sir Hiram Maxim argued that there
would be no defense against the airplane, the most potent machine of destruction ever invented.5
This kind of speculation should not, perhaps, be surprising. After all, human flight opened up the
prospect of warfare raining down from the skies, making all those below vulnerable in ways they had
never been before. No longer would armies and navies act as the shield for polities, defending the
weaker citizens behind the frontlines of battle. And this prospect surely was unsettling to political
leaders, policymakers, and military planners alike. Political elites worried that those on the homefront
were alienated already, due to the crowded conditions, long work hours, and heavy stresses of the
industrialized, urbanized environment that increasingly defined life in the western world. How would
these citizens hold up to the increased stresses of aerial bombardment?
On the Eve of World War I.
In 1905 the British War Office’s Manual of Military Ballooning argued that the balloons dropping
gun cotton charges might have a “moral effect” on the enemy that “should not be lost sight of” in
estimating their combat value. The “moral effect” (pronounced “morale” but spelled without the “e,”
as in the French) reflected a particularly potent and widespread fixation in the European military of
the day. It revealed in part the influence of the Prussian, Carl von Clausewitz, whose writings had
become particularly popular after the Franco-Prussian war when Field Marshal von Moltke claimed
they had influenced him. Clausewitz’s On War (1832) had been translated into English by the end of the
century, and was studied at the Army Staff College in Britain.6 The work of French military theorists
du Picq, Foch, Langlois, and de Grandmaison added to a trend emphasizing the role of “will” and
moral factors in warfare.7 The emphasis on “moral effects” in warfare highlighted the qualities valued
by upper middle class Victorian and Edwardian era societies—courage, initiative, resourcefulness,
tenacity, and willpower—but it also resonated with prejudices and darker trends therein, including
Social Darwinism, anti-intellectualism, a strong emphasis on virility and aggressiveness, and a strict
class system.8
Speculation was widespread not only about how competing states would stack up against one
another, but also about how different races and classes within a state might affect its overall strength,
virility, cohesion, and steadfastness under stress. How would the urban working classes hold up under
the stresses of modern, industrialized war? Would they be steadfast or brittle? In 1908 the flight tests of
Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin’s airships were watched closely and anxiously by the British. Lieutenant
General Baden-Powell (noted for fostering the Boy Scout movement) made a vigorous call to arms in
the Daily Mail on July 13.9 Concern over England’s perceived inability to defend itself was at the center
of a flurry of invasion literature, peaking between 1906 and 1909.
In both the United States and Britain, civil strife and industrial crises became endemic as laborers
struggled for more humane working conditions; the problem was particularly acute on the eve of
World War I. In Britain, frequent bitter strikes—especially by miners and railwaymen—were marked
by unusual assertiveness.10 Naturally, this atmosphere fueled speculation about how workers would
behave in wartime. Commentators and observers worried that the subhuman conditions present in
the nation’s congested industrial cities created weaknesses in the national population that might cause
fatal vulnerabilities in wartime. In two lectures to the Royal United Services Institution in 1909, T.
Miller Maguire associated what he called “the flotsam and jetsam of decaying British humanity” with
the perversions of the “factory system.”11
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World War I.
These concerns over public robustness formed the context and backdrop for military debate and
planning over the role of aircraft in war. But there was no overarching consensus on what aircraft
might accomplish in the near term, or how they ought to be assessed against other military resources.
Enthusiasts clashed with traditionalists who doubted that a new machine—and a highly unreliable one
at that—would change the entire nature of warfare. The only genuine point of agreement concerned
reconnaissance: even the most conservative military thinkers were willing to concede that a mobile
aerial perspective would change the nature of warfighting to some degree. When war came in 1914,
most of the combatant states were still in the throes of working out how to integrate aerial weapons
into their force structures. Interservice conflicts and rivalries slowed progress in most states, including
Britain, where aerial resources initially were divided between the Royal Naval Air Service and the
Army’s Royal Flying Corps. The role of aerial defense remained a red-headed stepchild in Britain,
unwanted by either service.
The value of aerial reconnaissance, and thus the value of air space—both the enemy’s and one’s
own—became immediately apparent; indeed, this reality was made obvious right away at the battles
of Tannenberg and the Marne in 1914. Recognition of the value of an aerial perspective set in train the
development and rapid evolution of purpose-built “fighter” aircraft; these quickly became fast, agile, and
well-armed. Other roles for aircraft evolved throughout the war, including communication, battlefield
attack and assault, and battlefield interdiction. The relatively primitive state of communications
technology in 1914 meant that air/ground and air/air contact was sketchy at best, but it improved
generally over the course of the war, thus enhancing the battlefield role of the airplane. All of these roles
for aircraft were in full development—indeed in rapid, telescoped development—during the course of
the war. And the tactics for the employment of aircraft were worked out just as ground combat tactics
were worked out, through intensive trial and error. By the end of the war, a fairly sophisticated body
of doctrine existed for the battlefield uses of aircraft.
If this were the whole of the story, then the history of air power theory would be much simpler
than it is. It was, not, of course, the whole of the story since there was another powerful, compelling,
and intensely controversial role for aircraft: the use of long-range or “strategic” bombers to produce
a coercive effect on the enemy homefront. Most states possessing aircraft had shown some interest in
this prospect, but the development of bombers and bombing doctrine varied. The French, who were in
relatively easy reach of some German industry, began attacking elements of that industry as a way of
eroding the German ability to make war. This was part of an integrated campaign, and was not seen
as truly separate from the Army effort. As the French found themselves increasingly overwhelmed
by the demands of the ground war in 1916, they had fewer resources to devote to the air war; they
increasingly concentrated their aerial efforts on the battlefront, where their fighter pilots won acclaim
and honor in what was, contrary to popular memory, a brutal, exhausting, and very deadly struggle
with Germany’s equally determined fighter pilots.
In Germany the Kaiser gave in to public pressure to use Zeppelins (airships) in an aerial offensive
designed to undermine the warmaking capacity and will of their British enemy. Germany’s great
strategic problem in the west was the strength of the Anglo-French alliance, and they sought a means
to break the will of one or the other of those allied states. The airships had been, for the German
people, a symbol of power and pride: they were viewed as a manifestation of German technical and
aerial prowess. Throughout 1915 and into 1916, the Germans expanded the range of targets in Britain
open to airship attack. At first, the British were vulnerable to the onslaughts. Air defenses were poorly
organized and underfunded, and early British fighters did not have the engine thrust to intercept the
high-flying airships before they could get in and out of striking range. Over time, though, the trends
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shifted as British defenses improved rapidly. Better fighters, special incendiary bullets, and much more
efficient signals and defensive communications made flying zeppelins over England a very risky task
by late 1916. In addition, the Royal Naval Air Service launched an aerial offensive against zeppelin
sheds on the European coast.12
In 1917 the Germans made another attempt to use strategic bombing to break the will of the British.
That spring and summer “Gotha,” and later four-engined “Giant” bombers (Riesenflugzeuge), began
menacing British cities, including London. Two small daylight raids on London (June 13 and July 7)
managed to cause significant casualties and to raise the indignation and anger of the British, especially
in response to bombs that hit a kindergarten. The British public demanded better air defenses, and
retaliation in kind against the Germans. This public outcry—the very fact of the public’s demand
for a voice in the prosecution of the war—was unsettling to British elites, who were already on the
lookout for signs of domestic unrest. Coming in a year when strikes and industrial actions had become
commonplace once again and when the Russian Revolution was in full gear, the public agitation was
worrying. Field Marshal Douglas Haig found himself forced, against his will, to send fighter squadrons
from the western front back to England. And a commission established by Prime Minister David Lloyd
George concluded that Britain’s aerial performance in the war could be improved most effectively by
the creation of a separate service. Indeed, the commission, under South African general and statesman
Jan Christian Smuts, came to some radical conclusions: “As far as can at present be foreseen, there is
absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when
aerial operations . . . on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older
forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.”13
It is no small thing to change one’s defense structure in the midst of a major war, and yet the British
did it during World War I. It reflected their anxiety about the domestic front, and the perceived need
to respond to public pressure. The internal politics of the newly-independent Royal Air Force (RAF)
were bumpy at first, since neither Haig nor Major General Sir Hugh Trenchard, then commanding the
Army’s air offensive on the western front, was the slightest bit interested in creating a new service.
But Trenchard found himself, in May 1918, in command of a long range bombing force referred to as
the “Independent Force” (IF). France’s Marshal Ferdinand Foch queried indignantly, “Independent of
what, God?”14
Though promised a sizable force, Trenchard never received it; indeed, the aircraft he had were
hardly up to the task they were given. After making requests for more and better aircraft (especially
fighter escorts), Trenchard decided to make do with what he had. For the most part, he stayed with
what he knew, attacking targets selected to affect the ground war. He was well aware, though, that the
eyes of the public were upon him, and he was expected to achieve results. Thus, he directed attacks
on cities and industry when such opportunities presented themselves. Trenchard’s rather haphazard
approach to the strategic campaign caused no end of exasperation among the newly-formed Air Staff
planners back in London. They had devoted considerable effort to analyzing German war industry and
identifying strategic targets of consequence. One analyst in particular, Lord Tiverton, authored a theory
of strategic air war that sought to identify “bottlenecks” in the German war economy. A sophisticated
plan, it was a precursor to the “industrial fabric” theory of bombing that would be stressed in the
United States during the interwar years.
But Trenchard felt no obligation to heed his own staff and carried on as he pleased. Because he could
produce little in the way of physical results in Germany, he stressed instead the indirect results and
the psychological impact of his air campaign. He argued that his bombers produced strain on workers
and citizens, and lowered factory production due to ongoing air raids and alarms. He argued that
the “moral effect” of bombing was 20 times the physical effect. Though his math was haphazard, the
language of the “moral effect” was resonant at the time. Needing to justify his operations, Trenchard
waged a rhetorical offensive designed to achieve what his actual air offensive could not.15
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From the time of their entry into the war, the Americans had shown a strong interest in the prospects
for air warfare and long range bombing. But they were not able to produce the aerial armada they had
envisioned early on; indeed, they discovered that in the industrial era one could not simply create a
fighting force overnight. While General Billy Mitchell oversaw the air offensive at the St. Mihiel and
Meuse-Argonne campaigns, the Americans engaged in no long-range bombardment (or “strategical
bombardment” as they called it at the time). They did, however, keep a keen eye on the bombing efforts
of their allies, and they produced a plan—based entirely on one drawn up by Tiverton—to wage an
aerial offensive on German industry. Though it was never implemented, the Americans did engage in
an evaluation—a bombing survey—of the British and French efforts. The Americans were attentive to
the critiques of Trenchard by the British Air Staff, and they, too, criticized his unsystematic application
of air power; while they appreciated the “moral effect” of bombing, they did not feel it achieved all
Trenchard had claimed for it. Instinctively, they preferred a more analytical approach.16
The experience of long range bombing in World War I was rushed, imperfect, and marginal: air
warfare remained a sideshow, ancillary to the tremendous effort taking place on the ground. The most
impressive result was the body of ideas that emerged quickly from those analysts, like Tiverton, who
devoted energy and effort to the key questions. But the ideas were well ahead of the actual weapons
required to implement them. While the Germans managed to produce an impressive four-engine long
range bomber by the end of the war and while the British were working on a plane capable of reaching
Berlin, most World War I bombers were limited in size and lift capacity, had primitive navigation tools,
and were prone to unreliability. All this meant that there was no full test of long range bombardment
and its effects on the enemy. There was, however, just enough experience to allow interested parties to
make claims—and to stake out positions—with respect to it.
For the Germans, the experience of bombing England had been largely disappointing. While they
stirred up anger and indignation among the British, that unrest did not translate into military or political
gain. While the British were forced to bring fighters back from the front and invest more heavily in air
defenses, the timing was such that the entry of the Americans into the war made good the shortages
that would otherwise have been felt more keenly. And the Germans found themselves frustrated by
the improvements in British air defenses (against both airships and bombers), and by the difficulty
of flying and bombing accurately in cloudy, rainy north European weather. By the spring of 1918 the
Germans had largely abandoned the strategic air campaign against England, and had refocused all
their aircraft on the ground war.17
The English interpretation of their experience was quite different, however. As noted, British elites
were unsettled by the public demand for a voice in the war, by the need to bring fighters back to the
homefront, and by the indirect effects—mainly production losses—from overflight and air raid alarms.
Indeed, so grave were Lloyd George’s concerns about the stability of the homefront that in the spring
of 1918 a scheme was drawn up to provide for marshal law in the event of full-scale domestic unrest.18
After the war, RAF officials argued that, in exchange for a limited offensive effort, the Germans were
able to tie up considerable resources in the United Kingdom (UK). Indeed, the first commandant of the
RAF Staff College pointed out in 1924 that, in response to 452 German aeroplane flights over England,
the British put up 1,882 defensive sorties.19 In this environment, Trenchard, who had become the
postwar Chief of Air Staff, was able to make a persuasive case that Britain must be in a position, should
war come, to wage a prompt and incessant air campaign against the enemy, designed to push him on
to the defensive before that enemy could do the same to Britain. The argument was useful to Trenchard
because it enabled him to argue that the RAF deserved to maintain its institutional autonomy after the
war.
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The Interwar Years.
Trenchard proved himself a master of the bureaucratic arts: he fended off claims on RAF resources,
and he continually built the case—to military planners and policymakers—that the RAF was essential
for deterrence and future warfighting. During the interwar years, public views on warfare tended to
embody extremes—either a determination to avoid the topic altogether, or a tendency to articulate it in
the most apocalyptic terms. Perhaps this should be unsurprising in the aftermath of the unremittingly
grim experience of World War I, but its effect was to leave little room for rigorous or considered
analysis. Dark forebodings in the realm of popular culture resulted in a flurry of books addressing the
apocalyptic side of the spectrum: The Poison War, The Black Death, Menace, Empty Victory, Invasion from
the Air, War Upon Women, Chaos, Air Reprisal, and What Happened to the Corbetts.20 The impact of these
was augmented not only by the futurist scenarios being played in the (increasingly popular) cinemas,
but also by the ominous and troubling events of the 1930s, including the Japanese attack on Manchuria,
the Italian attack on Abyssinia, and the Spanish Civil War.
By this time as well, the ideas of Italian air enthusiast General Giulio Douhet were becoming more
widely known in English-speaking countries. Douhet’s 1921 book, The Command of the Air, had painted a
graphic vision of societal collapse in the face of air attack. Indeed, it was the futurist drama he conveyed
rather than the analytical rigor of his ideas that gave Douhet a lasting place in the canon of air warfare.21
A poet, painter, playwright, and amateur novelist, Douhet brought to bear on his work “the intense
modernist fascination with the latest advances in science and technology—with the automobile, with
electricity, with gas, and finally with the aeroplane—prevalent in prewar Italian protofascist avantgarde culture.”22 Though both British and American airmen had developed indigenous theories of air
warfare that did not depend on Douhet—and though there is no evidence that Douhet was read widely
in Britain or the United States before the 1930s—his ideas were cited thereafter and used to support
apocalyptic visions of air warfare. His prose seemed to capture an important element of the mood in
the West, and it seemed to capture, as well, a kind of archetypal image of the airplane as weapon.
Douhet’s vision stressed the offensive, indeed he referred to aircraft as the offensive weapon “par
excellence.” Postulating that vast destruction could be wrought by 50 squadrons of bombers, he asked
his readers, “How could a country go on living and working under this constant threat, oppressed by
the nightmare of imminent destruction and death?” Douhet was impressed by the possibilities of attack
against those of “least moral resistance,” such as factory workers.23 His vision was one of technological
determinism: “The brutal but inescapable conclusion we must draw is this: in the face of the technical
developments of aviation today, in case of war the strongest army we can deploy . . . and the strongest
navy we can dispose . . . will provide no effective defense against determined efforts . . . to bomb our
cities.”24
Though Douhet believed that technology had given the defensive a permanent pride of place in
ground warfare, he argued just the opposite with respect to air war. Douhet believed that the vastness
of the sky made defense against the airplane virtually impossible: defender’s inability to know the exact
position and timing of air attack gave the attacker a tremendous edge. Douhet also largely dismissed the
potential of ground defenses. As historian Phillip Meilinger has noted, “Douhet sarcastically concluded
that ground fire might down some aircraft, much like muskets shot in the air might occasionally his
a swallow, but it was not a serious deterrent to air attack.”25 Douhet noted several target categories of
primary significance: industry, transport, infrastructure, communication, seats of government, and the
will of the people. Douhet emphasized the latter in particular, since he argued that wars in the future
would see no distinction between combatants and noncombatants, and that urban targeting would do
the most to collapse enemy will.
Because he saw airplanes as strategic rather than tactical weapons, Douhet did not advocate the
use of aircraft in support of armies or navies. He did not believe, either, that ground forces would be
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required to occupy enemy territory. While he admitted that a strong and wealthy nation might opt to
build both tactical and strategic air forces, he still believed that the utility of the latter vastly outweighed
the former.26
But Douhet’s perspective was narrow, and he saw only the evidence that supported his view. As
historian Michael Sherry has pointed out, his idea of the future rested on crude extrapolation, and
like many other interwar prophets of air power, he failed to see how it “might evolve unpredictably,
strengthening the defense as well as the offense, creating its own futile charges and bloody
stalemates.”27
Much of the power of Douhet’s vision came from his linkage of airplanes and chemical warfare.
Gas weapons, though not terribly effective on the battlefield, nonetheless had brought to the surface
a sense dread in the public mind that was felt throughout Europe. Much earlier, the poet Alfred Lord
Tennyson had tapped into this foreboding when he, in his poem, Locksley Hall (1842), “dipt into the
future, far as human eye could see,” and postulated a “ghastly dew” raining from the heavens as “the
nations’ airy navies” grappled in “the central blue.”28
Douhet’s intense focus on the aerial offensive was also emblematic of the interwar years. In Britain
the popular memory of the air war focused on the early raids, when defenses were disjointed and
ineffective. By contrast, recollections of the later—and far more effective—defensive efforts seemed
to fade. A full and rigorous analysis of the wartime experience would have supported conclusions
quite different than those in the public mind, but such an analysis was never undertaken. Thus, in
1932, when once and future Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin declared, “the bomber will always get
through,” it was taken rather as an article of faith. To be fair, bomber speeds had run well ahead of
fighter speeds in the early interwar years, and it seemed that bombers—which would be able to take
advantage of the vastness of the air—might always have the advantage. But changes in fighter speeds,
and especially developments in defensive technology (radar), should have caused the entire issue of
bomber penetration to be rethought entirely in the mid-1930s. It never was, however, setting up the
first of many World War II clashes between expectation and reality in air warfare.29
When Trenchard handed the RAF off to his successors in 1929, it was secure in its autonomy. It was
not, however, in a position to carry out the offensive policy it had touted so consistently. Trenchard
did not give center stage to the questions and issues that should have dominated the service agenda:
Can the bomber always get through? Under what circumstances? How do bombers find and hit targets
accurately and reliably? What kinds of bombs are most effective under what conditions, and against
which targets? How well can bombers fare in poor weather? But Trenchard’s interwar traction rested
on two elements besides his skill at bureaucracy. The first was a postwar environment that was still
traumatized by the horrific experience of the stalemated ground war on the Western Front. So disturbing
had been that episode that anyone who seemed to offer an alternative to it was given a hearing, at the
least. The second was a claim that he, like other airmen of the day, truly understood the future of
war. Setting themselves up as visionaries and men of the future, the air power enthusiasts could cast
a certain disdain upon the stubborn, Luddite visions of those in the traditional services. Indeed, Billy
Mitchell frequently referred to his Army colleagues as “the longbowmen.”30
While Hitler set about renouncing the terms of the Versailles agreement and rearming the Luftwaffe,
the RAF found itself increasingly insecure about its own capabilities. Indeed, the new head of Bomber
Command, Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, discovered, to his disquiet, in 1937 that Bomber Command
was “entirely unprepared for war, unable to operate except in fair weather, and extremely vulnerable
both in the air and on the ground.”31 A year later, during the Munich Crisis, Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain would facilitate the handing over of a piece of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in a desperate
act that stemmed from an overwhelming desire to head off war—and the terrible aerial bombardment
it was expected to entail. Whatever effect it had on the enemy, the RAF’s interwar rhetoric surely had
been a deterrent to British statesmen as well.
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Without any actual experience in long range bombing and with a parent service that was hostile
to notions of independent air power, the U.S. Army Air Service/Air Corps made only incremental
interwar progress toward autonomy. If mavericks—led by Billy Mitchell—championed the cause,
they did not win the day. Without an immediate threat to menace their nation, the American people
saw no need to restructure the national defenses after World War I. But even in the absence of rapid
institutional progress, American airmen began to define and hone a doctrine of aerial bombing. It
rested on assumptions like those that Tiverton had used as the building blocks of his own air theory.
By 1926 William C. Sherman, who had gone from the Air Service Tactical School (later the Air Corps
Tactical School, ACTS) to instructor in air tactics at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, had taken the lead in articulating American air doctrine in his book,
Air Warfare.32 Explaining the future of the bomber, he pronounced enthusiastically: “The bomber now
stands forth as the supreme air arm of destruction . . . When nations of today look with apprehension
on the air policy of a neighbor, it is the bomber they dread.”33
Building on a traditional interpretation of the importance of interdiction in war, Sherman asserted
that “the military objective of bombardment aviation, par excellence, is the hostile system of supply.”
Therefore, “The long range of the bomber should be utilized to the full, and every sensitive point and
nerve center of the [supply] system put under pressure, in an effort to paralyze the whole.” Sherman
cogently articulated a set of ideas that would shortly thereafter take on a central doctrinal role at ACTS
as the “industrial fabric” or “key-node” theory of targeting:
Industry consists . . . of a complex system of interlocking factories, each of which makes only its allotted part of the
whole. . . . Accordingly, in the majority of industries, it is necessary to destroy certain elements of the industry only,
in order to cripple the whole. These elements may be called the key plants. These will be carefully determined,
usually before the outbreak of war. . . . On the declaration of war, these key plants should be made the objective
of a systematic bombardment, both by day and by night, until their destruction has been assured, or at least until
they have been sufficiently crippled.34

Sherman’s theory rested on a more rigorous and analytical foundation than Trenchardian doctrine,
but it depended upon two important and ultimately problematical assumptions: that intelligence work
would be able to identify the “key plants,” and that bombers would be able to find and strike them
without suffering prohibitive losses. In general, the Americans were not so inclined as the British to
assume that an aerial guerre de course might be possible, and they devoted a considerable amount of
time to considering bomber escorts. Upon failing to find their way to a solution, they opted instead to
give bombers self-protection by arming them heavily. The long range escort problem was a hard one
to crack: how do you build a fighter that can keep pace with a bomber deep into enemy territory and
then, on arrival at the target, fight on equal terms with fast, agile, enemy defenders? The Americans
side-stepped this technological challenge, for a time at least, by arguing that the interlocking fields of
fire created by bombers flying in groups would facilitate a reasonably safe entry into (and return from)
enemy airspace.
The Americans also focused their energy from the outset on the accurate bombing of specific targets.
The authorization of the B-17 bomber had been based on a coastal defense mission, the B-17 would
intercept ships at sea. And the Norden bombsight, the brainchild of the Navy’s in-house designer/
engineer, Carl Norden, would give the Americans the tool they would need to make the bomber a precise
instrument. The Americans’ lean toward a bombing doctrine that was oriented to the identification of
specific significant targets in the enemy war industry was driven, as well, by the prevailing cultural and
intellectual climate, in particular: the influence of the industrial efficiency movement and Taylorism; a
rational/economic approach to military problems facilitated by the nation’s distance from immediate
enemies; and the impact of the Great Depression, which hit the United States particularly hard and
seemed to underscore the idea that complex economies are fragile and subject to ready disruption.
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Through the 1930s, the industrial fabric theory would be refined at the Air Corps Tactical School, by
then based at Maxwell Field in Alabama. Careful not to overstep their bounds and raise the suspicions
of Army officials in Washington, ACTS instructors and students nonetheless worked quietly on a
doctrine that was ready for implementation when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and General George
C. Marshall began to turn their attention to air power as a means of warfighting.35
World War II.
By the time that the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe launched their war, they had taken the doctrinal
lessons of modern combined arms—worked out slowly and painfully between 1914 and 1918—and
refined them into a mode of warfighting that looked, for a time at least, unstoppable. The “Blitzkrieg”
of 1939-40 was nothing more than the intelligent application of armor and air power to the ground
war breakthroughs of 1918. But, for states that had not concentrated so effectively on tactical and
operational integration, it seemed daunting to say the least. In Britain, where the RAF had focused
nearly all of its energies on strategic bombing and home defense, air-ground cooperation had fallen
by the wayside. Indeed, as historian Sir Maurice Dean has argued, “between 1918 and 1939 the RAF
forgot how to support the Army.”36 The fault belonged to both services—but fault it was, nonetheless,
and it revealed itself glaringly during the Battle of France. Air-ground cooperation on the battlefield
would be relearned by the Allies on the deserts of North Africa. Though much doctrinal ground had
been lost, it was made up for relatively quickly by talented airmen like “Maori” Coningham of New
Zealand, Sir Arthur Tedder of Britain, and Carl Spaatz of the United States. With their survival at stake,
the Russians, too, learned the methods of effective air-ground interoperation.37
The problems of air-ground cooperation are relatively easy to grasp, but not always easy to solve.
Because it requires cooperation between two different organizations operating in two different realms,
communication is an on-going issue. Air and ground must be able to communicate effectively without
jeopardizing their own indigenous operations. In addition, the structure of air support to the ground is
tricky. Overcentralization of resources leads to a lack of responsiveness. But too much decentralization
means that there is little ability to concentrate at a point. It means, as well, that many airplanes are likely
to be left in locations where they can do little good at all. Finding just the right balance is crucial—and
yet it is difficult to achieve.
Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goering launched his pilots into the Battle of Britain with an
optimism unsubstantiated by the reality of the situation. While some Germans air theorists had shown
interwar interest in long range bombing, their ability to translate it into something robust fell victim
to the early death of a leading theorist, Walter Wever, and the tendency of Third Reich bureaucracy
towards overweening insularities and inefficiencies. The Luftwaffe was controlled largely by the fighter
pilots, to the detriment of bomber doctrine.38
In the meantime, the British had developed an effective communications net into which radar, when
ready, could be inserted successfully. A late-in-the-day push to build adequate numbers of fighters—
and very good ones—enabled the British to hold out against the aerial onslaught of an overconfident
enemy. But the failure of the Germans in the Battle of Britain did nothing to dissuade the British from
trying their own air offensive against Germany. The decision reflected the desperate straits the British
found themselves in by 1940-41. Without allies, and with only one potential offensive tool against
Hitler, the British could not afford to countenance the possibility that bombing might not work. After
all, in May 1940 Churchill had made bombing a main pillar of his argument that the British ought not
to seek terms with Hitler, and ought, instead, to follow an economic and peripheral strategy against the
enemy.
But the interwar lacunae in analysis and training all came painfully to the surface in the early years
of the war. Bomber Command’s initial missions—dropping propaganda leaflets—pointed out just how
339

woefully unprepared the organization was for full-scale war. The long sorties told of the difficulties of
finding distant cities, of the constant battles with weather, and of the physical discomforts crews would
encounter in such operations. The effectiveness of German defenses pushed operations increasingly
into the nighttime hours, when darkness could afford some protection. Crews were sent out with
maps, astro-sextants, and directional radio. With these means, which required a high degree of skill
to use effectively, they were expected to find their way about; in essence, crews were expected to
navigate at night by observation—an all but impossible task under the weather conditions so frequently
prevailing.39
Having been pressed into serious thinking about targeting, the RAF’s Air Staff came up with a list
that identified critical nodes in the German war economy: transport and oil figured prominently. If
German defenses had forced the British to fly under cover of night, this, in turn, only exacerbated the
navigational and target-finding problems. The first vigorous analysis of British accuracy, undertaken
in the summer of 1941, produced results that the leaders of the RAF could barely believe: only one in
five bombers was getting within five miles of its target. The Chief of Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal, saw
the handwriting on the wall. There was little choice but to turn to the only targets that crews could
find and hit reliably in darkness, cities. In mid-February 1942, Bomber Command came under a new
directive, calling for an attack on area targets; the objective was to undermine “the morale of the enemy
civil population and in particular, of the industrial workers.” This step, an expedient, removed any
doctrinal underpinning that counted on precise targeting of specified industries or resources. While it
did not abandon an economic rationale entirely, it shifted the emphasis back to Trenchard’s point of
focus, the morale of the enemy.
One week after the new directive was issued, Sir Arthur Harris became the head of Bomber
Command. While the directive for city bombing predated him, he was an adherent of the strategy—
and would remain so, stubbornly, until the end of the war. Harris believed that cities contained, and
concentrated within them, everything important to modern industrial nations. Harris’s own view of
city bombing hinged on the idea that he simply could overwhelm the Germans by smashing their
infrastructure, eroding their confidence in their leadership, and demoralizing them. The theoretical
underpinning rested in part on “brute force”—the destruction of infrastructure and thus the erosion of
the war economy—and in part on “coercion.” Harris assumed that when the Germans began to believe
they could not stop Bomber Command’s overwhelming offensive, the prospect of seeing their entire
nation in ruins would cause them to seek terms.
Harris set about making his crews technically proficient, skilled, and consistent in their new task.
His was an immense job—both the public and the bomber crews themselves had begun to wonder if the
investment in bombing had been sound—but Harris brought great energy and dogged determination
to Bomber Command Headquarters. By 1944 he had under him an air force that was the most powerful
and proficient of the war, able not only to devastate cities, but to find and destroy specific targets such
as marshaling yards and synthetic oil plants.40 Whatever Harris’s flaws and blind spots, his proficiency
as a field commander and a problem-solver was matched only by that of the young American general,
Curtis Emerson LeMay.
In 1942 the American entry into the air war, as in 1917, had been painfully and frustratingly slow.
While Harris waged thousand-bomber raids on British cities, the Americans flew 12-bomber raids to
the coastal edges of France. Fearful that the American determination to employ “precision bombing”
would fall victim to the same nemeses the British had faced, Prime Minister Churchill tried to intervene,
imploring the Americans to join the nighttime area offensive. But the Americans would have none of
it. They were, for a variety of reasons, committed to attacks on the German industrial fabric by groups
of self-defending bombers flying in daylight.41 The heady, unshakeable American faith in their bomber
doctrine finally came a cropper in the late summer and autumn of 1943, however, when raids into
Germany proved so costly as to be unsustainable. In four raids carried out over 6 days in October, 148
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American bombers failed to return to their bases.42 These raids were aimed in part at the supply of
German ball bearings—an element of the enemy war economy the Americans assessed as pivotal.
At this point the Americans, too, were forced to re-evaluate. But instead of changing targets like
the British had done, they changed tactics. They embraced the long-range escort fighter, now equipped
usefully with droppable self-sealing auxiliary fuel tanks, and sped them into production. During the
winter of 1944, the Americans fought a sustained, force-on-force battle for air superiority in Europe.
Taking bombers to targets the Germans felt compelled to defend, they set up duels between American
escorts and German short-range defenders. Backed by a powerful industrial base in full swing and a
steady supply of pilots, the Americans began to chip away steadily at Luftwaffe dominance. This was
not what interwar theory had predicted: the Americans figured that they would win air superiority by
attacks on the German aircraft industry on the ground. But the operational changes were effective, and
by placing heavy pressure on the supply of German pilots, they relieved much of the strain on Bomber
Command, too.
In the spring of 1944 the Anglo-American bombers came under the control of General Dwight
Eisenhower and his deputy, Tedder, who used the strategic bombers operationally—to great effect—to
pave the way for the Normandy invasion. Heavy attacks on railways and bridges in France considerably
reduced Germany’s ability to move men and supplies to the new front as the amphibious assault gained
a foothold. Though both Harris and Spaatz (by then the head of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, or USSTAF)
had hoped that the invasion would be unnecessary and considered the tactical preparation a diversion
from their main task of bombing the heart of the enemy, both men complied proficiently with their
orders. This work, along with the attrition of the Luftwaffe carried out by the Americans, did as much
as anything else to ensure the success of D-day and the Anglo-American ground war that followed it.
After D-day, full exploitation of tactical air greatly aided the fortunes of the Anglo-American ground
forces.43
Convinced that his city raids would bring about a German collapse, Harris sought to recommence
them once he was out from under the demands of the Normandy campaign. But the Air Staff now
was increasingly unconvinced that Harris’s campaign made the best possible use of British bombers.
Instead, they supported General Spaatz’s prioritization of Germany’s remaining (and dwindling) oil
supply. This led to an intense debate between Portal and Harris in the winter of 1944-45. Portal, who
suspected that the lure of cities drew Harris to them even when weather conditions would support an
attack on oil, encouraged Harris to embrace a new bombing directive designed to exploit Germany’s
Achilles’ heel. Harris countered that he went to oil targets every time it was feasible to do so. There
could be no victor in the debate since it all depended on differing interpretations of weather data. As it
was, Harris and Portal were debating only the close calls—those nights when the weather conditions
might support an attack on a specific target. But these were the minority; much of the time area bombing
was the only real choice. Such was the technology of the mid-20th century.
In order to maintain American operations at something approaching a consistent tempo, head of the
U.S. Army Air Forces General “Hap” Arnold had authorized, by late 1943, bombing “on instrument”
through cloud cover. Though he eschewed the term “blind bombing,” Arnold was prepared for his
crews to abandon the visual sighting and aiming of “precision bombing” when weather conditions did
not support it, and to rely instead on imperfect navigational aids. Since they identified themselves as
a visual force and had trained that way, the Americans did not adapt easily to the change. Indeed, in
the winter of 1944-45, 42 percent of American bombs dropped through cloud fell more than five miles
from the target. In order to increase the collateral impact of these poor weather raids, the Americans
began adding incendiary bombs into their ordnance mix. Aimed typically at railway marshaling yards
(big targets that often can be spotted through even a brief break in cloud cover), these raids did not
differ much in their practical effects from British area bombing. Marshaling yards were attacked by the
American air forces more frequently than any other target in Europe.44
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The bombing theories motivating the British and the Americans remained distinct: the latter went
to specific targets whenever weather would support it, and they did not ever embrace, in Europe, a
focus on the fire-bombing of cities. But the constraints and limitations of the technology of the 1940s
had pushed the two air forces in a similar direction. Bombing in Europe was a blunt instrument that
pounded the body of the enemy; it was not a rapier that impaled central organs. By the end of the
war, the Americans—perhaps frustrated by the limited impact of their “precision” bombing—became
more amenable to targeting for psychological effect, and targeting to hasten the progress of the ground
war.
At the end of the day, two targets did provide an important payoff: by the end of the war, Germany’s
dwindling oil supply badly compromised her ability to continue to fight a war of maneuver dependent
on tanks and aircraft. And attacks on German transport hubs increasingly compromised Germany’s
ability to distribute the fuel central to her war industry, coal. The American quest for a silver bullet—
for the key card in the house of cards—did not yield a payoff until the very end of the war, when, in
conjunction with the high-tempo ground war and the westward movement of the Red Army (which
denied Germany the oil of southeastern Europe), it finally found a degree of vindication in the oil
campaign. And Harris, by forcing the dispersal of German industry, had helped set the conditions
that would make the late-war attacks on German railways quite devastating to the enemy. These
achievements, however important and significant, came late in the war and did not follow the pattern
of claims made by the most assertive interwar air theorists.
Though the Americans would make much of the oil campaign in their postwar survey (U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey, USSBS), it was not a truly “independent” victory for air since its effectiveness rested
on the enemy’s cooperation in continuing to fight an intense, resource-demanding ground war. But if
the industrial fabric theory of bombing had not worked out in quite the way that its proponents had
expected, the Air Force and its supporters could—and did—claim that this was not an indictment of the
theory itself. If, they argued, a bigger and better air offensive had commenced sooner, independent air
power might have won the day. Harris’s defense of Bomber Command was similar in tone, if somewhat
different in detail. Harris argued that, if only he had been able to fight his war on cities—focused
solely on the air and free of “diversions” like the Normandy campaign—he could have proved the war
winning capability of bombers. He never accepted what the evidence had revealed by the end: that,
in a police state, it was hard to translate popular dissent into political pressure. The German people
fought under and successfully endured the impact of a weight of bombs that any interwar air theorist
would have predicted as paralyzing to an enemy state. And German leaders were not so convulsed by
the thought of their cities in ruins as to seek terms.
Much of the prewar speculation about the fragility of civilians and the frangibility of economies
was simply wrong: both were more robust than the interwar writing had anticipated. Prior to the
war, the British had expected 30,000 casualties per day; in 1939 authorities handed out one million
burial forms to local authorities. But these figures were way wide of the mark, having been based on a
faulty interpretation of the World War I experience, combined with the impact of apocalyptic interwar
rhetoric. During the Blitz against London in the winter of 1940-41, the British population revealed
stability and robustness instead of the flightiness and panic that many specialists had predicted.
Hospital admissions for neurosis declined, suicide rates fell, and incidents of drunkenness declined
by half.45 To their credit, the psychologists admitted they had been wrong during the interwar years.
Writing in the Lancet in 1941, Dr. Felix Brown explained: “The incidence of genuine psychiatric air-raid
casualties has been much lower than might have been expected; the average previously healthy civilian
has proved remarkably adjustable.” He added that women had not been a “weakening element” in the
general population, as they had been expected to be.46
There was certainly disruption after some raids, but this almost always was related to perceived
inadequacies in relief efforts: people generally behaved well when they believed the government was
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making concerted efforts on their behalf. In response to a Gallup poll asking what had made them most
depressed that winter, Londoners early in 1941 ranked the weather over aerial bombing.47
Even at the end of the war, when the bomb tonnage dropped in 1 month could equal the tonnage
dropped previously in an entire year, popular pressure did not cause the Germans to sue for peace.
To some extent, this represented commitment to the cause, and to some extent, it reflected the fact
that people feared retribution for protest even more than they feared bombing. The former was more
certain and swift than the latter. And propaganda indicating that the enemy would have no mercy in
unconditional surrender surely was an element in the starch that kept the Germans fighting till the last.
Culture mattered, too. In Japan, for instance, Hirohito was able to turn his entire nation into a kind of
human shield. The Emperor was perceived by the people as divine, and they felt it their obligation to
protect him—to the last—with their lives. This enabled them to endure the fire-bombing of over 60 of
their cities without losing their commitment to fight on.48
Speculation about popular reaction to bombing rested partly on faulty assumptions about the likely
behavior of the masses—especially the working classes—under the fall of bombs. And it rested partly
on extrapolation from experience with the bombing of troops in the field. Heavily bombed troops
often reacted with panic and flight. This same behavior—and worse—was expected of civilians; after
all, the civilian population had no formal training, and (according to elites) little self-discipline. But
attempts to predict the homefront on the basis of the battlefront were erroneous. After all, troops under
fire are pinned in place. Exposed, or sheltered in shallow trenches at best, they have little to protect
them from the full brunt of aerial attacks. Civilian populations, however, are not like fish in a barrel;
they generally are not “trapped” since they continue to have some say in their actions—some ability
to avoid potentially dangerous places or to take shelter if they are caught under attack. Thus, their
psychological state does not parallel the psychological state of the soldier who must endure a bombing
raid on the battlefield.
Many of the economic assumptions underpinning the theories of World War II bombing also proved
wide of the mark. Substitution and stockpiling (the latter explaining an ongoing ball bearing supply)
could make up for many of the shortages caused by bombing; slack in the Germany economy meant that
increased production could occur through expansions of the workforce and work hours; and dispersal
of industry could reduce vulnerability to bombardment. The German economy was nowhere near full
stretch at the outset of the war (as intelligence analysts thought it was).
The experience of the Anglo-American bombing campaign pointed to one lesson above all: it is
necessary to have highly accurate and highly detailed intelligence information about the enemy—and
about the enemy’s ability to adapt—in order to have any hope of using aerial bombardment as an
effective tool of war.
Some of the lessons of the war came to the surface in the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, but the
Survey was so vast and unwieldy (consisting of well over 300 separate reports) that the “Summary”
reports were the only ones that garnered very much attention in the end. Committee products that
ended up largely defending the big investment in strategic bombing, they did not contain the rigor
or subtlety to guide future policy in an effective way. In Britain, Churchill’s nervousness about the
potential backlash against area bombing caused him to prevent any full-scale survey from taking
place.49
The record of World War II strategic bombing has been intensely controversial, in part because
of the ethical ramifications of the late-war raids (the American firebombing of Tokyo on March 9-10,
1945, killed over 100,000 persons), and in part because there is no way to calculate satisfactorily the
cost and effectiveness of the bombing versus the military alternatives that might have been pursued.
Many of the most recent histories have tended to give credit to strategic bombing for keeping at least
some cap on German economic and military might during the course of the war. Historian Richard
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Overy has pointed out, for instance: “By the middle of the war, with the whole of continental Europe
at her disposal, Germany was fast becoming an economic superpower. The harvest of destruction and
disruption reaped by bomb attack, random and poorly planned as it often was, was sufficient to blunt
German economic ambitions.”50 Bombing, he added, allowed the Allies to rely on their preference for
bringing economic and scientific power (as opposed to large armies) to bear on their enemies, resulting
in lower Allied casualties.51
What is clear is that neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to hazard a repeat of
World War I’s Western Front. They were powerfully inclined, therefore, to turn to air power as a
warfighting tool. Once they had done this and had made the investment, they surely foreclosed other
options: the investment in long range bombing meant that the United States would never build a 200division ground force. And the same was true, albeit on a different scale, for the British. Indeed, the
U.S. manpower crisis on the autumn of 1944 saw all sorts of specialist soldiers—including airmen—
transferred unceremoniously into the infantry.
In addition to keeping a ceiling on German production and aiding greatly in the collapse of the
German war effort in 1945, the strategic bombing campaign provided the air superiority that made
the Normandy invasion feasible. The actual process had not cleaved very closely to prewar doctrinal
expectations, but the Americans showed themselves adaptable (and blessed by a vast productive
capacity well behind the front lines); their willingness to learn and change in real time proved crucial
to a victorious outcome.
The Early Postwar Years, and the Korean War.
For the United States and its allies in Western Europe, the only threat on the horizon was the former
Eurasian ally, the Soviet Union. Though there had been no lack of tension between the Anglo-Americans
and the Soviets during the war, postwar conflict was by no means foreordained; indeed, it took several
years before the hostility and mistrust became intolerable and laden with policy consequences. In the
years between 1945 and 1950, the American military largely was preoccupied with demobilization,
restructuring, and the working out of postwar roles and missions. The Air Force, in particular, had
invested a great deal of energy in finally winning its autonomy from the Army—an event formalized
as part of the National Security Act of 1947.
Aside from reorganizing and fighting for its independence, the new U.S. Air Force (USAF) focused
on being able to help halt a possible Soviet advance across Europe. This meant that its doctrinal energy
was shifted largely to the problem of delivering the small number of nuclear weapons the United
States had available at the time. In eschewing a large standing army (and universal military training
for its young men), the American people opted to rely on air power as their deterrent to war and their
main tool against the enemy, should war come. General Curtis LeMay, who had run the devastating
air campaign in Japan that culminated in two atomic attacks, became the head of the USAF’s Strategic
Air Command (SAC) in 1948 following his orchestration of the Berlin airlift. SAC became the dominant
institution within the USAF, and it held its position for many years.
Naturally enough, the airmen’s case for autonomy rested on the argument that the Air Force was best
qualified to undertake a mission central to future warfare: long range bombing. This meant defending
the wartime record, and asserting—as the British had in the aftermath of World War I—that a powerful
strategic bombing force would be essential to deterring wars and to fighting them if they came. The
advent of nuclear weapons, and the role of the USAF as the only service able to deliver them, only
reinforced the tendency to focus on long range bombing to the exclusion of other missions. But this
meant that the USAF was underprepared for other contingencies. In the 1950s and 60s, as Americans
found themselves fighting limited wars in Asia, the ideas underpinning Anglo-American World War
II strategic bombing had little relevance to the circumstances at hand.
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At the outset of the Korean War in 1950, SAC bombers were moved overseas to supplement the
existing assets of the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), under the overall control of General Douglas
MacArthur, commander-in-chief in the Far East. The commander of SAC’s Fifteenth Air Force, Major
General Emmett O’Donnell, became the commander in chief of FEAF Bomber Command (Provisional).
In consultation with SAC chief, General Curtis LeMay, he quickly requested MacArthur’s permission
“to do a fire job on the five industrial centers of northern Korea.” He thought MacArthur should
announce that the communists had forced him, against his wishes, to use “the means which brought
Japan to its knees.”52
In the early stages of the war, though, MacArthur was unwilling to escalate so dramatically. O’Donnell
chafed under orders that saw his big bombers “diverted” to tactical support missions on behalf of the
hard-pressed United Nations (UN) ground troops. In the late summer, bomber missions were expanded
to include broader scale interdiction and attacks on industry in North Korea. Following Chinese entry
into the war in November, MacArthur permitted attacks on a wide range of targets—including fire
raids on North Korean cities—in order to do everything possible to stem the tide of Chinese advance.
He held back on striking North Korean hydro-electric plants, though, hoping they might prove useful
bargaining chips in the negotiating process. Incendiary attacks on Pyongyang in early January 1951
burned out 35 percent of the city. Training for atomic missions went forward, but authority for actual
use of A-bombs was withheld.53 The wider use of bombers, however, did not translate into discernable
progress toward victory, and, as time passed, American B-29s became increasingly vulnerable to North
Korean air defenses: by the end of 1951 they were forced to fly almost exclusively at night.54
Airmen were frustrated by the politics of the limited war, which ensured that enemy supply sources
outside of North Korea remained permanently off the target lists, and that, therefore, the industrial
fabric theory would remain a poor fit with the reality of the situation. General LeMay would later say
about the war, “We never did hit a strategic target.”55
After General MacArthur was fired in April 1951, General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command
of UN Forces. Though he generally restrained the use of bombers, he continued to use them to maintain
pressure on Chinese troops. Such pressure included interdiction-oriented attacks on Pyongyang (on
July 30 and August 14). But little headway was made in diplomatic negotiations, and, in the meantime,
overworked air crews began to suffer morale problems and high abort rates.56 In May 1952 Ridgway
was replaced by General Mark Clark, who was interested in using aircraft to compel movement in the
negotiations. Clark authorized a FEAF-designed “air pressure” campaign designed to destroy military
targets so situated as to have a “deleterious effect upon the morale of the civilian population actively
engaged in the logistic support of enemy forces.”57 Pressure would now be applied to civilians as well
as to combat troops. The rhetoric attempted to frame it carefully and to identify it under the rubric of a
logistics campaign, but the emergence of the “air pressure” campaign signaled a familiar pattern of an
air force, in frustration, turning to an increased emphasis on civilian morale.
The first targets were the previously off-limits North Korean hydro-electric power plants. The
attacks saw FEAF destroy 90 percent of all North Korea’s hydro-electric power potential in less than a
week. The air pressure campaign also renewed full-scale attacks on Pyongyang and other North Korean
cities, beginning in July. The August 29 attack on Pyongyang was designed to “punish the enemy
with air power,” yielding a psychological payoff during the Moscow Conference between the Chinese
and the Russians.58 Following a course similar to the one the USAAF had followed in World War II,
FEAF’s Bomber Command was, by early 1953, attacking small cities and towns deemed important
to the communist supply and distribution system. Still, however, negotiations dragged on with little
apparent change in the enemy’s determination to hold out against UN pressure.
The last phase of the air pressure campaign manifested itself in a particularly dramatic way. In
March 1953 FEAF planners began to study the North Korean irrigation system. Out of patience, General
Clark told the Joint Chiefs that he was prepared to breach 20 dams, which would flood areas producing
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approximately 250,000 tons of rice. In the event, the campaign went forward a bit more modestly, with
mid-May attacks on three dams situated near railway lines. (Officially, the attacks could be designated
“interdiction” attacks against those railway lines—although neither FEAF planners nor the communists
perceived them in that way.) The raids produced dramatic effects, flooding nearby villages and rice
fields. The North Koreans engaged in vigorous repair efforts at the Toksan dam site in particular: 13
days later they had repaired the dam and the railway lines around it, and had placed anti-aircraft
artillery all around the dam itself. Two more dams were struck in June, and planning went forward for
further strikes. These, however, were delayed, pending the outcome of armistice negotiations. Those
talks resulted, shortly thereafter, in a truce.59
There has been no consensus on the impact of the dams raids. Historians recently have tended to
argue that they probably had some effect on the negotiations, even though that impact is difficult to
specify and separate from other factors bearing on the outcome, including, in particular, the death
of Stalin. Conrad Crane’s recent conclusion is representative: “The resort by the UN to such extreme
measures as the dam attacks might have alarmed the enemy enough to influence their negotiating
position to some degree, though there were many other factors involved in their decision to sign the
armistice.”60 If the exact impact of the raids was hard to specify, however, its effect on Korean civilians
was not. In 1954 Brigadier General Don Z. Zimmerman, FEAF Deputy for Intelligence, argued that,
“The degree of destruction suffered by North Korea, in relation to its resources, was greater than that
which the Japanese islands suffered in World War II.” He believed that “[T]hese pressures brought the
enemy to terms.” Many others in the USAF came to share his view, and the Air Force interpretation cast
events in a positive light.61
By 1954 the USAF was anxious to put the Korean experience behind it. FEAF’s 1954 final Report on
the Korean War repeated a conclusion that General George Stratemeyer already had drawn in 1950: the
Korean conflict contained so many unusual factors as to make it a poor model for future planning. In
particular, the USAF wished to distance itself from the successful close air support operations that had
been a main a feature of the war. The final report stated: “Because FEAF provided UNC ground forces
lavish close air support in Korea is no reason to assume this condition will exist in future wars.”62
Air Force leaders instead were anxious to reassert their priority: preparing for a strategic bombing
campaign against the Soviet Union. The funding allotted to the services as a result of the Korean War
had increased greatly the size and strength of SAC; now, more than ever, the SAC mission reigned
supreme in the USAF. General LeMay was appointed Vice Chief of Staff in 1957 and Chief of Staff
in 1961; in 1964 three-quarters of the high ranking officers on the Air Staff came from SAC. Between
1954 and 1962, the total U.S. nuclear arsenal grew from 1,750 weapons to 26,500 weapons. SAC, which
controlled the majority of them, planned to deliver them in a “massive preemptive bomber assault.”
Planning for other contingencies received little attention. Despite the political upheaval in Southeast
Asia in the 1950s, the Air University Quarterly Review published (in the whole of the decade) only two
articles relating air power to insurgency movements in that region.63
Vietnam.
When President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors dramatically increased the U.S. commitment to
South Vietnam, they hoped that air power might facilitate a relatively quick and painless campaign that
would not divert too many resources from the broader national agenda. They hoped that air strikes
would demonstrate U.S. resolve, bolster morale in the South, erode the morale of Viet Cong cadres, and
generally intimidate the leadership of the insurgency—convincing them that they could not win.64
In April 1964 the Joint Chiefs had compiled a list of 94 bombing targets in North Vietnam. The Air
Force wished to see these targets attacked immediately and heavily, so as to impose psychological
shock as well as physical damage. But the administration instead chose a more graduated approach
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that would punish by reprisal acts of terror committed by the Viet Cong, and would hold enemy
targets (of presumed value) at risk. After Viet Cong guerillas struck a U.S. Special Forces camp at
Pleiku in February of 1965, American policymakers implemented Operation ROLLING THUNDER,
an aerial interdiction campaign that eventually would run for 4 years and would be characterized by
increasing pressure on the enemy. In August 1965 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara rejected a
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommendation for attacks on North Vietnam’s strategic oil facilities and
electric power plants. The Hanoi government began to disperse the nation’s limited industry and to
erect passive and active air defenses; their efforts were aided by supplies and workers from the Soviet
Union and China. In light of this, the JCS called for an expanded bombing program late in 1965. The
Johnson administration did, in fact, expand the air campaign in 1966 and 1967: in June 1966 North
Vietnam’s oil storage facilities were bombed for the first time; in May 1967 Hanoi’s main power station
was attacked.65
Unsurprisingly, the Air Force chafed at the early restrictions: both during and after the war the
Air Force claimed that the ROLLING THUNDER campaign had been undermined by the intervention
of civilian planners and analysts who interfered with both the timing and the nature of the bombing
sorties flown. While it is true that the destruction of all major targets was not completed until 1967
(whereas the Air Force would have preferred an all-out assault in 1965), the civilian intervention may
not have been so consequential as it has been made out to be. The JCS list grew from 94 targets to 242
targets shortly after ROLLING THUNDER began, and the latter number changed little through the rest
of the campaign. In 1965, 158 of these targets were destroyed (nearly all of them military targets below
the 20th parallel); in 1966 22 more were destroyed. The president released nearly all the remaining
targets for attack in 1967, and by December, almost all of North Vietnam’s industrial war capacity had
been destroyed. The Air Force had the air campaign it wanted, but did not achieve the end it sought.
There was, by the end of the war, virtually no target left unattacked that might have been bombed.
Indeed, during the course of the war, the USAF dropped some 6,162,000 tons of bombs—vastly more
tonnage than had been dropped by the Allied powers in all of World War II.66
The ensurgents required little in the way of supplies, and they could often move what they needed
through territory that was off limits to the bombers. In addition, the ensurgents could fight the war
at their own pace, backing off when their losses became costly, and recommencing when they had
recovered. The slow pace—and the inability of the Americans to either drain the enemy’s will or to
build an effective government in the south—eroded American public support for the war.
Robert Pape has argued that there is “no evidence that executing the sharp knock in 1965, instead of
1967, would have produced better results.”67 Structural factors (including the economy and geography
of Vietnam) and the nature of the war itself helped insulate the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
against the effects of interdiction and coercive air power. Finally, even if an earlier all-out air assault
had convinced the North to stop supporting the Viet Cong insurgency, this is no guarantee that the Viet
Cong would not have continued the war on their own, and at their own pace.68
President Richard Nixon instituted a program of “Vietnamization”—a means of reducing the
increasingly unpopular American commitment to the war by placing the main responsibility for the
ground war back into the hands of the South Vietnamese. Along with this, he allowed the JCS to give
more freedom to U.S. air commanders in Vietnam. Operation LINEBACKER, designed to halt Hanoi’s
1972 spring ground offensive, largely achieved its purpose and appeared to put a settlement within
reach. But North Vietnamese negotiators stalled late in the day, prompting LINEBACKER II, an 11day campaign (December 18 to December 29) to bring enemy negotiators back to the table to sign a
final accord. The latter concentrated on military assets in and around Hanoi. On the 29th, communist
leaders indicated willingness to resume serious negotiations. This outcome reflected the impact of both
LINEBACKER campaigns, which were—by that point in the war—oriented to fundamentally different
circumstances and goals than the ROLLING THUNDER campaign had been.69
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Many observers, both civilian and military, argued that if a LINEBACKER-style campaign had
gone forward from the outset, the war would have been brought to a successful conclusion promptly.
Frustrated over the political constraints placed upon them, airmen argued—in the tradition of Harris—
that they might have won had they been free to prosecute the war as they saw fit. Writing in the June
1975 edition of Air Force Magazine, General T. R. Milton, USAF (Ret.) argued that LINEBACKER II was
“an object lesson in how the war might have been won, and won long ago, if only there had not been
such political inhibition.”70 But this perspective overlooked the crucial differences between 1965 and
1972. The success of the LINEBACKER I campaign was facilitated by the fact that, when it took place,
Hanoi had shifted to a conventional war strategy that was far more vulnerable to the effects of strategic
air power than the earlier guerilla war had been. And when LINEBACKER II commenced, the Hanoi
leadership already had achieved most of its political goals and was prepared to sign an accord that
would put it, ultimately, within easy grasp of the final aims it was seeking. These important distinctions
often were glossed over or ignored, however, and this had the effect of vindicating broad claims about
the decisiveness of bombing and reinforcing proclamations about its future application in war.71
The Air Force’s response to criticism implying that it had not lived up to public expectations was
not to try to modify those expectations, but rather to insist that bombing could be decisive—if only it
could be freed from political restraints affecting the timing and targeting of air strikes. Those air leaders
who had held important positions during World War II particularly resented the constraints placed on
them later. But two observations are worthy of mention here. First, there were few important targets
in Korea or Vietnam that were not hit hard by bombers (often multiple times). And second, World
War II was the exception rather than the rule: most wars in history have been fought within distinct
political parameters—not to mention legal and ethical ones. For political reasons, it very rarely, if ever,
will be possible to carry out what air forces have traditionally believed to be the most effective form of
a bomber campaign: an immediate, all-out strike on those assets most valuable to the enemy. Even in
World War II—the most “total” of all modern wars—limits on Anglo-American bombers were lifted
only slowly, over a period of years. And, even though the war was later considered a “good war”
fought for the right reasons, the Anglo-American public has sometimes shown uneasiness with the
unconstrained bombing undertaken at the end of the war.
After Vietnam, defensiveness inhibited USAF dialogues, and, for time at least, proscribed a thorough
and searching analysis of doctrine (and the applicability of that doctrine to differing circumstances).
There was still no satisfactory understanding of the crucial relationship between bomber raids and
desired political outcomes. In the conclusion to his 1989 book, The Limits of Air Power, Mark Clodfelter
wrote:
The tremendous rush of technology—which has produced gargantuan B-52s and sleek B-1s capable of carrying
30 tons of ordnance, and supersonic fighters capable of directing laser-guided bombs into a single warehouse
in the heart of a densely-populated city—has not guaranteed military success. What it has done, however, is to
create a modern vision of air power that focuses on the lethality of its weaponry rather than on that weaponry’s
effectiveness as a political instrument.72

His critique was notable not only because it was perceptive, but because it was delivered by a serving
USAF officer.
Air Power in Operation DESERT STORM.
The “Persian Gulf War,” as it came to be called, saw the first extensive use of post-Vietnam era
U.S. troops and equipment. U.S. Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, who led the military operation,
envisioned it in four phases:
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1. a strategic air campaign against Iraq;
2. an air campaign against Iraqi forces in Kuwait;
3. an attrition phase to neutralize the Republican Guard forces and isolate the Kuwaiti battlefield; and,
4. a ground attack to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.
The first three of these would be carried out by coalition air forces, and the final phase would be
conducted by ground forces.
The air campaign in the Kuwaiti theater of operations had three primary objectives: suppression of
Iraqi air defenses, preparation of the battlefield for coalition ground attack, and support of the ground
attack.73 The strategic air campaign over Iraq was designed to support the war aim by pressuring
Saddam’s regime directly on a number of levels. A primary intellectual influence on the strategic air
campaign was Colonel John A. Warden III, USAF, who had been in charge of the Deputy Directorate for
Warfighting Concepts within the Air Staff Directorate of Plans. A strong advocate of independent air
operations, Warden had conceived of a targeting theory based on five principal categories, envisioned
as five concentric rings (like the rings in a bull’s eye) that increase in value as they approach the center.
The focal point—his designated “center of gravity”—was the enemy leadership. Just outside of that,
in the position of second priority, was the enemy state’s energy sources, advanced research facilities,
and key war-supporting industries. Beyond that, in the third ring, was enemy infrastructure, such as
transportation systems. The fourth ring was comprised of the enemy’s population, and the fifth ring
designated the enemy’s fielded military forces. Warden’s ideas, which he promulgated effectively and
energetically, brought back to the surface some heated service debates over the primacy that should be
accorded to independent air operations.74
Warden was counting on developments in precision targeting to herald a new kind of air war.
He went beyond the idea of targeting government buildings and communications nodes, instead, he
thought in terms of cutting the enemy leaders off from the people. His was a targeting theory resting
on assumptions about an enemy leader’s control of his polity. Warden’s book, The Air Campaign (begun
when he was a student at the National Defense University), argued that air power allows for strikes
against the full spectrum of enemy capabilities, with leadership first and foremost. The five rings model
was an extension of the operational concepts he had first explored in his book. “Decapitation” might
or might not be possible, but it was only one of several approaches to largely the same end: targeting
leadership directly to seek “strategic paralysis” of the enemy. It was not entirely clear, however, how
this paralysis would translate into surrender.75
Only days after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, American military aircraft began landing in Saudi
Arabia. Schwarzkopf sent Air Force Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner into the theater to receive
incoming American air forces. The plan that Warden and his staff developed for the crisis in the
Middle East, called INSTANT THUNDER, focused on strategic air attacks on Iraqi centers of gravity;
it was designed to pit American strengths against Iraqi weaknesses, while minimizing U.S. casualties,
collateral damage, and civilian deaths. Warden sought to target the heart of Saddam’s regime—the
key structures, institutions, and resources that facilitated his control of the state. INSTANT THUNDER
aimed, ultimately, at regime change. It rested on a body of assumptions about the nature of the enemy—
and on confidence that U.S. intelligence could support an intricate air campaign with ambitious goals.
It was designed to place intense pressure on Iraqi leadership in a period of 6 to 9 days.
INSTANT THUNDER won Schwarzkopf’s endorsement, and Warden went to Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, to brief Horner. Uneasy with the plan’s failure to consider fully the offensive capabilities of
the Iraqi army, Horner modified it somewhat, changed its name, and appropriated several members
of Warden’s staff to comprise a secret, elite “Central Air Forces Special Planning Group”: the “Black
Hole.” As historian Richard G. Davis has pointed out, “If Lieutenant General Horner rejected the form,
he kept the substance of INSTANT THUNDER.” The main objectives of Warden’s plan remained, and
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these “continued to emphasize leadership; electrical, nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities; and
the other target sets derived from the five rings.”76
Following in the tradition of some of the World War II air power advocates who believed that
strategic bombing might preclude the need for a ground campaign, Warden believed that his plan
could stand alone. The 700 aircraft that were ready on the eve of war, would, Warden hoped, achieve
Coalition political aims. Schwarzkopf, following in the tradition of World War II ground commanders,
saw the air plan as the first phase of a larger, integrated air-ground liberation of Kuwait.
Even though the aircraft coming into the theater comprised the vast majority of the USAF’s
precision delivery capability at the time, the force was not ideally suited to the task Warden had set
for it. Technological evolution throughout the Vietnam War had yielded some promising results in
highly precise, guided-bomb technology. But the USAF had been leisurely in appropriating it and
integrating it into doctrine and mission statements: most of the combat aircraft procured between 1972
and 1990 (the F-15C, F-16, and A-10 series) did not include guided bomb unit-delivery capability.77
Still, the USAF had the capacity to employ air-delivered, precision-guided munitions with hard-target
penetrating capability, and this would become a centerpiece of its war effort. A dramatic new delivery
system in the U.S. arsenal was the F-117A “Stealth” fighter, introduced to the public in late 1988.
The Black Hole planners, led by Lieutenant Colonel David Deptula, updated the air war plan right
through the opening hours of the war on January 17, 1991; they emphasized simultaneous attacks
on target sets that would have overlapping and linking effects. Weeks before the kick-off of the war,
General Horner combined the Special Planning Group with CENTAF’s tactical air planners in a newlyformed Directorate of Campaign Plans. The Black Hole planners became the Iraqi Target Cell, and the
tactical planners became the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) planners. The latter, departing from
the practice of identifying individual targets, prepared to send packages of strike and support aircraft
(guided by an airborne controller) to hit all targets of opportunity within its allocated “kill box.”
Many hours before bombs began falling over Baghdad, seven hulking B-52Gs took off from Barksdale
Air Force Base, Louisiana, to begin a 14,000 mile round-trip delivery of air-launched cruise missiles into
Iraq.78 The Air Force, anxious to prove its “Global Reach,” did not wish to be overshadowed by the
Navy’s ship-based Tomahawk missiles about to launch from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Even
though Baghdad was a heavily-armed city with plenty of time to prepare for combat, the massed
Coalition air attacks largely overwhelmed the defenders. Thoughout Iraq, Coalition forces struck
command and control targets (including Baath Party headquarters), electrical facilities, and Scud
missile launchers. Anti-radiation missiles homed in on radar facilities and anti-aircraft defenses while
both British and American planes cratered the runways on Iraqi airfields. Iraqi oil refineries and storage
facilities came under attack as well. At the end of only 2 nights, Coalition aircraft had struck nearly half
of 298 identified strategic targets. They had won air superiority, and had cut off Iraqi electricity. The
stealth fighter-bombers proved their worth early on; indeed, one F-117A with two bombs could do the
same work as more than 100 World War II-era B-17 bombers carrying nearly 650 bombs.79
The great abundance of Coalition air power facilitated parallel attacks on arrays of targets. Rather than
attacking targets in sequenced priority order, Coalition air forces were able to carry out simultaneous
counter-air, interdiction, close air support, and strategic missions into Iraq. By mid-February, Coalition
bombers had struck the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, the Baghdad Conference Center, TV and press
buildings, and the Military Intelligence Headquarters. As the month went on, strategic attacks were
waged against airfields, nuclear and chemical targets, communication facilities, and mobile Scud
launchers. Fearing that Iraqi Scud missile attacks into Israel would prompt Israeli entry into the war
and thus fracture the carefully-constructed Coalition, the Bush administration placed a high priority
on targeting Scuds. No less than 15 percent of CENTAF’s strategic effort went into attacks on Scuds,
including launchers, as well as manufacturing, assembly and storage centers.80
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The ground campaign, which had been planned all along as the final phase of major combat
operations, finally kicked off on February 23. Simultaneously, coalition aircraft struck Iraqi airfields,
aircraft, and bridges near the front. Strategic raids continued to target leadership, and industrial facilities
in Iraq. Newly-developed GBU-28 penetrator bombs were used against high priority targets, including
the Al Taji command bunker.
In an interesting inversion of roles, B-52 bombers—so long associated with strategic missions—were
employed almost exclusively in ground support missions inside Kuwait. In postwar debriefings, Iraqi
soldiers readily attested to the unnerving effect of the B-52 strikes. Indeed, General Schwarzkopf so
valued the B-52 strikes inside Kuwait that he resisted their use elsewhere. In the end, only a handful of
B-52s operated outside Kuwait against targets that the Black Hole planners designated as “strategic.”81
But the attacks on troops proved responsible for the profound weakening of the morale and cohesion
of segments of the Iraqi Army, thus contributing directly to a shorter ground war.82
The B-52s required 40 percent of the USAF’s tanker force, as well as large packages of support
aircraft. By contrast, the F-117 fighter bombers, which were the only planes authorized to strike targets
in downtown Baghdad, required no support aircraft. One F-117 with two laser-guided bombs could
achieve the same level of destruction as 108 World War II B-17s with 648 bombs.83 Other fighter bombers,
including the F-111F and the F-15E, helped carry the bulk of the strategic missions, with air-to-air
refueling facilitating their range and effectiveness. This efficiency impressed the Air Force, prompting
high and sustained attention to precision systems through the 1990s.
Attacks on Iraqi communication targets had a corrosive effect on the speed and efficiency with
which Saddam could conduct his war. Rarely, however, were communications cut totally since the
regime resorted to more primitive means such as message delivery by bicycle or motorcycle. And fiber
optic nets were more redundant and elusive than the Black Hole planners had anticipated. The precise
military and political impact of raids on leadership targets—the focus of Warden’s theory—has been
difficult to discern. As Richard Davis concluded, “little solid data is available to connect the bombing of
leadership or command and control facilities with specific consequences.”84 And air planners who had
hoped to integrate and implement a program of psychological warfare found themselves stymied by
concerns over the sensitivities of Coalition partners, and by interagency conflict over the program.85
Strikes on Iraqi oil saw the collapse of refinery capacity by the end of the war. But the very fact
that the war was so short in duration meant that Iraq was able to rely on stored supplies for military
operations. Thus, in the end the oil campaign had no impact on the outcome of the war itself. Pressure
placed on the Iraqi population due to strikes on the electrical net and fuel more generally may have
contributed to the postwar uprisings by the Kurds and the Shi’ites, but did not lead to a weakening of
the Sunni commitment to Saddam’s regime.86 This failure of pressure to create political effects was of
course assisted by the strength of the Iraqi internal security forces; this paralleled, to some degree, the
situation in Germany during World War II, when air planners in England and the United States hoped
that deprivations might turn the population against an already unpopular leader.
The 5 months between the invasion of Kuwait and the commencement of Operation DESERT
STORM gave Saddam time to further disperse and hide his weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capability—a set of resources already dispersed in reaction to the Israeli strike in 1981. The targets
proved to be elusive, and postwar inspections revealed that many facilities had been missed by target
planners (who had operated with limited and out-of-date intelligence). Attacks on mobile Scud mobile
launchers failed to destroy any more than a handful of them, and, while attacks on known production
sites achieved some effect, the Iraqis had removed the bulk of it prior to the war. Thus, the considerable
effort dedicated to Scuds yielded results that were less fruitful than planners hoped or expected.87
As Richard Davis has pointed out, Scuds present air force planners with many of the same sorts of
challenges Army officers face in counterinsurgency warfare.88
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The Coalition achieved its main aims, including the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait,
and the right of the UN to install peacekeepers on the border, and to inspect and eliminate any
WMD in Iraq. The speed and apparent ease of the victory prompted many commentators to proclaim
that a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) had occurred, based on the sophisticated technology
employed by American forces. Indeed, the one-sided outcome had resulted from the interaction of
American proficiency and Iraqi incompetence. Poor skills and training ensured that Iraqi armies would
be punished disproportionately by the enemy’s modern military toolkit.89 Perceptive analysts warned
against reading too much into the victory, and called for more nuanced interpretations of the war and
its outcome.90
At the end of the day, the political result of the war was mixed: Saddam Hussein remained in power
and worked to quickly reassert and consolidate his authority within his borders.
Air War in the Balkans.
Out from under the thumb of communism, the ethnically-mixed regions of what had been the state
of Yugoslavia began to pull away from their center. Slovakia and Croatia escaped to independence
in the summer of 1991, quickly winning recognition from European states. But the Serbians sought
a halt to the disintegration, and took up arms to hold on to a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Strife followed, heightened and inflamed by extremist rhetoric. President George H. W. Bush was not
anxious to wade into the complex ethnic entanglement that was post-Cold War Yugoslavia, but the
situation continued to fray badly.
In 1992 the Serbs began to shell Sarajevo, the capital of the new state of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Bosnian
Serbs sought to displace the Muslim population and claim land for themselves. By the end of the year,
some 150,000 were dead from the bloody fights. During his campaign, President Bill Clinton criticized
the Bush team for not doing enough about the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia. Many analysts in the
United States feared the entrenched nature of the ethnic strife, and worried about how the United
States might get out of the Balkans once it got in. They also believed that the Europeans ought to take
a leading role in settling a fight taking place in their own backyard. After a particularly bloody Serb
attack on a marketplace in Sarajevo in early 1994, American planes flew in to evacuate the wounded;
thereafter the United States began to take on more a more aggressive role, helping to enforce the limits
and constraints that the international community tried to impose on the Serbs.
In 1995, in the Muslim town of Srebnica, Serbs massacred thousands of Bosnian men and boys.
Bosnian Serbs routinely raped Muslim women and girls. Later in the summer, the United States and
its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies commenced air strikes against the Serbs, while
the Croats turned on their former Serb ally and began a ground campaign to help drive them out
of Bosnia. Fearing a possible loss of power and a Serb collapse, Milosevic agreed to seek terms. The
peace, arranged during an extended conference in Dayton, Ohio, included the establishment of an
International Implementation Force (IFOR) to keep the peace in Bosnia; U.S. forces took a leading role
in what eventually proved to be a worthwhile operation. The U.S. public, however, remained largely
unmoved by the intervention, and the House at one point toyed with cutting off the funds for U.S.
troops in Bosnia.91
The 1995 Dayton accords did not, however, persuade Milosevic to confine himself to acceptable
standards of international behavior. In 1999, NATO went to war in an air-only operation to try to halt
the Serbian annexation of the province of Kosovo. Ethnic Serbs formed a small part (about 10 percent) of
the population of the province, which consisted mainly of Albanian Muslims, or Kosovars. The Serbian
minority long had dominated the politics of the province, spurring a movement for independence
led by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The failure to bring the opposed parties together at the
Rambouillet conference in early 1999 led to a NATO decision to try to coerce Milosevic and the Serbs
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into accepting terms. Perhaps relying overmuch on a faulty interpretation of why Milosevic signed the
Dayton accords when he did, the Clinton administration expected him to cave in under air strikes in a
few days. Quite to the contrary, however, he encouraged his forces to run amok in Kosovo. Muslims
poured out of the province and into refugee camps in neighboring states. Air strikes, waged from
high altitude so as to minimize the risk to NATO pilots, could not halt events on the ground, and the
strikes seemed only to unify the defiant Serbs behind Milosevic. NATO was cautious in all regards,
and there was considerable anxiety about whether the alliance would hang together long enough
to solve the problem. Clinton, who could hardly escape recent memories of the American public’s
ambivalence about Bosnia, would not agree to the use of ground troops, even as the situation worsened,
and Milosevic carried out ethnic cleansing. In May an increasingly alarmed NATO took advantage of
improving weather and intensified the bombing—attacking rail lines and bridges in Kosovo and Serbia,
and striking the electrical net inside Serbia. Significantly, NATO began to discuss the use of ground
troops. This put the Russians—old allies of the Serbs—in a particularly awkward situation since they
had no intention of ending up in a shooting war with NATO. Pressure from the Russians surely helped
convince Milosevic that he had to accept defeat. The bombing ceased in June, and the United States
and NATO sent a force of 60,000 troops (Kosovo Force, or KFOR) into Kosovo. Milosevic, who in the
meantime had been indicted as a war criminal by the International Criminal Tribunal, was ousted from
power in the autumn of 2000.
The air war over Kosovo led to a rekindling of the debate over whether or not airplanes can coerce
successfully enough to win wars on their own. Clearly, air strikes had not been able to halt the ethnic
cleansing and, indeed, hastened it. But the relationship between the intensification of NATO strikes in
May and the acceptance of terms by Milosevic in June suggested that the strikes on Serbia proper had
a role in the outcome. RAND analyst Benjamin Lambeth stated, appropriately, that “We may never
know for sure what mix of pressures and inducements ultimately led Milosevic to admit defeat.”92 Any
historical outcome is driven by a particular interleaving of events and perceptions of events, and those
seeking to explain it must identify the contributing elements and arrange them into a structure that is
logically coherent and robust relative to other possible explanations. But fitting together all the puzzle
pieces is a complex process that tends to develop slowly, as additional bits of evidence are brought to
light over time, and as the perspectives of all the key actors are brought to bear on the story.
The very fact that NATO managed to sustain a 78-day campaign that—Milosevic believed—might
have continued indefinitely must have convinced the Serb leader that his opponents were committed
to the cause. As another RAND analyst, Stephen Hosmer, has pointed out, Milosevic and others in his
circle seemed to fear that there might be no limit to the level of destruction NATO might be willing to
impose; indeed NATO, led by the United States and Britain, might continue escalating to the point of
“carpet bombing” Serbia.93 As much tension, political wrangling, and inefficiency as there was within
NATO, the members of the Alliance held together in a campaign that grew more intense over time.
(Milosevic himself contributed immensely to NATO’s level of commitment through behavior that was
reprehensible and deeply offensive to the international community.) Clear evidence that NATO was
preparing to authorize the use of ground troops was an unmistakable sign of this continued commitment.
Not only did it spur the Russians to pressure Milosevic into accepting terms, but it signaled to the Serb
leader that his political and personal fortunes were more at risk from a continuation of the war than
from a cessation of it. In addition, the playing out of the campaign revealed as well that Milosevic had
miscalculated on virtually every important strategic issue concerning the war.94
The escalation of the air campaign was driven by frustrated policymakers who increasingly reached
the conclusion that the only way to influence Milosevic via an air campaign would be to place pressure
directly on the leader himself, in part by bringing hardship down upon Serbian citizens within Serbia.
A main feature of the latter was the inclusion of attacks designed to damage to the electrical power
net in Serbia and to turn the lights out in Belgrade. The pattern of commitment and intensification
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seems likely to have been more significant to the outcome than the total level of physical damage
and disruption suffered by the Serbs in the air campaign. The pressure placed by the 1999 air war on
Serb civilians came nowhere close to the levels of pressure imposed on them by the earlier economic
sanctions resulting from the Bosnia crisis. Those economic sanctions essentially had destroyed the
Serbian economy in the early 1990s: Serbia’s industrial output and retail sales fell by 40 percent and 70
percent respectively, and inflation reached the almost unfathomable level of 116 trillion percent. Sixty
percent of Serbia’s labor force was laid off, and by December 1993, 80 percent of the population had
fallen below the poverty level. None of this had budged Milosevic. By the time of Dayton, the Serbian
economy was actually in recovery.95
The suffering imposed by the 1999 air campaign at no time approached this level of intensity. Neither
the overall level of pain imposed nor the striking of any specific target is likely, therefore, to have more
explanatory power in this case than the fact that Milosevic saw all the trends aligning against him, and
that the Russians made it clear that they would not continue to support him. It would therefore be
risky to attempt to draw specific targeting lessons from the Kosovo case—a case entailing a range of
idiosyncratic characteristics that, in the end, came together in a unique way. Still, in the years after the
Kosovo war, some in the USAF suggested that the laws of war regarding aerial targeting be revisited
to allow more expeditious clearance of targets in the enemy’s civilian infrastructure, in particular, to
allow “tremendous destructive power to be applied discretely and efficiently against a wide range of
objects that opportunistic, materialistic societies like Yugoslavia value.”96 Aside from the thorny ethical
issues raised by loosening constraints on targeting civilian infrastructure (especially since even the
most precise targeting of civilian infrastructure does not preclude the deaths of innocents), it rests on
assumptions that not only tend to mirror American society in problematical ways, but also may not
hold up across different cases. Under some circumstances, air pressure on civilian infrastructure may
produce a desired political effect; in other cases, however, it may have no effect at all other than to
bolster enemy cohesion, or to erode international support for the attacking force. More recent literature
has been more judicious. One USAF author recently argued: “The danger of Allied Force’s success
is that politicians could now view airpower as a panacea and substitute for jointness. . . . An actual
invasion obviously was not necessary, but Milosevic may have complied sooner had he faced NATO’s
joint military might.”97
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
In an attempt to go after the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush sent U.S. forces to Afghanistan in the autumn
of 2001. Because of the nature of al-Qaeda, targeting information with respect to leadership was slim.
The Air Force struck such infrastructure as there was in Afghanistan. When this did not coerce the
various elements of the Taliban (including al-Qaeda), the USAF joined the effort to use U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF)—working in conjunction with indigenous friendly forces in Afghanistan—to
attack elements of the enemy dispersed through various regions of the country. In addition to flying
some battlefield interdiction, the USAF flew lots of close support missions on behalf of soldiers on the
ground. This inverted the Air Force’s traditional mission preference, but pilots and aircraft proved up
to the task, despite some occasional problems centering on the Air Force’s strong preference for having
its own forward controllers direct fires (as opposed to Army controllers).98
During the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the USAF flew against its traditional set of targets in the
opening phases of the war. Enemy air defenses were crippled, and communications were degraded.
Due to American strength and preponderance, the USAF was able to attack a wide range of targets
simultaneously, including an attack on the Dora Farms complex when intelligence indicated that
Saddam Hussein might be located there. The USAF quickly won air supremacy, clearing the path for
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the ground forces that moved quickly into the battle. The Americans encouraged Iraqi troops to stay
in their garrisons and decline to fight. If they did attempt to maneuver, they came under prompt air
attack. When the ground war slowed due to a blinding sandstorm, USAF troops—with all-weather
capability—were able to pound Republican Guard units located mainly in the Karbala Gap region.
This facilitated an easier move into Baghdad by the Third Infantry Division, and a rapid capture of
the capital city.99 Possessed of far more precision-guided munitions (PGMs) than it had had during the
first Gulf War, and with improved target acquisition technology, the USAF was able to engage in an
overwhelming offensive that, once again, included effective support of ground troops. With excellent
air-ground communication and ever-improving responsiveness, the USAF has proved itself highly
capable of doing a mission that it traditionally would not prioritize. Indeed, so proficient is the Air
Force in close air support at the moment that a new defense debate centers on weather USAF close
air support ought to largely substitute, in the future, for ground-based indigenous fire support. The
question is a difficult and emotional one, and part of the question to be answered is whether Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), with its highly-permissive environment for aircraft, is a reliable model for
future conflict. If the air defense threat were greater, would the USAF still be willing to fly aggressive
close air support? The Army is not convinced on this point, and the debate is likely to continue.
Currently, the USAF is engaged in many internal and external doctrinal debates. Some of these
continue long-standing conversations about the effective identification and exploitation of enemy
weaknesses. Others however, relate to space power theory (including the protection of vital military
assets in space), and to the effective use of air power in counterinsurgency campaigns. One of the major
debates at the moment pits proponents of the Warden systems approach (with its heavy emphasis on
leadership) against proponents of battlefield effects. In his recent book, Air Power, Stephen Budiansky
has argued that operations in Afghanistan, and in Iraq (2003) have largely discredited the Warden
theory, or any “shock and awe” approach, and instead have validated the idea that air power’s greatest
contribution is to be made on the battlefield against fielded forces. He asserts: “despite the howls of
protest heard from Army partisans, who claimed that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had taken
inordinate risks by launching Gulf War II with only two heavy armored divisions…the effect of air
power on Iraqi tanks, surface-to-surface missiles, artillery, and troops left little doubt that Rumsfeld
was right: far smaller, lighter, and more agile ground forces could now do jobs that once required huge
armies.” Budiansky’s argument hardly has gone uncontested, not least because its sweeping language
oversimplifies a set of complex issues that require more analytical discernment than he gives them.
But he has identified the direction of the debate, and, in the final paragraph of his book, introduces
one more challenge: “The great historical joke on airmen was that, having struggled for a century to
escape the battlefield in their quest for equal status and independence—having fought so many bitter
battles to free themselves from the indignity of providing ‘mere support’ to ground forces—it was on
the battlefield where air power finally achieved not merely equality, but its claim to ascendancy.”100
Issues of air power are vital to all military services, and should be a subject of sustained attention
among professional officers. This is true for many reasons, not the least of these being the strong
political appeal of air power. National political leaders who are in possession of air forces are likely
to continue to look upon them as a relatively clean and cheap means of wielding force—a means of
using the military instrument of power without the level of commitment (and potential entanglement)
involved in deploying ground forces. Thus, they are likely to be used first—and increasingly, perhaps,
alone—when conflicts arise and lead to military interaction.
Conclusion.
Organizational cultures, the impact and memory of World War I, public fears and pressures,
assumptions about technology, bureaucratic politics, and service rivalries all have major roles in this
355

story. In general, the expectations of the major air power theorists ran well ahead of what could be
achieved in wartime, and many who lobbied for independent air power were guilty of over-claiming
and over-promising. They tended to assume that enemy states had weak points that could be exploited
readily. Their reasons for holding these views were, in many respects, understandable. But advocacy
often got in the way of critical thinking, and the theorists were disinclined to examine—or even
countenance—those arguments that might challenge their underlying assumptions.
The complexity of modern societies and economies does not make them inherently fragile, as many
air theorists assumed they must be. Human beings are adaptable creatures capable of adjusting to and
accommodating new circumstances—even very stressful ones—if necessary. It, therefore, is often the
case that what planners and analysts identify as readily exploitable weaknesses turn out to be much
less exploitable than expected. And, because the process of exploitation is itself difficult, often it becomes
rather more iterative and protracted than planners assumed it would be. In the meantime, the enemy
can continue to learn, to adapt, and to adjust to the pressures imposed. Under these circumstances, the
attacking air force often will be tempted to broaden or intensify the campaign in some way.
There is an inherent tendency among planners to mirror-image the enemy: to assume that he is like
us, that he values what we value, and that he will respond to threats and punishments as we assume
we would respond. But this tendency has proven, again and again, to be a misleading and dangerous
one. Precisely because societies are complex, we are prone to misinterpret and misjudge them. The
relationship between dropping bombs and producing a desired political outcome (a relationship that
one perceptive observer recently has called the “exchange mechanism” in air power theory) still is
inadequately understood.101 There is much to be learned, yet, about how and when different enemies
will respond to aerial threats, punishment, and coercion. As they move into their second century, air
forces—while more technically skilled and capable all the time—still have much to learn about the use
of violence to achieve political aims.
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CHAPTER 26
JOHN WARDEN’S FIVE RING MODEL AND THE INDIRECT APPROACH TO WAR
Clayton K. S. Chun
Military strategists and practitioners develop and execute campaign plans based on a host of factors.
Experience, intelligence, force structure, technology, legal, the threat, and environmental factors are
only a few elements that affect these decisions. Another key factor is theory. Theory attempts to explain
and get a reader to understand the occurrence of an event or state of nature. Theory can provide a
framework to consider how to approach a problem. It can help one consider issues or questions to solve
before making detailed approaches toward developing a theater strategy or campaign plan. If a theory
is sound, then one could use it to solve problems by predicting possible outcomes, identifying potential
problems, and finding options to get an opponent to take certain actions or modify his behavior.
Theory can provide a foundation to help military strategists contemplate or evaluate potential courses
of actions.
Military theory often is criticized, not without justification, for being unrealistic or static. Theory may
not seem relevant because it lacks details or does not adequately represent a situation. Additionally,
a theorist may have created an appropriate theory for his age or historic context that does not seem to
fit the contemporary environment. Societies, militaries, weapons, and political situations may evolve
such that the theory may not be relevant. A theorist may have worked during a particular period with
certain international conditions or technology available to fight a war. Over time, political relationships
change, engineers replace technology, and the character of warfare evolves.
Although compared to other weapons like small arms, aircraft are relatively new weapons; they
have changed significantly since the first Italian aircraft appeared in combat over Libya in 1911.1 Aerial
warfare has evolved from simple biplanes that dropped very limited bomb loads, which pilots hoped
would land within miles of their targets. Today, aircraft using satellite navigation systems can place
precision guided munitions within a few feet of the intended target. Airpower theory also has evolved.
Early air power theorists like Giulio Douhet developed ideas about aerial bombardment and predictions
about its impact on the battlefield with particular technologies in mind. In hindsight, Douhet’s theories
on breaking the will of people through bombardment of cities lacked credibility. Douhet argued that the
most humane way to end war was a swift attack on the most vulnerable element of society: the populace.
Perhaps more of vision than a theory, critics challenged his concept on moral, military, political, and
technical grounds. For example, Douhet advocated that air forces could use poison gas against cities
that “paralyzed all life” by killing civilians.2 Still, Douhet’s ideas had a great impact on future concepts
and ideas during the interwar period and World War II. Many air forces developed bomber fleets with
the thought that strategic bombardment would help destroy a foe’s ability to fight a war. World War II
demonstrated that breaking the will of individuals, let alone a society, by bombing was difficult. The
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan each suffered from massive bombing campaigns, but in each
case strategic bombing alone proved inconclusive. Lack of information about targets, bombing effects,
and the use of massive, indiscriminate attacks may have contributed to problems attacking the specific
industrial and political centers of Germany and Japan.
Since the end of World War II, technology has changed significantly to include jet aircraft, radar,
surface-to-air missiles, nuclear weapons, instant communications, improved reconnaissance and
surveillance, improved bomb damage assessment, and precision guided munitions. Ideas that were
once discounted as unrealistic might now find validity due to improvements in fighting capability,
increased urbanization, enhanced intelligence abilities to pinpoint key targets, and other changes. One
recent airpower theorist, John A. Warden III, believed that a state would collapse if sufficient pressure
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was placed on certain key elements of its government, economy, society, and military. Many World War
II U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) and British Royal Air Force (RAF) officers agonized over what targets
would accomplish this same goal. Eighth Air Force B-17 and B-24 bomber crews smashed industrial
targets, while losing thousands of crewmembers and creating massive collateral damage, in search of a
way to force Germany to capitulate. Warden built many of his ideas on concepts developed during the
interwar period before World War II.
Warden believed that advances in technology—precision guided munitions and stealth had made
revolutionary changes to the nature of warfare. Instead of using masses of bombers like World War
II, a single stealthy plane today, armed with precision guided munitions, could destroy a target. This
fundamental change in aerial operations increased the options a commander had available in battle.
Aircraft could attack several targets simultaneously with surprise. Precision guided munitions gave
aircrews the ability to destroy or disable a target with a single mission instead of returning repeatedly
to a target. Modern technology allowed air forces to avoid having to go to battle against the strength of
most nation-states, their military. Attacks on several centers of gravity created more chaos and damage
to an enemy than a single, direct clash between opposing militaries. Centers of gravity are targets
that if destroyed or disabled have a significant impact on a nation’s war making capability. Warden
thought that technology freed campaign planners to consider more options to strike an enemy. A main
concern involved not how many aircraft or systems could attack a target, but what type of target
should military forces damage or destroy? Commanders needed to consider what effects that strikes
on the targets would have on the enemy. They also had to question whether a particular sequence of
attacks made sense.
John Warden was able to employ his ideas directly in a campaign plan without the concern of
interpretation or potential misapplication of his ideas. Unlike some theorists, Warden was able to
translate his ideas into actual combat planning for operations in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The use of
his ideas and concepts for that situation is a prime example of how a military theory guided campaign
planning and how to think about what targets to destroy or disable. Although geared toward a stateon-state confrontation, one might ponder how much of his theory may or may not be relevant to the
rise of conflict with non-state actors or states that do not have discernable centers of gravity.
The Enemy as a System.
Colonel John Warden believed that nation-states operate like biological organisms composed of
discrete systems. In a perfect world these systems function in harmony and the organisms survive
and flourish. However, certain systems controlled other systems and were thus significant, while
other elements might appear to be vital, they actually were not important for sustaining the organism.
Warden believed that, like a biological organism, a nation could be stunned. Military action could
produce strategic paralysis. Strategic paralysis in Warden’s terms would make an enemy incapable of
taking any physical action to conduct operations.3 The key was to think of the enemy as a related set of
systems. By using this rationale, a strategist could distinguish the important systems and avoid wasting
effort on less critical targets. How one can attack an enemy depends on the objectives being sought,
the enemy’s defensive capability and intensity of resistance, environmental conditions, and the effort
and resources the attacker is willing to exert to attain his goals. But in every case, Warden believed a
systematic approach would produce the most efficient use of airpower. For example, striking targets
essential to a nation’s leadership or command and control functions might negate completely or at
least inhibit the ability of an enemy to defend its cities or other locations. If a country could disable or
destroy particular centers of gravity in an enemy nation, then it could stop that enemy from directing
its political, economic, informational, and military elements of power. Victory thus was assured.
Successful attacks on a particular hierarchy of systems might lead to a target country’s downfall.
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Warden believed that organizations from nation-states to terrorist organizations have a common
critical feature: some type of leadership. An individual or a command group with control capability
provides guidance and direction to that organization. Without this system, the organization would
flounder, and particular functions cease to exist or become severely limited. This leadership function
has become a vital “center” of action against which an attacker should focus its military actions. Once
an attacker neutralizes the “leadership” function, other systems become vulnerable for further assault
or become neutralized. Ultimately, the goal of striking leadership targets was to destroy the psyche of
the enemy’s top command. Determining the level of success against the enemy’s psyche is difficult, if
not impossible. Warden reasoned that an attacker could only view the physical manifestations of the
enemy that would help identify targets that would comply with this scheme.4 A prioritized scheme of
attacking leadership targets first, then others could provide a blueprint for a campaign plan.
Instead of attacking the “muscle” of the system, Warden advocated striking an enemy through a more
indirect approach and creating a similar effect. A military force could clash directly in a conventional
battle that could result in an attritional battle or a decisive encounter. However, if the leadership of the
state either was disabled or unable to provide guidance to its forces, it might be possible to render those
military assets useless much faster. Warden became an advocate for an indirect approach to warfare.
This emphasis was developed while Warden was a graduate student at Texas Tech University where
he developed an affinity to British military theorist, Basil H. Liddell Hart.5
Liddell Hart, a land power theorist, focused on an indirect approach to warfare. A veteran of World
War I, Liddell Hart saw the horror of trench warfare and the folly of direct attacks against entrenched
positions. Instead of concentrating on an enemy’s strengths, a nation’s land power should focus on
a foe’s weakness and then exploit it. If a military force could find an unlikely avenue to approach
and defeat a foe’s military, then a country might achieve its objectives with less casualties quicker.
Liddell Hart contradicted post-World War I conventional wisdom concerning a direct approach to
warfare. His ideas clashed with existing approaches like Carl von Clausewitz’s focus on trying to
defeat an opposition’s military forces first. Supporters of the “false doctrine of war” from Napoleon
and Clausewitz that saw enemy armies as the primary objective in war created the vast carnage from
World War I.6 Liddell Hart believed a nation’s will was subject to exploitation by attacking elements of
the society where they were vulnerable. If the elements that created the country’s peace and security
were threatened, then the state could collapse.
Warden, a career Air Force fighter pilot, predicted that airpower could play a pivotal role in conducting
operations through an indirect approach. Given the nature of modern aircraft, support capabilities, and
precision guided munitions, airpower could destroy or disable systems that range from leadership
to economic capabilities. Unlike the World War I and II aircraft that required a mass of inaccurate
munitions to destroy a command and control center or other target, technology had improved that
allowed a single aircraft to deliver munitions quickly within a few feet of its intended target. Aircraft,
if a country attained air superiority were free to attack several different types of targets simultaneously.
This ability to strike many targets would confuse an enemy by not letting a foe determine the direction
and focus of an attack. This approach allowed aircrews to conduct parallel warfare and a commander
could strike fast over a wide range of objectives. Other forces might need to attack in a slower, more
linear manner. For example, ground forces would have to defeat a similar military force first, before
proceeding to other targets like the rival’s transportation networks or leadership. Aircraft could bypass
the enemy’s ground forces and strike directly against the capital, industrial centers, or other targets.
Although airplanes could attack most nation-states independently, Warden was careful to note
that airpower alone might not be sufficient or efficient enough to use exclusively to attack an enemy.7
Warden is an airpower advocate and stresses the value of using that means to achieve military and
national objectives. However, commanders can use airpower to support land and naval forces as part
of a joint operation. Other military forces could also act as a supporting force for airpower. Whether
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a commander uses airpower in a supported or supporting role, Warden believed that one essential
element is the attainment of air superiority. Air superiority allows control of the skies that lets a
military force attack from the skies while being protected from attack from the air by the enemy. An
air force needs the ability to destroy enemy aircraft and support infrastructure, while protecting itself
from similar enemy operations. Once a nation controls the air, it can conduct air and other operations
without significant opposition.
Warden’s theoretical blueprint for using airpower would combine nonphysical (or in his term
“morale”) and physical effects on warfare. Nonphysical factors include the impact of fog, friction, and
other psychological affects on national leadership, military, and civilian populations. Physical targets
included military forces and means to fight war. Warden believed that the relationship between the
two was defined by the equation Morale X Physical = Outcome. He realized that attacking morale was
difficult. Modern technology could do much to reduce the impact of friction and fog through better
communications and the availability of information; however, a military force could not completely
negate friction, fog, or morale issues. A nation could not guarantee its ability to predict perfectly an
enemy’s intentions and actions. Unexpected enemy actions could also affect any outcome.
Physical damage to enemy forces or economic targets is easier to accomplish. If an attack could reduce
the enemy significantly through physical damage, then morale considerations might be moot. This
approach assumes that the nation can identify correctly the appropriate physical targets. Alternatively,
“morale factors” could change the physical dimension of warfare. Leadership could exhort workers
to produce more munitions or the populace to better support the war effort. Conversely, the attacks
on physical targets could alter the morale of population and affect the ability of a rival to discern an
attacker’s intention; this may create the fog of war. Pressure on enemy leadership or the adversary’s
population, based on physical attacks, could affect morale and may change enemy behavior. For
example, the relentless bombing of economic targets could cause significant disruptions in everyday
lives of workers. If conditions were bad enough, prominent members of the population might confront
the national leadership with demands to negotiate or submit to the enemy. Short of such radical steps,
opinion leaders and the general public might begin to openly question national policy.
John Warden’s Five Ring Model.
John Warden selected five general areas or systems that he believed were key centers of gravity to
exploit against any foe. This model provided a framework to analyze how to disable an enemy using
strategic paralysis. The systems Warden picked were leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure,
population, and fielded military forces. One could envision this model as a series of five concentric
rings with the most important element in the center and progressively less important ones moving
outward. A way to think about defeating an enemy was to attack the concentric circles from “inside
out.” That is, disable the most important center of gravity first and work outward to less important
rings. (See Figure 1.)
Leadership was at the center of Warden’s ring model. In his biological system analogy, leadership
equated to the brain of a living organism. The most important leadership in a state was the government
because it could ultimately decide to concede in a conflict to another state. Leadership, above all
else, was the primary center of gravity in a state. If the national leadership was isolated, disabled, or
destroyed, then the country could not function. Leadership requires an ability to gather, process, and
act on information—all functions that an adversary might strike and affect the functioning of a nationstate. Direct attacks against enemy leaders, command and control structures, or headquarters could
affect an opponent’s ability to continue a conflict. The Operation LINEBACKER II bombing campaign
in December 1972 impressed Warden. In his opinion, the campaign forced the North Vietnamese
government to return to peace negotiations with the United States.8 Hanoi had broken off diplomatic
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Figure 1. John Warden’s Five Ring Model.
efforts in the Paris Peace talks until Operation LINEBACKER II. Air campaign planners directed
these bombing attacks at Hanoi. Similarly, the combined Air Force and Navy attacks on Libya during
Operation EL DORADO CANYON in April 1986 on Muammar al Qadhafi, who supported terrorist
attacks on Americans, also impressed Warden. Neither attacks destroyed enemy leadership. However,
actual destruction of leadership targets might not be possible since political leaders might be highly
mobile, operate in areas that are not conducive to military action, or are too diverse to effectively
damage. Instead of direct attacks on leadership, Warden thought attacking other targets might produce
enough internal pressure to force the leadership to capitulate.9 Indirect attacks or effects against the
leadership might produce the desired effect on the enemy.
Leadership targets can include executive, legislative, judicial, and other functions. Campaign planners
could target physical governmental facilities. Attacking the means these targets use to coordinate or
control activities within the nation requires a Herculean effort. Additionally, striking leadership targets
of nonstate actors that do not have established facilities or locations can create problems. Conversely,
foes with a loose confederation of leadership, such as a cartel or combined revolutionary movements,
who are highly mobile, may not lend themselves to a rapid attack.
Living organisms do not exist on their brains alone. An organism needs certain raw materials to
live. Organic essentials provide elements to function, grow, and replace damaged tissues. Similarly, a
state cannot exist on leadership alone. It needs raw materials that include sources of energy, food, and
financial resources to maintain its existence. These raw materials provide energy to the entire state.
Attacking such targets, especially food sources, needs careful consideration because of ethical issues and
other strategic implications like the national and international opinion. However, industrial countries
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require oil to fuel industry and transportation that, if effectively interdicted, could slow industrial and
military operations to a crawl. The lack of energy can influence national leadership’s behavior and limit
severely actions by subordinate actors in the state. Warden believed that successive degradation of a
state’s organic essentials could lead to the collapse of the entire system; create conditions for a state that
make it physically difficult or impossible for the state to continue a policy or fight; and force significant
political and economic impacts due to damage to the ring.10 He thought that destruction of key targets
in the energy field, like petroleum refining stations or electric production facilities, could paralyze
a modern state. Industrial production, transportation, economic activities, and people’s lives would
be altered suddenly with massive disruptions rippling throughout the state. Pressure on national
leadership to respond or mitigate the damages could force policy changes.
Warden’s next ring is infrastructure. Infrastructure is like the vessels, bones, and muscles in the
human body that allows an organism to move and take action. Society’s infrastructure includes, among
other things, road and rail networks, airports, power grids, and factories. Potential infrastructure targets
include a long list of activities—some of which are more valuable than others. Attacking rail lines may
take months or years to destroy hundreds of thousands of miles of track. Destroying or disabling key
infrastructure requires a careful analysis to find vital elements that, if struck, could disrupt operations.
For example, instead of trying to bomb rail lines, a single bombing of a key bridge, tunnel, or rail
junction might accomplish the same purpose. Commanders may need to consider the post-conflict
impact of infrastructure attacks. Reconstruction of needed roads, rail lines, and other targets after the
conflict may add time and cost to returning the nation to a normal state after the war. It might be wise
to avoid destroying infrastructure you might need for your own purposes or will have to repair after
the conflict.
The fourth ring is the population. Attacking the population does not focus solely on bombing
civilians, but could also include using psychological warfare or other activities to reduce a populace’s
morale. Like an organism composed of millions of cells that can survive the loss of many of those
cells, a nation can endure some loss of population. However, economic and military support might
falter under air attack if the public perceives its losses are too high. The effect of bombing population
is extremely unpredictable. Examples of increased morale under bombardment are numerous. Also,
if organic essentials are limited, then a reduction in unessential parts of the population may actually
improve the state’s ability to operate by relieving pressure on limited resources.
The last ring comprises fielded military forces. Fielded military forces represent the “fighting
mechanism” that protects the state from attack. Warden makes an organic analogy to leukocytes or
white blood cells that ward off viruses.11 If states lived in perpetual peace they would not require a
protective force like a military or even police. Although fielded military forces are a formidable foe,
they depend heavily on the other rings for support. Instead of directly attacking this ring, strikes on
the supporting rings could sufficiently weaken these forces to the point that they were incapable of
resistance. Fighting through the fielded military forces—that is, making a direct military on military
effort—could take much time and cause many casualties before breaking through to the other more
important rings. Unhampered, the enemy leadership could operate normally and replenish fielded
military forces with which to continue the fight.
Commanders should take a systems approach to warfare. Instead of destroying an entire foe, attacks
on key system components could render a strategic effect. This type of approach forces one to consider
how to derive a specific end—paralysis—using specific ways—attacks on subsystems or rings. John
Warden’s theory of identifying and creating a priority of subsystems allowed strategic planners the
ability to attack in a specific order. However, Warden also stressed that a combination of varying size
and scope of attacks could create certain vulnerabilities to the rings themselves. For example, attacking
infrastructure, like transportation networks, could alter the ability of fielded military forces to move and
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engage against another military force. Likewise, striking industrial targets that manufacture weapons
or munitions could also delay or affect the fielded military forces. Thus, selecting the correct targets
and assessing the probable effect of their destruction on the system becomes a prime concern.
Many of Warden’s ideas had surfaced earlier. Early airpower theories and concepts in the United
States were developed as a part of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field in Alabama.
ACTS writers had advocated the use of precision bombing to strike economic targets to undermine the
ability of a nation to sustain itself in war. Writing during the interwar period, the ACTS faculty was
influenced by the brutality of trench warfare and the destruction during World War I. Perhaps by using
strategic bombers that could hit and destroy specific targets, the nation could avoid another replay of
a World War I type of conflict. Although ACTS writers also contended with issues concerning service
independence and the tactical use of airpower, the long-range, heavy bomber rose to prominence as
a means to influence events in a strategic manner. Army Air Corps bombers would attack selectively
targets like transportation, steel plants, ball-bearing manufacture, food sources, energy supplies, and
especially electrical production facilities.12
ACTS concepts focused on modern states. As a nation became more industrialized it generated
complex economic interactions and increased degrees of specialization. Thus, modern nations became
more susceptible to disruption by attacks on key nodes. A state could disrupt a foe more quickly,
efficiently, and effectively through the air than by trying to conquer its fielded forces. Unfortunately,
“precision” attack had not come of age. Low altitude bombing risked the aircraft and crews to air defenses.
High altitude bombing forced crews to deliver their ordnance with great inaccuracy that would create
collateral damage and cause massive casualties, a result ACTS faculty tried to avoid. Additionally, Air
Corps pilots needed current target information. Given the lack of intelligence capabilities during the
period, finding exact locations, functions, interrelationships, and impacts of destroyed targets may have
overwhelmed the Army Air Corps’ ability to accomplish actions ACTS had advocated. Technology
was not available to either find the proper targets or to deliver munitions with “precision. “ However,
today’s aircrews have access to a host of precision guided munitions, navigational systems, weather
reports, intelligence sources for targeting and bomb damage assessment, and other capabilities beyond
the wildest imagination of the ACTS faculty.
Warden shared some of the ideas from the ACTS faculty. A common theme was the attack on
targets using an indirect approach. Warden and ACTS concentrated on subduing an enemy through
a particular center of gravity. Striking economic targets was the primary focus of the ACTS concepts.
Warden used a series of targets to affect the will of national leadership. The ACTS approach of assaulting
enemy targets by strategic bombardment alone created doubt in many minds throughout the 1930’s
and into World War II. Warden advocated the use of airpower too, but also recognized the value of
other military instruments.
Airpower’s Value.
To Warden, airpower offered many characteristics that could hasten the downfall of an adversary,
especially if it were susceptible to his five ring model. Airpower offered a number of characteristics that
could serve a nation. Aircraft, by their very nature, could provide a very fast, long-range and flexible
tool for commanders.13 Given these characteristics, airpower can conduct parallel attacks against an
enemy that can hit simultaneously segments of all five rings. These multiple strikes can cause all types
of second and third order effects and create pressures between rings. The leadership ring is especially
susceptible to such pressures.
Airpower allows a nation to conduct parallel attacks since airpower transcends geography. Aircraft
simply can fly over enemy fielded forces and avoid marching through an enemy. Like other military
forces, airpower can mass against particular targets and is flexible enough to change targeting within
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minutes. The advent of stealth aircraft, improved battle management systems, precision guided
munitions, instant information, and the growing capacity to integrate and use a combination of joint
forces in combat operations simply enhanced this capability. Attacking in a parallel manner allows
a nation to place demands on the enemy that can overwhelm an enemy’s defenses. These missions
create confusion and doubt for the enemy’s leadership. Military force, airpower especially, can operate
on several levels: strategic, operational, or tactical. Although these attacks could deal a direct blow
against a foe, Warden recommended concentrated effort aimed squarely at a specific end—coercing the
leadership to change its behavior.
For Warden, destruction of key targets had secondary importance to the effects such destruction
would have on the adversary’s leadership. Since the United States can achieve almost unfettered air
superiority and can deliver munitions accurately, the use of airpower seemed logical. Countries around
the globe did not have the capacity to challenge the U.S. ability to conduct air and space operations.
Although Warden developed many of his ideas while the Soviet Union was a viable nation, his ideas
about airpower may have taken on more credence after 1991 when his concepts were tested in Operation
DESERT STORM. In some respects, the focus on measuring the impact on a function instead of the
physical destruction of a target forced a change in the way commanders viewed combat operations.
Effects-based operations became a key concern. Assessing particular targets for their impact on a
larger scheme is not new. During the Combined Bomber Offensive in World War II, AAF pilots attacked
ball-bearing plants to stop the manufacture of German industrial and military products. American
officers believed that ball-bearings were a crucial center of gravity in German industrial production.
Reducing ball-bearing production would severely affect engine production that could limit aircraft and
tank inventories. Unfortunately, German industrial production in some cases did not cease but actually
increased. For example, BMW 801 aero-engines manufacture jumped from 5,540 motors in 1943 to
7,395 units in 1944.14 Perhaps due to a shift to full mobilization or use of methods to ameliorate ballbearing shortages through alternative production or substitution, the predicted outcome did not occur,
despite its apparent plausibility. Still, strategic bombardment did disrupt the German economy and
reduce production. By January 1945, German Ministry of Armaments officials claimed that strategic
bombardment reduced aircraft production by 31 percent, tanks by 35 percent, and trucks a further 42
percent.15 The Allies attacked targets such as oil, transportation nets, and other activities, but the selection
of targets was difficult. Faulty intelligence, limited understanding of the German economy, and the
changing nature of that economy made the feasibility of successful economic warfare questionable.16
Although impressive in size and scope, the AAF bombing attacks could not stop German economic
activities. The German juggernaut continued until its dying days of May 1945.
What has changed since World War II is vast improvements in technology that allow one to strike
and make pre- and post-attack assessments against targets in a more effective and efficient manner than
in the past. Could advances in aviation and other support systems today identify, find, and destroy
targets that could cripple decisively an economy or national leadership? The dream of ending the
warmaking capability of an enemy, much like the hopes of AAF officers during the Combined Bomber
Offensive during World War II, might come to fruition with these advances. Effects based operations
require a commander to predict accurately the impact of the destruction of specific targets and their
eventual influence on an adversary. Economic activities today are even more complex than those
in World War II. Suppose a country wanted to disable an economy. What targets should the nation
bomb? With complexity and increased specialization from globalization, this task actually might be
easier today than in the past. Many nations today require outside resources and components to take
advantage of global markets and comparative advantages in prices, wages, and capital. Weakening
key transportation nodes, energy sources, or assembly plants that focus on a few industries might
shock a nation’s economy. Especially in countries that have found their niche in the world economy
due to globalization, John Warden’s concepts might still work. However, issues still abound. Does
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the nation have alternative sources of products and services that can substitute for the target? Due
to specialization of industrial products, would attacks on the economy create hardship on allies who
trade with or produce products within the targeted areas? What amount of collateral damage will
result from these actions? Suppose a country wanted to disable an economy, what targets should the
nation bomb? Reducing electricity could force a slowdown in industrial production, but this could
affect hospitals and other services that cause innocent lives to be lost. What if the country has few, if
any, visible targets, like non-state actors?
Warden’s theory assumes that airpower has almost unlimited access to attack enemy targets. To
gain maximum efficiency and effectiveness, a nation must have the ability to gain air superiority.
Warden takes great pains to ensure readers understand that air superiority is a “necessity” that allows
air forces to conduct operations and allows them to conduct attacks on the centers of gravity that he
believes would cripple a foe.17 Given this assumption, Warden proceeds with his theory, but what if the
nation cannot achieve air superiority. That condition may not be a problem for the United States in the
near future, but it might not be the case for other states or in a particular region. Additionally, much
of Warden’s theory assumes a fairly static enemy. A rival can react and might modify its behavior
to compensate for attacks on the ring structure. For example, instead of maintaining a strict chain of
command leadership, what if a terrorist organization or state fragments its leadership, or it dissolves
into a loose confederation of leaders? Disabling one specific leadership center of gravity may not halt
significant operations in the terrorist cell or a particular country.
Timing is also a concern. Warden assumed that a country’s air force could strike the enemy at
the onset of any hostilities.18 Attacking an enemy at the very beginning of a conflict could produce
significant shock value to an adversary. A tremendous level of parallel attacks could cause the foe’s
leadership to snap. Contrast this situation with one where an air force has a gradual build-up of attacks,
as it shifts forces or tries to wrest air superiority from an enemy. A foe could attempt to disperse its
economic centers of production (admittedly difficult), build redundant capabilities, or find alternative
sources of production. Targeting information, like the flow of activities, could change and cause the air
force to bomb unnecessary or counterproductive targets.
Warden’s ideas were tested in 1990-91. During Operation DESERT STORM, the United States
executed a strategic air campaign plan that reflected much of Warden’s theory. The uncontested use
of American airpower resulted in an asymmetric advantage over the Iraqi forces that pit U.S. and
coalition strength against Iraqi weakness. Iraq could not prevent the U.S.-led coalition from gaining
air superiority. Strategic bombers, land-based tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, naval aviation, and
multinational partners contributed to a massive attack on Iraq.
Planning an Air Campaign.
During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, John Warden served in the Pentagon in the Air Staff’s directorate
of plans where he was deputy director for warfighting concepts. This position allowed him to
experiment with many creative concepts of airpower employment. During the opening days of the
August 1990 during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, commander of
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) initiated planning activities that ranged from stopping a possible
invasion of Saudi Arabia to immediately pushing Iraqi forces back into their own country. One area
that Schwarzkopf found lacking in CENTCOM was the ability to conduct a strategic air campaign.19
Schwarzkopf sought out the Air Staff. His request allowed Warden to work on a strategic air campaign
against Saddam Hussein’s government. The Five Ring model would be subjected to the test of action.
Warden proposed a number of approaches within the Air Staff. His final concept was presented as an
Iraqi air campaign entitled Operation INSTANT THUNDER. The intent of INSTANT THUNDER was
to conduct a very short, 6-day, intensive bombardment that would “incapacitate” the Iraqi leadership
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and destroy vital Iraqi military capability. It would not touch “basic” infrastructure that would create
undue civilian hardship.20 Warden cautioned that this action was not designed to be a long-term plan
that would turn into an attritional campaign. INSTANT THUNDER would last days, instead of the
years of air operations by the Navy and Air Force over North Vietnam. The campaign plan seemed
like a great opportunity to demonstrate his ideas. A rapid campaign could allow American air forces to
isolate Hussein and attack systematically the centers of gravity of Iraq.
The five ring model capitalized on the strength of American airpower. The United States could
launch such an attack immediately as ground forces were building up in Saudi Arabia. If Schwarzkopf
conducted the campaign as written, Warden predicted it would minimize U.S. and allied losses and
could reduce Iraqi civilian casualties and collateral damage. This campaign, more importantly, could
eliminate Iraqi military capability for an extended period.
Warden developed a set of specific targets that closely resembled his model. The first targets were
designed to gain air superiority by destroying air defenses, airfields, and the Iraqi air force. After the
coalition achieved air superiority, its air forces would concentrate on leadership, command and control,
key internal production and distribution centers, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production
and storage facilities, and offensive air and ballistic missile capability. Warden did not include Iraqi
fielded land power in the INSTANT THUNDER proposal. Instead, Warden proposed to incapacitate
the Hussein regime and tie up its telecommunications, civil and military, in an effort to reduce national
leadership effectiveness. The organic essentials ring had several potential targets to include electricity,
petroleum and oil distribution and storage for domestic Iraqi use. Warden did not want to destroy
the export capacity or damage Iraqi’s long-term economic health. Aircraft would attack infrastructure
targets that involved railroads and some bridges. Air forces also would use psychological warfare
against the Iraqi population, foreign workers, and any forces in Kuwait to reduce Saddam Hussein
and his Ba’ath Party’s influence. The elements of the last ring, fielded military forces, which Warden
addressed, were strategic air defenses and delivery systems like bombers and ballistic missiles that
could use WMD or conduct strategic operations. The attacks would occur in parallel across all five
rings from strategic air defenses to Saddam Hussein’s palaces.
The key center of gravity was Saddam Hussein’s ability to lead and control his nation.21 Each target
attacked by Coalition air forces would support this aim. The destruction of telecommunications and
command and control capabilities would disrupt any connection between Hussein, his people, and Iraqi
military forces. Striking at Iraqi strategic delivery capability would reduce any regional threat posed by
Iraq at the time and into the future. Hussein had demonstrated his ability to use SCUD and modified
ballistic missiles to hit targets in Tehran in the War of the Cities during his conflict with Iran in the 1980s.
Hussein could use the same systems to attack south to Saudi Arabia or west to Israel. Eliminating Iraqi
strategic air defenses would open Iraq to continual attacks and reduce a large threat to American air
crews. A massive assault on electrical grids would cripple any industrial production and allow chaos
to reign among the population. The lack of refined petroleum products could hamper transportation
and paralyze civilian and military movements. These targets would underscore Hussein’s weaknesses
to his people and the world.
CENTCOM campaign planners modified Warden’s original 6-day INSTANT THUNDER campaign
plan. Warden had used the idea of a 6-day campaign as a device to sell the concept to Schwarzkopf.22
When Warden was asked to develop a campaign plan, the Iraqis had just invaded Kuwait in August
1990. The original plan was an option to strike back at Baghdad. Fortunately, the United States and other
powers had sufficient time to conduct an unmolested build-up of air, land, and maritime forces to eject
Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The Coalition air forces did conduct a strategic air campaign, but planners
dismissed the belief that airpower alone could defeat Iraq. Top military leadership and CENTCOM
planners did not believe Warden’s idea that a weeklong campaign that concentrated against 84 strategic
level targets was credible. Instead, the Coalition conducted a four-phase campaign after attaining air
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superiority, which included a longer strategic air campaign plan, followed by operations against Iraqi
air defenses in Kuwait. The third phase featured air support of ground forces to attrite Iraqi forces and
isolate enemy forces in Kuwait. The last phase used air and ground forces to push all Iraqi forces out of
occupied Kuwait. The first two phases lasted 39 days. The Iraqi government did not capitulate nor did
the will of the people erode significantly enough to affect Hussein.
John Warden’s theories had a major impact on Operation DESERT STORM and the air campaign.
Warden’s ideas on precision guided munitions, stealth, parallel attack, and other airpower features did
create some strategic paralysis among the Iraqi government. Although Hussein’s government did not
collapse, it was affected significantly during the strategic bombardment campaign. For example, air
strikes disabled communications. In a centrally controlled state like Iraq, unimpeded communications
was vital if Hussein expected to control every action in the country. Destruction and disruption of the
center “ring” aided the Coalition efforts to reduce Baghdad’s military capability and effectiveness.
The destruction of key national leadership, command and control, communications, industrial sites,
and other sites helped support Warden’s ideas. However, Iraq was a nation-state that had these types
of targets, and American air superiority really was not challenged. In the future, enemy nations or
nonstate actors may not present as lucrative a target to air forces as Iraq did in 1991.
John Warden’s Impact.
John Warden focused his ideas on getting commanders to consider attacking the enemy by
measuring the impact on those strikes on the enemy’s ability to wage war. His five ring model gave
campaign planners the ability to focus on a framework to paralyze a foe. Warden linked his ring attack
to a plausible scheme against a modern nation-state. The advent of advanced munitions and delivery
systems created conditions where these types of attacks might achieve what earlier air power theorist
could only dream about.
Warden’s ideas led to greater reflection among airpower advocates not only on the planning and
actual attack on targets, but also on the more complex factor of the effect of an attack on the enemy.
Commanders needed to consider not only the primary, but secondary and tertiary effects on the
destruction or temporary disruption of these targets. Commanders through the ages have planned
campaigns to meet objectives that require a study of the effects and assessment of target destruction.
The advent of greater precision, speed, and lethality has allowed unprecedented opportunities to
strike targets that can cripple a nation. Calls to limit damage and reduce human suffering have forced
commanders to operate under increased constraints as they seek ways to accomplish their aims. Careful
consideration of targets becomes a prime concern. Additionally, the ability to conduct parallel attacks
forces commanders to consider how to paralyze a foe arrayed as a network or a complex of indistinct
relationships. All these considerations need detailed study as commanders plan operations.
In the future, can national and military leadership gather and analyze sufficient information to
implement Warden’s concepts on the battlefield? Adaptive foes, lack of understanding about complex
economic relationships, and other factors can limit the ability of militaries to conduct set-piece operations.
Adversaries that gather information and disseminate it quickly via the Internet or cell phones can
thwart efforts to conduct parallel attack schemes even if the strikes occur almost simultaneously and are
separated by vast distances. Technologies that enable air and space operations to make John Warden’s
ideas come true also are available for an enemy to exploit as he develops countermeasures. Similarly,
foes that do not operate or react like a nation-state or mirror how this country might respond could
make Warden’s theories difficult to implement. Still, the focus on what factors make an enemy operate
as a system is a valuable way to think about an adversary. Military commanders might not overlook
targets or weaknesses that they could now exploit. Warden helped integrate technology and strategic
concepts that supported a major change in how nations use airpower in war.
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CHAPTER 27
NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE: JUST ABOUT TECHNOLOGY?
Jeffrey L. Groh
. . . the general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in war: All action takes place, so to speak,
in a kind of twilight, which like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they
really are.
Whatever is hidden from full view in this feeble light has to be guessed at by talent, or simply left to chance. So
once again for lack of objective knowledge one has to trust to talent or to luck.
									

Clausewitz1

What is all this fuss about network-centric organizations? Is Network-Centric Warfare an “emerging
theory of war” or just about technology? Scholars, politicians, appointed government officials and
warfighters are lining up to take sides on the utility of information sharing and networking U.S. military
forces.2 The business community continues to grapple with knowledge management, business process
management, information technology (IT), and enterprise networking to gain a competitive advantage
in the market place.3 There is a plethora of literature documenting how IT is enabling innovation in
business as well as the military.4 It is time to continue the dialogue and raise the awareness of the
benefits of network-centric operations as an enabler to gain a competitive advantage over current and
potential adversaries in the 21st century. If we agree that Clausewitz is correct about the unreliability
of battlefield information, could Network-Centric Warfare concepts and capabilities improve this
situation? The Department of Defense (DoD) has decided to pursue an aggressive policy to develop
network centric warfare (NCW) capabilities as a “source of warfighting advantage.”
The author argues that DoD is on the right track to pursue advanced integrated information
technology to enable warfighting in the future. He does not argue that information systems and
technology are the panacea to solve all the complex issues associated with warfare in the 21st century.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the fundamental concept of network-centric warfare
and the current DoD policy for networking the force. Then, the author will investigate the potential
of information and knowledge sharing on the battlefield to provide a competitive advantage against
potential adversaries. There are tactical, operational, and strategic implications to sharing information
and networking the force within the battle space. This chapter would not be complete without addressing
a few of the most prevalent arguments by those who caution against relying on information technology
and networking. The final section of the chapter will outline a few recommendations to proceed with
the implementation of network-centric warfare.
Network Centric Warfare (NCW): Developing a Concept.
It should not be a secret that the world is squarely in the age of information. One only needs
to view the nightly news, scan the newspapers, or pick up the latest technology books and trade
journals to understand the magnitude of corporate investments in information systems. “Worldwide,
businesses spend nearly $1 trillion a year on IT gear, software, and services—more than $2 trillion if
telecommunications services are included.”5 The enormity of the spending by corporations around
the world on new ways to capture, store, and share information inside and outside of organizations
continues to increase since the turn of the century. DoD is well aware of the potential benefits of sharing
information and knowledge to generate competitive advantage.
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There is a significant body of literature that addresses the benefit of sharing information on the
battlefield to develop a common operating picture. It is not possible to conduct an exhaustive review
of the literature related to NCW in this chapter. However, it is important to review some of the seminal
works that establish the fundamental underpinnings of this emerging and dynamic concept. The Office
of Force Transformation, Office of Secretary of Defense, as well as the DoD Command and Control
Research Program, are two of the conceptual leaders developing the theory of Network-Centric Warfare.
The latest publication from the Office of Force Transformation, Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare,
released in January 2005, establishes the current thinking on NCW by providing “answers to some of
the fundamental questions regarding NCW as emerging theory of war in the information age.”6
There is a significant body of knowledge published by the Command and Control Research Program
that provides the theoretical development of the concepts of Network-Centric Warfare for the Office of
the Secretary of Defense.7 One should begin the journey to examine the potential of NCW by reading
the book authored by Dr. David Alberts, Mr. John Garstka, and Mr. Fred Stein titled, Network Centric
Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority.8 A careful reading of the book will explain the
purpose and concept of NCW, how NCW has the potential to leverage information age technologies,
and a methodology to implement the concept over time.9 The authors proposed this early concept of
NCW as a point of departure:
NCW is about human and organizational behavior. NCW is based on adopting a new way of thinking—networkcentric thinking—and applying it to military operations. NCW focuses on the combat power that can be generated
from the effective linking or networking of the warfighting enterprise. It is characterized by the ability of
geographically dispersed forces (consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared battlespace awareness that
can be exploited via self-synchronization and other network-centric operations to achieve commanders’ intent. 10

The publications in 1998 set the stage for the intellectual debate on the potential of NCW as a new way
to examine the conduct of war in the 21st century with networked forces and enhanced situational
awareness.
NCW is about warfighting in the 21st century. It is about warfare in the information age. There are
significant new information technologies that enable commanders to know more about the enemy,
plan faster, make decisions faster, and synchronize sensors and shooters to create desired effects on
the battlefield. David Alberts, in Information Age Transformation, conducts a thorough analysis of what
warfare will entail in the 21st century; he postulates the challenges with warfare in the information
domain. “As the global society enters the information age, military operations are inevitably impacted
and transformed. Satellite communications, video teleconferencing, battlefield facsimile machines,
digital communications systems, personal computers, the Global Positioning System, and dozens of
other transforming tools already are commonplace.”11 The question then becomes how to transform a
military force with the appropriate capabilities to operate in this new environment.
The author proposes that the following NCW tenets should guide the adoption of information
technologies and transformation:
• A robustly networked force improves information sharing.
• Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared
awareness.
• Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.12
Alberts presents these tenets espousing the potential benefits of information sharing, networking, and
enhanced situational awareness act as an organizing function to transform the force in the information
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age. These tenets provide a series of research questions to analyze case studies to investigate the
potential benefits of a networked force.13
Alberts and Hayes continued to expand the idea of the inherent benefits of sharing information in a
networked environment in their next book titled, Power to the Edge: Command Control in the Information
Age. The book argues that current command and control relationships, organizations, and systems
are just not up to the task of executing warfare in the information age.14 It is critical to push essential
decisionmaking information out to the “edges” of the organization. “Power to the Edge is about changing
the way individuals, organizations, and systems relate to one another and work. ‘Power to the Edge’
involves the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organization (where the organization
interacts with its operating environment to have an impact or effect on that environment) or, in the case
of systems, edge devices.”15 The ubiquitous nature of IT makes the vision of achieving “Power to the
Edge” possible. The transition from strictly hierarchical organizational structures is already underway.
The Army’s restructuring to smaller more lethal Brigade Combat Teams and Stryker Brigades takes
advantage of more powerful networks to push information and thus greater situational awareness out
to the edges of organizations.
The power of the network has provided new and innovative approaches to command and control
organizations. One needs only to review the legendary actions of small Special Forces Teams on
horseback during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) to see the power of interdependent edge
organizations networked to accomplish desired effects on the battlefield.16 Small Special Forces Teams
operating with satellite communications equipment (data and voice) synchronized joint fires to attack
targets. Special Forces Teams adroitly coordinated and laser designated targets for Joint Direct Attack
Munitions from F-14, F-15E, B-1, and B-2 airframes during OEF with devastating results and accuracy.17
The relationship between sensors (Special Operating Forces, Predator, and Global Hawk) and shooters
(AC 130, B-1, armed Predators, numerous USAF fighter assets) linked through a network to command
and control demonstrates the potential benefits of the concept. This is but one example of the future
potential of a networked force that pushes critical information to those that need it when they need to
accomplish tasks in the battlespace. The U.S. military is in the early stages of understanding the full
potential of network-centric warfare and sharing knowledge out to the edges of an organization, i.e.,
Power to the Edge becoming a reality.
This brief NCW literature review would not be complete without mentioning the Network Centric
Operations Conceptual Framework Version 2.0. There are numerous critics of NCW calling for academic
rigor to be applied to this emerging concept. There is a need to develop a framework to produce metrics
that can empirically measure the efficiency and effectiveness of NCW. It is important to validate where
to spend finite defense dollars to achieve the greatest possible return on investment.
As a consequence, OFT [the Office of Force Transformation] and OASD-NII [Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Networks & Information Integration] began collaborating on an effort to develop metrics to test
hypotheses in the NCW value chain. The primary objective was to develop a rich and comprehensive set of NCWrelated metrics that could be used in experimentation and other research endeavors to gather evidence. This
evidence then could be used in experimentation and other research endeavors across the DOTML-PF [doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities] spectrum. This effort resulted
in the development of a Conceptual Framework for Network Centric Operations and a variety of other NCOrelated research, outreach and publications.18

This document begins to address a more rigorous approach to measure the efficiency and effectiveness
of NCW. This framework may provide measures of effectiveness and performance to truly measure the
benefits of NCW in the future.
The Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework (NCO-CF) proposes a series of concept
definitions, attributes and metrics to measure numerous elements of NCW based on the NCO-CF:
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Figure 1. The Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework.19
The NCO-CF defines each concept and attribute and recommends a quantifiable metric for each. The draft
schema presented in the NCO-CF is complex and untested. It is however, a step in the right direction.
This framework goes well beyond the general assertions of efficiency and effectiveness outlined in the
NCW Tenets. The NCO-CF “provides basis for quantitative exploration and/or assessment of NCW
hypotheses; and investment strategies and other DOTML-PF related issues.”20
It will take a substantial effort to validate the attributes and metrics proposed in the NCO-CF. The
metrics for many of the attributes are based on a Likert scale, i.e., a scale of 1-5. There is a degree of
subjectivity involved with assigning a value to the attribute. How does one truly measure quality,
consistency, currency, precision, completeness, accuracy, relevance and timeliness of information?
These attributes begin to investigate, experiment, and test metrics. However, the next step must be
to gather a committee of experts to further define the attributes and metrics based on more objective
criteria. Another approach is to begin gathering data using the proposed attributes and metrics to
determine the validity of the framework. This work already has begun with the publication of the
Network-Centric Operations Case Study: the Stryker Brigade Combat Team.21 This report along with the
NCW Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) case, A Network-Centric Operations Case Study: US/UK Coalition
Combat Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom,22 points out the difficulties of applying the attributes
and metrics of the NCO-CF in an empirical study.
The latest publication to explain the potential of NCW and NCO as an emerging theory war is the
Office of Force Transformation (OFT) publication, The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare. This
publication by the OFT touts NCW as an “emerging theory of warfare in the information age.”23 The
authors bring the numerous concepts associated with NCW, outlined in this compressed literature
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review, into a concise framework. The purpose of the framework is to begin to work the fundamental
hypothesis of Network-Centric Warfare. “The working hypothesis of network-centric warfare (NCW) as
an emerging theory of war, simply stated, is that the behavior of forces, i.e., their choices of organization
relationships and processes, when in the networked condition, will outperform forces that are not.”24
It is important to review this work in order to have a meaningful dialogue about the potential of
Network-Centric Warfare as an emerging theory of warfare.
The hypothesis stated above focuses on several critical variables prior to discussing the issue of a
“networked force.” Many critics of NCW focus mainly on the technology aspect of NCW.25 However,
NCW is much more than the information technology. First, NCW entails examining organizational
relationships and processes. Then, highly effective and efficient organizations are networked to leverage
shared knowledge and information in the battlespace. A balanced and holistic assessment of NCW is
called for to determine the potential of this concept on the modern battlefield.
The human behavior variable remains a crucial aspect of NCW. “The implementation of NCW
is first and foremost about human behavior as opposed to information technology. While ‘network’
is a noun, ‘to network’ is a verb. Thus, when we examine the degree to which a particular military
organization, or the Department as a whole, is exploiting the power of NCW, our focus should be
on human behavior in the networked environment.”26 This publication goes into considerable detail
outlining the numerous benefits of networking humans to share information and knowledge. NCW
is all about connecting individuals across the battlespace to leverage information age technologies
to reduce the “fog and friction of war.” There is no attempt to imply that all of the fog and friction
of war can be eliminated through networking forces. “This will not be the case. Rather, the issue is
how one creates and exploits an information advantage within the context of the fog and friction of
war.”27 However, there is a case to be examined that linking warfighters together on the battlefield
may increase speed of command and synchronize dispersed forces to more efficiently and effectively
accomplish objectives. Therefore, although the reliance on technology is apparent when discussing the
potential of NCW, it is important to examine the literature as it relates to the human dimension of the
concept.
The OFT publication, Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare, goes further to outline the
importance of human behavior in NCW by investigating the tenets of NCW. Figure 2 demonstrates
the important relationship between the information domain, the cognitive and social domains, and the
physical domains. The essence of the concept can be realized by understanding these relationships.
The information domain is where data, information, and knowledge are created, manipulated and
shared among warfighters. The cognitive domain is where the data, information, and knowledge are
manipulated in the mind of the warfighter. The all important social domain is where the interaction
between humans occurs. “This is also the domain of culture, the set of values, aptitudes, and beliefs
held and conveyed by leaders to the society, whether military or civil.”28 An understanding of the
relationship between the information, cognitive and social domains begins to address the core principles
of NCW as they relate to the physical domain, i.e., mission accomplishment.
The human behavior aspect of this schema is central to understanding NCW as a “source of
Warfighting advantage.” The networked force enables information sharing, shared awareness, and self
synchronization within the information domain. The real warfighting and decisionmaking functions
remain in the cognitive and social domains. Is there any evidence that units are actually operating
within this framework?
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Tenets of NCW: A Hypothesis Regarding Sources of Power
A robustly networked force improves information sharing.
Information sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of information
and shared situational awareness.
Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self synchronization,
and enhances sustainability and speed of command.
These in turn dramatically increase mission effectiveness.
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Figure 2. Tenets of NCW and the Value.
The OFT has set out to document that units already are operating in a network centric operational
framework. OFT is developing seven NCO case studies that apply the NCO-CF, gather data, and analyze
evidence. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review all seven case studies. However, the results
of Ground Operations (Stryker Bridge Combat Team) will illustrate the potential benefits of NCW. The
case study explored the hypothesis that “the NCO capabilities of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT) would enable information and decision superiority and increase force effectiveness.”29 The
conditions for the test were an operational environment (Small Scale Contingency) at the Joint Readiness
and Training Center (JRTC) conducted in May 2003. The baseline for this study was to compare the
SBCT against a nondigitized light infantry brigade. The study measured the quality of effectiveness
of command and control based on the degree of situational awareness, speed of command, quality of
decisions, and force self-synchronization.30
The results of the study are impressive. It is important to note that 75 percent of the SBCT had
networked battle command systems. A few of the most interesting findings are the following:
• Friendly vs. enemy casualty ratio decreased from a normal JRTC rotation with a light infantry
brigade from 10:1 to 1:1;
• Acceleration of speed of command from 24 to three hours in engagements; and,
• Increase in individual/shared information quality from 10 percent to 80 percent.31
The results only begin to scratch the surface of potential benefits of fully networked forces. One can
argue the rigor, conditions, standards, and data gathering methods for this study. However, these
results should stimulate additional rigorous experiments to validate the return on investment of
maneuvering a networked force. The Army has yet to determine the actual benefits and effectiveness of
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the networked SBCTs serving in OIF. It will be interesting to compare the results from this JRTC study,
quantitative and qualitative, to the data collected in Iraq in ongoing counterinsurgency operations.
It should then be possible to acquire a better understanding of the effectiveness of a networked force
in an actual combat environment. Also, there is much more work to be done to analyze the potential
benefits of networked forces at the operational and strategic levels of war.
Network-Centric Warfare: The Silver Bullet?
Now that the literature review is complete, it is possible to investigate the potential of NCW. This
author has not found any proponents of NCW touting that this concept is the “Silver Bullet” to solve
all the problems of future warfare. Many of the same problems that have plagued warfighters in the
past exist today and will exist in the future: fog and friction, competing advances in technologies, the
unpredictable nature of human behavior on the battlefield, and asymmetric warfare to name only a
few. The issue is not the existence of these challenges to modern warfare, but how one exploits the
advantages of information to mitigate and exploit strengths in the force to achieve objectives.32 Are the
potential benefits of NCW worth the opportunity costs associated with aggressively moving forward
with the implementation of this new concept?
The concept of Network Centric Warfare already has moved beyond the “bumper sticker” stage.
NCW is not a fad that will go quietly into the night. There is little doubt that significant finite resources
are being expended to pursue NCW capabilities. DoD spending in the area of communications and
electronics is approaching the $60 Billion level for 2006.33 There may be changes to terminology, shifts
in policy, and alterations in implementation plans. However, the core concepts that relate to leveraging
the power of information will remain. The DoD and senior military leaders have been consistent in their
support of a networked force. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has concisely stated the importance
a fully networked force in the Transformation Planning Guidance. “. . . We must achieve: fundamentally
joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects
across the battlespace. Realizing these capabilities will require transforming our people, processes, and
military forces.”34 Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, former Commander U.S. Joint Forces Command,
stated, “A fully collaborative and networked force is an imperative, not a luxury.”35 Commandant of
the U.S. Marine Corps General Michael Haggee said, “The capability to connect disparate units spread
over the battlefield will help to provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to commanders
who can then call in fire support . . . Information Technology (IT) also will be critical to Sea Basing,
a key component of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 Concept.”36 The Army’s former Training and Doctrine
commander, General Kevin Byrnes, remarked that, “The Army is addressing immediate gaps in today’s
networks as it continues to develop the essential capabilities for the future—Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical, Joint Tactical Radio System, Joint Command and Control, Future Combat system,
Land Warrior and the organizations that will fight in this net-centric world.”37 The question is not if
DoD will proceed with NCW, but how.
NCW Way Ahead.
DoD has a plan for the implementation of NCW. The plan calls for a holistic approach to the
implementation of NCW that investigates the potential of NCO in joint, multinational, and interagency
operations. As previously discussed in this chapter, there has been a significant effort to establish the
theoretical underpinnings of the concept. The most recent publication, Implementation of Network-Centric
Warfare, establishes the outline of the plan to move forward with NCW. The next part of the process
was to begin to study the tenets of NCW through case studies. Additionally, the Services are working
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to integrate information systems, sensors, and decisionmaking processes and technology to leverage
the capabilities of a fully networked joint force. The Air Force Command and Control Constellation
network is an example of the integration of C2; ISR; tankers; space, ground, and sea-based systems; and
strike platforms to achieve shared battlespace awareness to maximize effects.38 Constellation works
with FORCEnet (U.S. Navy), and LandWarNet (U.S. Army) to achieve synergy on the battlefield.
It is not in the scope of this chapter to examine all of the specific subelements of the implementation
plan for NCW. However, there are several key pieces that provide a flavor for the journey ahead. It is
important to remember that NCW is, in fact, a journey and not a particular destination. This is a dynamic
process. Theories will be tested, concepts will be modified, technology will continue to advance, and
budgeting priorities will shift over time. The overall path leads to a convergence of disparate sensor and
command and control systems to create synergy among the numerous joint information systems. Many
of the critics of NCW focus solely on the technology aspect of the concept. This is a short sited approach
to a complex transformation in thinking about warfare to leverage technology to gain a competitive
advantage over potential adversaries. “Progress in implementing network-centric warfare cannot be
measured solely by focusing on one dimension, such as technology or doctrine. Rather, progress must
be assessed in terms of the maturity of mission capabilities, that integrate key elements of DOTMLPF
(Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel (technology), Leadership and Education, Personnel, and
Facilities).”39
A program that highlights the potential advantages of NCW is the Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2/BFT) Blue Force Tracking systems. FBCB2/BFT was used extensively during
OIF to monitor the maneuver of U.S. Army, U.S. Marine, U.S. Special Forces, and British ground forces
during the conflict. FBCB2/BFT uses the global positioning system and numerous sensors to pinpoint
units on the battlefield. This capability provided unprecedented situational awareness to commanders
at all levels on the battlefield. The qualitative data acquired from interviews with those on the ground
validates the utility of acquiring better situational awareness. Leaders from General Tommy Franks,
U.S.A. (Ret) down to battalion and company commanders marveled at the ability to track unit progress
during major combat operations.40 The data available through FBCB2/BFT allowed commanders to
quickly adjust to changing operational conditions and manage complex logistical situations.
The Global Information Grid-Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) program will provide the backbone
to facilitate NCO in the future. It is difficult to discuss NCW without touching on the importance
of the GIG-BE. GIG-BE is the technology that will facilitate numerous NCW initiatives in the years
ahead. Major General Marilyn Quaglotti, Vice Director of the Defense Information Agency (DISA),
described the vision for the GIG as a single secure Grid providing seamless end-to-end capabilities to
all warfighting, national security and support users.41 DISA achieved initial operational capability of
the GIG-BE at six locations around the world on September 30, 2004. Final operational capability for
the GIG-BE is expected at 92 sites by September 30, 2005.42 DISA announced full operational capability
of the GIG-BE in December 2005.
It is essential to continue the development of the GIG-BE to realize the potential benefits of NCW.
GIG-BE provides the necessary technology to facilitate the interaction of sensors, linked to command
and control, to effectively engage shooter platforms to achieve desired effects on the battlefield. GIG-BE
will provide necessary bandwidth to support requirements at all levels of warfare. “GIG-BE will create a
ubiquitous “bandwidth-available” environment to improve national security intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance, and command and control information-sharing.”43 The warfighters’ ability to have
access to necessary bandwidth with the appropriate integrated information systems across the services,
DoD, joint, and interagency communities has the potential to truly stimulate innovative approaches to
solving complex tasks across the spectrum of conflict. DoD is far from achieving this lofty goal at this
time. Also, there is no guarantee that as the pieces fall into place that the expectations of NCW will
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be achieved. However, the early indications of the potential synergy afforded by networked forces
continue to form a powerful augment to continue down this path.44 This is not to say that there is not
room for caution as DoD and the Services invest large portions of their budgets to technology.
The Genie and NCW.
Let us postulate for a moment that this chapter convinced you that the Genie representing the power
of knowledge through collaboration enabled by a robust network (information system) characterized
by the latest information technology is outside the bottle. The challenge is to ask for the correct wishes
that would facilitate achieving the principles and tenets outlined in the NCO-CF. There are numerous
potential disadvantages to NCW. One could easily ask the Genie for a worthless wish. There is a fairly
substantial list of those who point out the shortcomings of NCW.45 These authors provide a valuable
service to highlight the potential deficiencies in the theoretical underpinnings of NCW as well as
outlining the opportunity costs associated with pursuing this extremely expensive transformation of the
defense information architecture. The naysayers stimulate dialogue and debate and assist proponents
and decisionmakers to better allocate scarce resources in pursuit of NCW capabilities.
The disadvantages of NCW are well-documented in the literature. Numerous scholars and
warfighters have taken the time to thoughtfully outline the potential pitfalls in the pursuit of NCW
capabilities. It would be impossible to enumerate all of the explicit and implicit disadvantages outlined
by the critics. However, it is useful to highlight a few of the major concerns that deserve further attention
and study in the years ahead:
• NCW places too much emphasis on tactics and the tactical nature of war.
• U.S. advances in information technology will outpace our allies and potential coalition partners
ability to operate together on the battlefield.
• More information and superior information technologies do not translate into information
dominance.
• Situational awareness is not going to eliminate the fog and friction of war.
• Too much speed of command can lead to unsound decisions.46
• NCW ignores the human dimension of warfare.
• Technology is dictating strategy. “[NCW] driven by its self-centered concern with technology
for technology sake.”47
• NCW and its reliance on information technology fails to address the emergence of the current
and future threat posed by insurgency, terrorists, Netwars, and 4th Generation Warfare. 48
The articulated disadvantages help to focus research, funding, and execution of NCW in the years
ahead. Also, many of these possible negative aspects will be addressed as DoD publishes empirical
evidence to refute these concerns.
The proponents of NCW recognize these potential negative aspects of NCW. DoD, headed by
the Office of Force Transformation, is working to harness the power of industry, academia, and the
military community at large to thoughtfully address each of these concerns with rigorous conceptual
and empirical study. Colonel Douglas Macgregor, USA (Ret.), a well-known critic of numerous aspects
of Army transformation, understands the potential benefits of technology and acquiring information
on the battlefield. “In the pursuit of knowledge, the U.S. Navy has broken new ground in context of
network-centric warfare with its cooperative engagement capability (CEC). This system distributes raw
sensor and weapons data among warfighting units, enabling them to combine and share composite
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data in a coordinated joint defense.” 49 This is why it is critical to proceed with the study and focused
conceptualization of how technology can enable and facilitate warfighting in the 21st century.
Moving Forward: Course of Action Missouri.
It should be apparent by now that this author is an advocate of NCW. This should not imply total
agreement with the concept. This author supports the continued study of how the principles of NCW
will leverage information and knowledge on the battlefield. It is understandable that the academic
community and even warfighters want to see solid evidence supporting the need to make large
investments of scarce funding to pursue NCW capabilities. Thus, there is a requirement to develop a
strategy and course of action that clearly demonstrates the return on investment to stakeholders, i.e.,
Course of Action (COA) Missouri. The designation of COA Missouri was selected based on the state of
Missouri’s nickname of the “show me state.” NCW will need to clearly demonstrate value added to
the warfighter. Elements of this proposed course of action already are beginning to take shape in the
Office of Force Transformation. The empirical evidence and future studies begin to outline the potential
of aligning the appropriate technology to support joint warfighting in a collaborative information
environment. So what are the key elements of COA Missouri?
The Human Dimension of Warfare.
As previously discussed, many of the critics state that NCW does not address human behavior
in warfare appropriately. The NCW literature does address the importance of the interaction of the
cognitive, social, and information domains as an essential element of NCW. To address this concern, the
Office of Force Transformation should focus future research and publications on the human dimension
and leadership issues associated with information age warfare. There is adequate coverage in the current
literature to indicate that the warfighter on the battlefield is and will remain the key to success and not
the technology. However, the current case studies focus mainly on the enabling technology related
to organizational effectiveness. Future studies should examine the effects of technology on human
behavior in a combat environment at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare. Academic
scholars in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and psychology should work with the developers of
the NCO-CF to investigate the potential benefits as well as the negative aspects of NCW in the human
behavior domain. The Office of Force Transformation has established transformation chairs at all of the
Senior Service Colleges and Service Academies. These scholars would be a good place to begin studies
investigating human behavior and leadership challenges to warfare in the information age. The results
of this work should be published and disseminated for scholarly examination, critique, and additional
study.
NCO-CF Attributes and Metrics.
There is little doubt the developers of the NCO-CF are in the early stages of defining rigorous
attributes and associated metrics to conduct empirical studies of the model. Two of the NCW published
case studies have stated that attributes and metrics must be further defined.50 The U.S./UK case study
on NCO highlighted several insightful observations and recommendations about the NCO-CF:
• The language of the NCO-CF be changed so it is better understood by combat units and nonU.S. forces.
• Quantifying metrics related to combat operations—as was done for this case study—can be very
difficult. Beyond this report, it is recommended that a focused effort be made to incorporate into
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the NCO-CF recommendations for improvement and lessons learned from the application of
NCO-CF within various case studies.
• Certain definitions and corresponding metrics difficult to translate into meaningful interview
questions.
• Many attributes definitions and metrics are liable to variations in interpretation.
• Difficult to identify data sources.
• Weakness in consistency and completeness in descriptions, explanations, measures and metrics
for each of the attributes.51
• The Stryker BCT NCW Case Study called for the development of additional metrics:
• Develop metrics that reflect the degree to which the development, maintenance, and sharing of
the Common Operational Picture critically depends on the interaction of technology, training
and personnel experience.
• Current metrics do not measure the synergy between net-centric current operations and
improved planning in land warfare.
• Metrics do not exist that reflect the degree to which the Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP)
has been properly reengineered to exploit the potential advantages of information networks.
• Metrics are required to reflect the degree to which process design, technology, business rules,
training, personnel experience and other factors combine to either enhance or impede effective
and efficient collaboration.52
These observations highlight the requirement to conduct focused research to develop appropriate new
attributes and metrics based on lessons learned in previous studies. This study could provide new
insights and directions to develop the appropriate NCW capabilities.
Convergence of Services’ Information Systems.
A further defined NCO-CF with appropriate attributes and metrics will assist in selecting the correct
enabling technologies. Information technology and systems will remain the cornerstone of the enabling
technologies to create the competitive advantage against U.S. adversaries in the future. Currently,
there is a proliferation of waveforms, software, and hardware dispersed throughout the current DoD
information system. There should be little doubt that the “to be” DoD information system supporting
NCW was based on the convergence and interoperability of the enterprise architecture. Voice, video, and
data communications must be seamlessly shared between the services in an interoperable information
system. This is the essence of transformational communications.53
The GIG-BE became fully operational in December 2005 providing the backbone for a DoD
information system to support Joint communications and enable NCW. The services must continue
to fund initiatives to integrate and upgrade their information systems. FORCEnet (U.S. Navy),
Constellation C2 (U.S. Air Force), and LandWarNet (U.S. Army) have the potential to move toward
an interoperable Joint communications network supported by the GIG-BE. “Operationally, the
foundation of transformational communications rests on four primary supports: the Transformational
Satellite Communications System (TSAT), the Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIGBE), the Warfighter Information Network Tactical system (WIN-T), and the Joint Tactical Radio System
(JTRS).” 54 The JTRS initiative provides the promise of a joint communications system that will support
information sharing between the Services. The integration and convergence of Services’ information
systems and the abundance of disparate waveforms must remain a high priority.
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Network-Centric Warfare: Proceed with Caution.
This chapter has demonstrated that NCW is much more than developing an integrated DoD
information system on steroids. NCW is more than just technology. In order to argue the merits of NCW
as more than just information technology, it is essential to review the body of literature that supports
the fundamental underpinnings of the concept. This chapter has provided a brief literature review of
the key documents to bring the dialogue on the merits of NCW up to date. NCW is still an emerging
concept yet to be fully developed and validated. The recently published OFT NCW case studies begin
to illustrate the potential of leveraging information and knowledge on the battlefield. However, there
is still much work to be done to demonstrate benefits of NCW at the operational and strategic levels of
war.
DoD should continue to aggressively pursue case studies that investigate the relationships in the
NCO-CF that deal with the human dimension of warfare. The interaction between the information,
cognitive, physical domains enabled by appropriate technologies should be a priority. There should
be collaboration between scholars in the fields of psychology, sociology, and anthropology to examine
the implications of NCO on human behavior and leadership. Next, this chapter has provided ample
evidence that it is time to reexamine the attributes and metrics associated with the NCO-CF. Finally, the
Services and DoD must continue to work the “network” in terms of interoperability and convergence
of unique applications, waveforms, and information technologies. A clearly articulated action plan
for NCW that includes these recommendations will continue to move NCW in the right direction to
harness the power of information on the battlefield to support the warfighter.
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APPENDIX I
GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY FORMULATION
GENERAL
Strategy is an art and a highly creative one. It is also somewhat scientific, in that it follows certain
patterns which require a common understanding of terminology, adherence to certain principles, and
disciplined, albeit creative, thought processes. Remember that these strategy formulation guidelines
are not formulas. Strategy will be developed in keeping with the particular features of the time, place,
and personalities involved. Nevertheless, these guidelines offer an approach to address the complexity
of strategy, and are intended for strategists attempting to achieve the coherence, continuity, and
consensus that policymakers seek in designing, developing and executing national security and military
strategies.

Figure 1. Strategy Formulation Model.
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NATIONAL PURPOSE
This is the start point for the entire process. Enduring values and beliefs embodied in the national
purpose represent the legal, philosophical and moral basis for continuation of the American system.
From the nation’s purpose, as well as an understanding of the nation’s domestic and global needs, the
United States derives its enduring core national interests in the grand strategic appraisal process. The
strategist should return to these considerations in terms of risk assessment at every derivative level of
strategy formulation.
CORE NATIONAL INTERESTS/ENDS
There are three generally agreed upon core U.S. national interests: physical security, defined as the
protection against attack on the territory and people of the United States in order to ensure survival
with fundamental values and institutions intact; promotion of values; and economic prosperity. Some
practitioners and scholars argue that existence of a favorable world order is also a core national interest
and has been since our entry into World War II. However, we will focus primarily on the first three.
These core interests are translated into three grand strategic objectives: preserve American security,
bolster American economic prosperity, and promote American values. All administrations focus on
these objectives, but depending upon the assessments of threats and opportunities, as well as other
variables such as personal beliefs and unique circumstances, Presidents establish different strategic
visions of America’s role in the world, often causing them to choose to emphasize one objective over
the others. For the Carter administration, the initial emphasis was on human rights; for the Reagan
administration, it was security; and for the Clinton administration, it was the economy. Security is
once again the top priority, but in an increasingly globalized world populated by non-state actors with
possible access to weapons of mass destruction, achieving physical security paradoxically may require
an equal emphasis on promoting democratic values and generating global economic prosperity.
GRAND STRATEGY/STRATEGIC VISION
At the grand strategic level, the ways and means to achieve strategic objectives are based on the
national leadership’s strategic vision of America’s role in the world that U.S leaders believe will best
achieve U.S. core national objectives.
Throughout America’s history, this vision has ranged from isolationism to global engagement,
containment of Communism, and American primacy. In order to be effective, each new administration
has to express a vision for the U.S. role in the world that does not outrun the experience of the American
people and thus lose the decisive authority or domestic consensus to implement the strategic vision. Is
the vision, in other words, suitable and acceptable?
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, had to act carefully prior to World War II as he moved
the American grand strategic vision from isolationism to one of global engagement. And within 5 years
after the end of that war, the perception of external threat allowed President Harry S Truman to gain
support for the grand strategic vision of containment—focused on containing the Soviet Union on the
Eurasian landmass.
Grand strategic means involve consideration of America’s national elements of power at the
broadest level. Given the state of the international and domestic environments and the scope of the
administration’s strategic vision of the U.S. role in the world, a key consideration is the feasibility of
employing sufficient U.S. national power to achieve the core objectives.
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NATIONAL POLICY
Based on grand strategic decisions, the U.S. political leadership provides national policy in the form
of broad guidance concerning America’s global role in pursuit of the core national objectives. This policy
is the start point for strategy formulation at the national level. National policy is conveyed in many
iterative and cumulative forms ranging from formal national security directives and pronouncements
in presidential and cabinet-level speeches to presidential replies to press queries and cabinet-level
appearances on current affairs television shows.
STRATEGY FORMULATION PROCESS
General.
Inherent in this more detailed strategy process is an appropriate degree of analysis designed to
illuminate alternatives in the face of recognized uncertainties. A general outline for this phase of the
strategy process follows:
a. Identify U.S. interests.
b. Determine level of intensity for each interest.
c. Evaluate the issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities) in regard to interests.
d. Determine objectives (ends).
e. Consider alternative concepts (ways) that utilize available or needed resources (means)
to achieve objectives.
f. Determine the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of the strategic options.
g. Conduct a risk assessment.
h. Present policy recommendations.
The analysis must be more than a listing of challenges. To be useful, it must examine and explain
which and in what ways U.S. interests are affected. The analysis should seek to identify opportunities
and threats to U.S. interests. As a consequence, the strategic analysis not only will be influenced by
current national policy, but will help identify recommendations to change existing policies or create
new ones. The analysis should address most—if not all—of the following questions:
a. What is the current U.S. policy or precedent?
b. Who are the other critical actors?
c. What are their interests and/or policies?
d. With whom does the U.S. have convergence or divergence of interest/policy?
e. What are the other feasible options to employ the U.S. elements of power to achieve the policy
options under consideration?
f. How will the policy be sustained?
The strategy formulation guidelines delineated above can apply equally to all formal national
security documents (i.e., National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military
Strategy, theater military strategy, etc.). The strategist must be able to develop strategies employing all
of the elements of power. Students at the U.S. Army War College will develop and practice these skills
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in NSPS, elective courses, and the Strategic Crisis Exercise. Remember, the formulation of strategy at
any level employs the strategic thought process based on the balancing of Ends, Ways, and Means.
National Interests.
During the strategy formulation process, the strategist moves beyond the core grand strategic
interests to more specific national security interests derived from those core interests in accordance
with national policy. These national security interests provide more detail to the nation’s needs and
aspirations, in terms of the relationship between the foreign and domestic aspects of national security,
and are thus the start point for defining strategic objectives for national security related strategies.
As a rule of thumb, interests are stated as fundamental concerns of the nation, and written as
desirable conditions without verbs, action modifiers, or intended actions. For example, U.S. national
interests might be stated as:
(a) Access to raw materials—(not “Protect sources of raw materials”).
(b) Unrestricted passage through international waters—(not “Secure sea lines of
communications”).
Categories.
The Army War College groups national interests into three categories derived from the three core
interests of the United States. Categories help to organize interests. Keep in mind the breakdown
normally is artificial. Thus, while “Unrestricted access to Persian Gulf Oil” as a U.S. national interest
has a primary category of “Economic Well-Being” for the United States and its allies, it also ties into the
other two categories of national interests used by the USAWC. The three categories are:
(a) Security of the Homeland: protection against attack on the territory and people of a nation-state
in order to ensure survival with fundamental values and political systems intact.
(b) Economic Well-Being: attainment of the conditions in the world environment that ensure the
economic well-being of the nation.
(c) Promotion of Values: establishment of the legitimacy of or expansion of the fundamental values
of the nation such as democracy and human rights.
Intensity of Interests.
Determining the level of intensity helps to determine priority of interests, recognizing that without
prioritization, there is the potential for unlimited derivative objectives and the consequent mismatch
of those objectives (ends) with resources (means), which are always finite. The degree of intensity of
an interest, in particular, should be determined before a detailed analysis of threats to those interests.
It is important that interests not become a function of a particular threat. If a government begins with
a threat assessment before a conceptualization of interest intensity, it may react to a threat with major
commitments and resources devoid of any rational linkage to that intensity. Rational cost-benefit
analysis should not be allowed to affect the intensity of interest. The three USAWC degrees of intensity
are determined by answering the question: What happens if the interest is not realized?
(a) Vital: if unfulfilled, will have immediate consequences for core national interests.
(b) Important: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that will eventually affect core national interests.
(c) Peripheral: if unfulfilled, will result in damage that is unlikely to affect core national interests.
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Ends-Ways-Means.
Strategic Objectives are derived from national policy and from a detailed consideration of U.S.
national interests by category and intensity against the backdrop of issues, trends and challenges
(threats and opportunities) that affect those interests. Based on these objectives, strategists then
consider alternative concepts and courses of action for the use of the national elements of power. Note
the primacy of the objectives—strategy should be ends-driven, not resource-driven, if order to ensure
maximum opportunity to achieve the objectives.
Defining the objective (end), therefore, is a critical first step in the strategy formulation process.
If the objective is too vague or poorly understood, no amount of resources or careful consideration
of ways to employ those resources will ensure success. On the other hand, defining an objective too
narrowly may restrict the ways and/or means available. Finally, understanding of the objective is
critical to determining success or failure of any particular strategy.
Once the desired end is identified, strategists consider the range of resources (means) available, then
examine potential ways to employ these resources in pursuit of the objectives. While strategy should
remain ends-focused, ways are necessarily resource-constrained. Unless a state has nuclear weapons,
the concept of nuclear deterrence cannot be adopted in developing its security strategy (there is no
“mutually assured destruction”). Therefore, the state must find alternative ways to enhance security or
deter attack by a nuclear-capable adversary. Potential alternatives include establishing alliances with
nuclear capable countries (i.e., NATO), or securing security assurances in exchange for not pursuing
attainment of (or eliminating existing) nuclear weapons (i.e., Cuba). If, however, deterrence is perceived
to be the only viable option, the state must either work to attain nuclear weapons (i.e., North Korea) or
to develop alternative forms of deterrence (chemical or biological weapons, perhaps?).
Feasibility, Suitability, and Acceptability: Once potential strategy options are identified, each option
must be examined to determine its feasibility (Do we have the means to execute the ways?), acceptability
(Does it have domestic and Congressional support? Is it legal? Ethical? Worth the cost?) and suitability
(Will it achieve the desired ends?). This evaluation process enables to strategist to evaluate the likelihood
of success for each option and to select that strategy deemed most likely to attain the desired ends
with available means and in an acceptable way. Before a final strategy is recommended or adopted,
however, each option must also be subjected to a risk assessment.
Risk Assessment.
Strategies at any level normally lack resources or the ability to employ resources in a manner
sufficient for complete assurance of success. As a result, a final and essential test is to assess the risk of
less than full attainment of strategic objectives, as well as the risk of second and third order effects that
implementation of the strategy could have (i.e., effects on the economy, relationships with allies, etc.).
Living with risk is part of the strategist’s business in the modern world, and being able to articulate
its character and extent is the first step in reducing its impact. Where the risk is determined to be
unacceptable, the strategy must be revised by either reducing the objectives, changing the concepts,
increasing the resources, or some combination of these actions. In the deterrence example described
previously, the state’s decision about whether to pursue attainment of nuclear weapons rather than
entering into an alliance or accepting a security assurance pledge will depend, in part, on the extent
to which it is willing to accept the risk associated with each option. In the risk associated with relying
on the good faith of its allies and/or potential adversary is unacceptable, then the state will likely try
to attain nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if the risk associated with attempting to acquire nuclear
weapons (i.e., economic sanctions that might cripple the economy) are too great, the state may have
little choice but to pursue other options.
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